SOE
Page 17
This was the time of the Playfair and Hanbury-Williams report, commissioned by Selborne shortly after his appointment as Minister of Economic Warfare to look into the organisation of SOE and its relationships with other Services. Hanbury-Williams, a director of Courtaulds, was ‘one of the ablest business organisers in London’ while Playfair was from HM Treasury. They recommended some reorganisation, to which the Head of SOE (CD) readily agreed as he acknowledged that SOE had been set up in haste and had grown rapidly to a size where its original ‘family business’ methods were no longer sufficient. (Out of a total establishment of 3,226, Station IX accounted for 194, Station XII for 54 and Station VI for 11.) Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, commented that the inquiry had shown there was nothing wrong with SOE that couldn’t be put right.6
At the invitation of Horton, the SOE’s Deputy Director of Scientific Research and DSR/D visited Portsmouth to see other small underwater craft such as the X-Craft and Chariots under construction and to assess their suitability for SOE’s purposes. They considered that none would fulfil the requirements for Operation Frodesley and, with the approval of Horton, it was decided by DSR (Newitt) that Station IX should proceed with its own design as a matter of urgency.
He reported that progress was being made in the construction of Welman 1, and a tank model would soon be ready for drag tests. He requested that Horton should attach two naval officers with technical qualifications to the staff of Station IX, and drew attention to the urgent need for additional sheet metal workers and mechanics. It was hoped that depth and trimming tests, and the fitting out would be completed by August 1942. He also raised the question of training of SOE people by FO(S).
On 11 May 1942, six weeks into construction of the first Welman and on the originally estimated date for its completion, Sir Charles Hambro, the new Chief Executive of SOE, expressed doubts to Davies as to the wisdom of his organisation continuing this somewhat specialised work. It was, after all, a project aimed at putting an enemy battleship out of action and had obvious Naval connotations. The Admiralty must surely have had more expertise in the design and construction of sea-going vessels of all types and SOE’s embarkation on such a project could be seen as duplication of work being done in the Submarine Service, despite what the Deputy DSR’s visit to Portsmouth had revealed. Davies informed Horton of these doubts, raising the question as to whether it was duplication of work being undertaken by the Submarine Service. Gubbins became involved in the question and expressed the opinion that this type of work should indeed more properly be carried out under the control of either the Admiralty or Chiefs of Combined Operations (CCO) rather than the still-struggling SOE. Davies undertook to approach these two organisations to see if they were interested in taking over the project.7
Meanwhile, Col G.F. Taylor, later COS at SOE HQ, had circulated a minute on 18 May stating that Gubbins as Director of Operations was the SOE director responsible for deciding the use to which Welmans should be put and who should use them. It was the responsibility of Davies’s directorate (i.e. Newitt) to research, develop and produce and Newitt should apply only to Gubbins for direction about the use of the craft and the training of potential crews. Taylor, however, seemed to think that SOE Country Sections, the M/H Section, the Admiralty and/or CCO as appropriate should have a say in matters, but Gubbins made it quite clear that he would decide which organisations should use it and he would negotiate with the Admiralty or CCO, and Capt Simpson RN should look to him for direction in these matters. So it appears that although Gubbins was not particularly keen for SOE to research, design and produce the submarines, believing it should be an Admiralty or CCO matter, he wanted them for SOE and to control their use by his organisation.8
Some further discussions must have taken place during which time Nelson had been replaced by Hambro. Less than a week later, on 23 May, in what appears to be an uncharacteristic volte-face, Taylor’s understanding was that Gubbins had decided that there was no question of the Welman being used by the Operations Directorate (of SOE) and he therefore questioned whether research and development should continue with SOE on behalf of the Admiralty and CCO. Simpson was charged with finding out the Admiralty’s wishes and reporting back to Taylor and Davies while the latter approached the CCO. While all these political issues were being ironed out the first Welman was under urgent construction.
Capt R. Wilson RA visited Station IX on 9 June 1942. He was sent by Maj Courtney, the Officer in Charge of the Special Boat Section, S.S. Bde, and like him, Wilson was thrilled at the prospect of the Welman and hoped to be able to drive one. He had logged 150 days of experience in submarines in the Mediterranean, which seemed to be considered sufficient qualification for appointment as a seconded ‘operational adviser’ on development of the craft at Station IX.
Completion of the first submarine was achieved by the end of June 1942, just about double the time originally estimated but nevertheless a very creditable performance starting from a blank sheet of paper. The trials which followed in July and August demonstrated that the requirements of the specification had been broadly met. Testing at Station IX took place in a large brick-built tank subsequently used to circulate cooling water around some of ICI’s laboratories.
Among the flimsy and fading papers discovered in Everett’s files is the following anonymous skit upon the Welman and its inventor. ‘Bus’ refers to Buswell, ‘Mel’ to Maj Meldrum, and ‘Port’ to Porteous. ‘John’ is, of course, the inventor Dolphin but ‘Lloyd’ is unidentified.
FRATA MIRACULA
And it came to pass that the people of the land of England were sorely oppressed, being set upon by enemies from without.
And the King spake unto his Councillors, saying Go ye forth into the Wilderness that is called Welwyn and bring unto me one John, that dwelleth there.
