In December the Officer Commanding HMS Titania, having witnessed a demonstration of the Welman, wrote a paper comparing the Welman with the Chariot, the existing submersible device which was ‘ridden’ by a two-man crew called ‘charioteers’. The new craft was relatively comfortable and dry for the driver who was also able to take food and drink. He could surface and open the conning tower hatch to relieve any claustrophobia and stale air build-up whereas the charioteer could not get out of his diving suit and Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus (DSEA set). The Welman had a longer range and the possibility was being examined of carrying it to an operation within the casing of a submarine. It could probably resist small depth charges of the type dropped from ships in harbour unless one happened to fall very close. The course of instruction for the Welman was shorter and the care and maintenance simpler than for the chariot with its riders’ life-sustaining equipment. Clearly, at this relatively early stage the Welman camp had an enthusiastic supporter.
SOE held a meeting on 10 December at which it was agreed that:
a) Steps should be taken to retain the operational and experimental development of the Welman in the hands of SOE in charge of a special section under Capt Simpson.
b) That Capt Simpson with Lt Col Rowlandson should produce a memorandum for the Admiralty in which SOE’s proposal for this operational development and control should be set out.
c) The closest cooperation with the Admiralty should be maintained at all stages.
Less than seven months after Gubbins had questioned whether research and development of the Welman should continue to be conducted by SOE, positive steps were now being taken to ensure this did in fact happen. Perhaps Gubbins’s misgivings had been shown to have been misplaced or maybe the enthusiasm from certain quarters had changed his view. Or could it have been that a further six months of experience in subversive warfare had given him some ideas for its use by SOE?
Davies announced that financial authority had been given for twenty one-man Welmans and a new development, a three-man version. But what was this three-man Welman? A document by T.A. Hussey (DXSR) dated 16 January 1943 states that the three-man Welman was to be used for landing small demolition parties to destroy beach and underwater obstacles prior to an assault.12 No record or any drawings have been found indicating whether this development was to be physically larger or considerably more cramped and stuffy. If all twenty one-man craft were to be produced at Station IX, yet more workshop space would be needed and this would have a limiting effect on Dolphin’s other experimental work, so he would really prefer, say, ten or twelve boats. What was more, it would be necessary for at least three three-man Welmans to be made in SOE’s own workshops before constructional difficulties could be ironed out and a final production design could be arrived at.
The eight one-man craft for the Admiralty were to take priority and would take eight weeks to complete, presumably in parallel by eight teams of technicians. Thereafter, one per week would be made for SOE. Estimates gave the cost at that time of producing a Welman in SOE’s workshops at Station IX as £800, but if a large order was placed with an outside contractor the cost was likely to be about £1300. With all the initial problems of starting work on a new venture, production by an outside firm would be unlikely to commence for four to five months but after that the rate was estimated to be one per day which seems a wholly unrealistic improvement on earlier estimates and actual production times.
It was then agreed that as five or six of the eight one-man Welmans were required urgently and this would grossly overstretch the facilities at Station IX, an outside order would be placed for a reasonable order of 40 of the craft at a total cost of £50,000. Two additional three-man Welmans would be started as soon as the experimental designs were far enough advanced.
Completing the basic one-man Welman as an operational vessel and bringing it up to a stage where large-scale production would be possible was the first priority of the project at this time. Thereafter the construction of a satisfactory production model of the three-man version was to be pursued. Having available submarines, attention would then be given to production of a device for discharging Welmines (also being developed at Station IX – see Chapter 8) or for releasing numerous magnetic charges without opening the conning tower hatch.
It was, of course, necessary to devise some means of transporting the submarines to the area of any intended operation, for the Welman did not have the range to travel far under its own power. Possible means of transport to an operational area were seen as:
a) The aft compartment of a Sunderland flying boat. (Six Sunderlands were adapted to carry two Chariots each, so why not Welmans?)
b) By Motor Torpedo Boat or SOE’s own fast motor boats. It is not clear if these included the American sub-chasers which were used later.
c) By fishing boat or other vessels. Simpson was charged with arranging for trials in the estuary of the Helford River near the Lizard in Cornwall. Gerry Holdsworth, formerly of Section ‘D’, had set up a small base there in November 1940 from which the ‘Helford Flotilla’ of SIS and occasionally SOE vessels were busy infiltrating agents into France. From June 1943 the unit was officially known as the Inshore Patrol Flotilla (IPF) and was eventually relegated to a training establishment.13
January 1943 saw a certain amount of frustration reflected in reports of slow progress with the Welmans and of CD writing to Barry about the urgency of the project and the labour problems they were experiencing. He asked for a high-level meeting to enable decisions to be made. Welman No. 2 had been refitted at Station IX and sent back to Scotland for further trials. Welman No. 3 underwent a number of trials which included a deep water test and the placing of charges. Welman No. 7 had its preliminary trials in Staines reservoir. Experiments were also carried out with a modified charge and with an emergency release buoy. There had been some concern for the safety of the drivers during trials and training. It is thought that Dolphin considered the risk to be low, but Meldrum made an urgent request to the Experimental Section on 14 January for an Emergency Release Buoy, possibly as a result of a near-fatal incident when a Welman was unable to surface and was not raised for 18 hours. They designed a buoy containing calcium phosphide which, on reaching the surface, admitted water which led to the production of a plume of smoke. It was completed, tested and handed over for fitting to Welman 10 on 3 March.
