by Tom Clancy
Once in control, Giroldi planned to talk Noriega into retiring to Chiriqui Province in western Panama, where Noriega had a country house—one of his many luxury homes.
The CIA agents went on to explain that Giroldi, who had played a large part in crushing the coup attempt eighteen months earlier (he’d identified the conspirators, who had then all been jailed and tortured), was not exactly a man of conspicuous integrity, and could not be totally trusted now.
Though he had a bad feeling about the entire CIA report, General Thurman decided to pass it up to the Pentagon, just in case, and at about 2:30 in the morning, he reached General Kelly at home on his secure phone. After Thurman described what was going on, Kelly asked for his thoughts. “My advice is to wait and see what happens,” Thurman said.
Soon after that, Generals Kelly and Powell met in the Pentagon with Rear Admiral Ted Shafer, the deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose analysts were already busy trying to check out the coup information. The immediate consensus was that the whole thing was likely a trick or a deception; but if not, the plan was ill-conceived and unlikely to succeed.
By this time, Secretary Cheney was in his office for a heads-up from Powell, followed by a further review by Kelly and Shafer. All four then went to the Oval Office to update the President, where Powell recommended holding off on a decision until there was further information. “If there’s a coup,” Powell told the President, “we need to watch it develop before we act.” The President agreed.
That day, the coup did not go off. But Mrs. Giroldi reported it was on for the next morning, October 3.
That morning, Noriega arrived earlier than usual at the Comandancia; the ceremonial guard force met the entourage in the normal way, but then took the dictator into custody—sparking an immediate argument between Noriega and Giroldi. Shots were fired, which General Thurman could hear at his quarters in Quarry Heights about a mile from the Comandancia.
Thurman immediately called Powell with a report.
By 9:00, it was clear a coup was under way, but its outcome was still far from certain. By noon, Panamanian radio announced that a coup was in progress.
Meanwhile, under the guise of a routine exercise, U.S. forces blocked the road to Fort Amador, though the Panamanian 5th Infantry Company based there had not attempted to react. At about the same time, two PDF lieutenants, identified as coup liaison negotiators, arrived at the front gate of Fort Clayton and asked to see Cisneros (now a major general), who spoke fluent Spanish. Thurman told Cisneros to talk to them.
According to the lieutenants, the coup leaders had control of Noriega and his staff, and were now looking for an honorable way for the dictator to step down, yet remain in Panama; but when Cisneros offered to take him into custody at Fort Clayton, the lieutenants refused. They had no intention of turning him over to the United States. They still pressed for a U.S. roadblock at the Bridge of the Americas, however, to prevent Panamanian forces from coming up from Rio Hato.
Cisneros made no promises.
TALKING Noriega into stepping down turned out to be a much more formidable undertaking than Giroldi had imagined. What the two men said to each other, we’ll never know, but we do know that Noriega out-talked Giroldi. Rather than continue the conversation, Giroldi left Noriega in a locked room for a few minutes, then went off to regroup. It was a fatal mistake : The room had a telephone. Noriega (it was later learned) evidently got in touch with Vicki Amado, his number-one mistress, and asked her to contact the commanders of the 6th and 7th Companies at Rio Hato and the PDF Mechanized Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron, some twenty miles northeast of the city.
Soon, a 727 launched from Tocumen International Airport, ten miles east of Panama City, landed at Rio Hato and began shuttling the 6th and 7th Companies back to Tocumen. Meanwhile, Battalion 2000, ten miles farther east at Fort Cimarron, headed to Tocumen with a convoy of trucks and V- 150 and V-300 armored cars. There they picked up the 6th and 7th Companies and went on to the Comandancia.
The forces the coup leaders feared had merely flown over the Comandancia, linked up with other reinforcements, and entered the compound from the eastern side—actions that proved very enlightening to Stiner and his planners as they revised BLUE SPOON.
At this point, it was obvious the coup was over. Shots from inside the Comandancia could be heard—executions. Major Giroldi and his number two, a PDF captain, were taken to Tinajitas (five miles north of the city, and the home of the 1st Infantry Company), tortured until they identified the other coup leaders, and executed.
“The PDF’s response to the coup seriously demonstrated considerable military capability and resourcefulness,” Carl Stiner remarks. “That day’s events made it very apparent to me that if democracy was ever going to succeed in Panama, we had to clean out the whole kit and caboodle, including Noriega, his PDF force, the command-and-control structure (specifically the Comandancia)—and the national police as well. That was not all—as we came to learn. Noriega had placed his disciples in control of every key position in every institution of government, and all of them were on the take in some form or other. They would all have to go.”
BOOSTING READINESS
After the failed coup, General Thurman acted to improve readiness: All personnel on duty now wore camouflage fatigues. Marksmanship training was intensified, and everyone—individuals and crews—had to be qualified in their weapon systems. Category three and four exercises were increased, and companies on Sand Flea exercises visited some of the twenty-seven planned targets daily (although the troops involved didn’t know this). A nightly helicopter assault exercise was also conducted, to improve proficiency with night-vision goggles.
