by Tom Clancy
For example: When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf owned exactly nothing in the way of combat forces. All he had was a staff and a headquarters. So where did he get the nearly 500,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who fought in Operation Desert Storm? Well, those forces were "packaged" and "chopped" to his command (CENTCOM) for the duration of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and included units from virtually every other command in the U.S. armed forces. At the time, this action was regarded as something of an anomaly, but today it is a fundamental principle of our national defense strategy. By the year 2001, something like 90 % of all U.S. forces will be based in the continental United States, meaning that if we want to intervene somewhere, we're going to have to take our show on the road.
To support this shift in the U.S. defense paradigm, a new joint command has been created, called United States Atlantic Command (USACOM). In essence, this massive command "owns" virtually every military unit based in the continental United States. The role of USACOM is to be the "packager" of joint task forces for shipment to the various unified commands around the world. Delivery of the package is handled by the folks at U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) at Scott AFB, Illinois. TRANSCOM controls all the ships, heavy airlift, trucking, and rail assets needed to move the packaged forces to wherever they are needed.
This is where ACC comes in — as the one-stop supplier for USAF combat aircraft. If you need a wing of F-15s with AWACS support to keep a no-fly zone patrolled, ACC supplies the units that will make it happen. In addition, they can supply airbase construction teams (Red Horse battalions), Tactical Air Control Centers (TACCs), medical teams, and even field kitchens, for use at undeveloped airfield sites. They are also, as was demonstrated recently in Haiti, capable of deploying forces from their home bases in America directly into a crisis area.
ACC: THE FORCE
So just what is ACC made up of? The slides of the "ACC Today" command briefing (September 1994) are full of numbers, some of them almost numbing in magnitude. Over 250,000 personnel, including 117,700 in the Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserves (AFRES). Twenty-five dedicated ACC bases, with ACC units "bedded down" at eleven other USAF installations. ACC boasts a force of some 3,230 aircraft (1,640 active, 1,590 ANG/AFRES) in some 160 different "battle management units," as they are called. These are distributed in four numbered air forces across the continental United States:
• 1st Air Force—Provides fighters, radars, and other units as the primary air component of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).
• 8th Air Force—Provides the bomber force for ACC, as well as being the primary air component for STRATCOM and USACOM.
• 9th Air Force—Equipped mainly with fighter and transport aircraft, it is the primary air component for CENTCOM.
• 12th Air Force—This is the primary air component for SOUTHCOM, as well as the airborne battle management component for STRATCOM.
In short, if it is a combat USAF aircraft, it belongs to ACC.
An F-15E Strike Eagle of the 366th Wing's 391st Fighter Squadron taxis down the ramp at Mountain Home AFB to take off on a training mission. LANTIRN-pod equipped F-15Es and F-16Cs will provide the bulk of the USAF precision guided munitions capability until the introduction of JDAM and JSOW early in the 21st Century.
John D. Gresham
Headquartered at Langley AFB, Virginia, near Hampton Roads, ACC is commanded from the old TAC headquarters building. From here, General Joe Ralston (the current ACC commander) oversees one of the largest aerial combat units in the world today. But it's a shrinking unit, down from its 1980s high point of almost forty combat wings. In the fall of 1994, ACC was based around a force of some 22 1/2 combat wings. The calculus of counting military strength is an arcane science at best, but for our purposes, we will assume that a fighter wing equivalent (FWE) is composed of roughly seventy-two aircraft in three squadrons of twenty-four planes each. The bad news is that preplanned cuts will drop this number to 20 1/2 wings by 1996. Despite this, Generals Loh and Ralston have worked hard to make this force stretch to meet the requirements of the current Administration's two near-simultaneous MRCs strategy.
One way is to retrofit older airframes with the new series of precision munitions. Another is to make the limited number of new airframes (B-2As and F-22As) as capable as possible, so they might do individually more than the aircraft they will replace. In General Loh's view, any air force that buys new aircraft that are neither stealthy nor equipped with new generation precision and fire-and-forget weapons is committing a criminal act. This is not an extreme point of view; it is borne out by the results of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The effectiveness of aircraft like the F-117A and the F-15E shows what can be done with modern systems and advanced aircraft engineering.
