17. See Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), 19. Carla Del Ponte, chief prosecutor at the international tribunal investigating war crimes in Bosnia, was quoted by Hockenos as saying of Tuđman: “Were he not dead, he would have been one of The Hague tribunal indictees.” See also Diane Orentlicher, “Who Will Judge the Court Itself?” Washington Post, July 8, 2001. Orentlicher wrote: “After Tudjman’s death in December 1999, Del Ponte stated that Tudjman would have been indicted had he lived longer. I can’t assess whether Tudjman deserved to be indicted, but I find it worrying that the prosecution was unable to complete its investigation more than four years after the most recent alleged crimes occurred.”
18. See Cohen, “Balkan Leaders Face an Hour for Painful Choices.”
19. NATO was supervising flight restrictions over Bosnia that the United Nations Security Council had imposed in 1992.
20. See Francis X. Clines, “Downed U.S. Pilot Rescued in Bosnia in Daring Raid,” New York Times, June 9, 1995.
21. Quoted in Piero Valsecchi, “Pilot: ‘Scared Little Bunny’ While Eluding Serb Forces,” Associated Press, June 10, 1995, retrieved from LexisNexis database.
22. Sergeant Scott Pfister, a crew chief of one of the helicopters, said of O’Grady: “He looked scared. . . . There were tears in his eyes. He definitely looked emotionally drained.” Quoted in Daniel Williams, “I’m Ready to Get the Hell Out of Here,” Washington Post, June 9, 1995.
23. Ibid.
24. Clinton stamped his feet with joy over the news of O’Grady’s rescue. See Richard Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2009), 134.
25. Clines, “Downed U.S. Pilot Rescued in Bosnia in Daring Raid.” News of Clinton’s cigar-smoking celebration was derided by some observers. For example, a columnist for the St. Paul Pioneer Press in Minnesota wrote: “These days . . . national triumphs come in small packages. We can’t stop the slaughter in Sarajevo. We can’t agree what to do about it. We can’t even stick to one policy for five minutes. But, dang it, we can rescue our boy! And, if we are president, we can gloat and smoke!” Nick Coleman, “Smoke Can’t Hide Timid President,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, June 11, 1995.
26. Quoted in Williams, “I’m Ready to Get the Hell Out of Here.”
27. See Alison Mitchell, “After the Cigars, Clinton Still Faces Growing Criticism of Bosnia Policy,” New York Times, June 9, 1995.
28. Peter Slevin, “Clinton Got Bold on Foreign Policy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, September 29, 1996.
29. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 217.
30. Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars, 136.
31. See Warren Bass, “The Triage of Dayton,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September–October 1998): 98.
32. See, among others, Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 252. He wrote: “We had relied unrealistically and for longer than was justifiable on our European allies to resolve the problems in Bosnia.”
33. The Serbs claimed to have been aware of the rescue mission but let it go ahead as a humanitarian gesture. See Clines, “Downed U.S. Pilot Rescued in Bosnia in Daring Raid.”
34. Another factor propelling the Clinton administration to intervene was the realization that U.S. forces would be sent to Bosnia in keeping with a NATO commitment to extricate U.N. peacekeepers should conditions on the ground force their withdrawal. It became clear, Warren Bass wrote, that the only way to forestall such a scenario “was to push the parties” in Bosnia to a peace agreement. Thus the administration “became bold [in Bosnia] almost by accident.” Bass, “The Triage of Dayton,” 100, 101.
35. Bosnian Serbs had blocked resupply routes for the Dutch peacekeepers, who had received no diesel fuel or fresh food in weeks. See Rohde, Endgame, 5–6.
36. Quoted in Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 401.
37. Ibid., 420.
38. See Rohde, Endgame, 229.
39. See ibid., 158–61.
40. Samantha Power wrote: “There was much the United States might have done” in response to the outrage at Srebrenica. But it did very little to prevent the enclave’s fall or to punish the Serbs for their aggression. Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 406.
