Despite such tempting prey, merchant ships were not Karenin’s objective, the Koschei meandering west of the Spratly Islands and close to the Vietnamese coast. The submarine’s sonar suite automatically analysed and filtered the hundreds of sonar contacts in order to search out potential threats and key targets, Karenin being given a very specific set of criteria to work with.
The red icon revealed the position of Vietnamese frigate HQ-17, the vessel some 30 kilometres distant and well outside of Vietnam’s territorial waters. Built in Russia in 1972, the Petya-class corvette had been transferred to Vietnam in ’84; re-designated as a light frigate, it was soon due to be replaced as part of Vietnam’s ambitious naval program. The new Gepard-class frigates would have provided a far sterner challenge, but maybe that was for the best, the Koschei and its crew needing something relatively easy as a first test.
The submarine crept forward, simply waiting for the frigate to cruise past. The Vietnamese vessel was ambling along at a steady 14 knots, no sense of danger, no active sonar searching for a potential enemy, the frigate not even varying its northerly course.
“Confirm firing solution for Alpha-One,” Karenin ordered, “Forward tubes one through three; passive setting, three degree spread.” Visual confirmation was an unnecessary and risky luxury, the modern targeting and sonar systems able to tell Karenin far more than any video camera or a brief glance through a periscope.
“Solution confirmed, Sir; Alpha-One: bearing two-three-two, relative zero-one-zero; speed 14 knots; range 7800 metres.”
“Fire tubes one through three.” The orders were spoken without emotion, Karenin almost embarrassed as to how easy it all was. The atmosphere in the control room was expectant, certainly no sense of fear, the experienced crew confident but in no sense complacent.
There was a triple thump as the torpedoes were ejected. Karenin hated having to rely on the Chinese torpedoes but their systems had been checked thoroughly: although not wire-guided, they had both active and passive homing, and at 40 knots could easily outpace the Vietnamese frigate.
“Helm, left five degrees rudder; come to course one-six-zero.” Karenin rubbed his unshaven chin, careful to give the impression that he had everything under control, every potential problem duly weighed and a suitable response prepared.
“Five minutes to first impact.” The weapons officer hadn’t needed to give an update, the information clearly visible, but he well knew Karenin’s preference for regular reports.
The frigate still seemed unaware it was under attack, Karenin watching the target and torpedo icons, the data alongside showing something of the subsequent chase; abruptly, the frigate started to accelerate, turning rapidly towards the threat, the increasing clamour from its engines only helping the chasing torpedoes to acquire their target.
Karenin idly wondered whether the Vietnamese captain would choose to blast the sea with his ship’s active sonar and so attempt to detect the attacking submarine; if so, then it would merely seal the frigate’s fate, the sonar pulses a guiding beacon for the three torpedoes.
Under different circumstances, Karenin would have ideally launched the attack from much closer, maybe just four kilometres: he didn’t fully trust the ageing torpedoes’ guidance systems and he’d generously given the frigate almost seven minutes to plan its escape. More importantly, it also provided the Vietnamese a chance to analyse and report the attack, the Koschei’s alter-ego – or at the very least another Chinese submarine – hopefully taking the blame.
“ASW rockets fired, Sir; they seem to be targeting the torpedoes rather than the Koschei.”
The frigate’s rocket system was designed to target submarines and hardly ideal for torpedoes. Still, it was better than simply doing nothing and Karenin well understood the desperation of such measures.
“Explosion in the water,” the sonar chief reported. He glanced across at Karenin, a look of understanding passing between them: so much for the rocket system being ineffective – one Yu-4 torpedo destroyed.
“High-speed screws; two torpedoes fired. Bearing two-six-five; range estimate 8000 metres; designate as Alpha-Two and Alpha-Three.”
The frigate was trying to fight back, the torpedoes most likely sent along a reciprocal course in the vain hope of searching out the Koschei.
“Thirty seconds to first impact, both Yu-4s running true.”
Karenin raised the attack periscope, giving a rapid all-round sweep before lining up on the frigate and increasing magnification. The ship was surrounded in a smoky haze, its outline suddenly revealed as another salvo of rockets was fired. A heartbeat later a brilliant crimson glow enveloped the frigate’s stern, the ship rearing up as though punched from below; a count of six and a second explosion snapped the frigate’s back.
“Confirm two hits on Alpha-One; target breaking up.”
“Down scope,” Karenin ordered. “Ten degrees down-angle; make your depth two hundred metres. All-ahead one-third.”
The orders were repeated, and Karenin moved to study the tracks of the Vietnamese torpedoes. Russian designed and manufactured, he well knew their capabilities; however, these were thirty years out-of-date and fired blind, Karenin confident the Koschei was in no danger.
The control room was silent, no-one yet having the courage to celebrate the submarine’s first ever ‘kill’. Strangely, Karenin felt drained, his mind struggling with a complex mix of emotions: pride at how well they had performed, and fear at what they might have unleashed.
Thirty minutes later, the Koschei turned east. The submarine had finally been bloodied after almost sixty years – time now to build on that success.
