by Tom Clancy
Four months later, on January 24, 1989, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft IV, signed a memorandum giving USCINCSOC budgetary authority over MFP-11. Soon afterward, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) gave USSOCOM control of selected MFP-1 1 programs on October 1, 1990, and total responsibility in October 1991.
By law, the services are responsible for training, equipping, and modernizing their respective forces. The CINCs are not. They take the forces they are given and employ them. The services had long been “robbing” SOF by transferring previously approved money to other requirements. Giving financial control to SOF was the fundamental basis for the Nunn-Cohen Amendment.
For the first time ever, a CINC had been granted authority for a budget and POM.
THE complex, politically sensitive process of establishing a new unified command extended into Carl Stiner’s tenure as CINCSOC. He pushed the command to fulfill the provisions of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment; oversaw the implementation of developing and acquiring “special-operations-peculiar” equipment, materiel, supplies, and services; and watched over the command’s submission of fully supported budgets based on SOF mission requirements.
After DESERT STORM, he devoted much of his time to raising awareness about SOF capabilities and successes in and out of the military. Supporting the theater CINCs and maintaining SOF combat readiness were also top priorities. Finally, he convinced the Secretary of Defense to designate Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs as part of SOF. This enabled USSOCOM to command and control these units in peacetime as well as war, which greatly improved the command’s ability to fund, train, equip, and organize these forces.
During his time in command, SOF optempo rose 35 percent. USSOCOM supported a number of operations worldwide, most notably DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT (support to Kurdish refugees), PROVIDE RELIEF, and RESTORE HOPE (Somalia relief operations).
THE main challenges of General Downing’s tenure were to continue the revitalization of SOF and to prepare the SOF community for the twenty-first century. to these ends, General Downing streamlined the acquisition of SOF-specific equipment, increased the command’s focus on new emerging threats, and realigned SOF budget requirements with the reduced Defense Department’s budget. His changes in the allocation of resources resulted in a far more efficient strategic planning process.
During his watch, SOF optempo again increased, with SOF participation in UNISOM II (Somalia), SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), as well as many smaller contingencies and deployments.
GENERAL Henry H. Shelton guided the command through a time of greatly constrained resources and extraordinary worldwide demand for SOF support. SOF operations increased by more than 51 percent, and personnel deployments increased by 127 percent. In 1996 alone, SOF deployed to a total of 142 countries and engaged in 120 counterdrug missions, 12 demining training missions, and 204 joint combined exchange training exercises with other nations. General Shelton’s largest SOF operations commitment was to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD, the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, and special operators assisted in noncombatant evacuations from such crisis areas as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Albania.
GENERAL Peter J. Schoomaker’s top priority was to organize SOF in ways that kept it relevant to national security requirements. To that end, he initiated or accelerated numerous projects—headquarters reorganization; planning, programming, and acquisition enhancements; and the integration of SOF’s components into one resourcing and acquisition team.
On his watch, SOF took part in the transition from JOINT GUARD to JOINT FORCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina, DESERT THUNDER in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (to thwart Saddam Husscin’s restrictions on UN inspectors’ freedom of movement), and numerous contingencies and peacetime engagements. SOF played crucial roles in ALLIED FORGE, the operation that forced Serbian forces out of Kosovo, and joint GUARDIAN, which enforced the Kosovo Peace Agreement.
GENERAL CARL STINER, CINC USSOCOM
Carl Stiner describes his time in command:
In my thirty-five years of service, I have never known anyone who faced a challenge of greater complexity than General Jim Lindsay’s in the standing up of the United States Special Operations Command, nor do 1 know an officer who could have done the job better. If you had the choice of whom to succeed in command, it would certainly be Jim Lindsay. Not only did he turn over a well-trained and functioning staff, but all operating systems were in place as well.
Because he had kept me constantly in the loop on his challenges and decisions, very little transition was needed when I assumed command. My challenge became to take what he had given me and move it forward.
Two major objectives remained in achieving Congress’s intent: developing a new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process to structure a SOCOM POM and budget, and bringing under the command the major weapons development programs that were still being managed by the services.
Even with a congressional mandate, the Command found itself in a very difficult position to establish MFP-11. The command was still “standing up,” and some 100 key personnel short of reaching its manning objective, when the Chairman directed USSOCOM to take personnel cuts proportionally equal to other commands, as part of the downsizing of the military resulting from the fall of the Soviet Empire. The Command had to take a measured approach to assuming its budget tasks.
DEVELOPING THE POM The POM was the first step. The initial one was completed and submitted in 1988 during Jim Lindsay’s tenure—but through the Department of the Air Force (which was USSOCOM’s executive agent for budgeting issues at the time). The Command only assumed budget execution authority by October 1990.
