The allied army, which is generally believed to have been about 27,000 strong, was deployed ‘in a large field of Rie’, according to Simeon Ashe, on the north slope of the ridge to the south of the Long Marston/Tockwith road. Watson recorded that at: ‘About two of the clock we had indifferently well formed our army’ and this time was also mentioned by Thomas Stockdale who wrote that the allies ‘were all putt into order for a feight...by 2 a clocke.’ Stragglers though, no doubt continued to arrive for some time after this.
The left wing was commanded by Oliver Cromwell, Manchester’s lieutenant-general of horse, and was drawn up in three lines. The first contained units of Eastern Association cavalry between which were bodies of musketeers, while the left of the line was made up of Scottish dragoons under Colonel Hugh Fraser. The second line comprised Eastern Association cavalry, while the third consisted of Scottish regiments under David Leslie. The wing numbered about 4,700 horse, 500 dragoons and around 600 foot.
The centre was also marshalled in three lines and consisted of about 17,300 foot. The left of the front line comprised brigades of Manchester’s army under Major-General Lawrence Crawford. Then came a brigade of Lord Fairfax’s foot, while the right of the line was made up of Scottish brigades under Lieutenant-General William Baillie. The second line comprised Scottish brigades under Major-General Sir James Lumsden, while the third had, from left to right, brigades belonging to Manchester’s army, that of the Scots, and Lord Fairfax. To the rear were two Scottish units in reserve.
The right wing was led by Sir Thomas Fairfax. Though drawn up in three lines it was not as strong as Cromwell’s, for it consisted of about 3,300 horse and some 600 foot. Again, musketeers were interposed among the bodies of horse in the front line. The second line was under Colonel John Lambert and, like the first, was made up of the horse of Lord Fairfax’s army. The third line consisted of Sottish regiments under the Earl of Eglinton.
The allies had between 30 and 40 guns. Most were probably stationed between the infantry units in the front line.
Watson informs us that at about ‘two of the clock, [before the arrival of the bulk of Newcastle’s men], the great Ordnance of both sides began to play’ and this is supported by other primary accounts. The cannonade seems to have continued in a desultory fashion for an hour or so and no great damage was done, though some fatalities did occur. One such was Thomas Danby, a middle-aged Roman Catholic gentleman cut down on the Royalist left wing.
After the firing ceased, the allies began singing Psalms. Then, according to Watson, at ‘about five of the clock’ a general silence ensued on both sides, at which hour stragglers, in particular members of Newcastle’s army, were perhaps still arriving on the scene.
As time slowly passed neither side resumed hostilities. Most probably towards 7.00pm Rupert, who had decided not to attack until the next day and believed Leven felt likewise, allowed the Royalists to relax. Newcastle retired to rest in his coach. His relaxation was brief for according to The Life of...William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle, he soon ‘heard a great noise and thunder of shooting, which gave him notice of the armies being engaged.’ Leven had seized the opportunity presented by Rupert and had given the order to advance. Thus the surprised Royalists looked up and saw the enemy army bearing down on them, which ‘in its several parts’ states Ashe, ‘was like unto so many thick clouds.’
Fraser’s dragoons, on Cromwell’s wing, moved against Napier and according to Captain Stewart ‘acted their part so well, that at the first assault they beate the enemy from the ditch,’ thereby facilitating the advance of the horse under Cromwell. Hence as Watson, who was on this wing, recorded: ‘In a moment we were past the ditch into the Moore, upon equall grounds with the enemy.’
Byron moved forward to engage Cromwell. In so doing, he masked the fire of his musketeers and perhaps contributed to the discomfiture of Napier’s men. Indeed, by advancing he may have disobeyed an order from Prince Rupert, for according to a late source, the Life of James II, he had been ordered ‘not to quit his ground’ but to ‘recieve there the charge of the enemy.’ If given, the order—which harmonises with other evidence that Rupert wished to fight a defensive battle—was intended to force the allied left wing to come to grips with Byron after being disordered and softened up somewhat by crossing the ditch and being subjected to heavy Royalist fire.
