4.A wide-ranging exploration of the many strategy and policy issues raised by this new thrust of American security planning in the wake of the September 11 attacks may be found in Karl P. Mueller and others, Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-403-AF, 2006).
5.George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 229.
6.Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 120.
7.Todd S. Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing: America’s War in Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2003), 4.
8.For the U.S. figures, see “U.S. Casualties in Iraq,” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm. The number of Iraqi civilian fatalities due directly to combat and insurgency-related operations is highly disputed. One of the more reliable sources, the Iraq Body Count Project, an independent UK/U.S. group, put the number at around 111,000 in mid-August 2011. See Iraq Body Count Project, at http://www.iraqbodycount.org.
9.Andrew Flibbert, “The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War,” Security Studies, April–June 2006, 317.
10.See Charles Duelfer and others, Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Washington, D.C.: Iraq Survey Group for the Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004). Both President Bush and his closest White House counselor during the planning and conduct of the campaign have been frank in acknowledging their collective error in this regard. In his memoirs Bush freely admitted that “the reality was that I had sent American troops into combat based in large part on intelligence that proved false. That was a massive blow to our credibility—my credibility—that would shake the confidence of the American people” (Bush, Decision Points, 262). Bush’s most senior political adviser, Karl Rove, later conceded in his own memoirs: “I am under no illusions—the failure to find stockpiles of WMD did great damage to the administration’s credibility” (Karl Rove, Courage and Consequence: My Life as a Conservative in the Fight [New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010], 342).
11.The respected British newsweekly The Economist reported in late October 2011 that “the verdict of Americans at large is bleaker. . . . Even among those who fought in Iraq or Afghanistan, . . . only 44 percent now think the war was worth fighting, according to recent polling by the Pew Research Center; and an even smaller proportion of the general public, 36 percent, agrees with the veterans” (“No Satisfaction, No Resignation,” The Economist, October 29, 2011, 42).
12.I am grateful to my colleague Nora Bensahel for urging me to highlight this important qualification to the otherwise impressive success story of the three-week major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
13.Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), xxxi. The ground-centric emphasis of this otherwise superb account is telegraphed by its title, which was the code name adopted for the land component of Operation Iraqi Freedom, referring to the offensive launched by Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley’s First Army eight weeks after the D-day landings during the Normandy campaign of World War II.
14.Stephen Biddle and others, Toppling Saddam: Iraq and American Military Transformation (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2004), 1. See also Stephen Biddle, “Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam,” Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2007.
15.Col. Gregory Fontenot, USA (Ret.); Lt. Col. E. J. Degen, USA; and Lt. Col. David Tohn, USA, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 178. This impressive study is unswervingly joint-minded in its appreciative treatment of the air component’s contribution to CENTCOM’s campaign to topple Hussein and should be mandatory reading for all those interested in understanding what the air war was supporting on the ground throughout the three weeks of major combat. With regard to the early transition in focus of the air offensive from independent strategic operations to direct support of the land advance, Colonel Fontenot later recalled that “to me, the best thing about [General] Moseley [the campaign’s air commander] was that he was able to anticipate when to shift effort and did so very well” (comments on an earlier draft by Col. Gregory Fontenot, USA [Ret.], October 22, 2010).
16.Iraqi Freedom also offered a base of experience from which to identify lessons that were not duly heeded by Washington and CENTCOM, suggesting areas that continue to need remedial work.
17.Gen. Tommy Franks, USA (Ret.), with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 411–412.
18.See, among numerous others, Jon Lee Anderson, The Fall of Baghdad (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); John Koopman, McCoy’s Marines: Darkside to Baghdad (St. Paul, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2004); Tim Pritchard, Ambush Alley: The Most Extraordinary Battle of the Iraq War (New York: Random House, 2005); Bing West and Maj. Gen. Ray L. Smith, USMC (Ret.), The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the United States Marines (New York: Bantam Dell, 2003); Evan Wright, Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of American War (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004); Karl Zinnmeister, Boots on the Ground: A Month with the 82nd Airborne in the Battle for Iraq (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003); and David Zucchino, Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004). Of those books that have appeared on the war more broadly defined, Thomas Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, July 2004), and John Keegan, The Iraq War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), do not address air operations at all; and Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing, and Williamson Murray and Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr., USA (Ret.), The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), do so only cursorily. Franks’ memoir, American Soldier, likewise discusses allied air operations only briefly and superficially. A more detailed treatment of the air war is offered in Walter Boyne, Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why (New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2003). By far the most richly informed account of allied air and space operations thus far is Michael Knights, Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 235–327. At a more general policy and strategy level, see also Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 142–172.
