It must be emphasized that even now, successful submarine warfare is greatly dependent on our air reconnaissance, so that the latter becomes an absolute necessity with the employment of the new types of U-boats, which will be operating almost exclusively under water. The old demand made by BdU to have at least 12 machines [aircraft] ready for operations daily, will scarely suffice for the U-boat war with the new types. According to the present planning, and taking into account the new constructions and losses even until the end of 1944, the total number of long-range reconnaissance aircraft (Ju 290) which can be reached and attained by the Fliegerführer Atlantik, will amount to only 20.
I therefore beg an investigation as to whether the production of Ju 290s cannot be given priority and I furthermore ask whether the whole production of Ju 290s could not be placed at the disposal of U-boat warfare for long-range reconnaissance.
I deem it my duty to report that even with the new types of U-boat, the U-boat war can be raised again to higher level only when the air reconnaissance absolutely indispensable to it is available in sufficient numbers.
That evening, Hitler declared his agreement with Dönitz: in his view ‘the cited number of Ju 290s to be completed is ridiculously low and must be increased by every means possible, as U-boat warfare is in urgent need of this air reconnaissance.’
The next morning, 18 December, Assmann advised General der Flieger Günther Korten, the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, of this development. Korten, caught between a rock and a hard place, took the news to his superior, Reichsmarschall Göring, who brushed it aside, proclaiming it to be impossible to increase production of the Ju 290 as construction capacity for the Luftwaffe was already at full stretch. Korten went back to Assmann and advised him of the present state of Ju 290 production at Dessau as well as his ‘willingness to examine the possibility of increasing production.’3
Just 68 reconnaissance flights had been made by the Luftwaffe over the Bay of Biscay and Atlantic in the period 15 November to 18 December 1943, an average of two per day and far, far fewer than the number achieved by RAF Coastal Command.4 On 20 December, FAGr 5 reported the following strength:5
Aircraft available (ready) Crews available (ready)
Stab 1 (1) 2 (2)
1.Staffel 4 (1) + 1 Ju 88 (ready) 8 (3) (Staffel still in the process of transfer from Achmer)
2.Staffel 7 (4) 12 (10)
Total: 13 (7) 22 (15)
That day a Naval Operations Staff memo noted:
All operations carried out during the past weeks in cooperation with the Fliegerführer Atlantik and the BdU against the north–south and west–east convoys in the North Atlantic were frustrated. According to the view of the Naval Staff, the failure is not attributable to any deficiency in the crews of the Fliegerführer Atlantik, but was due to lack of forces. It is impossible to carry out adequate reconnaissance of the large sea areas in question several days in succession with only one, or in maximum case, with three aircraft even when equipped with ship [search] gear. The convoys were, if at all, detected only by chance, and then so late that a change of the U-boat dispositions was no longer possible. Thus each of these operations is fresh proof that only with adequate air reconnaissance will U-boat warfare be able to achieve new successes. The Luftwaffe Operations Staff and the Reichsmarschall were informed of this necessity by the Chief of Naval Staff in numerous letters and personal discussions. A demand was made for 12 operational aircraft to be placed at the disposal of U-boat warfare daily. This demand was acknowledged as practicable and possible to carry out within a short time. Generalfeldmarschall [Erhard] Milch [the Generalluftzeugmeister and Secretary of State for Aviation] promised that the projected monthly production of 26 aircraft would be raised to 50 aircraft monthly if possible.
Against this, a production target sent in by the General der Aufklärungsflieger provides for ten Ju 290s as the monthly maximum for 1944, and ten Ju 290 reconnaissance aircraft for 1945. Thus the number of aircraft available to the squadron [FAGr 5] can be raised to 20 at most only after eight months, and only then by reckoning with a minimum of losses.
At the same time the General der Aufklärungsflieger reported that this [new type of] Ju 290 will also be built as a bomber, its construction will start in January 1944 so that already in December 1944 ten bombers will be completed monthly, and in December 1945, 30 bombers monthly. This means that of this type, which is of decisive importance to the U-boat war, only one-third will be placed at the disposal of long-range reconnaissance in the Atlantic.
The Naval Staff thus urgently requests:
a. That production be raised to at least 25 aircraft per month as soon as possible.
b. That the building capacity used for it be used exclusively for the reconnaissance type, while the bomber production of this type be discontinued until a daily minimum of 12 operational Ju 290 reconnaissance aircraft is guaranteed.
