The result of this reconnaissance shows that the number of aircraft was insufficient. At least twice as many are necessary, as apart from the fact that more aircraft can cover a larger area, if the radar gear on one aircraft breaks down, the other aircraft can be directed to the focal point and maintain successful and constant patrol.
It is not possible to concentrate reconnaissance for a short time as the submarines must be given time to change their position. With the few aircraft at present available, such hard driving for long-distance reconnaissance prevents proper servicing (on 11.1 one Ju 290 had to break off operation because of engine trouble).
Once again the BdU referred to ‘luck’ as a factor: ‘As submarines within the scope of our own air reconnaissance are entirely dependent on its results, we cannot afford to rely on luck in finding the convoys. The number of aircraft used for each operation must be at least double.’21
Next day, the British codebreakers surmised: ‘The Ju 290 failed to locate [the northbound convoy] although it must have been in the vicinity.’22 Hessler comments that FAGr 5’s operations for the four days from 8 January, which saw two aircraft per day operated, were achieveable only by a ‘strenuous effort’.23
It was not a good day for the Kriegsmarine in the mid-Atlantic; U-641 suffered diesel problems and was forced to dive to make repairs. U-382 was depth-charged and forced to abort operations, while U-953 was hunted for no fewer than 13 hours with depth charges, but survived. From the ‘jeep’ carrier, USS Block Island (CVE-21), two Avengers attacked U-758 with depth charges and new 3.5-in rockets, damaging the U-boat and forcing it to abort as well.24
Indeed, by the conclusion of its operations later in January, Borkum had lost three of its eight boats to the Allies, with another lost to unknown causes, while three more were forced to abort following action by Allied aircraft. Just one U-boat completed its patrol. For these casualties, Borkum had accounted for one British frigate and a B-17 of Coastal Command shot down.25
Meanwhile, BdU had stretched its 20-plus boats in a wide arc from the Faroes to Brest, disposed singly about 50 km apart, a policy that was unlikely to have much effect against heavily defended convoys. Dönitz had instructed his commanders to make diving patrols and to surface only to recharge batteries, and they were further advised that Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft would be searching for the convoys, and when found they would signal positions to the boats. It was the first time that the U-boats had operated in the Western Approaches since they had been forced out farther into the Atlantic back in 1941.26 But FAGr 5 would not appear, at range, over the Atlantic for a week and the six to eight available Ju 290s of the Gruppe had been suffering from engine problems.
On the evening of the 17th, an He 177 of 5./KG 40 returned from an offensive patrol having sighted the Liverpool–New York convoy ON.220. It was not until after the Heinkel crew had landed, however, that they reported their sighting.27
ON.220 had departed Liverpool on 15 January made up of just under 60 merchant ships with 25 escorts; on the morning of the 18th, the Germans estimated that it would be in the area of 25° West 3646, based on a reported course of 250°.28 Two Ju 290s were sent out to search for it. At 1001 hrs, Hauptmann Hubert Schreiner of 1./FAGr 5, as commander and first pilot, with Leutnant Hellmut Nagel as his second pilot, took off in Ju 290A-4 Wk-Nr 0166 9V+DH to shadow the convoy.29 However, at 1145 hrs on the 18th, while the Junkers were making their way towards the search area which was, in reality, to the south of ON.220, 9V+DH was signalled to advise of a new estimate of the convoy’s position at 25° West 7559. Despite being to the south, at 1803 hrs, one of the Junkers made RDF contact with the convoy in position 55° 50´ North 17° 30´ West. The course could not be determined however, and BdU remained sceptical about this pick-up, or even whether the Junkers had located the convoy, or possibly that it was an eastbound grouping. Neither aircraft made any more reports and it seems that at 1930 hrs, at least one of them broke off their mission.30 Part of the failure of this mission may have been attributed to the fact that at least one FuG 200 set became ‘covered with ice’.