On 28 January CD took Lord Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, Mr Clement Jones and Mr Markham of the Ministry of Labour to Station IX to show them its activities, to emphasise to them the urgency of the Welman project and, more importantly to him, the problems they were encountering. They were impressed and promised CD assistance with the labour problem. While SOE’s manpower problems were clearly being taken seriously in some quarters, there were some with a wider view who thought in terms of efficiency and who were particularly concerned at the risk of duplication of effort between SOE and branches of the three regular Services. CD, Gubbins, Lt Gen R. Weeks (DCIGS) and Maj Gen Galloway (DSD) met on 12 February to discuss the manpower issue and whether SOE’s design and development establishments were overlapping with others, such as Lord Cherwell’s protectorate at The Firs near Aylesbury, run by Millis Jefferis and known as Station MD1. Weeks was fairly well satisfied with the explanation given by CD and even approved the existing arrangements for liaison with the other services but, nevertheless, a committee was set up to examine the whole question. The global strength of SOE at that time was 3,352 persons but CD was looking for a figure of 7,000 of all ranks in 1943. There was a need for 180 additional tradesmen, who were hard to find. The policy was to employ personnel who would not be more useful on active service. Hence the establishment included significant numbers of borrowed RAF radio technicians, self-trained ATS girls and some wounded Service personnel.
On the same day, after a discussion with Barry, CD told Davies that he could place an order with the Pressed Steel Company for 120 Welmans. Barry told him he had heard that the CCO had an immediate need for
40 so he was increasing the number to a round 150. 30 were for training; eight for FO(S); 80 for SOE; and 40 for CCO. Now Dolphin could see the wisdom of placing the large order six months previously. Once again, Gubbins’s doubts about the Welman being used by SOE seemed to be receding.
Activity at Station IX at this time was intense. ISRB were constructing about 20 Welmans of which six were now complete and had passed their preliminary trials and four more were due to be launched in the next two weeks. Naval personnel for the Admiralty maintenance crew were being trained with SOE before being posted to HMS Titania.
Coincidentally with the urgent work on the submarines themselves, the explosive charge for the nose of the Welmans was presenting some difficulties. Further research into the fusing and initiating of the charge had proved necessary. It will be recalled that fusing the device was achieved by turning the holding screw fully home and releasing it by turning in the opposite direction. If the long screw were to jam after the first operation, the submarine crewman would be faced with the serious problem of not being able to distance himself from the fused charge short of abandoning ship and swimming for it; so the initiating device had to be as near foolproof as possible.
The committee set up the previous month by Weeks met at the War Office on 15 March. Brig F.J. Mitchell was in the chair, the others being Davies, Lt Col Wood of Station XII and Newitt. After what was probably thought to be an unnecessary, and no doubt short, gathering their conclusion was that co-ordination and liaison were complete with all the Services, the Ministry of Production, and the Ministry of Supply with the exception of relations regarding design of weapons and ammunition. One wonders if this exception was born out of frustration with the long series of official tests of the Welgun, the almost universal praise for it, but its eventual rejection. It was to be hoped that future liaison with respect to weapons was, perhaps, of less immediate importance since arms emerging from the fertile design offices of Station IX tended to be of a very non-standard kind (such as the Welrod, then under development) and required in limited quantities.
Towards the end of March there was unanimous agreement to the use of the Welman to lay a special magnetic mine, carried in place of the explosive charge, in narrow waterways such as the Gironde in western France, from which German and Japanese blockade runners were operating, and the Corinth Canal in Greece. It was acknowledged that in some circumstances in such operations the whole craft might have to be abandoned and left as a mine. One of the earliest suggested uses, the landing of agents, was now seen as unlikely due to the particular need for the right conditions of the beach, swell, etc., for success.
Other problems addressed at this time were the limited range of the Welman and finding a suitable means of transporting it to a target area. One ambitious idea considered was to establish a hidden base of operations complete with basic servicing facilities. The possibility of making use of one of the unfrequented bays in the Lofoten Islands off northern Norway was mooted.
On 19 April 1943 Selborne sent one of his enthusiastic letters to Winston Churchill anticipating his interest in photographs of the new one-man submarine which had been evolved (sic) at the SOE workshops. Trials, he said, had been so successful that the Admiralty had ordered 150. He went on to state that certain ideas, new to submarine construction, had been borrowed from the technique of blind flying in aircraft and developed by ‘an engineer and a scientist in SOE respectively and appropriately named Dolphin and Newitt’. The technique referred to was the use of a direction-indicating device.