In the resulting clash, Byron came off worst and his line soon broke. But while Cromwell seems to have withdrawn temporarily to have a wound tended, leaving Leslie in command, his wing encountered stiff resistance from the Royalist second line, or at least part of it, under Molyneux. The latter received support from Rupert who hurried to the aid of the Royalist right wing with his Lifeguard and, presumably, Widdrington’s brigade. According to Cholmeley, as the prince did so he encountered ‘his own regiment turning their backs to the enemy which was a thing so strange and unusual he said, “Swounds, do you run, follow me.”’ In so doing, he managed to rally at least some of the troopers who had been affected by the panic which had swept through part of the right wing. Others though, no doubt continued their flight, as did troopers from other regiments, and the Duchess of Newcastle was to record that some of them slew fellow Royalists who tried to stop them.
Assisted by Rupert, Molyneux’s men continued fighting resolutely. A Parliamentarian, Lord Saye and Sele, relates: ‘The Enemies Horse, being many of them, if not the greatest part, Gentlemen, stood very firm a long time...standing like an Iron Wall, so that they were not easily broken.’ According to Watson, ‘Cromwell’s own division had a hard pull of it: for they were charged by Rupert’s bravest men, both in Front and Flank: they stood at the swords point a pretty while, hacking one another, but at last (it so pleased God) he brake through them, scattering them before him like a little dust. At the same instant the rest of our horse of that Wing, had wholly broken all Prince Ruperts horse.’
In part, the success of the allies can be attributed to numerical superiority. But discipline no doubt also contributed to their success, and is certainly manifest in the aftermath for instead of pursuing the enemy Cromwell’s men were held in check by their commander.
Meanwhile, ferocious fighting had taken place, and indeed was still taking place, in the centre. An anonymous source, W.H., notes, ‘the main bodies joyning, made such a noise with shot and clamour of shouts that we lost our eares, and the smoke of powder was so thick that we saw no light but what proceeded from the mouth of gunnes.’
On the allied left, Crawford, with no obstacle between him and the enemy, did well. Some of his men assisted Fraser’s dragoons against Napier before aiding their fellows against the foot on the right of the Royalist centre, (exactly what happened to Trevor’s cavalry regiment is uncertain), who were driven back and had their flank turned somewhat. In due course Cromwell was able to assist Crawford and this resulted in the right flank of the Royalist centre being turned so that the axis of advance for the bulk of the allies in this sector was west to east instead of south to north.
So far one could be forgiven for thinking that the allies had gained the upper hand in the battle. But had they? How were they faring elsewhere on the field?
Here things were different, very different. Initially, it is true, Lord Fairfax’s foot in the centre of the allied front line drove back the opposing soldiers under Colonel Robert Broughton. However, they were forced to give ground when the Royalists received reinforcements from the second line. Then, to make matters worse, Sir William Blakiston’s cavalry, perhaps at the instigation of Newcastle, charged the Fairfax foot and at least some of the Scots to their right, and succeeded in driving them and many of the men stationed to their rear, from the field. It is reported that at some stage in the battle, and most probably now, Newcastle charged with his Lifeguard and personally killed three members of a Scottish regiment of foot.
Captain Stewart relates that Blakiston charged as far as the top of the ridge. Th
ere he halted while panic-stricken allied soldiers ran on as fast as their legs would carry them. It was not just the rank and file who fled. The allied generals, Leven, Lord Fairfax, and perhaps Manchester, did likewise. The departure of the latter however, if it occurred, was only temporary. On the other hand Leven and Fairfax quit the field for good believing that the day was lost. According to the account of Lieutenant-Colonel James Somerville, Leven ‘never drew bridle’ until he arrived at Leeds.