Eastern United States – 10:11 Local Time; 14:11 UTC
The twin reports of separate artillery and torpedo attacks kept the news agencies working overtime to try and make sense of who had hit whom and why. The TV images from Khabarovsk at least offered an explicit illustration of what had happened, everyone able to see the carnage and destruction caused by China’s artillery: at least twenty killed, over two hundred injured. The sinking of the Vietnamese warship was somehow less ‘real’, and it was more difficult to point blame with any degree of certainty, even though everyone knew China was responsible.
Russia’s outrage and angry condemnation of China was matched by Vietnam, the latter immediately blaming China for the sinking of the frigate. Just ten survivors had so far been rescued, the rest of the frigate’s ninety crew members assumed to be dead. Vietnam’s neighbours, even Malaysia, universally condemned the attack, the United Nations Security Council meeting in emergency session to argue and then do nothing. For once, it was Russia which proposed a more forceful approach towards China’s alleged belligerence, support garnered from a significant majority of the Security Council’s fifteen members. China vehemently denied responsibility for either attack, suggesting that it was some plot cooked up by Russia and Vietnam.
Even as the emergency meeting was breaking up, news reports detailed rumours of a Chinese missile strike against a Philippine patrol boat. Official sources within the Philippine Coastguard first confirmed, and then denied the attack, the confusion spreading as a second news story broke. Now it was a Chinese landing on one of the Spratly Islands held by the Philippines, the exact details unclear.
It was the final straw. With the rest of the world looking on, Vietnam and the Philippines used the United Nations as the venue for a joint statement, just one step from a declaration of war. With immediate effect, they announced the creation of a maritime exclusion zone, south of the 14th Parallel between the coasts of Vietnam and the Philippines, with all Chinese military forces presently inside or entering the exclusion zone liable to attack without warning. In addition, China’s embassies and consulates were to be closed, staff expelled, both countries declaring a moratorium on Chinese goods and services. The final paragraph was a plea to other nations, specifically the United States, to actively support the fight against China, and help defend the sovereignty of both Vietnam and the Philippines.
<
br /> The Spratly Islands were some 200 kilometres south of the 14th Parallel, the line roughly traversing east-west from Manila to the Vietnamese city of Quy Nhơn. Many independent observers assumed the creation of an exclusion zone was simply an idle threat, the two countries needing to be seen to be standing up to China without actually going to war. Others considered it a foolish and ill-timed knee-jerk reaction which neither nation could enforce, while potentially giving China an excuse to assert its authority over the rest of the Spratly group.
Even the moratorium was considered a toothless gesture: China was Vietnam’s second largest trading partner after the United States, with bilateral trade worth over $80 billion a year; the Philippines would be similarly exposed, a quarter of its exports going to China. In reality, there was little either country could do to bully or threaten its powerful neighbour, with only a combined threat by the ten-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations likely to sway Asia’s sole superpower.
China immediately rejected the joint statement, denouncing the ‘blackmail and lies’ that had brought about the crisis. The government in Beijing angrily restated its denial of involvement in any attack against either Vietnam or the Philippines, and asserted the lawful right of Chinese warships and aircraft to cross the 14th parallel. The aggressive nature of the response left little doubt that any attempt to block China’s access to the south would be met with deadly force.
The artillery attack on Russia somehow seemed to lose prominence, it automatically assumed that Russia was more than capable of standing up for itself. The apparent restraint showed by Moscow was unexpected, Russia merely restricting itself to verbal attacks against Beijing, while offering implicit support for the actions of the Philippines and Vietnam.
There was one key player no-one had yet heard from, President Cavanagh due to hold a press briefing at 13.00 Eastern Time; 01.00 Saturday in Manila.
* * *
McDowell sat alone in the computer centre, his gaze drifting across the main screen while waiting for CNN to swap to a live feed from the White House. It was already a quarter past one, the President no doubt delaying his speech due to ongoing developments in the South China Sea. The White House phones were probably red hot from over-use, a dozen capital cities called, leaders argued with and cajoled, bribes offered and threats hinted at.
McDowell was confident it would do no good, and the furore created by the Koschei’s actions had been further inflamed through Marcelo’s passion and the disinformation of others, McDowell making good use of an influential source hidden deep inside the Philippine Navy. Maybe not today, but very soon, Cavanagh would be forced into making an obvious error of judgement – then the final act could play out. The resources were already safely in place, with each minor incident and scandal easing others into positions of power.
There had been a few complications along the way but none that were too serious or couldn’t be effectively dealt with. Anderson was more a personal concern for McDowell rather than realistic problem, and even if he talked to the FBI, there was nothing new he could tell them.
Still, it would have been far better if Anderson had not escaped, and McDowell appreciated he had made it too obvious his offer wasn’t genuine. Despite his warning to his two colleagues that they needed to watch Anderson, they had taken the Englishman’s compliance at face value – now he was two men down with nothing to show for it. McDowell himself had tidied up their mess, leaving Carter and Preston to finish off at Garcia’s house.