The Chief of Naval Staff will discuss this matter with the Führer.6
Dönitz was true to his word and met with Hitler at the Wolfsschanze the same day to discuss submarine warfare. Göring was also in attendance. Dönitz banged the drum for ‘very extensive long-range air reconnaissance.’ He also stressed that aside from a shortage of aircraft, the German war effort in the Atlantic was suffering from insufficent training in navigation and communications, something which, in his view, had ‘hampered the effective functioning of our aerial reconnaissance during the past few weeks and has shown the need for a coordinated training programme.’ He warned Hitler that the introduction of new and improved types of U-boats would be nullified without adequate air reconnaissance.
An indignant Göring insisted that the Luftwaffe could not be held solely responsible for any failures so far, but Dönitz went further and again ‘demanded’ that the entire production of Ju 290s should be turned over to long-range maritime reconnaissance and not for bombing. Hitler ‘promised’ to discuss the matter with Göring.7
While such high-level discussions were taking place, the situation at Mont de Marsan had been buoyed in late December by the arrival from Achmer of the men and aircraft of 1./FAGr 5 under Hauptmann Josef Augustin, whose officers were billeted in properties on the Rue de Manon. Since the departure of 2.Staffel to France in early November, 1.Staffel had continued with its training in Germany.8 Like 2.Staffel, its crews spent time at Rerik on the Baltic coast from where they undertook over-water training and air gunnery flights. For example, one pilot of 1./FAGr 5, Leutnant Hellmut Nagel, spent several days in late November 1943 flying Ju 290A-3 WK-Nr 0163 9V+CK from Rerik for the benefit of the gunners of his Staffel.9
Just one Ju 290 equipped with ship-search gear was deployed south-west of Ireland on the 21st, the results of which are not known.10 That evening, the officers of FAGr 5 did their best to create some early festive spirit by celebrating the opening of the officers’ mess; it had been set up in the villa of a local timber magnate in Mont de Marsan, whose family continued to live on an upper floor of the building.11 The next day it was business as usual, however, when four Ju 290s took part in a reconnaissance mission, this time probably to discover the positions of Allied naval forces on behalf of German blockade-runners inbound from the Far East.
At sea, during December, attempts by the Allies to prevent German blockade-runners bringing in their vital cargoes to the Biscay ports from the Far East escalated into a small campaign. Commodities such as tungsten (wolfram), rubber, tin, molybendum, zinc, opium and quinine were crucial to the German war effort, yet they were not available within the Nazi-occupied territories. The solution lay with Germany’s Axis ally, Japan. When the previous means of bringing such supplies in via the Trans-Siberian Railway was terminated by the Soviets following the German invasion of the USSR, the only option was to use merchant ships. However, under the name Operation Stonewall, Allied naval and air forces had made concerted efforts to locate, identify and sink the merchantmen, to which the Germans reacted by despatching destroyers to meet and escort them to French ports. The A
llies then deployed their ships to intercept the German escorts. In turn, the Luftwaffe readied the Fw 200s and He 177s of II. and III./KG 40 to conduct attacks against the enemy naval vessels using Hs 293 glide-bombs.12
To both search for the runners and render reconnaissance for the Luftwaffe strike force, Ju 290A-3 Wk-Nr 0164 9V+GK, the A-4 Wk-Nr 0169 9V+KK and Wk-Nr 0161 9V+DK took off from Mont de Marsan between 0630 hrs and 0730 hrs on 22 December. 9V+DK returned prematurely, while 9V+GK made the only known sighting of the day at 1435 hrs, which on this occasion was an American Task Group, TG 21.15, in the eastern Atlantic, which was reported as comprising one aircraft carrier USS Card (CVE-11), one destroyer and several escort vessels, course West. Indeed, the Americans reported being shadowed by an enemy aircraft between 1326 hrs and 1458 hrs in position 46° 56´ North 17° 40´ West. The aircraft, along with 9V+KK, was then instructed to patrol a line 34° West 3749–24° West 9737 and to look out for enemy vessels. A fourth aircraft, the A-4 Wk-Nr 0158 9V+BK, is believed to have operated much later, and did not return until early on the 23rd, landing at Bordeaux-Mérignac at 0645 hrs.
Later on the 23rd, 9V+DK was airborne again as part of a larger force of eight Fw 200s and a single Bv 222. This time Kessler wanted the Ju 290 to act as a homing aircraft for six He 177s of II./KG 40 in a strike against TG 21.15 and the Card during the afternoon. The lone Junkers crossed the French coast at 0645 hrs and at 1425 hrs it sighted ships of the task group: the crew reported observing one aircraft carrier and one cruiser at 1425 hrs as well as advising on prevailing weather conditions. At 1515 hrs Bordeaux-Mérignac, home base to II./KG 40, relayed the Junkers’ observations to a formation of He 177 bombers and ordered an attack, also advising them to watch out for beacon signals on 446 kc/s. Fliegerführer Atlantik instructed the Ju 290 shadower to remain in contact with the task group and to send signals on its progress, which it did for several hours until it had to break off suddenly to return to base.13 The reason for its break-off was because of heavy attacks by enemy fighters, which meant that it was not able to send D/F signals and thus the planned attack by the Heinkels was aborted.