Fortunately for the allies, some of the foot in the sector in question stood firm, most notably a brigade led by Lord Crawford-Lindsay on the right of the front line. Initially these infantry had made progress against the opposing Royalist foot but had then been held. Nonetheless, they continued fighting doggedly. As Lumsden records: ‘They that faucht stood extrarodinare weill.’ This is undoubtedly true, for they were not only attacked by foot from the front—and no doubt the left flank—but were also assailed by horse under Sir Charles Lucas from Goring’s wing. According to Stewart, Lucas ‘assaulted the Scottish foot upon their...Flanks so that they had the foot upon their front and the...Cavalry of the enemies left wing to fight with, whom they encountered with so much courage.’ Furthermore, he states that Baillie and Lumsden, ‘perceiving the greatest weight of the battell to lye sore upon the Earl of Linsies, and Lord Maitelands regiment, sent up a reserve for their assistance.’ Thus reinforced by men from the second line, the embattled regiments began to gain ground again.
Success was also achieved against Blakiston. According to Ashe, he was attacked on the ridge by a ‘regiment of the Earl of Manchester’s foot’ stationed in the allied third line, which ‘did wheele on the right hand upon’ Blakiston’s horse ‘and gave them so hot a charge that they were forced to flie back disbanded unto the moore.’
Before continuing with events in the centre, let us turn to a discussion of the conflict between the allied right wing under Sir Thomas Fairfax and the opposing Royalist horse under Goring.
At the commencement of the battle, Fairfax moved forward to engage his adversary. Some of the ground between Fairfax and Goring was crossed by the bank referred to earlier, running west from Atterwith Lane and evidently crowned for at least part of its length by a hedge. It seems, moreover, that there was some form of obstacle for some distance to the east of the lane for Captain Stewart (who as noted earlier was on the allied right wing), relates that ‘there was no passage’ for Fairfax’s men to come to grips with the enemy ‘but at a narrow lane,’ that is, Atterwith Lane. As the troopers moved forward, they suffered from Royalist musket fire and sustained severe losses as they tried to make their way ‘in threes and foures’ along the lane onto the ground beyond the obstacles. When the bank was levelled in the 1960s hundreds of musket balls were discovered, a fact which testifies to the intensity of the fire Fairfax’s cavalry encountered in this area. Not for nothing did Fairfax recall: ‘Musketeers...did us much hurt with their shot.’
In view of this, it is reasonable to conclude that chaos soon reigned in the ranks of the horse attempting to gain the ground beyond, via the lane. As the front ranks, which consisted of a newly raised regiment, were shot up it would have become increasingly difficult for those behind to make their way passed the dead and dying, riderless mounts, and those recoiling from the fray.
When one notes that Stewart himself comments that ‘five or six Troopes’ of horse subsequently managed to ‘charge through the enemy,’ it thus becomes hard to imagine that all Fairfax’s cavalry attempted to attack the Royalist left wing via Atterwith Lane. At Edgehill, Royalist cavalry had jumped over hedges barring their way and it seems apparent that whatever obstacles existed between Fairfax’s wing and that of Goring likewise did not prove insuperable.
Once beyond, many of the troopers found themselves on the moorland where clumps of gorse bushes rendered orderly progress difficult. The horse on the right of the wing did not have to make their way onto the moor, for the opposing cavalry was drawn up on cultivated ground to the east of Atterwith Lane.
The troopers who had progressed this far proceeded to charge Goring, who counterattacked. Some of the Roundheads reportedly did very well, for as noted, Stewart relates that five or six troops managed to charge through their opponents. Fairfax recalled that ‘with much difficulty I could get but 5 Troops’ [i.e., ‘a body of 400 horse’], ‘in order: with which I charged the Enemy’s Left Wing.’ A fierce struggle ensued: ‘We were a long time engaged one with another; but at last we routed that part of their Wing...and pursued them a good way towards York.’
It seems that the routed troopers had belonged to the left of Goring’s wing. The bulk of his command, however, fared better, much better. They successfully dealt with the disordered troopers who came against them. Only Eglinton’s Scottish regiment managed to partly halt the progress of the ‘Cavalier-like assault’ (W.H.), but after some hard fighting they too were driven off.
Many of the musketeers posted in support of the allied horse must have been cut down by the enemy or been trampled under foot. It is moreover recorded that in their haste to get away some of the broken horse overrode men on the right of the allied centre. As for Goring’s victorious troopers, they pursued the fugitives as far as the crest of the ridge. Indeed, some continued the chase far beyond.