For I have seen a vision and dreamed a dream, and it hath been shown to me that this John will save us from the enemies which are beyond the sea and in the waters under the seas.
And the Councillors said unto the King Oh, King, live for ever.
And immediately he lived for ever.
Whereupon they departed thence, to find John in the Wilderness and when they came upon him, they told him that which the King had commanded.
And John said unto them I too have seen a vision and dreamed a dream. For behold, in my dream I saw a Dolphin upon the waters, the like of which has never been seen before. Go and tell the King to build an Ark for his peoples, built in the likeness of the Dolphin of my dreams.
But they spake amongst themselves, saying No man can do this.
Whereupon John the Prophet hurled them forth, and called unto him his three sons, Bus, Mel and Port.
And he spake unto them, drawing in the sand at his feet, saying Thus it shall be made, and thus, and thus. Go ye and do my bidding.
And Bus and Mel went forth, but Port looked about him gloomily and drummed his fingers upon the table.
Now passed a period of many moons, when they did gather together many materials. Steel of the finest lustre did they buy, to the weight of four score oxen, and with it rods of the most brazen brass, one thousand cubits.
And day and night they wrought upon it, and when it was nearly finished, Mel said unto Bus Let there be light therein.
And Bus replied, saying There is light, whereupon Port replaced the fuses.
But John their father chided them, saying Haste, for the day cometh when she shall float beneath the waters, to confound our enemies.
So they fashioned for the Ark a cart of huge dimensions, and having placed the Ark upon it, they wrapped her in silken cloths, so that no man might see that which had come to pass.
And they departed unto the waters.
Now, when they had arrived there, they placed her upon the surface of the sea, crying What Ho! and that she bumped. And all were of good cheer.
But lo! there was a man named Lloyd who set his heart against them. But it was of no avail, for he was cast into the outer darkness.
But, anon, he re-appeared amongst them, saying I have spoken unto the Councillors of the King and have sold the Ark unto them, not once but many times.
And they were greatly cheered by his words.
And so it came to pass that the words of the prophet were fulfilled and a Dolphin floated upon the waters, the like of which had never before been seen.
HERE ENDETH THE FIRST PART OF OUR CHRONICLES.
It appears that the earlier questions of control of the Welman project had been resolved in favour of the Admiralty, for the FO(S) now began a close association with the project. Early in July Horton wrote to Dolphin with a list of twenty trials which he required to be completed satisfactorily before he would consider the craft up to Admiralty standards. In his opinion these should be carried out at the Vickers test tank at St Albans, Horsea in Portsmouth harbour and Port ‘D’. On 27 July 1942 Horton told CD that, after useful conversations with two SOE officers, he considered that trials and exercises with the Welman should continue but at Staines reservoir rather than at Horsea. He was sufficiently impressed to order the second vessel to ISRB’s (Station IX’s cover name) design, the hull of which the Admiralty would pay for and Station IX would fit out. The limited trials so far possible with the original Welman were clearly insufficient to provide a basis for longer-term production decisions. Many more would be necessary before a decision on future development could be taken. But now that the design was more or less settled and with production experience of the first Welman, this second craft was completed in about four weeks.
The trials called for must have proceeded apace for on 12 August Horton told CD that they had reached the stage when consideration should be given to production matters. He wanted a number of pre-production models built by SOE as a matter of urgency in order to gain detailed experience in production methods and to permit training of operational personnel from the Admiralty, CCO or SOE. Despite Gubbins’s decision that Welmans would not be used by the Operations Directorate, Horton was keeping the options open.9
Horton, who now seems to have taken charge of the project and was thinking in terms of a production rate of one craft per fortnight up to a minimum of twenty, was told that this would require another building and more machines at Station IX. If large-scale production was decided upon it should, he considered, be under the control of the Admiralty although, he assured SOE, they would need their fullest help in the early stages. He would support their approaches to the Treasury or any other government departments. Mr Hanbury-Williams, the Deputy Chief (D/CD), told Horton that the Minister, Lord Selborne, was very appreciative of all the help the Admiral was giving and CD suggested to Lt Col H. Sporborg, his political assistant, that this correspondence might be mentioned to the Minister, no doubt to illustrate the cooperative nature of the project and to allay any fears of duplication of effort between the Services.
In the following week, on 19 August, CD approached Horton to use his good offices to obtain high priority for the additional buildings at The Frythe. Horton asked the Civil Lord to take the necessary action and a week later told CD that the Civil Lord had told him the Admiralty had supported SOE’s application for super-preference. They could hardly have done otherwise since they were placing the orders and impressing the urgency upon Station IX. While all this urgent action was taking place in high places, the second Welman was completed but not early enough for trials to be conducted during the month. Three more were ordered and another twenty were being considered by CCO, who were now interested in this development.