When you think of ACC today, the cutting edge of its capability is the fighter force. The word fighter is broadly defined. The USAF classifies any tactical combat aircraft as a fighter, regardless of whether it has an air-to-air capability or not. As shown in Table 1 below, the ACC fighter force is currently based around six different types of aircraft (F-15, F-16, F-15E, F-111, F-117, and A-10), which provide it with the bulk of its strike and interdiction capability. A further look shows that something like 25 % of the ACC force is based overseas with United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and the Pacific Air Force (PACAF). These will almost certainly be pulled back to U.S. territory. In the Pacific, this has already begun, with units previously assigned to the Philippines being transferred to bases in Alaska, Okinawa, and Hawaii. Similar cuts and transfers are being made in Europe, with the bulk of the remaining USAFE units now based in the United Kingdom and Italy, with a continuing presence in Turkey.
Table 1—ACC Fighter Aircraft Force
Another point to notice is the small but significant force of air defense fighters which "chop" to the control of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) for purposes of continental air defense and airspace control. It is a sign of the times that these aircraft are no longer flown by active duty USAF personnel, but by units of the ANG. In fact, if you look closely, over 40 % of the ACC fighter force is made up of AFRES/ANG units flown by dedicated weekend warriors who might fly you commercially from Washington to Boston on a normal weekday. This is the total force concept put forward after the Vietnam War, where reserve and national guard units are equipped with the same up-to-date equipment as the active components, and trained with them to be able to work together in time of crisis. For example, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, AFRES and ANG provided the bulk of the deterrent reserve for Korea, as well as virtually all of the air defense for the United States, while the bulk of the active force was fighting the war with Iraq. The process, called backfilling, is vital to the multiple MRC strategy, if it is to work.
A Rockwell B-1B Lancer bomber files over the Egyptian pyramids during Operation Bright Star 93. Building upon their known and existing capabilities, ACC hopes to arm B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s with a variety of precision guided munitions to support their worldwide missions.
Official U.S. Air Force Photo
As for the future, the good news is that there is a new airframe on the way to replace the F-15 Eagle, the backbone of the fighter and interceptor force for over two decades. When the F-22 arrives for service in the early part of the next decade, it will probably become the basic "heavy" fighter airframe for the USAF. The bad news is that the program will only see production of 442 fighter versions, about enough for four and a half wings of fighters in the current ACC structural scheme. In addition, there will be further cuts in the aircraft shown in Table 1 in some especially critical areas. The most likely place for cuts will be in the force of F-111Fs operated by the 27th Wing at Cannon AFB, New Mexico. While the Aardvarks of the 27th are some of the oldest and most expensive aircraft in the ACC force to operate and maintain (O&M), they also have the longest range and some of the best weapons systems in the whole of the USAF. Most important, to lose
the entire force of F-111s, with their invaluable Pave Tack delivery systems, is to give up almost 25 % of the Air Force's PGM delivery capability. According to current ACC plans, the B-1B force will take over this role when the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) programs come online in the late 1990s. The problem is that none of the munitions these critical programs are designed to deliver is yet in service, meaning that if we prematurely retire aircraft capable of precision strikes, we will have a window of vulnerability that might prove critical in a time of crisis.
And then there is the shortage of F-15E Strike Eagle airframes. To sustain the current force of roughly two hundred F-15Es, ACC will need about forty additional airframes to make up for aircraft lost in accidents and projected combat attrition. Despite a hard fixed price offer by McDonnell Douglas ($50 million per copy), there is no money for such a sensible purchase. Lockheed has submitted a similar bid for its F-16 Block 50/52 Fighting Falcon, at $20 million per aircraft, and Northrop has submitted a bid of $595 million per aircraft for the B-2A Spirit. Money is just that tight right now.