19.I am grateful to my RAND colleague Karl Mueller for drawing my attention to this important point.
20.Amy Butler, “Lack of Embedded Reporters a Hurdle for Air Force Media Ops,” Inside the Air Force, April 4, 2003, 5–6.
21.Joint Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations, coordinating draft, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va., March 1, 2004, 33.
22.Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Instant Lessons’ of the Iraq War: Main Report,” third working draft, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., April 14, 2003, 8.
23.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 73.
Chapter 1. The Road to War
1.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 13.
2.Bush and his national security adviser stated succinctly in their joint memoirs published seven years later: “Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land” (George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998], 489).
3.Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 415.
4.Quoted in Charles Krauthammer, “What Ever Happened to the Powell Doctrine?” Washington Post, April 20, 2001. An informed assessment of Hussein’s risk calculus eight years after Operation Desert Storm ended suggested that the Iraqi dictator’s ultimate decision to withdraw his occupying forces from Kuwait “stemmed from
his fear of losing both the war and his entire army. . . . The destruction of the Iraqi army would have stripped Baghdad of its ability to defend itself. . . . It also would have meant the destruction of the Republican Guard. . . . Finally, such a crushing defeat would have been such a humiliation that he would have had to expect an immediate challenge from within his power base” (Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman, “Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past,” Survival, autumn 1998, 134).
5.Bush, Decision Points, 228; Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 418.
6.This prolonged pattern of behavior on Hussein’s part is chronicled in detail in Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), 55–108.
7.Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 414.
8.Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing, 20.
9.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 25.
10.Ibid.
11.Ibid., 1.
12.Ibid., 34.
13.Michael R. Gordon, “Pointing Finger, Bush Broadens His ‘Doctrine,’” New York Times, January 30, 2002.
14.Charles Krauthammer, “Redefining the War,” Washington Post, February 1, 2002.
15.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 108–109.
16.Ibid., 116.
17.Ibid., 119–120.
18.Mike Allen and Karen De Young, “Bush: U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies,” Washington Post, June 2, 2002. In fact, according to one of CENTAF’s key air operations planners, the first steps toward developing a concept of operations for the air war were taken in early February 2002 when, “upon returning from Tampa to Shaw, under General Moseley’s direction, CENTAF planners put together the first draft of a three-day MAAP using a force structure that General Moseley had passed to Shaw from the CAOC in Saudi Arabia. This three-day MAAP would be continuously refined over the next 13 months, but it formed the foundation of the air campaign” (comments on an earlier draft by Lt. Col. Mark Cline, USAF, January 11, 2008; Cline headed the MAAP cell in the CAOC during the final preparations for and execution of the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom).
19.Allen and De Young, “Bush: U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies.” Secretary Rumsfeld chose to characterize the emergent Bush doctrine of preemption as “anticipatory self-defense” (Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 423).
20.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 112.
21.Ibid., 169.
22.Ibid., 161.
23.Karen De Young, “Bush Cites Urgent Iraqi Threat,” Washington Post, October 8, 2002.
24.Alison Mitchell and Carl Hulse, “Senate, in 77–23 Vote, Passes Iraq Resolution,” New York Times, October 11, 2002.
25.“Mr. Bush’s UN Mandate,” Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2002.
26.“The State of the Union Message,” New York Times, January 29, 2003.
27.For amplification on this assertion in an unclassified extract of the estimate in question, see Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (Washington, D.C.: Director of Central Intelligence, October 2002), 1.
28.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 23.
29.Ibid., 2.
30.Ibid., 9.
31.Ibid., 34.
32.Ibid., 71.
33.Evan Thomas and Martha Brant, “The Education of Tommy Franks,” Time, May 19, 2003.
34.Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 315, 331.
35.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 8.
36.Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 427.
37.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 28.
38.Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 337.
39.Ibid., 334.
40.Ibid., 335.
41.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 60–61.
42.Before becoming CENTCOM’s director of operations, Renuart commanded Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, which enforced the southern no-fly zone over Iraq through Operation Southern Watch.
43.Thomas and Brant, “The Education of Tommy Franks.”
44.Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 361.
45.Vice Adm. David C. Nichols, USN, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE [Naval Air Liaison Element],” briefing by the then deputy combined force air component commander, Operation Iraqi Freedom, no date given.
46.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 96.