In order to beef up command and control, General Thurman officially designated Stincr as his war planner and war fighter; and on October 10, Stiner was named commander of Joint Task Force South.26
Stiner and his staff were already well ahead of the game with planning revisions to BLUE SPOON. In early September, Major General Will Roosma and a team of planners met with the SOUTHCOM staff to further integrate planning. On October 9, Stiner and his key staff flew to Panama for a contingency planning summit with the CINC—again wearing civilian clothes and traveling in an unmarked airplane. For the next three days, the two staffs worked in the SOUTHCOM command post in Quarry Heights, ironing out operational and tactical details.
Meanwhile, Stiner took time off to make a clandestine helicopter reconnaissance of the likely targets, which was critical for finalizing plan development. He was accompanied by Colonel Mike Snell, the commander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade, who was intimately familiar with the country and PDF locations.
As the meetings were concluding, General Thurman announced that Stiner would be in overall command of all U.S. combat forces in Panama, including special operations forces, and that the contingency plan for Joint Task Force South would include the following objectives, to: protect U.S. lives, key sites, and facilities; capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority; neutralize the Panamanian defense forces; support the establishment of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama; and restructure the PDF as directed by the duly-elected government.
An unwritten but high-priority mission from Washington was to rescue Kurt Muse, a CIA operative who had been arrested by Noriega and imprisoned in the high-security Modelo prison. Muse had been told that he would be executed if U.S. forces launched an attack against Panama. His executioner kept him under constant observation.
To accomplish these objectives, Joint Task Force South would have to either protect or neutralize the twenty-seven major targets. Many of them were in or near Panama City, but several, including the elite companies at Rio Hato, Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron, and Torrijos-Tocumen Airport, were some miles from the capital (the airport was dual-use: Tocumen was the civilian side, Torrijos the military). There were also major targets in the Colon area, on the Caribbean side of the country some forty miles northwest of Panama City.
Now that the targe
ts had been determined and prioritized, Stiner and his commanders had to decide on the tactics and forces best suited for each.
At the end of the three days, Stiner summarized his “Commander’s Intent” for the operation.27
In essence, he said: “Using electronic warfare capabilities to jam PDF communications, together with our EC-C130s (Volant Solo and Compass Call) to override civilian media stations and broadcast our message to the people of Panama, we will take advantage of surprise and darkness to attack or secure all twenty-seven targets simultaneously. A vital part of the operation is the protection of U.S. lives, beginning from H-hour and until stability has been achieved. The key to success is surprise and the simultaneous takedown of the PDF, its command-and-control capability, and the national police. The majority of the fighting must be over by daylight, with our forces in control of the area bounded by Panama City to Colon in the north, and from Rio Hato in the southwest to Fort Cimarron in the northeast. Most Panamanians are our friends, and therefore we must minimize casualtics and collateral damage. We will employ psychological operations at the tactical unit level to try to persuade each installation to surrender without a fight. If this does not achieve results, then measured force will be applied to accomplish the mission. At daylight, because there will be no law and order, the tactical units must be prepared to begin stability operations to protect life and property. To support this requirement, we will begin bringing in the rest of the 7th Infantry Division and the remainder of the 16th Military Police Brigade, beginning at H+4 hours and closing by H+24 hours. The capture of Noriega, the rescue of Kurt Muse from the Modelo prison, and other special mission requirements are the responsibility of the JSOTF. These operations are an integral part of the success of this operation, and will commence concurrently with all other operations at H-hour. I hope that the signal which will be sent by our actions at H-hour will make our job much easier as we fan out to take down PDF units in the rest of the country. If we can achieve some degree of surprise, and if we do this right, I don’t expect much staying power out of the PDF.”
At the same time, Stiner laid out his warfighting philosophy: “Hit first; surprise the enemy; overwhelm him with heavy combat power; use the cover of darkness to take maximum advantage of our night-fighting capabilities during the initial assault and follow-on attacks, so that our superior forces are on the objectives come dawn; and always fight under favorable conditions.”
The party returned to Fort Bragg on October 11 to complete the plan.
During the next week, they worked day and night. For security purposes, planning for General Luck’s special missions operations continued at his headquarters, but liaison officers were exchanged between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Joint Special Operations Task Force to ensure continuity and integration.
The morning after their return, Stiner spoke to the planners at Fort Bragg:
“As I analyze this mission,” he explained, “these are the specified and implied tasks that we must be concerned with:
The priority is to protect U.S. lives and the key sites and facilities in Panama.
We must capture Noriega and deliver him to competent authority.
We must neutralize the PDF, and at the same time neutralize the command-and-control mechanism (that is, the Comandancia), as well as the national police.
We must support the establishment of a U.S.-recognired government.
We must be prepared to begin stability operations as soon as the fighting is over—because there will be no law and order.
We must be prepared to engage in necessary nation-building activities to assist the new government get on its feet and begin to meet the expectations of the people.