"What the hell are we going to do with bombers?" When ACC was created in 1992, some of the former TAC-types were asking that question. And the answer they wanted to hear was: "We don't need them. Throw them the hell away." The TAC types were wrong. We need bombers; we need them bad.
Without bombers, General Loh would tell you today, there is absolutely no way ACC can hope to accomplish its assigned missions. Though they seem large and ponderous to fighter pilots, the big birds represent a known and ready capability to deliver massive amounts of firepower over great distances, with rapid responsiveness. Current ACC plans have the bombers armed with a variety of precision munitions (JDAMS and JSOW), conventional bombs (Mk 82/83/42 and CBU-87/89/97), and standoff missiles (ALCM-C/CALCM and AGM-142 Have Nap), so they might provide the necessary firepower to prevail in a future conflict. And in time of international crisis, elements of the force of B-52Hs and the B-2 force may be chopped over to control of STRATCOM, to provide additional nuclear deterrence muscle. The Cold War may be over, but the need to present a credible nuclear deterrence force is still with us. Remember, settling our problems with Russia only leaves a couple of hundred potential enemies (countries, terrorist groups, etc.) to deal with out there in the world. Many of them are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of suffering nuclear annihilation from an overwhelming and undeniable U.S. deterrence force is one way to keep proliferation of such weapons under control.
Table 2—ACC Bomber Aircraft Force
As with the fighter force, the good news for the bomber community is that a new, highly capable airframe is on the way. With the B-2A, ACC has a penetrating bomber capable of flying a good payload into virtually any air-defense environment in the world. The bad news is that the USAF is only buying twenty of the production B-2s, with further production greatly in doubt. General Loh has stated his support for maintenance of the heavy bomber production capability, and obtained some $125 million in FY-1995 funding to keep the Northrop production line and its subcontractors alive while the question of further production is studied. ACC's long-term problem is to keep the bomber force viable in the face of pressure to cut ACC force levels.
This is where the long-standing disputes between the "fighter mafia" and "bomber barons" become most evident. The fighter supporters question both the ability of bombers to operate in a modern war and their relatively high O&M costs. The bomber supporters will tell you that fighters do not have the range or carrying capacity to haul the loads of precision munitions required in future conflicts. Who is right? In a manner of thinking, both of them. Generals Loh and Ralston, as well as the rest of the ACC leadership, have tended to bet on the bird-in-the-hand theory, which is to say that the bombers are here, they are paid for, and as such should be made use of. Nevertheless, there will inevitably be cuts in the bomber force. Though General Loh would prefer to maintain a force of 180 bomber airframes on duty, this number will probably have to be cut, mostly though a mix of B-52H and B-1B mothballing.
To sustain a force of one hundred available bombers requires a total of about 180 airframes to cover those in test, training, refit, and maintenance. Note that I say mothballed, and not retired or scrapped. ACC wants the bomber airframes that are taken out of service to be protected, so they can be "bought back" should a crisis arise or attrition from combat casualties become critical. Moreover, the ACC leadership have done their best to buy back capabilities that were lost when the last of the B-52Gs were retired in 1993. During a recent visit to ACC headquarters at Langley AFB, General Loh was almost ecstatic when he heard that six B-52Hs of the 2nd Bombardment Wing at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, had been made capable of launching the AGM-142 Have Nap standoff missile, and that their AGM-84 Harpoon anti-shipping missile and mining capabilities would also soon be restored. Such is the state of affairs in the U.S. military that a senior military leader is excited over a restored capability in just six airframes of a forty-year-old bomber design. It is something to keep in mind.
An EF-111A Raven of the 27th Fighter Wing standoff jamming aircraft on the ramp at Nellis AFB during Green Flag 94-3.