In December 1943, FAGr 5’s Kommandeur, Hermann Fischer, recorded the challenges associated with the transmission of D/F signals, or Peilzeichensenden:
The most difficult task of the Aufklärer is, without doubt, shadowing and the Peilzeichensenden for detection of a convoy. In D/F transmission, the entire defence [of a convoy] is concentrated on the single shadowing aircraft, which acts like a radio beacon. New orders regarding D/F transmission eases the situation, but still represent a very high level of danger for the shadower. Shadowing with cloud cover, and at night, can be carried out by the instructed methods; with less cloud cover, or else in cloudless weather, the instructed method is only possible using the Rotte [two aircraft] or Kette [three aircraft] formations in order to increase defensive capabilities. In order to lighten the burden for the shadowing aircraft, other means have to be found which detect the position of the convoy: increased use of Schwan-See [air-dropped radio buoys] sorties and similar methods; additionally at night, using optical means (parachute-flares, Lux lights, etc.).14
Navigation skills were another vital area of FAGr 5’s work, as Oskar Schmidt recalled:
With extensive flight routes and long flying times, the navigator had to be well trained in astronomical navigation. Radar navigation using beacons was not possible at such distances and to camouflage radio navigation was not possible. For this reason, the navigator took with him – just like his comrades at sea – ‘his instruments’. There were ‘shots’ made using the sun, the moon and the stars. The sextant was a special development with a ‘mechanically balanced averager’. The mean fixed-point measurement value was entered into an electronic measuring device which processed all values in about five minutes and gave the required course. With a good navigator, course deviation was, at the most, 20 km!’15
On Christmas Eve, the blockade-runner Osorno, inward-bound from Kobe, Japan, to Bordeaux, carrying 3,882 tons of rubber, 1,797 tons of tin and 177 tons of tungsten, was met by destroyers from the 8.Zerstörer-Flottille and torpedo-boats from 4.Torpedo-Boot Flottille. On 26 December, despite having to be run aground as a result of striking the wreck of another vessel in the Gironde Estuary, which damaged its hull in the process, to the Germans’ delight, despite sustained Allied air attack, the Osorno had shot down a Sunderland and made it to France; the blockade-runner had benefited from the protection of German surface vessels, and air cover from the Ju 88 long-range fighters of the Fliegerführer Atlantik.16 Dönitz cabled the ship’s master on the 27th, ‘I welcome the Bernau [codename for the Osorno] home and express my special acknowledgement to the captain and crew for their achievement which will be of decisive value to the war.’17 Thus far, Stonewall had failed.
At Mont de Marsan, for the crews and personnel of FAGr 5 Atlantik, Christmas 1943 passed as a subdued occasion, as Oskar Schmidt remembered: ‘Christmas celebrations took place in the individual units. It was a very quiet Christmas. Everyone was thinking of the war and their loved ones at home.’18
But there was little time for rest. On 26 December Fliegerführer Atlantik organized long-range air reconnaissance for another blockade-runner, the 2,729 GRT cargo ship MV Alsterufer, also inward bound from Japan with a precious cargo of 344 tons of tungsten concentrate that would have been sufficient to meet the needs of German industry for a year.19 The Alsterufer was believed to be in the outer Biscay, and, once located, as with the Osorno, vessels from 8.Zerstörer-Flottille and 4.Torpedo-Boot Flottille, as well as Luftwaffe aircraft, could be deployed as escort for the ship. To this end, a first Ju 290 took off at 0230 hrs, followed by three more at short intervals between 0445 hrs and 0745 hrs. The aircraft involved were 9V+AK, 9V+BK, 9V+DK and 9V+KK, all of 2./FAGr 5. At 1735 hrs, one Ju 290 equipped with FuG 200 detected a large formation of ships in BD 6260, giving no details, and, according to another report, in BD 6610. The Operations Division, Naval Staff did not learn of this report until after 2300 hrs when Marine Gruppe West sent a radiogram to the Alsterufer, ordering the vessel to switch off its Metox high-frequency warning receiver.20
Between 1800 hrs and 1930 hrs, Ju 290s ‘A’ and ‘B’ were heard by Allied radio intercept operating in an area 46–48° North, 16–18° West, but, despite attempts to contact ‘D’ regularly throughout the afternoon and early evening, there was no response.21 In fact, Ju 290A-3 Wk-Nr 0161 9V+DK, piloted by Oberleutnant Werner Nedela, had turned for home at the end of its mission, but, because of the bad weather, its crew had decided to take a direct course back to Mont de Marsan. Flying over Spanish territory, the aircraft flew into the side of a mountain between Bilbao and San Sebastián, just below its summit, to the east of the Pyrenees. The whole crew was killed, possibly as a result of an incorrect altimeter setting.
