Dr. McGuire, who knew Jackson as well as anyone in the army, said that the general was well known to strictly follow commands, and the direction Jackson had received was “to stay on this road until further orders.” McGuire added, “If General Lee had wanted Jackson he could have sent for him, but General Lee did not want him.” Jackson had to obey instructions—“as a soldier he could do nothing else.” Adding some plausibility to this argument were Jackson’s actions on the twenty-sixth at Mechanicsville, where he waited for orders at Hundley’s Corner while A.P. Hill was fighting a few miles away at Beaver Dam Creek.75
Exhaustion is a recurring theme. Kyd Douglas wrote, “No one who rode with him on the 29th and 30th can recall a moment when he rested.” Apparently, he had slept little since leaving the valley to meet with Lee and plan the campaign. One author pointed out that Jackson had written to his wife and said that he was sick with a fever, and a previous night he had a wet bed and had been awakened by a torrential rainstorm. Porter Alexander was having none of it. He said the rest of the army was just as exhausted. It had fought on the Peninsula and at Seven Pines, Mechanicsville and Gaines’s Mill. He tended to agree with Hill’s comment that Jackson pitied his own men. Alexander’s comments noted that exhaustion certainly was a plausible factor and likely played a role in Jackson’s less than effective behavior.76
Thomas Munford, who had known Jackson since the days at VMI, compared his chief’s condition to Napoleon at Ligny, where, owing to exhaustion, “precious time was lost.” Of Jackson, Munford said that “his devoted friends all agree that his endurance gave out, and that he was not at his best. His ambition was too great to flag, but neither man nor beast can go beyond certain limits.”77
Jackson offered other reasoning. He said that he heard the heavy cannonading of Longstreet and was “eager to press forward.” However, “the marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position of the enemy defending the passage prevented my advancing until the following morning.” By the morning of July 1, the Federals had retired toward Malvern Hill. Whiting’s division then rapidly repaired the bridge, and Jackson’s troops crossed over in pursuit. Jennings Wise concurred with Jackson’s statement, stating that Jackson had opened his artillery barrage in an effort to gain superiority over the defenders, which did not occur. In his opinion, “Jackson undoubtedly recognized many elements of danger for his command and sought in vain to overcome them.” While there may be some substance to Jackson’s statement, Wise’s does not hold up. Munford and Hampton had offered alternatives, and Jackson, as evidenced in the Valley Campaign, was not one to spare his troops when duty called. As he had demonstrated in the Valley, and would prove again in the future, Jackson did not fail to be creative in finding ways to defeat the enemy.78
Of all these explanations, a few stand out as the most likely. Robert K. Krick, a widely respected historian and student of Jackson, argued that he was “exhausted beyond the ability to function adequately” and that he “apparently hit bottom on June 30.” He said that Jackson was a man who required adequate sleep. Completely worn down, he “simply was not at home.” Many have noted Jackson’s lack of rest since the time he arrived in Richmond, but one can look back even further. He had just fought the legendary but bone-wearying campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley. Getting little rest, he would fall asleep with his boots and sword on. Sandie Pendleton commented as far back as the first week of June that “General Jackson was completely broken down.” One of Jackson’s artillery battalion commanders, Colonel Thomas Carter, wrote that Jackson was “physically broken down, stupefied and dozed with fatigue.” As exhausted as he had been in the Valley, there would be no opportunity for Jackson to rest before the action at White Oak.79
Krick also debunked D.H. Hill’s notions that Jackson thought the Richmond troops should shoulder more of the brunt of fighting or that he was trying to protect his own troops. As Krick stated, “Jackson never before or after was unmanned by responsibility, prone to sulking, confused, jealous or unduly (if at all) sparing of his men. Quite the reverse was true in each case.”80