Craig E. Kaston
Of equal concern to the ACC leadership is the problem of their limited fleet of electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. EW aircraft are what is known as "force multipliers," and no aerial campaign in the last two decades has succeeded without them. Unfortunately, the linchpin of the USAF EW fleet, the SAM hunting Wild Weasel version of the venerable F-4G Phantom II, is — well — ancient. With the airframes hitting their twenty-fifth year of continuous service, it is essential to find a replacement airframe to do the mission of suppressing enemy air defenses. However, since there is absolutely no money to even consider producing a dedicated replacement Wild Weasel aircraft, the two remaining squadrons of F4-Gs will have to soldier on, supplemented by the hundred Block 50/52 F-16Cs equipped with the new Texas Instruments AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) pods and support from other ACC EW surveillance aircraft.
The other ACC EW airframes are in somewhat better shape, though their numbers are much lower than the ACC leadership would like. The EF- 111A Raven (called the Spark 'Vark by their crews) fleet is in good shape. Unfortunately, they are scheduled to be retired in the next few years. The EC- 130H Compass Call birds are also quite capable, though their lack of numbers is somewhat troubling.
Certainly the most diverse part of the ACC fleet is the aircraft that fall in the general category of support. At the top of the list is the fleet of E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Few communities in the USAF have more temporary duty (TDY) assignment days than the 552nd Wing at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Like the other force multipliers, the E-3 community is limited by their relatively small number of airframes. In addition, they suffer because of their 1960s computer technology and less-than-efficient turbojet engines. The good news is that the AWACS Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) should resolve the worst of the Sentry's problems, and the USAF is studying the retrofitting of new engines as well. In the long term, the next generation of surveillance aircraft will have to wait for some time, probably well into the 21st century.
Table 3—ACC Electronic Warfare Aircraft
Table 4—ACC Support Aircraft Force
The problem of numbers is also of concern to the EC-135 Looking Glass and EC-130 Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) communities. These airborne command posts provide command and control for a variety of USAF operations. Both are invaluable national assets, and are beginning to get a bit long in the tooth. Watch for a replacement or supplement for these airframes in the next few years. Happier thoughts surround those in the OA-10 community, whose performance as forward air controllers during the recent Persian Gulf was nothing short of outstanding. Though short on all-weather/day-and-night systems, their crews and support personnel have taken their Warthog attitude of operations and made lemonade from what some fo
lks might consider lemons. Right now they are starting to consider using night vision goggles to get more out of their already busy birds. Finally, in one of the ironies of the 1992 mergers, ACC took over beddown and control of the fleet of E-4s. Once known as the "Doomsday Planes," these modified 747s still remain on alert to provide a secure, safe haven for the national command authorities in the event of a crisis or national emergency.
So what will be the next addition to the American fleet of support aircraft? Probably the new E-8 Joint Surveillance Tactical Reconnaissance Systems (JSTARS) aircraft, which will become available in the late 1990s. The E-8 (another modified 707 airframe) will provide information on ground forces the way the E-3 AWACS keeps an eye on airspace. While extremely expensive, the E-8 will undoubtedly become one of the crown jewels of the USAF fleet.
Nowhere in ACC is there a greater shortfall of capability, or more frustration, than in the airborne reconnaissance community. At the top of the problem list is the fleet of RF-4C Phantom II photo reconnaissance aircraft. These birds are antiquated and obsolete. They suffer from structural fatigue problems, short range (due to their thirsty J-79 turbojet engines), lack of modern radar warning receivers (RWRs), electronic countermeasures (ECM) gear, and outdated sensors. Only the loving care of their operators in units of the Nevada and Alabama ANG is keeping the RF-4C as a viable system. There had been plans to replace the RF-4C with a reconnaissance version of the F-16, carrying a podded version of the Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS). But when the system ran into technical problems, the USAF canceled the program. This caused much shock and displeasure for the other planned ATARS users, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. Following this programmatic fiasco, as well as complaints with the overall direction of airborne reconnaissance, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) was created in 1993 to coordinate all airborne reconnaissance systems for all services. For now, though, the Air Force's contribution to the tactical photo reconnaissance mission is going to be limited to satellite assets from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the aging fleet of RF-4Cs.