Post-Mubarak
The Brotherhood was as jubilant as the rest of the protestors at Mubarak’s departure. It was also equally explicit that Mubarak’s removal was not the end of the road and that the army still needed to transfer power to a civilian authority for the revolution to be complete. However, the movement carried over the cautious approach it had employed during the uprising into the transition period. Once again the Brotherhood was quick to stress that it was not hungry for power and that it had no intention of dominating the post-Mubarak political arena. In a statement issued the day after Mubarak’s departure, the Brotherhood declared that it would neither nominate a candidate for the presidency nor seek a majority in parliament.30 A few days later, Issam al-Ariyan said, ‘We are also not targeting to have a majority in the upcoming parliament. This is a time for solidarity, unity, we need a national consensus.’31
This concern not to frighten anyone off, least of all the still dominant military regime, was understandable. Ending up in confrontation with the military could spell disaster for the Brotherhood. If it was to ensure its role in the new Egypt, the movement’s leadership knew that it had to play the game right. Doing so meant employing patience, moving gradually and, perhaps most challengingly, treading a difficult path between the military and the people. Despite its desire to see an end to the powerful military regime, the Brotherhood knew that being wholly on the side of the revolutionaries, who were still in Tahrir Square demanding that the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) hand over power immediately, was a risky strategy that might backfire. Not only might such an approach result in further chaos and violence, it could still see the military retaliate and deny the Brotherhood any kind of legitimisation as a political actor. This would be a disaster for the movement that was determined to play its part in post-Mubarak Egypt. The Ikhwan calculated that its best option was to work with the SCAF to help it come up with an acceptable transition plan. This way, the Brotherhood believed, it could direct the transition and secure the best gains for itself in the unfolding process. However, the Brotherhood was also aware that it could not cosy up to the generals too much. This would risk alienating its supporters and losing the revolutionary credentials it had managed to chalk up despite being a latecomer to the uprisings.
The Brotherhood therefore had to navigate a careful path between the two camps, relying on its age-old strategy of forging temporary alliances of convenience and playing to both sides simultaneously. This way, the movement’s leadership believed, the Brotherhood could manoeuvre itself gradually into a position of power. For all the Brotherhood’s denials that it was seeking to dominate the post-Mubarak political arena, right from the outset its actions suggested otherwise. The Brotherhood jumped at the chance, for example, to participate in the committee of legal experts established by the SCAF immediately after Mubarak’s departure. This committee, which comprised a small and select group of legal experts, was tasked with drawing up a set of recommendations for amending the constitution ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections. Lawyer and senior Brotherhood member, Sobhi Saleh, was appointed to the committee that was headed by Tariq al-Bishri, the former head of Egypt’s administrative court, a known Brotherhood sympathiser.
Being part of this committee would enable the Brotherhood to have a direct say in how the transition would pan out. The committee proposed a series of amendments to regulate both presidential and parliamentary elections. The most crucial element for the Brotherhood in this respect, however, was that it could have a say in when the country’s new constitution was to be drafted. Most political groupings in Egypt wanted a new constitution written before parliamentary and presidential elections took place. Conversely, the Brotherhood was intent on ensuring that elections occurred prior to the constitution writing process, and importantly, that they took place as soon as possible.
The Brotherhood’s rush to hold elections had little to do with lofty ideals about the nature and machinations of the transition to democracy. Rather, being the most organised political grouping on the scene, the Ikhwan knew that it was best placed to succeed in any national poll. The Brotherhood’s years of underground activism and the resulting networks it had established put it way ahead of its liberal and secular rivals, many of whom were new to the scene. As such, the Ikhwan wanted to ensure that there could be no delay in going to the polls.
Equally important to the Brotherhood was how the document was to be drawn up. The movement worked hard to ensure that the amendments specified that the constitution be drafted by members of a 100-member committee, to be elected by the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council, the two houses in Egypt’s parliament. The Ikhwan was eager for parliament to have the overall say in appointing the committee because it had calculated that it could win in parliamentary elections. It would thus be able to dominate the whole constitution drafting process and ensure that the resulting document have a strong Islamic flavour.
While an Islamic flavoured constitution was the last thing on the SCAF’s mind, it was willing to work with the Brotherhood in return for the latter’s supporting its roadmap. On 19 March, the proposed constitutional amendments were put to the people in a referendum. Many political groupings, including those of a liberal bent, were desperate for the amendments to be rejected because they still wanted the constitution to come before the elections. However, having got the SCAF to agree to its transition plan, the Brotherhood was not going to squander its gains by allowing the people to vote ‘no’. The movement mobilised its supporters by portraying the referendum as a choice between Islam and secularism, warning voters that opposing the amendments would be tantamount to rejecting Article II of the constitution of 1971, which describes Sharia as the principal source of legislation.32 According to some reports, the Brotherhood resorted to even cruder tactics in order to convince people to vote ‘yes’, allegedly adopting slogans such as ‘Voting yes, with Allah’ or ‘Voting no is siding with the Copts’.33 By touching on such a raw nerve, the Brotherhood ensured that its supporters felt a kind of moral duty to come out and support the amendments.