Frank E. Vandiver echoed the theme of exhaustion, stating that “worked beyond the limit of even his iron endurance, Jackson did not realize that he had lost contact with reality.” Vandiver also noted that Jackson had received orders from Lee that “pinned him to the road leading across White Oak Swamp, and he did not feel he should ignore Lee’s desires.” With no further word from his commander, Jackson may have assumed he was where Lee wanted him to be.”81
Vandiver’s explanation leads logically to an indictment of the command structure of the Army of Northern Virginia. Historians have noted how the entire Confederate Seven Days Campaign was a victim of poor communications. White Oak is a prime example. Why didn’t Lee, who was probably within a forty-five-minute ride from Jackson, send a message to him and ask about his dispositions and request an attack? Why didn’t Jackson write to Lee and request further instructions? What was discussed at their meeting? The answers to these questions were forever lost when these men passed away. In any case, it was a tragedy for the Confederate cause. The failure of Huger, Holmes and Jackson to accomplish anything at all was a bitter blow to Lee’s hopes to crush McClellan’s retreating army. One could argue that because of the failures on June 30, a high price would be paid by Confederate troops the next day at Malvern Hill.82
Chapter 7
TIME Is RUNNING OUT
By early afternoon, Lee’s plan was rapidly deteriorating. Jackson remained immobile north of the White Oak Swamp with 25,000 men. Huger was doing nothing of consequence with his division, and Holmes was basically sitting tight on the southern flank. To make matters worse, Magruder’s command, which had been designated to support Longstreet and A.P. Hill, was sent to Holmes’s aid down by the river. Instead of having a pincers of 70,000 men converging on the Union army, Lee’s attack would be limited to Longstreet and A.P. Hill, who had a combined force of about 19,200. This was not enough for the task at hand, and they would ultimately be outnumbered by Union troops. It was hardly a recipe for success.
The Federals had established a sort of “fishhook” line of defense. To the north, Franklin faced Jackson along White Oak Swamp. One of his Sixth Corps divisions, under William F. Smith, was stationed to the right of the bridge road, with Israel Richardson’s division of the Second Corps to the left of that road. Henry Naglee’s brigade from the Fourth Corps was with them. Moving to the west, Franklin’s other division, commanded by Henry Slocum, was to the right of Charles City Road facing Huger. Across that road, to Slocum’s left, was Phil Kearny’s division of the Third Corps.
“Frayser’s Farm.” Map by Hal Jespersen.
On Kearny’s left, to the south, was George McCall’s battered division from the Fifth Corps. McCall’s men had been heavily bloodied in the actions on the twenty-sixth at Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville) and on the twenty-seventh at Gaines’s Mill; they were exhausted. By normal military protocol, they should have been stationed in a rest area. Instead, they were placed astride Long Bridge Road, which would become the axis for the day’s action. On McCall’s left, farther to the south, was Joe Hooker’s division from the Third Corps. Hooker’s right rested on a farm road that entered the Willis Church Road a little north of the church. Behind McCall, across the Willis Church Road, John Sedgwick’s division from the Second Corps, stationed in an open field in front of the Nelson House, could serve as a reserve. Fifth Corps commander Fitz John Porter had his remaining two divisions (Morell’s and Sykes’s) stationed farther south on Malvern Hill, where they had blunted Holmes’s efforts. The remaining divisions of Erasmus Keyes’s Fourth Corps were safely tucked away south of Malvern Hill.83
George McCall. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
It was a powerful position from which to guard the retreat of the trains, but it was complicated by its disorganization. All unit cohesiveness had broken down. As shown earlier, units were not with their ass
igned corps but instead were plugged in wherever they might be of use. The units were not organized into a contiguous defense; there were gaps between them. McClellan, the army’s commander, once again was not on the scene. Instead, he had gone to the river to meet with the navy. Who was in charge? Corps and even division commanders would have to fend for themselves. It was a risky situation at the army’s moment of greatest peril.
