There remains the question as to whether SOE ever carried out the proposed operation in which an agent carrying documents would be killed as a result of a deliberately arranged parachute failure. The technical evidence suggests strongly that this was impracticable. But was some other means found to achieve the same result without involving the crew of the aircraft? It is tempting to speculate that the dropping of an agent from a low-flying aircraft might have been carried out under the cover of a low-level air attack. One such attack is recorded on a German railway station between Holzmunden and Stahtoldende during which a briefcase was in fact dropped (Operation I.2 or ‘Acktentasche’). Was an agent also dropped? The briefcase was recovered by the Germans but there is no evidence of either a body or a parachute having been found. The operation took place on the night of 12/13 March, i.e. shortly before Templer left SOE. So he could have passed on the news to Marks as he was leaving. However, this scenario can be rejected if, as seems highly probable, the air attack was carried out by Mosquito aircraft which did not have a jump hole. Nor is there any record of these aircraft being modified for the dropping of personnel. Moreover, it is unlikely that a much slower Halifax could have mingled with the rest of the formation. So it would be of considerable interest to discover if any record of this exists in RAF files.
Yet another sinister possibility emerges. If Marks reported accurately Templer’s comment that ‘the agent would be dead before he reached the ground’, then did Templer have an alternative to parachute failure in mind? Was the agent to be killed in the aircraft before the drop by one of the unarmed combat techniques taught at STS 41? After all, a broken neck could well be the result of a rough parachute landing.
It is interesting that the agents Bienecke and Kick had both been briefed in coding, and Kick had been instructed in W/T work (but lost his wireless set in the drop). And Bienecke had codes, crystals and signals plans. So they could have been candidates for Marks’s Schiller. But they were not dropped until 2 April and they both survived. Two further clues in Schiller’s identity jigsaw have come to light: the minutes of the ‘W’ Board of the Security Services’ Twenty Committee (the body which so successfully ran captured enemy spies whom they had ‘turned’ to work for the Allies) for 15 March 1945 reveal that Capt (possibly Cdr) Cohen, an SIS member, had suggested that agent ‘Teapot’ might be used for plan Periwig and the Committee saw no objection to this. ‘Teapot’ was a triple-cross who had started working for SIS in January 1943 using both W/T and personal contacts.20 Marks makes the point that Schiller was a first class W/T operator and had worked for SIS. The second fact that might be relevant is that the PWE Periwig Report No. 7 up to 26 March comments that Operation W.5, the possible use of a high-grade P/W, had been cancelled owing to security objections.21
Unless further searching of files at the PRO sheds light on possibly as many as thirteen unidentified Periwig operations (assuming the last discovered number to be the end of the sequence and the numbering to be continuous), it seems highly unlikely that the murder of a PoW ever took place. But as Marks commented in a TV interview with Everett, ‘Templer would have made sure that he had covered his tracks’.
In the event, Periwig, although initially hailed in some quarters as an imaginative plan, was judged to have failed in its main objective, i.e. to persuade the Germans of the existence of an active and dangerous resistance movement in the Reich. It is clear that the various obstacles placed in its way by SIS and other agencies so delayed its full implementation that it was too late to have any significant influence on the final stages of the war.
It is perhaps pertinent, in hindsight, to question the validity of the original concept upon which Periwig was based. Its success depended both on the use of agents and on the provision of arms and equipment apparently for the use of a movement which did not actually exist. The deception was to be heightened by arranging for the discovery of dead agents carrying documents incriminating influential Germans. These agents were either to have been ‘shot while attempting to cross the lines’ or killed by ‘parachute failure’. Even had a method been found for ensuring parachute failure, the plan would have been faulted. While the discovery of one agent killed in an accident might not arouse suspicion, a second or third similar incident would undoubtedly lead to the revelation of a major deception plan – especially in the knowledge that such failures were rare. Even if the operation were to be limited to one agent then the contents of the briefcase would have to be sharply targeted on influential members of the Nazi regime. In fact, it appears that only one briefcase was dropped (without an agent) and although the contents appeared to reveal the existence of a subversive movement in a large German company, it would be unlikely to strike at the heart of the German establishment. Similar arguments would apply if a number of agents were shot while trying to cross the lines. But Templer’s plans envisaged not one but many infiltrations – at one stage he hoped for a dozen a month.
In the same way dropping of empty containers and packages would be difficult to achieve without revealing them as part of a deception plan. It was perhaps not realised at the planning stage that to release an empty container safely from an aircraft it would have to be ballasted with sand. Assuming that there was not to be a reception committee on the ground to empty the sand, then this ploy would not carry any conviction. All the recorded Periwig supply drops were in fact ‘blind drops’ of containers filled with arms and equipment. So the concept of using empty containers was apparently not pursued. The proposals to drop other items such as dummy radios, etc. were overtaken by events.