He then described a proposed method of strike against the Tirpitz and further boosted the Welman by stating that in a trial it had carried out a successful mock attack on HMS Howe during which the submarine had gone ‘through and under nets and every other form of anti-submarine protection including all the latest detection apparatus’. In view of other evidence this was almost certainly an over-optimistic and perhaps misleading assessment. Selborne invited the Prime Minister to see the Welman for himself at Staines reservoir. Churchill would have liked to have seen it one day and would perhaps fix something up a little later on. No record has been unearthed that he ever did.14
Senior members of the Armed Forces and the Government now addressed the matter of operational policy regarding the use of Welmans. CD suggested they should be used in large numbers, possibly in the Baltic, Black Sea, Adriatic and Danube and their existence should not be revealed by the premature deployment of small numbers of the craft. Introduction of the craft into the Danube to disrupt important river traffic, including the long-time target of Rumania’s vital supply of oil to Germany, was clearly an admirable objective but it is not clear how it was proposed to get them into the river. Perhaps they were thinking of entry via the river’s delta in the Black Sea. Or perhaps the subsequent experiments with air dropping Welmans were initiated by the problem. The meeting also agreed that SOE’s efforts should be concerted with those of the Royal Navy and CCO. There was a clear case for a Combined Operational Committee to study intelligence, select targets, organise training and transport, etc.
The Royal Navy had had representation through much of the development stage in the persons of Lt Jimmy Holmes RN and Lt Basil Maris RNVR who had been attached to Station IX to advise and take part in experiments. They were subsequently to be the two British officers taking part in Operation Barbara. At this point in the spring of 1943 the use of the Welman in the Far East had not been broached but, as will be seen, Admiral Mountbatten and Special Operations Australia were to take an interest in it.
Station IX was instructed to proceed as a matter of urgency with both the Welfreighter (see later) and the two-man Welman (the Mark II; the three-man version appears to have been too ambitious). The two-man version had been requested by Country Sections who envisaged it carrying a passenger in addition to the driver, 600 lb (272 kg) of stores instead of an explosive warhead, and possibly a small petrol engine as outboard propulsion in addition to the electric motor. The overall length would have risen to 25 feet. Newitt estimated that its range could be increased to 60 miles by the provision of 50 per cent more batteries, an improvement considered desirable. He undertook to explore the installation of a petrol engine to increase the surface cruising speed to 5 knots and range to 100 miles. He was asked to follow this up provided it did not delay production of the Welman Mark II, whose prototype was under construction, and the Welfreighter, whose outer skin was now half completed, the design of mechanisms finished and their manufacture in progress. Those addressing the problem of transportation to operational areas now found that the earlier suggestion for air transport of the craft in Sunderland flying boats faced difficulties.
By the end of March 1943 some ten Welmans had been completed and tested. Five were already being used for instructional courses at Staines and at HMS Titania. The Emergency Release Buoy had been installed on the most recently completed craft. In a pressure test on the hull of a Welman it had failed at 243 lb/sq.in which is equivalent to a depth of approximately 480 feet, considerably in excess of its operational requirements. This must have been reassuring to both designers and potential crew alike.
At the end of April it was reported that training of Welman personnel and general development would henceforth be vested in the FO(S). In effect, the Admiralty were now running the project and SOE were merely providing the workshop space and manpower for development work. The petrol motor proposal explored by DSR had been fitted to the two-man Welman Mark II and had given normal runs in the test tank. A towing skid for the Welmans, a structure to give the craft stability when being towed at the higher speeds than it could ever achieve under its own power, had been tested in model form in the tank at St Albans. Research into the mechanical and electrical fuses of the explosive charges was continuing.
Further tests and training were undertaken in April at HMS Titania and HMS Bonaventure, a depot ship with special facilities for handling midget craft. Welman production had almost reached fourteen, Nos 11 and 12 being completed by
the Pressed Steel Company, the former to be sent to America.
Following some correspondence in which the FO(S) expressed the opinion that traditionally superstitious users of submarines would not favour a number thirteen, the Pressed Steel Company was ordered to re-number the thirteenth example (Job No. 6622) as ‘Welman 161’.15
On 24 May a clearly concerned FO(S) wrote to CD asking if the large order for 150 Welmans ought still to stand. He had read a report on their operational capabilities and noted with some alarm two serious handicaps. Contrary to Selborne’s claim, Welmans could not pierce a protective anti-submarine net and the driver’s vision at night was very poor. He pointed out that Chariots did not have these problems and queried if the craft could be improved to overcome them. A reply from CD reiterated the good points already made and expressed his strong opinion that the order should stand. Perhaps the improvements which FO(S) sought would be incorporated in the two-man version for no action was taken at this stage. CD, still enthusiastic about the craft, said there would be plenty of lightly defended sea or coastal targets in Norway, the Middle East and the Far East. He argued that if it was finally decided to stop the order for the Welman Mk I, its production slots could be taken over by the Welman Mk II and the Welfreighter, so it made sense to let the order stand for the time being.16
By the end of May Nos 11 and 12 had been sent to America and further work had been done on the towing skid to enable the towing speed to be increased. This proved to be an improvement but was unstable above ten knots.
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