The Brotherhood’s efforts certainly paid off. A striking 77.3 per cent of voters came out in support of the changes. Although this was not all down to the Brotherhood, its efforts at mobilisation certainly helped swing the vote in the movement’s favour. The results left the secular and liberal opposition reeling. They also left the liberal parties feeling as though they had been thoroughly stitched up by the military and the Brotherhood – the two big forces that had emerged out of the revolution. So much so that allegations began to surface that the SCAF and the Brotherhood had struck some kind of sinister backroom deal and that they were two sides of the same coin.
Perceptions to this effect were heightened by the fact that following Mubarak’s departure, the Brotherhood pulled back from the ongoing demonstrations, distancing itself from the other revolutionary elements. When crowds flooded back into Tahrir Square at the start of April to demand that the SCAF move faster to hand over power, the brothers stayed away. Still they stayed away on 27 May when hundreds of thousands went back to Tahrir and when protests were held across the country in what was dubbed the ‘Second Friday of Anger’ or the ‘Second Revolution’. The Brotherhood’s absence also led some to conclude that the movement had hatched some kind of plot with the SCAF to share power.
Both the Brotherhood and the SCAF were quick to deny such allegations. Guidance Office member Saad al-Katatni asserted, ‘It happened many times that our political stand coincidently went in the same direction of the military council’s desires, but that doesn’t necessarily mean we have a deal with them … We don’t care whether the military council is satisfied with our decisions or not.’34 Indeed, accusations of a secret deal appear to be rather far-fetched. The two sides may have had some grudging respect for each other but they were hardly natural allies. Yet they somehow needed each other. With the Brotherhood being the largest and most potent force in the country, it was in SCAF’s interests to g
et the movement on board and, more importantly, to convince it not to create further trouble on the streets. One retired general reflected later, ‘The SCAF’s goal at the time was to calm down the streets, and with the Brothers being the most organised and numerous group, they naturally felt it made sense to let them have a critical say.’35
Furthermore, in order for the SCAF to ensure it could direct the transition in the way it wanted, and, more importantly, to ensure the preservation of its own privileges, it was vital that it come to some kind of understanding with the Islamist movement it had fought so hard to suppress over so many decades. As one retired Egyptian army general put it, ‘When you enter a new block, you usually look to see who is the strongest thug with whom you could have an understanding. The SCAF was the newcomer, and the thug was the Muslim Brothers.’36
For the Brotherhood, meanwhile, making itself indispensable to the SCAF, and working with rather than against it, was the surest way of getting what it wanted out of the transition process. Only this way could it ensure that the necessary constitutional foundations were put in place for it to be able to capitalise on its natural advantage. As one Egyptian analyst explained, ‘The brothers do not want any obstacle to the elections because they are trying to achieve power through the ballot … They are opposed to the immediate departure of the military as that would create turmoil in Egypt and delay the elections.’37 Moreover, in the Brotherhood’s view, co-operating with the SCAF was the most effective way to weaken it in the long term. As one Brotherhood member put it, ‘How do you eat an elephant? One mouthful at a time.’38 Thus the two sides came together in a kind of tactical and uneasy alliance of convenience.
The Brotherhood also knew that it needed to keep the SCAF sufficiently sweet to ensure that the latter would approve of its forming a political party. This was essential for the Brotherhood, as without a party it would not be able to contest the elections or enter the political scene in any meaningful way. Almost as soon as Mubarak fell, the Brotherhood’s Shura Council announced its intention to set up a political arm. Then in April 2011 the Brotherhood set up the Freedom and Justice Party. Three members of the Guidance Office were appointed to lead this new political venture. Mohamed Morsi was appointed as party head, Issam al-Ariyan as its deputy and Saad al-Katatni as its secretary-general with all positions valid for a four-year term. On 18 May 2011, the Brotherhood formally submitted a request to establish the party, which boasted some 9,000 founding members.39
Setting up the Freedom and Justice Party was a bold and decisive move for a movement that had long been riven with internal debates over the rights and wrongs of establishing a political party. All the more so given that in the years prior to the revolution, the traditionalists, who advocated shying away from the political arena, had come to dominate. However, after some heated debates within the movement in which some brothers argued that the Brotherhood should remain as a jama’a, leaving its members free to join whichever political party they wanted, the objections to forming a political party, even among the party traditionalists, seemed to dissipate as quickly as Mubarak himself. Now that the opportunity of getting to power had become a reality, ideological concerns were put quickly to one side.
Not that the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party was without its challenges. There was a great deal of discussion both inside and outside the movement about what the nature of the relationship between the party and the jama’a should be. The standard Brotherhood line on the subject was that the two entities would be completely separate.40 However, old habits died hard. Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie seemingly saw no contradiction in the fact that party leaders were appointed by the Guidance Office. He also prohibited Brotherhood members from joining any party other than the Freedom and Justice Party.41 The movement also wrote the party’s platform and approved its bylaws.42 For all its protestations to the contrary, it was clear that the party was going to be tightly controlled behind the scenes by the movement.