Although Templer was undoubtedly a hard man, and perhaps to some even ruthless, there is one incident which gives a different impression of him. Just before Christmas 1944 it was revealed that certain Norwegians were planning to deliver to SS headquarters in Oslo a 6-ft diameter traditional Christmas wreath, ostensibly from Quisling’s movement, the HIRD. The wreath was to be lavishly decorated with lights and greenery concealed within which would be a ring of plastic explosive detonated by a fuse in one of the candles. Norwegian Resistance welcomed this plan to wreak death and destruction upon their hated enemy but in London German Section did not support it. Templer showed some common humanitarianism and managed to veto the plan as being ‘contrary to the Christmas spirit’.22
SIXTEEN
TECHNICAL LIAISON
GENERAL
One of the main responsibilities of the DSR under Newitt was to establish and to maintain contact with Country and Overseas Missions on technical matters concerning the supply and use of equipment, and to ensure that their needs and complaints were referred to the appropriate Sections at Stations IX and XII. Initially the main concern was with Country Sections based in London, but as other Groups and Missions were established overseas it became increasingly important to ensure that their technical problems were brought to the attention of HQ. Conversely, it was important that Country Sections should be kept aware of the results of ongoing research and of its potential applications in their particular areas. This was in part achieved through the regular secret Technical Bulletins. It is not easy to say how effective they were, nor how widely these and other documents were distributed. There were occasional complaints that they did not reach those who could make best use of them. In part this may have been because the flow of information between users and providers was subject to security factors based on the ‘need to know’ principle. This security ethos also tended to mean that full details on the performance of equipment in the field were not always passed on from Country Sections to DSR. Moreover, few agents were technically trained and their reports, when available, often lacked the detail which would have been valuable to DSR in enabling performance to be assessed. Direct contact with agents was rarely possible (again perhaps for security reasons) and their debriefing reports were not often made available to DSR. In the early days these shortcomings were dealt with by Blount who had a roving commission to follow up enquiries and complaints with the Sections and to draw the at
tention of Station IX or Station XII to any matters needing immediate attention.
Another major task of DSR was to establish contacts with other Government establishments and to seek out new developments which might have applications to the work of SOE. This involved the creation of close links and joint research with RAE, AFDC and CCO covering developments in explosives, small arms and parachutage. Members of DSR sat on a number of Government committees such as the Incendiary Projectiles Committee, and were invited to observe some of the major trials and demonstrations at Aldershot and on Salisbury Plain. Thus AFDC were involved in the problem of the location of containers, while the Engineering Section was in regular touch with the Admiralty with regard to the Welman and other seagoing craft. Among the projects which were developed in collaboration with RAE were the K-type container, the Mosquito wing container, and HADDA. Conversely, the products of SOE’s research groups were made available to the relevant Services such as the Commandos, Airborne Forces and the Navy. Any impression that these links indicated an overlap of effort between the organisations was scotched by the Playfair and Hanbury-Williams enquiry which concluded that the operational requirements of the various interested parties were sufficiently different to justify parallel research programmes. Nevertheless, the importance of close liaison was emphasised. As a result, frequent exchange visits were made by appropriate staff.
The DSR Directorate was also the link with academia. Among those whose advice was sought from time to time were Professors Alex (later Lord) Todd; C.N. (later Sir Cyril) Hinshelwood; R.W. Norrish; M.B. Donald; and Sir Charles Darwin.
OVERSEAS LIAISON
SOE maintained contact throughout the world from Algiers to Cape Town and Darwin to Washington often by tiny missions, but in some cases with larger groups or regional organisations. Surviving organisational charts show the steady expansion of activities which took place as the war developed: in spring 1941 there was contact with just three countries outside Europe; in summer 1942 there were four, and by spring 1944 there were five. As far as DSR was concerned the main objective of overseas liaison was to assess the opinions of overseas sections and their criticisms concerning the suitability of equipment and its performance under local conditions.
Overseas Missions
Among the more important overseas missions were Massingham, based in Algiers and dealing with the western Mediterranean, and the Cairo Group (Force 133) concerned with Italy and the Balkans which moved to Bari in southern Italy when the area was in Allied hands. Air supply to the Balkans was directed from Bari where some facilities existed for conducting air supply trials. Station XV had a depot in Cairo headed by the well-known London stage illusionist, Jasper Maskelyne, whose treasure chest exhibited some of the more exotic products of the Thatched Barn.
The Indian Group (Delhi Mission, Force 136) had its headquarters at Meerut near Delhi and some research and other facilities at Kirkee near Poona (Special Forces Development Centre SFDC) and in Calcutta. In 1944 its HQ was moved to Kandy in Ceylon where Admiral Mountbatten had his Supreme Headquarters.