Meanwhile, many critics at OSD level who resented the decision to give USSOCOM its own budget argued that the Command would never be able to submit a POM. They believed USSOCOM didn’t have the intelligence and expertise to develop it. Nevertheless, in 1991, the Command submitted its first fully supported POM, totaling $3.2 billion-and it was the first one in, ahead of all the services. This was the first time USSOCOM had researched SOF mission requirements and developed the analysis for the POM justification instead of “cross-walking” requiremcnts to other services.33
The establishment of MFP-11 set up a more focused resource process and insured a balanced review of special operations requirements and programs.
CONTROL OF PROGRAMS USSOCOM also worked to take control of its major weapons programs.
On December 10, 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorised the Special Operations Development and Acquisition Center (SORDAC). Owing partly to manpower cuts, in 1992 Stiner consolidated the Command’s acquisition and contracting management functions into a new directorate under a deputy for acquisition, who was named the Command’s acquisition executive and senior procurement executive.
The Command’s procurement strategy emphasized a streamlined acquisition process—by modifying existing weapons or buying “nondevelopmental” (off-the-shelf technology) systems. This approach permitted quick, economical improvements to operational capabilities.
Since 1987, USSOCOM has fielded a number of modified or new systems, affecting nearly every aspect of special operations. Some of the more notable arc the MC-130H Combat Talon II long-range insertion aircraft and a state-of-the-art intelligence system (the most advanced in any command), both of which were used in DESERT STORM; and the Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships, used in Operations SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Other significant acquisitions included the MH-47E Chinook, a medium-range heavy-lift helicopter designed to conduct insertion operations under all weather conditions; the AC-130U Spector gunship, used for close air support and reconnaissance; the Mark V special operations craft, a high-performancecombatant boat capable of being transported over land or aboard C-5 aircraft; and the rigid inflatable boat (RIB) for the Naval Special Warfare Command, which provides a long-sought capability for a high-speed SEAL insertion-and-extraction craft. T
he RIB program, completed under cost and months ahead of schedule, exceeded every performance objective and won the 1998 Defense Department’s Packer Award for excellence in acquisition.
Another major program now coming to fruition is the Advanced SEAL Delivery System. The CV-22 Osprey aircraft program will also give the Command’s forces much greater capability for long-range insertions and extractions under all weather conditions.
By completing the POM and establishing control of major programs, USSOCOM had complied with all the provisions of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. Six years after President Reagan approved the Command, USSOCOM now controlled all SOF forces, its own budget, and its modernization programs.
USSOCOM has used its acquisition capability a number of times during contingencies to provide SOF with the latest technology or to accelerate modifications. During DESERT STORM, for example, the Command modified Chinooks with aircraft survivability equipment before they deployed to the Iraqi area of operations.
EDUCATING CINCs AND AMBASSADORS Following the Gulf War, I spent a great deal of my time educating commanders, particularly regional CTNCs and serving ambassadors, in the capabilities of SOF—showing the CINCs how to integrate SOF into their theater engagement plans, and showing the ambassadors how to integrate SOF into their country-security plans.
A theater engagement plan is based on the national security strategy for each of the world’s regions, and it is the responsibility of the regional CINC. The plan, which is country-specific, is developed with each ambassador, and details the security-assistance needs for that country.
We also educated newly appointed ambassadors on SOF capabilities before they took their posts. Every couple of months, in coordination with the State Department, we brought a new crop of ambassadors to Fort Bragg for a detailed orientation. Afterward, the ambassadors were far better prepared to use SOF forces to their fullest.
UPGRADING THEATER SOCs I also devoted a lot of effort to upgrading the Special Operations Commands (SOCs) assigned to the regional CINCs. A special-operations-qualified flag officer was placed in charge of each SOC, and it was staffed with qualified SOF personnel. The SOCs exercised both operational control (for the CINCs) of SOF forces involved in peacetime engagements and command of SOF forces in times of crisis.
COMBAT READINESS TRAINING Training is the most important thing we do—we must always train as we will fight. It was therefore my highest continuing priority.
Training should always be based on potential mission scenarios (including peacetime engagement missions) and serve as a rehearsal for what may ultimately become a no-notice contingency requirement. As such, it needs to cover all the bases: individual, collective, multi-echelon, and joint. Proper training—tough, realistic, demanding, and designed to develop and sustain individual and special skills—builds highly motivated individuals and units that function as an efficient, effective, and professional team. The primary focus of any training program must be the development of:Technically / tactically proficient leaders, sound in judgment, who will exercise initiative within the commander’s intent
Disciplined, mature troops, physically and emotionally prepared to withstand the hardships and dangers of combat
Troops highly skilled in individual tasks, and mature beyond their years
Small units / crews well grounded in basic technical tactical tasks and drills
There are three fundamentals to successful mission accomplishment:1. Disciplined, competent leaders with high ethical and professional standards are the key element of any training program—and any effective combat unit. The central focus of all SOF-related training must be to develop leaders.