47.Col. Mason Carpenter, USAF, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise: Operation Iraqi Freedom Air and Space Operations—Initial Assessment,” unpublished paper, 3–4. Colonel Carpenter headed the CAOC’s strategy division during the three-week major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
48.Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, USAF, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Initial CFACC Roll-up,” briefing given at a CENTAF-sponsored symposium to assess and document allied air operations during the three weeks of major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Nellis AFB, Nev., July 18, 2003.
49.Amy Butler, “Data Links a Solid Weapon against Scuds, Friendly Fire, Jumper Says,” Inside the Air Force, April 11, 2003, 1. As General Moseley later put it, “no Scuds” was the rule for the western desert (conversation with Gen. T. Michael Moseley, USAF, chief of staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., August 2, 2006).
50.The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that had been provided to Congress by the CIA in October 2002 indicated that Iraq possessed as many as several dozen Scud missiles with ranges of 400 to 550 miles. Yet in the years since Desert Storm, U.S. reconnaissance efforts had not succeeded in capturing a single image of an Iraqi Scud. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 335–336.
51.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 98–99.
52.Ibid., 110.
53.Conversation with General Moseley, August 2, 2006.
54.With respect to his burglar reference, Franks later explained that it meant that “you didn’t roll over and go back to sleep when there was an intruder downstairs with a gun” (Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 383).
55.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 113–114.
56.Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 383.
57.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 44–45.
58.Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 352.
59.For a concise synopsis of effects-based targeting that was published more than a decade ago, see Col. David A. Deptula, USAF, Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 1995; updated in 2001 under the new title Effects-Based Operations).
60.In addition, CENTAF staffers worked closely with the 32nd Air Operations Group, a similar planning entity attached to CENTAF’s counterpart, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) headquartered at Ramstein, in building a working relationship with that organization’s staff that would endure throughout the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom. Conversations with Col. Douglas Erlenbusch, USAF, CENTAF director of operations; Maj. Anthony Roberson, USAF, chief of the CENTAF commander’s action group; and other CENTAF staff during a visit to CENTAF headquarters, Shaw AFB, S.C., January 29, 2007.
61.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 114.
62.Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE.”
63.Ibid.
64.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
65.Ibid.
66.The White Plan covered a duration of between seventy-two hours and seven days, sufficient time for the 509th Bomb Wing to get its B-2 stealth bombers into the fight. The Red Plan, also known as Running Start, covered seven days. A CENTAF planner recalled that CENTAF “developed three different Blue Plans and three different White Plans, with one focused on Iraq’s air forces, one on the Republican Guard, and one on suspected facilities associated with WMD production” (comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008).
67.Comments on an earlier draft by Lt. Col. David Hathaway, USAF, February 19, 2007.
68.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
69.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 126.
70.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 51.
71.Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing, 9
7–98.
72.Ibid., 102.
73.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 124–125.
74.Ibid., 146.
75.Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 352. Another unplanned-for contingency, which Franks had taken to calling “catastrophic success,” was the outside chance that Iraqi resistance would crumble both quickly and unexpectedly (ibid., 392). That possibility raised the obvious question of what CENTCOM should do next.
76.A similar arrangement between the Air Force and the Navy involving the sharing of satellite-aided JDAMs had been brokered earlier during Operation Enduring Freedom by the Air Force chief of staff at the time, Gen. John Jumper, and the chief of naval operations, Adm. Vern Clark. Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
77.Earlier in June, General Moseley had approached Air Combat Command for help in developing new concepts of operations for the counter-Scud mission. The team of experts that Air Combat Command supplied in response to his request became an integral part of the broader CENTAF planning process.
78.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
79.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 154–155.
80.Elaine M. Grossman, “Coalition Will Calibrate Force to Limit Casualties in Baghdad Attacks,” Inside the Air Force, April 4, 2003, 4.
81.Lessons of Iraq: Third Report of Session 2003–04, vol. 2 (London: House of Commons, Defence Committee, HC 57-II, March 16, 2004), Ev 51 (hereinafter cited as Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2).
82.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 157–159.
83.Ibid., 207.
84.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
85.Thomas E. Ricks, “War Plan for Iraq Is Ready, Say Officials,” Washington Post, November 10, 2002.
86.Tom Squitieri and Dave Moniz, “U.S. War Plans: Blast Away Saddam’s Support,” USA Today, November 11, 2002.
87.Woodward, Plan of Attack, 327.
88.In military parlance, a Red Team is a group of skilled military professionals convened to detect and assess identifiable weaknesses in a plan’s or unit’s capability and readiness for combat.
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