The storm that would soon break around the crossroads would be known by a variety of names. In the South, the spot would be remembered as Frayser’s (sometimes Frazier’s) Farm. Other names for it included Charles City Crossroads, Charles City Road, Glendale, Long Bridge Road, Nelson’s Farm, New Market Road, Riddell’s Shop, Turkey Creek, White Oak and Willis Church. The confusing names were appropriate, as the action soon to occur would be just as bewildering.84
Just southeast of the intersection of Charles City, Long Bridge and Willis Church Roads sat the Nelson farmhouse. While the Nelson family had long since acquired the property, to the locals it was still known by the name of the previous owners as “Frayser’s Farm.” At the time of the battle, two Nelson sisters lived there: Lucy, age sixty-two, and Ethelinde, age fifty-seven. Down and across the road a short distance sat the Willis Church. The Willis Church Road ran directly south to Malvern Hill. Several humble farms and homes were in the area, including the Brackett, Sykes, Atkins, Pleasants and Whitlock homes and Riddle’s blacksmith shop. It was farm country with open spaces but included many wooded areas, thick undergrowth and some marshy places. It was an interesting and challenging place for a battle.85
During the movement south from White Oak, McCall had been ordered by McClellan to position his division so as to protect the army’s supply trains as they moved down the Willis Church Road toward Malvern Hill and the river. It wasn’t long before McCall realized that an attack on his position at Long Bridge Road would come from the west, from the direction of Richmond. Two of his brigade commanders, Generals Meade and Seymour, rode to the front and discovered that only a squadron of cavalry covered it. Receiving word of this, McCall ordered two regiments out to perform picket duty, the 1st and 3rd Pennsylvania Reserves. After studying the ground, McCall set his troops as follows: Meade’s brigade was on the right, with his men astride and to the right of the road. To their front was Alanson Randol’s Battery E of the 1st U.S. Artillery, with four twelve-pound Napoleon smoothbores, loaned from the army’s reserve. Another section (two guns) of Randol’s battery was held in reserve owing to a lack of space in the clearing but would soon be brought up. James Thompson’s Battery G of the 2nd U.S. artillery, Kearny’s division, guarded their right flank. While busy clearing brush to enhance his field of fire, Thompson was ordered to turn his guns to the right in order to support Kearny’s troops. Randol then brought up his two remaining guns to fill the space created. The 4th Pennsylvania Reserve infantry regiment was behind the guns in support, and backing the 4th were the 7th and 11th Pennsylvania Reserves.86
To the left of the Long Bridge Road was Truman Seymour’s brigade. From right to left, Seymour posted the four guns of Kerns’s Battery G of the 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Frank Amsden. To his left was Cooper’s Battery B of the 1st Pennsylvania with six guns. Next were two four-gun batteries of twenty-pound Parrott rifled guns, known as the “German” or “Dutch” batteries, from the army’s reserve. Captains Otto Diederichs and John Knieriem led these. On a day that was filled with divided units, two of Knieriem’s guns were in front of Diederichs’s, and two were to the rear. Infantry was behind the guns in support, consisting of the 9th, 10th and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves. The 9th was behind Cooper, with the 10th to its left. The 12th would soon be posted on a ridge near a small log farmhouse known as Whitlock’s. They hastily constructed a sort of defensive barricade out of some rails and logs found on the property. McCall commented that the ground in front of his division was a clear area, a “beautiful battleground” about eight hundred yards wide and one thousand deep, but it was too large for his force to adequately cover or be protected on its flanks. In reserve, McCall positioned Reynolds’s brigade (1st, 2nd, 5th, 8th and 13th), which had been under the command of Colonel Seneca Simmons since the capture of Reynolds after Gaines’s Mill. On his front line, McCall had about 5,000 men of his 7,500-men division, supported by twenty-four guns.87
George Meade. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