2. Language skills and culture training make SOF uniquely suited to our assigned mission and is fundamental to success.
3. We must focus our training on joint requirements, and we must train as we expect to fight. We will fight jointly in the future.
MEDICAL TRAINING In the past, each service trained its own medics—to varying levels of technical proficiency.
With the assistance of the surgeons general of all the services, we established a medical university at Fort Bragg to train all the medics of all Special Operations units—an innovation that greatly improved medical proficiency and readiness, and at considerable savings.
FOREIGN AVIATION TRAINING ln 1992, we established a Special Operations Aviation Foreign Internal Defense training capability. Many nations that we help had outdated, practically useless air forces. By developing a SOF training cadre proficient in both vintage aircraft and native languages, we have been able to help them greatly upgrade their air capability for meeting their own security needs.
COUNTERPROLIFERATION One of USSOCOM’s primary responsibilities is to anticipate the unanticipated, and then to develop the capability to deal with the potential threat. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the increased sophistication of state-sponsored terrorism, the threat of an asymmetrical attack with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) has increased significantly.
Advanced information technology allows extremists to communicate widely and efficiently; publicly available databases serve as repositories for technical information relating to weapons production; and materials and technology used to make WMDs are increasingly available. Many of these materials are widely used for legitimate commercial purposes.
The disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the potential unemployment and proliferation of thousands of skilled scientists, increased concerns about the protection, control, and accountability of WMD-related materials and technologies. Transnational threats by terrorist organizations have increased the potential for attacks against nonmilitary targets within our borders.
Non-nuclear WMDs are relatively easy to manufacture and deliver. Facilities to produce biological and chemical weapons are small and hard to detect.
As far back as 1991, USSOCOM took high-priority actions to deal with this threat. There are two primary requirements for success:Timely and accurate intelligence information for predicting the threat, the likely target, the type of weapon, and its general location is a responsibility of our national intelligence agencies (for threats abroad), and the FBI (for threats within the United States).
The capability to recover the weapon (in either a permissive or nonpermissive environment), to render it safe, and to evacuate it to a safe area for turnover or destruction was the focus of USSOCOM’s efforts.
These efforts continued as an assumed mission requirement, and much progress was made with the cooperation and help of national agencies—though at our initiative. When Wayne Downing replaced me, he invited Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to observe firsthand the capability that had been developed. The Secretary was impressed. “Who should have this mission?” he asked.
“We’ll take it,” Downing answered.
“You’ve already got all these other high-priority missions,” Perry replied, doubtfully.
“True,” Downing said. “But as you can see, we have very capable and smart forces, and we can do this thing.”
“What should the mission for counterproliferation say?” Perry asked.
“We’ll send you a draft.”
When Perry received the proposed mission statement, he signed it, and counterproliferation became an official USSOCOM mission. Along with that came funding and formalized cooperation and support from other agencies of government.
Since then, enormous progress has been made not only in developing and fielding essential technologies but in training special operators in all the skills needed to accomplish this mission. USSOCOM special mission forces have made vast strides in that direction, but that is not enough. The critical key is accurate intelligence for timely warning.
FORCES OF CHOICE Since 1987, SOF has become the force of choice for theater CINCs and ambassadors; and SOF forces have been involved in virtually every contingency operation, as well as thousands of joint training exchanges, peacetime engagement activities, and humanitarian relief operations. I’ve already mentio
ned several contingencies and training activities. Some other significant operations, involving all elements of SOF, include: Somalia (1992-1995), Haiti (1994-1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-present), Kosovo (1999-present), and Macedonia (1999-present). Many others cannot be mentioned for security reasons.
During the same period, SOF forces have performed a wide variety of missions under the category of “Operations Other Than War” (OOTW). OOTWs include a wide range of missions, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian demining, peacekeeping, crisis response, combating terrorism, enforcement of sanctions or exclusion zones, and show of force.
During the 1990s, these increased significantly.
For the UN’s first forty years, only thirteen OOTWs were conducted, but from 1988 to 1994 their numbers more than doubled—with far greater scope and complexity. U.S. Special Operations forces have served in most nations of the globe, performing as instruments of U.S. national policy, executing missions, and providing assistance possible only through their unique skills, language capabilities, and cultural orientation—missions that conventional units could not perform, and in many cases where a U.S. military signature was unacceptable to the host.
SOF takes up less than 1.4 percent of the total force structure and only 3.5 percent of the DOD budget; yet the increase in optempo is ample evidence of their usefulness. During 1993, USSOCOM averaged 2,036 personnel deployed away from home station each week, serving in 101 countries. By 1996, the number had climbed to 4,613; and by 1999, it had climbed to 5,141, deployed to 149 countries and foreign territories.