Admiral Mountbatten, who was Head of Combined Operations and something of a law unto himself, took an interest in the Welman. This could only have augured well for the project. Horton’s personal interest in the Welman continued and he witnessed trials in Staines reservoir. On 14 September he confirmed to CD that he had told Dolphin that until Admiralty trials had been completed he would not be in a position to recommend the production of more than the three vessels that had already been ordered. Dolphin had informed him that CCO had already ordered twenty-one Welmans. Whether this was a misunderstanding or some far from subtle manoeuvring, Horton had subsequently telephoned CCO and discovered in fact that none had been ordered! Unamused, he told CD that this confusion had better be cleared up. Nevertheless, contract No. CP 8A/70909/42 with the Pressed Steel Company in Oxford was for 153 units, known in the Company for security reasons as ‘Floats, sweep, MkIII’ (sic), and was dated 28 August 1942. It is suggested that this order could well have been a ploy to reserve production capacity in an already busy factory.
CD’s reply to Horton was that he understood Ashbourne and Davies had discussed the future of the submarine but that Horton was anxious to have the production of twenty craft postponed pending further trials to solve some technical problems. Putting back the order had been investigated but there would be difficulty in altering or cancelling certain of the contracts involved. CD presumed Horton still supported the erection of additional workshops, the installation of the machinery and the requisitioning of additional personnel for the pre-production work. CD also understood that CCO had given their requirements through Horton and hoped he would soon inform SOE of their likely commitments.
The saga of negotiation, confusing statements and (one suspects) intrigue was played out in London – while, at Staines reservoir, where steep wooden ramps into the water had been constructed, the second Welman, launched from a heavy wooden trolley, underwent its preliminary trials. Surviving photographs of the Welman show two different models. One, thought to be the prototype with pointed bow and stern, lacks the ‘bulges’ on each side and the splash-diverter looking like a small snowplough in front of the forward glass port in the conning tower. One picture10 shows the craft on a trolley with Dolphin in the background, while on the side of the conning tower has been painted an emblem which appears to be of a dolphin within a circle carrying the points of the compass, an apt insignia for a craft designed by someone with such an appropriate name. At that stage it was clearly incapable of having a 495 lb (225 kg) warhead attached to its pointed bow. Other photographs show a vessel with bulges on each side, fixings for the jettisonable keel and a blunter nose to which has been attached diverting bars from the hatch housing. The photographs in SOE’s catalogue of stores11 reveal how the warhead was eventually carried. One view with the warhead removed shows the redesigned bull-nosed bow of the Welman with an annular register on which to locate a mating part of the warhead. In the centre of the register is a single screw fixing to retain the warhead which now had a similar blunt nose to that of its host. The single holding screw passed through a watertight gland to an actuating wheel inside the hull. Consideration was given to fitting the charge with rubber buffers so that the driver could contact the target without making too much noise. The intention was that the driver should bring the bow of the submarine up beneath the bottom of the target until the ten powerful magnets of the charge held it fast with a pull of 1125 lb (510 kg) and a 40 lb (18 kg) positive buoyancy. He would next turn the holding screw fully home to arm the fuse and then turn the wheel in the opposite direction to release himself from the now initiated timed charge.
By the end of October two new workshops had been completed and their machinery installed. The Welman No. 1 had been used by the Commandos for training at Staines while Welman No. 2 had undergone further satisfactory trials. Now that Station IX had a couple of working examples it was anxious to demonstrate its success and accumulate credit among the previously sceptical Services. The captain of HMS Titania, a depot ship moored in the Holy Loch in Scotland, and other naval officers were invited to attend a demonstration.
On 9 November 1942 Horton, who had supported with interest the development of the Welman, was posted elsewhere and replaced as FO(S) by Capt Claud G. Barry DSO RN with the acting rank of Rear Admiral. CD wrote a letter regretting the loss of Horton’s inspiration and encouragement, no doubt
hoping it would nudge the newcomer in the right direction. Welman No. 2 underwent sea trials, although it is not known where, and the construction of Welman No. 3 proceeded.
On the last day of November a meeting took place between representatives of ISRB and Barry to discuss and plan future policy with respect to the Welmans. They saw the possibilities for its use by the Admiralty for attacks on enemy ships in harbour; by CCO principally for beach reconnaissance; and by SOE for miscellaneous requirements. Station IX with their additional workshops were at that time manufacturing or modifying ten Welmans, including the two already undergoing trials. The Admiralty wanted the remaining eight as operational craft. Having earmarked the current production run, the Admiralty told CCO and SOE to submit their requirements through the usual Admiralty channels. It was recommended that The Pressed Steel Company at Cowley in Oxford, used to making motor car body panels in peacetime, continue to fabricate the hulls but if the numbers required increased much more, the question of making expensive press tools would have to be faced.
It was decided that further, more comprehensive trials were to take place at HMS Varbel, again in Scotland. The opportunity was taken to propose, at least for the initial eight Admiralty craft, maintenance parties of two EMs, four ERMs, two Stokers and one Officer driver per boat with at least 50 per cent replacements. The training of the crews and maintenance of the submarines were to be the responsibility of the Admiralty, CCO or SOE depending on for whom the units were built. In the light of the Playfair and Hanbury-Williams report of June that year into waste and mismanagement, this seems a surprising duplication of training organisation and effort. ISRB was to be responsible for any developments in the boat’s design and Staines reservoir was to continue to be used for training and experimental work by SOE and CCO.