“Fighting Joe” Hooker’s division stood on McCall’s left, near Willis Church. He, too, had received orders to protect the movement of the trains on the Willis Church Road. Hooker’s nickname actually derived from a misprint in a New York newspaper. The article read, “Fighting—Joe Hooker,” but the dash was left out in print. Despite this, the name was appropriate. Very ambitious, the future army commander was hard-living and hard-fighting and was a top Federal division leader. Around 9:00 a.m., he established his line in an area behind the church, with Cuvier Grover and the First Brigade on the right, Joseph Carr’s Brigade in the center and Dan Sickles’s Brigade to the left. Grover placed the 16th Massachusetts on the right and to its left the 26th Pennsylvania. Behind them were the 1st Massachusetts and 2nd New Hampshire. The 11th Massachusetts was placed on the far left end of the division to protect against any effort by the Confederates to turn the division’s flank. Carr’s position included the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th New Jersey. The 2nd New York was sent to the left of the division.88
Hooker gave directions for his artillery to “continue their march to our proposed camp on the James River, in order that they might be put in position there.” At approximately 11:00 a.m., he noticed some wagons in his front, which were determined to belong to McCall’s division. McCall’s presence was a surprise to Hooker, and this was the first indication he had of it. Alarmingly, he noticed that there was a gap of five hundred to six hundred yards between McCall’s line and his own; not only was there a gap, but the two divisions were also not properly aligned. Hooker noted that McCall’s was in the woods at an “obtuse angle with the direction of my own.”89
On McCall’s right, Phil Kearny occupied a strong position in the space between Long Bridge and Charles City Roads. Thompson’s battery was on the left, supported by John Robinson’s Brigade. Robinson split the distance to Charles City Road with David Birney’s brigade, which was on Robinson’s right. In reserve was the brigade of Hiram Berry.90
James Longstreet was in overall command of the Confederate movement up Long Bridge Road, consisting of his division and that of A.P. Hill. Richard Anderson was assigned direct supervision of Longstreet’s six-brigade division. While they marched, one of Longstreet’s aides instructed A.P. Hill to take charge until Longstreet arrived. As his men approached the crossroads, Hill halted, established field hospitals and closed up his ranks. Anderson’s men were about three-quarters of a mile in advance of his. Hill and Anderson rode the line and “made such dispositions as were necessary.” Longstreet soon rode up and assumed command.91
As his men approached the crossroad, they encountered McCall’s pickets. Longstreet ordered Colonel Micah Jenkins to clear them out, and Jenkins soon reported that the enemy was ahead in strength. Longstreet patiently waited for the signal to advance, which was to come from Huger’s expected attack on the left. “Everything was quiet on my part of the line, except for occasional firing between my pickets and McCall’s.” Around 2:00 p.m., “artillery firing was heard on my left, evidently at the point near White Oak Swamp where Huger was to attack.” Assuming that this was the signal he was waiting for, Longstreet ordered “some of my batteries to reply, as a signal that I was ready to cooperate.” The fire he heard was not the signal that Huger was launching an attack; it was merely his sparring with Slocum’s guns. The coordinated attack was not happening. The Federals quickly returned fire. At that moment, Longstreet and Hill were speaking with Lee and President Davis, the latter having come out from Richmond to join them. They were sitting on their horses in an open field, surrounded by “tall, heavy timber and thick u
ndergrowth,” but an enemy battery had found their range. Several shells exploded near them, killing a few horses and injuring some more, and with strong encouragement from A.P. Hill, the “little party speedily retired to safer quarters.” How amazed would the Federal gunners have been had they known that both the Confederate president and the army’s commanding general were in their sights!92
James Longstreet. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Lee soon rode off on his fruitless effort to have Holmes contribute, and Longstreet established his battle line. He ordered L. O’Bryan Branch’s brigade from A.P. Hill’s division to head for the right flank. To Branch’s left would be James Kemper’s brigade, with Micah Jenkins (commanding Anderson’s brigade while Anderson led the division) on his left. Jenkins’s line brushed the southern edge of the Long Bridge Road. Crossing that road, and to its north, was Cadmus Wilcox’s brigade. Roger Pryor’s troops were to the left rear of Wilcox, and Winfield Featherston’s small brigade was to Pryor’s left. Pickett’s brigade, under the command of Eppa Hunton, was behind Jenkins and Kemper. With the exception of Branch’s brigade, A.P. Hill’s division was held back in reserve.93
The Battle of Glendale Page 6