We must be prepared to restructure the Panamanian Defense Forces and the national police as the new government decides.
“This is a very difficult and complex mission,” he continued. “We must plan to defeat the PDF and the national police in one night, and the next day raise those whom we have fought in a new image—no longer the oppressors of the people, but respected by them. We will be extending our hand to the PDF and then reraising him in a new image as a citizen or national policemen—whatever the new government decides.
“Practically all the fighting must be done in urban terrain—cities and built-up areas. We must limit the collateral damage—which translates to minimum loss of life on both sides—and limit all damage outside of what is strictly necessary to accomplish the mission.
“Accordingly, we will be forced to establish for ourselves specific rules of engagement that will limit our total combat capability. That is, we must limit ourselves to using only direct-fire weapons—individual rifles; machine guns; 66mm LAWs and AT-4 antitank weapons; Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles, with their large-caliber main guns; Apache helicopters with their hellfire missiles; AC-130 gunships; and artillery—the last three only in a direct-fire role for building-busting purposes. There’ll be no “area fire” weapons, such as mortars and bombing.
“These rules of engagement must be very clear, so that every person involved in this operation has a clear understanding of what he can and cannot do.
“As for planning, the staff is to concentrate on the conventional aspects of this operation, leaving the special operations part to General Luck’s headquarters—specifically, the capture of Noriega and his henchmen. The Noriega gang must be neutralized in order to provide an environment where the civilian government can function without threat. All other special mission requirements will also be the responsibility of Luck’s command, but when it comes time for execution, the two plans will be integrated. Luck will control the special operations side, reporting to me, the same as the other task force commanders.
“The success of this mission depends in large measure on the effectiveness of small units accomplishing their assigned missions. Therefore, I want to give them maximum flexibility and latitude in making the decisions necessary to accomplish their mission.”
He continued: “1 will personally begin work on structuring the command and control arrangements for this operation. These will be simple and direct—no unnecessary layering. As it stands right now, I plan to absorb the U.S. Army South headquarters into my headquarters (Joint Task Force South), making General Marc Cisneros my deputy.
“Because different forces from different services will be involved, we must have a joint CEOI [Command Communications and Electronic Operating Instructions], so we can talk to each other. I want this to be short and to the point, not a Sears, Roebuck catalog. Once it is developed, I plan to have an exercise where we can tweak all our radios and other means of communication, to ensure that we can talk to each other—and once we start this operation, we are not changing frequencies and call signs until it’s over. We will conduct this operation with such momentum that it will not matter if the PDF gets hold of one of our CEOIs, because they won’t be able to do anything with it anyhow.”
“Finally, within four days I want to see a draft plan that I can have in the hands of my major subordinate commanders within five days, to allow them time to study it before our next meeting in Panama, when I plan to have them present.”
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Within four days, a draft operations plan was completed. This included command-and-control relationships:
Beginning at the top was General Thurman, CINC South.
Immediately under him was Lieutenant General Stiner, Commander Joint Task Force South. When Stiner’s headquarters absorbed the Headquarters of U.S. Army South, Major General Marc Cisneros became Stiner’s deputy commander, and Cisneros’s staff principals became deputies to the staff principals of the XVIII Airborne Corps.
Directly underneath Stiner were six task forces, as follows:1. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) was headed by Major General Gary Luck. All special mission forces in Panama were to be under his command and control.
2. The Air Component was commanded by Lieutenant General Pete Kemph, the 12th Air Force Comma
nder. All the planning for tactical air support would initially be handled by Brigadier General Bruce Fister, Gary Luck’s deputy. After the initial assault, control of all aviation assets would revert to Pete Kemph.
3. Task Force Bayonet, headed by Colonel Mike Snell, was to be made up of the 193rd Brigade already stationed in Panama.
4. Task Force Pacific was to be headed by Major General Jim Johnson, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and his Division Ready Brigade (DRB)—approximately 4,000 paratroopers, with all weapons and equipment, including twelve more Sheridans.
5. Task Force Atlantic would initially be commanded by Colonel Keith Kellogg, the 7th Infantry Division’s 3d Brigade Commander, already in Panama.
6. Task Force Semper Fi was headed by Colonel Charles Richardson, commander of the Marine Expeditionary Battalion already brought in during the May 1989 buildup.
These officers were responsible for completing their portion of the plan, and then for rehearsing it.
The units already in Panama (12,000 troops), together with those coming from the United States at H-hour and throughout the first day, would bring the troop total to more than 26,000. By comparison, the earlier version of BLUE SPOON provided only 10,000 additional troops (total: 22,000) over twenty-two days. At H-hour there would be enough forces available to secure twenty-four of the twenty-seven planned targets. The three remaining—Panama Viejo (on the eastern side of Panama City), Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron—would be secured by battalion air assaults conducted by the 82nd Airborne Division DRB, who would jump into Tocumcn International Airport at H+45 minutes. The airport itself would be taken by Rangers, who were to jump in at H-hour. After landing, the 82nd was to assume operational control of the Rangers and take responsibility for security of the airport.