That had proved to be his second mistake, the unexpected time constraints and a miscommunication resulting in Garcia being found in the bedroom rather than downstairs near where Anderson had sat; Carter had also been forced to rush through changes to the CCTV images. Neither problem should have been that crucial but taken together they seriously tarnished the evidence against Anderson. It had probably been a foolish idea to try and frame him but McDowell was keen to to divert the authorities’ attention elsewhere. His FBI source supplied McDowell with infrequent but essential updates, and even though their search area still covered half-a-dozen states, with every day that passed the authorities edged a little closer.
On the main monitor, the CNN image finally moved to the White House Press Room, the President striding up onto the podium. To begin with Cavanagh was on fairly safe ground: regret as to the loss of life, frank exchange of views with other world leaders, the U.S. deeply concerned, important that the U.N. Security Council… There was nothing unexpected or controversial, Cavanagh preferring to speak without notes, his tone hitting just the right sense of gravitas.
It was almost a minute before he moved on to the trickier aspects, starting with the latest assessment of those responsible for the sinking of Frigate HQ-17.
“Detailed analysis of satellite data and communication reports,” continued Cavanagh, “give a sense of the suddenness of the attack and the desperate actions of HQ-17. There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the three torpedoes were launched in response to some form of provocation by the frigate, the attack taking place in international waters and over a hundred miles from areas of dispute. HQ-17 had no prior warning and her captain had no real opportunity to take appropriate defensive measures.
“At the present time we are unable to confirm Hanoi’s assertion that the torpedoes were fired from a Chinese submarine. Much of the evidence, primarily that obtained by an analysis of the torpedoes’ acoustic signatures and their mode of operation, is inconclusive; however, in terms of probabilities, it would seem very likely that the torpedoes were either Russian SAET 60s or upgraded Chinese Yu-4s.”
The final statement caused a noisy reaction from amongst the normally respectful press corps, Cavanagh having to wait for the hubbub to die down before resuming. “It is important to emphasise that this does not mean they were launched from either a Russian or a Chinese submarine; export versions of both types of torpedo were sold to various countries up until the early nineties.”
To the assembled press, and no doubt many of those watching, the President was simply quibbling over semantics – forget Russia; these were Chinese torpedoes, so obviously a Chinese submarine. McDowell assumed Cavanagh and his advisers were concerned as to the implications of apportioning blame without definite evidence; maybe they were being influenced by the Hanson link, even sensing something close to the actual truth. But such prevarication only made the President seem weak, unwilling to accept what was all-too obvious to everyone else.
The President pressed on regardless, “Reports of a Chinese attack on the Spratly Islands are simply not true. There has been a minor explosion aboard a Philippine patrol boat which was operating close to the islands, but that is believed to have been caused by an electrical fault – one person was slightly injured. The situation throughout the region is extremely tense, and every incident is liable to blown out of all proportion. It is thus of crucial importance that everyone – including this office and the news media – only report the facts, and not promote some outrageous rumour first seen on a social media website.”
It was a timely warning as how close the South China Sea was to a violent conflagration, the United States suffering more than most from the problems caused by exaggeration and innuendo.
Cavanagh paused momentarily, almost as though to emphasise what came next. “The exclusion zone announced by the Philippines and Vietnam will only increase the likelihood that other such tragic incidents will occur, with yet more lives needlessly thrown away. I have urged the two governments to reconsider and they have agreed to postpone its implementation, thus allowing more time to fully investigate the sinking of HQ-17. Beijing has offered its full co-operation in identifying the perpetrators, and we are presently evaluating additional data that they have now made available to us.
“In the light of today’s events, the joint naval exercise with Japan, operation Dragon Shield, has been concluded, and the USS Gerald Ford is already heading south to join the USS Milius. In addition, in order not to exacerbate the situatio
n further, China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have agreed to limit all military forces in the disputed areas to their present levels.
“Through these measures and the active co-operation of all counties involved, the situation in the South China Sea can be brought to a peaceful resolution without further loss of life. Over the course of the next few days, I will also be working with all parties in order to start the process of bringing about a more permanent solution.
“In addition, the United States is in discussion with Russia and China to ensure that the terrible events in the city of Khabarovsk are investigated fully, with those responsible brought to justice. Once again, I urge restraint from all parties; such attacks are in no-one’s interests, the danger of escalating mutual retaliation a threat to the stability of the whole region…”
Cavanagh quickly opened the briefing up to allow a limited number of questions, the White House press corps’ first concern the time scale as to the eventual implementation of the Philippines-Vietnam exclusion zone.
“I have been promised at least 72 hours,” responded Cavanagh. “By then, we might have a clearer idea as to the origin of the attack.”
“And what if it does prove to be China?” persisted the reporter.
“Let’s not jump to conclusions: we need to look at all the facts first.”
The President quickly moved on to someone else; even though he had obviously anticipated such a question, his response seemed tame, McDowell sensing something of the Administration’s lack of consensus as to what the U.S. should actually do.
The briefing was brought to a close. McDowell stayed with CNN, wanting to get a feel for how the President’s words had been received. Although the news channel’s senior defence correspondent was generally pleased with Cavanagh’s initial statement, he expressed disappointment as to the President’s subsequent answers, a view repeated when CNN’s presenter sought the views of political observers in Hanoi and Manila.
The Trust Of The People (Conspiracy Trilogy Book 2) Page 22