41. “Nothing else in the war had matched, or ever would match, Srebrenica,” Holbrooke later wrote. Holbrooke, “Why Are We in Bosnia?” in The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke in the World, ed. Derek Chollet and Samantha Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 219.
42. William Safire, “Essay: Time Has Come,” New York Times, July 13, 1995.
43. Anthony Lewis, “Abroad at Home: Weakness as Policy,” New York Times, July 14, 1995.
44. See Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 393.
45. See Thomas Lippman and Ann Devroy, “Clinton’s Policy Evolution: June Decision Led to Diplomatic Gambles,” Washington Post, September 11, 1995.
46. See Rohde, Endgame, 332–33.
47. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 199.
48. See Daniel Williams, “NATO Suspends Raids Indefinitely,” Washington Post, September 21, 1995. See also Roger Cohen, “NATO Presses Bosnia Bombing, Promising to Make Sarajevo Safe,” New York Times, August 31, 1995.
49. See Roger Cohen, “Taming the Bullies of Bosnia,” New York Times Magazine, December 17, 1995, 62.
50. For a discussion of Holbrooke’s character and how his independent streak may have kept him from becoming secretary of state, see James Traub, “Holbrooke’s Campaign,” New York Times Magazine, March 26, 2000, accessed August 18, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2000/03/26/magazine/holbrooke-s-campaign.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Traub compared Holbrooke to former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, writing: “Holbrooke speaks often of Henry Kissinger, and there is something in the way Holbrooke bestrides the world that can put you in mind of him. Like Kissinger, Holbrooke wants to be on the inside of everything—every debate, every decision, every juicy secret and every desirable party. He is, like Kissinger, a social animal, equally sought-after as a guest and a host.”
51. Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 239.
52. Donald Kerrick, a member of the core U.S. negotiating team at Dayton, recalled Holbrooke as “very talented and very energetic. But sometimes crazy.” Kerrick, a retired three-star Army general, also said: “I’m a big Dick Holbrooke fan. I think Dick Holbrooke was one of our generation’s best diplomats and statesmen. . . . Of course, he was not without shortcomings.” Kerrick, interview with author (August 12, 2013).
53. Roger Cohen, “The Unquiet American,” New York Times, December 16, 2010.
54. According to journalist David Rohde, Ratko Mladić disingenuously said he “couldn’t promise that Muslims wouldn’t shoot at” an aircraft carrying Holbrooke and his negotiating team. See Rohde, Endgame, 336.
55. Holbrooke, To End a War, 269. Holbrooke dedicated his book to the memories of Frasure, Kruzel, and Drew. Holbrooke’s wife, Kati Marton, was quoted by Roger Cohen of the New York Times as saying that Holbrooke “felt terrible over the deaths, and at some level responsible, and the only way to redeem this was for these people in the Balkans to come to terms and end the war.” Cohen, “Taming the Bullies of Bosnia,” 62.
56. Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars, 428.
57. Holbrooke wrote that whereas Christopher “was cautious and methodical, I tended to be intuitive and impatient.” Holbrooke, To End a War, 239.
58. “Lexington: Mr. Christopher’s Monument,” Economist, November 25, 1995, 72.
59. Warren Christopher’s visits to the Dayton talks “had a calming influence on everyone, especially in contrast to Holbrooke’s relentless (and at times overbearing) intensity,” Derek Chollet wrote. “Both in stature and style, the Secretary of State exuded control and steadiness.” Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 163. Kerrick recalled that Christopher “was able to add that gravitas that
we needed” at Dayton. Kerrick, interview with author. See also Michael Dobbs, “Three Shaped Pact: Effort Began with Frasure, Picked up by Holbrooke, Closed with Christopher,” Washington Post, November 22, 1995.
60. See Dirk Johnson, “Bemused Dayton Awaits Peace Talks,” New York Times, October 29, 1995. See also Ran Raider, “Famous Miami Valley Inventors,” Wright State University libraries, accessed July 27, 2013, http://guides.libraries.wright.edu/content.php?pid=51767&sid=716761.