While this lack of separation was predictable enough, it still frustrated some more reformist-minded members who had hoped that the revolution would herald a newer, fresher and more open way of doing politics. Particularly aggrieved at the dominance of the old leadership over the new party were some Brotherhood youth elements. These young people tried to stand up to the Brotherhood machinery by holding public conferences at which they challenged the leadership’s way of doing things. At one such meeting in April 2011, they demanded that the Brotherhood become an official Islamic society in order for the Freedom and Justice Party to operate as a truly independent body. They also called for a raft of reforms, including that the Brotherhood separate itself from the international tanzeem, and, most boldly, that it select a general controller other than the Supreme Guide. Some of these youth elements became so frustrated that they broke away and formed their own political parties, such the Hizb al-Tayyar Al-Masri (the Egyptian Current Party).
Just as it did with those Brotherhood members who broke away in the 1990s to form the al-Wasat party, the movement’s leadership took a zero tolerance approach to these ‘errant youth’, expelling them from the movement making it clear that there was no room for disobedience within the ranks. Whilst much was made of these youth elements in the international media, where there were even suggestions that the Brotherhood might split apart, the movement proved as robust as ever. Indeed, a movement as large and solid as the Brotherhood could clearly withstand such shocks, which ultimately proved to be little more than an irritation. The message was clear: revolution or no revolution, the Brotherhood was not going to change its way of doing things.
Moreover, such matters were of trifling concern given what was at stake. The Brotherhood could see that after almost a century of semi-clandestine opposition, power was finally within its reach. Rather than get bogged down in soul searching about internal procedures and reform, something that risked weakening the movement, the Brotherhood focused all its energies on the more pressing task in hand. This was ensuring a victory in the upcoming elections that were scheduled for November 2011. This was the all-important moment for the Brotherhood that had to legitimise itself by turning its perceived popular support into tangible political gains.
However, as the elections approached, the Brotherhood found the SCAF to be a trickier partner than it had first anticipated. For all that the generals had been willing to work with the Ikhwan on the transition roadmap, as the elections approached the SCAF began to get increasingly alarmed at the prospect of a Brotherhood controlled parliament and a Brotherhood dominated constitution. The SCAF began to wonder whether it had made a mistake in rushing to work so quickly with the Brotherhood on the roadmap. Thus, the SCAF, that had already been frustrating both the Brotherhood and the revolutionaries by its repeated backtracking on agreed dates for its handing over of power, took a series of steps to try to ring-fence the Ikhwan. Most notably, in July 2011, the SCAF issued a new parliament law which stipulated that 50 per cent of seats in the lower house of parliament be reserved for individual candidates, with the remaining 50 per cent to be elected under a party lists system. The law ruled too that in the Shura Council or upper house, 65 electoral constituencies would be reserved for individual candidates, while 28 would follow closed party lists. This was disastrous not only for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, but for the other political parties and groupings. Under intense public pressure, the SCAF were forced in September to increase the share of party lists from 50 per cent to two-thirds of seats, but this would still work to limit the Brotherhood’s presence and influence in the parliament.
The SCAF also upheld a constitutional provision introduced by President Nasser ruling that half of contested parliamentary seats be reserved for representatives of ‘labourers and farmers.’ What this had meant in practice in the last years of the regime was that these seats were taken by retired military officers and security personnel who turned themselves into farmers in order to enter government.43
Fearing that it was about
to be denied its moment, the Brotherhood retaliated by playing it tactically, trying to outmanoeuvre the SCAF by finding other ways to dominate the political arena. In the early days after the fall of Mubarak, consistent with its cautious approach, the movement had insisted that it would only nominate candidates to 35 per cent of seats in the parliament.44 By April 2011, a more self-assured Brotherhood had notched this figure up to 50 per cent. But by October 2011 the movement changed its tune and went full out for power. It announced that, through the alliance it had teamed up with – the Democratic Alliance for Egypt – it would be nominating candidates for all available seats.45 There were ten other parties in this grouping, but the Freedom and Justice Party was the dominant player by far. It also supplied the vast majority of candidates nominated by the alliance for the elections.
At the end of September, the Brotherhood also upped the stakes by threatening to boycott the elections unless the SCAF amended the parliament law. However, it was careful not to push things too far. At the same time, it declined to give its backing to the mass protest that was held on 30 September to ‘reclaim the revolution’. However, the pressure coming from all sides was such that the SCAF agreed in October to amend the law and to allow all seats to be contested through the party list system.
Whilst this was a triumph for the Brotherhood, the movement was soon to be disappointed again when, in November, the SCAF proposed a series of supra-constitutional principles. These principles, that had been circulating since August, included that the military budget remain confidential, that the military be granted the right to object to certain articles of the new constitution, and that if the parliament failed to draw up a new constitution within six months, the SCAF would be permitted to draw up a new assembly. Equally contentious for the Brotherhood was the proposal that the SCAF be granted the authority to hand pick 80 out of 100 members of the constitution writing committee.
The Muslim Brotherhood Page 23