Werner Nedela was a veteran airman, having flown Ju 52s with KGr.z.b.V.102 in Norway in 1940. The commander of the Junkers had been Hauptmann Werner Schmoll, a long-time former member of 3.(F)/Aufkl. Gr.Ob.d.L., who had served under Karl-Friedrich Bergen as a photo-officer and observer in Russia and who was regarded as ‘a capable and brave officer’. They were lost along with Leutnant Hans Fliege (co-pilot), Unteroffizier Alfred Gudde (navigator) Feldwebel Aloisius Rekersdress (gunner), Unteroffizier Oskar Matt (gunner), Feldwebel Adolf Widra (flight engineer), Unteroffizier Franz Margowski (gunner), Unteroffizier Gerhard Schramm (gunner) and Unteroffizier Valentin Sobotzki (gunner). As some measure of closure, under special arrangement with the Spanish government, a detachment from the Stabskompanie of FAGr 5 was permitted to travel to the site of the crash, recover the bodies and return them to Mont de Marsan, where they were buried in the airport’s military cemetery.22
The 26th also saw Oberleutnant Otto-Karl Kremser of 2./FAGr 5 undertake a long-range weather flight in 9V+KK to 31° West. The aircraft took off from Mont de Marsan at 0224 hrs and returned at 2141 hrs, after flying for 18 hr 17 min.23
On 27 December, along with a Bv 222 and
four Fw 200s, FAGr 5 sent up two Ju 290s at 0400 hrs to reconnoitre for enemy shipping on behalf of the Alsterufer now approaching the French coast, but at 1055 hrs one of them, 9V+EK of 2.Staffel, reported that its compass was malfunctioning and was forced to break off the mission. The aircraft returned safely, though whether its findings were of any significance is unknown.24 What the Germans did not know by this stage was that, as part of the ongoing Allied air operations against the blockade-runners, a Czech-crewed Liberator from No. 311 (Czech) Squadron, RAF Coastal Command out of Beaulieu, had found the Alsterufer early that morning, ‘making a most determined low-level attack with rockets and bombs’ and sunk it, before the German surface ships could reach the freighter. The ship was set on fire and abandoned.25
The next day, as a measure of just how important the Alsterufer was, despite its destruction the day before, a force of no fewer than 13 Fw 200s of III./KG 40 took off from Bordeaux between 0445 hrs and 0545 hrs to search for the vessel and to locate it, so that German coastal naval forces could be guided to it. The Condors were supported once again by Ju 290A-3, Wk-Nr 0162 9V+EK from 2./FAGr 5, presumably with a repaired or replacement compass, which left the French coast at 0640 hrs. Once located, these aircraft were to report the position of the blockade-runner using a system of points of reference. However, by now, British warships, including the cruisers HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, were on course to intercept the German surface force of five destroyers and six torpedo-boats that had set out to reach the vessel.26 The British ships were spotted by an Fw 200 shortly after 1300 hrs in 24° West 2735, course 30°, which apparently made an attack that seems to have been ineffective. Ten minutes later, the other Condors and 9V+EK were advised that there were two enemy cruisers in the vicinity. At around 1415 hrs, the Ju 290 was ordered to shadow the warships and an hour later, the crew reported that ‘enemy fighters’ had arrived in the area. However, it seems the Junkers remained in position, because when, at 1645 hrs, Fliegerführer Atlantik asked for updated details of the enemy naval activity, the aircraft responded, since 16 He 177s of II./KG 40 from Bordeaux, each carrying two Hs 293s, were making their approach for a dusk attack. A few minutes after that, 9V+EK was asked to send beacon signals from 1700 hrs in order to home the bombers. At 1717 hrs, the Fliegerführer, still anxious for information, requested a further update on the position, speed and course of the enemy vessels, but he received no immediate response. At 1750 the Ju 290 signalled that it had been driven off by the fighter screen and had lost contact with the ships. At 1825 hrs, the Ju 290 crew did signal to advise that they were at 24° West 286, and the Fliegerführer relayed this information to the He 177 leader who was told to look out for beacon signals. But by then the initiative had been lost and the bomber attack miscarried completely. Poor weather hampered the ‘half-hearted’ attack, allowing only nine of the Heinkels to reach the British ships. One bomber was shot down by fighters and another damaged.27 As late as 2004 hrs, 9V+EK signalled that it was still over the Atlantic, but it landed back at Mont de Marsan at 0043 hrs on the 29th.
Shadow over the Atlantic Page 14