Problems relating to the South-West Pacific Area were initially dealt with by the Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) based at Melbourne, Australia. When this was liquidated in February 1943 it was replaced by the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD). One of its research units, the Mount Martha Research Station (MMRS), set up in March 1944 was intended to fulfil the combined functions of Stations IX, XII and XV in the UK. However, the Australian organisation worked independently of DSR in developing a number of SOE devices for use in the very different conditions encountered in the Pacific area. These included Folboats and canoes, demolition and general equipment, and special camouflage projects. Informal links with DSR were maintained by the interchange of personnel. In particular, Capt G.I. Brown from Station IX spent several months attached to SRD.1
The effectiveness of the liaison with Missions depended largely on the exchange of information. The mechanisms for this were often inefficient, and suffered the same problems experienced between Country Sections and DSR. They were mitigated by personal visits from members of DSR staff. Thus Blount was despatched to the Balkans in 1943 to ascertain the situation there. Without his report little is known about the outcome of his visit. He made a later visit to SW China to investigate the possibilities for supplying secret Chinese groups with materials to use against the Japanese. Again, no record of his trip has been located.
Middle East
In October 1944 Everett was sent to tour the Middle East Missions in North Africa, Cairo and Southern Italy to collect information on the whole area of Air Supply. Among his concerns was the delivery and performance of supply dropping parachutes. These were being manufactured in Cairo ‘sweat shops’ from Egyptian cotton, extensive use being made of child labour in the form of small boys of perhaps eight to ten years of age. At Bari and Monopoly, where the parachutes were packed and stored, emphasis was placed on the importance of hanging parachutes in well-ventilated sheds. It was said that parachutes packed in humid conditions developed slowly, a possible cause of some reported failures. Everett’s stay in Bari was also concerned with details of the internal organisation of supply flights with Dakotas operating to an airfield on the Adriatic coast. A proposed flight to demonstrate such an operation was eventually cancelled after a week of bad weather.
India and Ceylon
A major and more extensive visit by Everett to India and Ceylon occupied March– May 1945. By now the emphasis of operations was in the Far East so that one of the objectives of his visit was to assess the performance and applications of SOE stores under tropical conditions and in the operational circumstances existing in this theatre. On arrival in Kandy, Everett was briefed by Brig Anstey and his staff on the fundamental operational differences between the Far East and the European theatres. In the first place there were no major industrial complexes in Burma, Malaysia, Siam or the East Indies so sabotage operations were much more like guerrilla attacks on selected targets.
COMMUNICATIONS
Among the most important targets were the Japanese supply lines which were being used to distribute supplies mainly by rail and river from ports to operational areas. There is no evidence that the Japanese supplied their troops by air. Attacks on road transport had to be planned so that they did not lead to prolonged disruption of the advancing British troops. Mining of roads was specifically to be avoided although felling of trees across roads to hinder Japanese withdrawal was encouraged. This could be done using explosive charges either placed as ‘necklaces’ around the tree or inserted into holes drilled into the trunk. Standard SOE devices were being used in attacks on railways; on the whole they were readily adaptable to local conditions and performed satisfactorily. But there was a short supply of extension rods for use with pressure switches. Important trains were sometimes protected by a pilot engine sent ahead to detonate any previously laid device. Here the use of the Imber switch which allowed a predetermined number of trains to pass before being actuated would have overcome this problem, but it is not known whether any of these devices were sent to Force 136, let alone used. In many areas the main communications were by river so attacks on river craft were a high priority but the general opinion of those concerned was that no really effective weapons were available. The main types of vessel in use were river steamers of metal construction; ‘Paddy Gigs’, flat-bottomed wooden boats using oars or sails; barges; and a wide variety of country craft. It was difficult to smuggle explosives aboard the larger vessels since security was tight. Proposals for the inclusion of parcels of explosive in sacks of rice were considered unrealistic. Another possibility under discussion was the use of fireships in ports and harbours. To be effective this was only practicable where the density of ships was high and there were few places where this seemed to be likely. Attacks on river shipping from the banks faced a number of problems. Many rivers were more than 400 yd wide with low banks and mud flats extending to a small stream in the centre. It would sometime
s be possible to choose bends in the river where the main channel came close to the bank, but the choice of weapon to be used was limited. The two-inch mortar, GP grenades, the PIAT and the Tree Spigot had all been considered but none was regarded as entirely suitable. In any case, heavier weapons were often ruled out by the nature of the terrain and it was important to be able to attack a moving target with as little time as possible for preparation. River targets were often the subject of daylight attacks from the air by the RAF so that increasingly river traffic moved by night. River ambushes could be carried out in darkness illuminated by 15-minute flares floated downstream or by parachute flares. Attacks on shipyards were not generally regarded as of great value and the use of the nailgun for the attachment of charges to wooden targets had not been widely tested.
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