The collapse of the allied right wing seems to have occurred at about the same time as Blakiston’s charge, for Cholmeley and the Parliamentarian, Edmund Ludlow, link Goring’s success with the flight of the allied generals, and it is reasonable to suppose that they would have only quit the field if the allied centre seemed to be collapsing as well.
Certainly, by this stage of the battle widespread confusion reigned. As has been noted, the Royalist right wing had been routed, and the right flank of the Royalist centre had been turned. The allied right wing had, on the whole collapsed, and in so doing had caused some disorder on the right of the allied centre where many of the infantry took to flight, as did other allied foot attacked by Blakiston.
It is thus easy to imagine the scene which confronted a gentleman approaching the field with dispatches for Prince Rupert. His name was Arthur Trevor and he later recalled, ‘in the fire, smoke and confusion of that day, I knew not for my soul wither to incline. The runaways on both sides were so many, so breathless, so speechless, and so full of fears, that I should not have taken them for men.’
It is evident that when the bulk of Fairfax’s wing faltered, Royalist horse of Goring’s second line under Sir Charles Lucas moved against the exposed right flank of the allied centre, an action referred to earlier, and clashed with a Scottish brigade comprised of the regiments of Lord Crawford-Lindsay and Lord Maitland. As Peter Newman has commented of this encounter: ‘The fight between Lucas’s cavalry and the Scottish regiments was a classic of infantry-cavalry fighting.’ Twice Lucas charged against the foot (who it will be remembered were also assailed by Royalist infantry), but on both occasions the hedgehog of pikes prevented him from breaking the doughty Scots. Then the latter, as noted earlier, received reinforcements. Once again, though, Lucas came against them only to fail for the third time. Indeed, on this occasion he was captured and what remained of his dispirited horse gave up the struggle.
By now Cromwell was approaching, after circling the moor with elements of Crawford’s foot in support, and cutting down Royalists unfortunate enough to get in the way. With Cromwell was Sir Thomas Fairfax who had returned from pursuing that part of Goring’s wing he had routed. Fairfax tells us that, bearing a cut to his cheek, he returned alone to the field to meet up with the men he had left behind. Upon finding that they had been put to flight, and that he was among bodies of enemy horse, he removed the field sign from his hat and made his way across to join Cromwell.
Interestingly, Captain Stewart makes no mention of a pursuit. He relates that upon charging through Goring’s wing with five or six troops Fairfax and the cavalry with him ‘went to the left wing of hor
se’, that is, to join Cromwell, and that two squadrons of Balgonie’s regiment (which had been stationed in Fairfax’s third line), subsequently did likewise. One did so after clashing with a Royalist regiment of foot and putting it ‘wholly to the rout,’ while the other, ‘by another way’, also joined Manchester’s lieutenant-general of horse. In short it seems that though a pursuit of part of Goring’s wing did take place, Fairfax was not the only one from his wing to make his way across to join Cromwell at some time or other.
As Cromwell and those with him drew near Atterwith Lane they came under fire from the Marquis of Newcastle’s regiment commanded by Sir William Lambton, which may, as Newman maintains, have taken up a position in one or more of the Hatterwith enclosures just to the east of the lane. Cromwell moved against the regiment (which had been raised in north Durham and about Newcastle upon Tyne in 1642), but failed to make any significant headway. Hence he pressed on, leaving Fraser’s dragoons and Leslie’s horse to deal with the isolated infantry regiment.
Cromwell and his Eastern Association Horse proceeded to engage what remained of Goring’s wing. Cholmeley records that many of the Royalist commander’s men were ‘dispersed in pursuit’ of fleeing allied soldiers, and he was therefore greatly outnumbered in this action, of which Watson wrote: ‘And here came the business of the day.’ Watson continues:
The enemy [i.e., the Royalists], seeing us to come in such a gallant posture to charge them...began to thinke that they must fight again for that victory which they thought had been already got. They marching down the Hill upon us, from our Carriages, so that they fought upon the same ground, and with the same Front that our right wing had before stood to receive their charge; and we stood in the same ground, and with the same Front which they had when they began the charge.
Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746 Page 19