61. Johnson, “Bemused Dayton Awaits Peace Talks,” 24.
62. Holbrooke identified the other finalists as the U.S. naval station at Newport, R.I., and Langley Air Force Base in Norfolk, Va. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 204. The president’s retreat at Camp David in Maryland was ruled out, Holbrooke wrote, because it “was too close to Washington, too small, too ‘presidential,’ and too closely identified with the 1978 negotiations between Egypt and Israel.”
63. Kerrick, interview with author.
64. See Roger Cohen, “Reporter’s Notebook: A Limousine Carries Milosevic, and a Message,” New York Times, November 2, 1995.
65. “We wanted them to see this physical symbol of American power,” Holbrooke wrote in To End a War, 233. Kerrick said the Balkan leaders at Dayton “understood that the U.S. had a lot of military power. And we had shown we would use it, if need be.” Kerrick, interview with author.
66. See Michael Dobbs, “Bosnia Talks Open with Warning to Leaders,” Washington Post, November 2, 1995.
67. See Steve Love, “In the Heartland, Hope for Peace,” San Jose Mercury News, November 1, 1995. The smoking ban in federal buildings reportedly was lifted at the talks, “to accommodate Eastern European habits.” See Kathy Lally, “Warning Opens Bosnian Talks,” Baltimore Sun, November 2, 1995, accessed August 5, 2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995–11–02/news/1995306124_1_christopher-herzegovina-bosnia/2.
68. Holbrooke said he found Dayton to be “a charming small Ohio city. . . . Unlike the population of, say, New York, Geneva, or Washington, which would scarcely notice another conference, Daytonians were proud to be part of history.” Holbrooke, To End a War, 234.
69. Ibid.
70. See Roger Cohen, “U.S. Envoy in Bosnia Helps to Free Colleague (from an Ally),” New York Times, October 19, 1995. Kerrick recalled that Milošević pronounced the city’s name “Day-tone.” Kerrick, interview with author.
71. Holbrooke, To End a War, 185.
72. Cohen, “Reporter’s Notebook: A Limousine Carries Milosevic.”
73. See Elaine Sciolino, “3 Balkan Presidents Meet in Ohio to Try to End War,” New York Times, November 2, 1995.
74. Kerrick, interview with author.
75. Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Associated Press, November 1, 1995, retrieved from LexisNexis database. See also Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 139.
76. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 204.
77. Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars, 158.
78. Holbrooke, To End a War, 232.
79. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 133. Only Warren Christopher and the State Department’s spokesman, Nicholas Burns, were authorized to speak for the record about the talks. Chollet also noted that, in many ways, “Dayton was not only radio silent to the public, but also to the rest of the American government.” Officials in Washington, he wrote, “were not always aware of the precise substance of the discussions, especially given the complexity and speed with which things happened inside the compound” at Dayton (133).
80. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 199–200. Other conditions the United States insisted on were that each leader have “full power to sign agreements” and that “they stay as long as necessary” to close a deal.
81. Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.
82. Ibid.
83. Kerrick, interview with author. Holbrooke later said he figured the chances of success at Dayton were 20–30 percent. See Traub, “Holbrooke’s Campaign.”
84. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 233.
85. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 140.
86. See Richard C. Holbrooke, “Dayton Update: Tuesday, November 7, 1995, 11:50 p.m.,” memorandum, “End of the Cold War Collection,” National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. See also Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 148.
87. Quoted in Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 148.
88. Holbrooke wrote that the session “was a disaster. Putting the principal actors in front of maps brought out the worst in all of them.” Holbrooke, To End a War, 255.
89. Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 255. Kerrick recalled that the dynamics of the talks could shift suddenly and dramatically. “It changed constantly,” he said. “It changed within meetings. You’d be sitting there one moment with what seemed to be consensus and it would just unravel before your eyes. And you would have to rebuild it all over again. It was very volatile, as were the characters.” Kerrick, interview with author.
90. See Richard C. Holbrooke, “Dayton Update: Tuesday, November 8, 1995, 10:00 p.m.,” memorandum, “End of the Cold War Collection,” National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. See also Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 151.
91. Holbrooke, To End a War, 243.
92. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 143. During NATO’s aerial bombing in September 1995, Tomahawk missiles were fired at Serb military positions from U.S. warships in the Adriatic Sea. See Rohde, Endgame, 339.
93. Kerrick, interview with author.
94. See Peter Grier, “Quest Launched for Reporter’s Freedom as He Paces behind Bars in Bosnian Serb Jail,” Christian Science Monitor, November 21, 1995.
95. Holbrooke, To End a War, 242–43.
96. Ibid., 247.
97. Holbrooke, “Dayton Update: Tuesday, November 7, 1995.”
98. Holbrooke later wrote that he violated the news blackout by taking a telephone call from Ted Koppel of the ABC News Nightline program who said Rohde had once worked for Koppel and urged Holbrooke to make the journalist’s case “a high priority.” Holbrooke, To End a War, 246.
99. See Michael Dobbs, “For Rohde, the Power of a Well-Placed Writer Paid Off,” Washington Post, November 9, 1995. Dobbs wrote: “So far only one writer has managed to penetrate the tight security surrounding the Bosnia peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base just outside Dayton. It helps that author Kati Marton is married to chief U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke.” At one point in Dayton during Rohde’s ordeal, Holbrooke picked up the wool fedora of Nikola Koljevic, the top Bosnian Serb official at the talks, and asked him: “Do you like this hat? Maybe I should hold it hostage.” Quoted in Grier, “Quest Launched for Reporter’s Freedom.”
100. David Rohde, “Personal Diplomacy,” New York Times, December 26, 2010. Rohde won a Pulitzer Prize in 1996 for his reporting about the Srebrenica massacre both before and after his arrest.
101. Derek Chollet described the Rohde case as “a time consuming diversion” at Dayton. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 150. Twelve members of Rohde’s family and two editors from the Christian Science Monitor traveled to Dayton to press for the journalist’s release. See Rohde, Endgame, x.
102. Quoted in Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 155.
103. See Chollet’s description of “napkin diplomacy” in The Road to the Dayton Accords, 165–66.
104. Ibid., 166.
105. Ibid., 166–67. See also Holbrooke, To End a War, 283, 285.
106. Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 285. Holbrooke wrote that he had seen “no evidence that the alcohol affected” Milošević.
107. See Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 170.
108. Quoted in ibid., 170.
109. See Holbrooke, To End a War, 302.
110. See Elaine Sciolino, Roger Cohen, and Stephen Engelberg, “In U.S. Eyes, ‘Good’ Muslims and ‘Bad’ Serbs Did a Switch,” New York Times, November 23, 1995.
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br /> 111. Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 289.
112. In 1992, the then–secretary of state, Lawrence Eagleburger, had said Milošević should be put on trial for “crimes against humanity” in Bosnia. See Don Oberdorfer, “Eagleburger Urges Trial of Serb Leaders,” Washington Post, December 16, 1992.
113. Kerrick, interview with author.
114. See Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 167.
115. Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 291. Holbrooke wrote that Milošević’s remarks in announcing the concession on Sarajevo “were probably the most astonishing and unexpected of the conference.” He further wrote: “We never fully understood why Milosevic decided to give Sarajevo to the Muslims. But in retrospect, the best explanation may be that he was fed up with the Bosnian Serbs and had decided to weaken their . . . base by giving away the Serb-controlled parts of Sarajevo” (293).
116. See ibid., 298.
117. Milošević would not go beyond the 51/49 territorial division, telling the Americans late in the talks, “I can do many things, but I cannot give you more than fifty-one percent.” Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 296. But Milošević made clear he would settle for real estate of almost any kind. Carl Bildt paraphrased Milošević as saying, “Give me something! Steppes, rocks, or swamps—anything will do.” Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), 155.
118. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 173–74.
119. Ibid., 174.
120. Quoted in ibid., 174.
121. Ibid.
122. Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 265.
123. Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords, 175–77. See also Holbrooke, To End a War, 304–5.
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