When Schreiner and Nagel returned at 0134 hrs on the 19th after 15½ hours in the air, Nagel noted in his logbook: ‘Sea reconnaissance west of Ireland–Scotland. No sea targets detected.’31
‘We have no information about its course,’ the SKL war diary noted, ‘Hence we cannot be sure this is the expected westbound convoy.’32 British intelligence remarked in a summary the next day: ‘No Allied convoy exists to comply with the German expectations, which were evidently based on a preconceived theory of the North Atlantic convoy cycle.’33
On the 20th, 1./FAGr 5 despatched two Ju 290A-5s, Wk-Nr 0172 (KR+LC) 9V+BH and Wk-Nr 0174 (KR+LE) 9V+EH, from Mont de Marsan at around 0600 hrs and they crossed the French coast 20 minutes later. The Junkers were to search the area 54° 57´ North 13° 30´ West in order to assist the Rügen pack, which had been directed to make maximum speed, even in daylight, in order to catch OS.65/KMS.39, which had left Liverpool on 14 January with 55 merchantmen and 18 escorts. The U-boats were intending to attack the convoy that evening. Earlier Luftwaffe reconnaissance failed to locate the convoy, although one U-boat, U-641, did get close to it, but it was destroyed in the process by a British corvette escort on the 19th.34
Once again, no convoy was actually in the assigned search area, so the air search was pointless and fruitless; but hardly the fault of the Luftwaffe. The most that seems to have been accomplished was a weather report signalled from 9V+EH at 1800 hrs; indeed, SKL reported, ‘air reconnaissance for the operation by the “Rügen” Gruppe was without result. Two Ju 290s will repeat the reconnaissance on 21 January.’35 The Ju 290s returned with 9V+BH landing at Mont de Marsan at 2336 hrs, having been in the air for 17 hours.36
The U-boats moved closer to the Irish coast, between 15° and 17½° West, but only under the watchful eyes of Coastal Command Liberators and Leigh Light Wellingtons.37
Next day, the 21st, according to the SKL war diary, of four aircraft from FAGr 5 assigned to search the Atlantic on behalf of Rügen, two were unable to take off because of technical difficulties and the result was not ‘exhaustive’.38 However, 2.Staffel sent out Ju 290A-4 9V+HK and A-3 9V+EK to hunt for convoys west of the North Channel (the strait between north-eastern Ireland and south-western Scotland). One of the aircraft located the Canadian C2 escort group, describing it as ‘five destroyers in line abreast, speed 15 knots, course 60° in position 25° West 5475’, but no merchant shipping was sighted. 9V+HK returned to France to land at Kerlin-Bastard at around 2050 hrs, while 9V+EK touched down at Mont de Marsan at 2145 hrs.39
On the 22nd, two Ju 290s were sent out, as part of a larger force comprising an He 177 of II./KG 40 and a Ju 88 of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123 detailed to search for convoys for Rügen to the west of Ireland. The Junkers flew out over the coast at about 0630 hrs, but at 0854 hrs one of them, aircraft ‘F’, reported from its position at 14° West 8766 that its gyro compass was out of order and that the crew was forced to abandon its mission. Several hours later, at 1740 hrs, aircraft ‘E’ – it is not clear whether this was the 1. or 2.Staffel aircraft – sighted a ‘10,000-ton motor vessel accompanied by a destroyer and an escort vessel’ in 25° West 6432. The motor vessel was the 7,040-ton SS Empire Treasure operated by the British Ministry of War Transport. On 15 January, whilst on a convoy voyage from Liverpool to Halifax and New York, its stern frame fractured and the vessel lost a propellor blade and the use of its rudder. By the time the Ju 290 spotted the ship, it was under tow to the Bristol Channel by the rescue tug, Bustler, and escorted by the corvette HMCS Giffard.40 The aircrew duly reported its observations to the Fliegerführer Atlantik and made for home where, after an initial instruction to land at Bordeaux-Mérignac, the aircraft put down at Mont de Marsan at around 0045 hrs on the 23rd.41
At 1000 hrs on the morning of the 23rd, Ju 290A-4 9V+DH of 1./FAGr 5, took off for an intended 15-hour flight on behalf of the U-boats gathered to the west of Ireland. Between take-off and 1335 hrs, the Junke
rs signalled three weather reports, before it seems it was recalled by Fliegerführer Atlantik for reasons unknown.42 There was another lacklustre mission two days later on the 25th, when the Gruppe again sent up two aircraft to patrol the convoy routes over the Western Approaches, but aside from further weather reports, SKL reported that ‘air reconnaissance for the Rügen Gruppe was without result’.43 This, despite the fact that FAGr 5 was now working in close cooperation with the Ju 88s of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123 based at Rennes to provide ‘intensive’ reconnaissance – presumably as a result of the pressure from BdU earlier in the month.
9V+DK of 2./FAGr 5 was airborne on the 26th to reconnoitre the Western Approaches, once more working with a Ju 88 of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123. The Ju 88 was assigned to look out for convoys, which it did, successfully sighting ON.221 en route from Liverpool to New York, while the Ju 290’s main task was to undertake weather readings, which it completed at 1610 hrs.44 The Gruppe sent out aircraft ‘D’ on the night of the 26th/27th to maintain observation to the west of Ireland, and this was probably ‘DH’ from 1./FAGr 5, but its efforts were plagued by malfunctioning radio equipment.45 As BdU recorded: ‘Ju 290 sighted convoy in AM 5168 at 1220, southerly course. No speed given. The Ju 290 detailed to shadow convoy at night reported results for the first time after landing, owing to wireless telegraphy breakdown.’46
Over the next 24 hours, the situation would become confusing and challenging for the German reconnaissance and U-boats as two outward-bound convoys, ON.221 and OS.66/KMS.40, crossed Rügen’s area combined with the fact that they assumed the inward-bound HX.275 was also in the area too. Furthermore, ON.221 had become scattered, giving BdU and Fliegerführer Atlantik cause to think that it was in fact two convoys, one of which they believed was bound for Gibraltar. Finally, a fast, homeward-bound military convoy from the US, UT.7, was sighted at least twice, but seems to have raised little interest.
At 0900 hrs, 9V+DK spotted the 100 or so vessels of ON.221 stretched across the ocean on what the crew described as a ‘southerly course’, indicative again of malfunctioning search and radar equipment. Later on the 27th, 9V+DK was replaced by aircraft ‘F’ (either 9V+FH of 1.Staffel or 9V+FK of 2.Staffel) and, at 1150 hrs, this machine was ordered by the Fliegerführer to shadow the convoy spotted by 9V+DK earlier. It is possible had ‘F’ had already found it, however, for at 1115 hrs it had sighted a grouping of 20 motor vessels, one destroyer and three escort vessels, possibly a part of ON.221. The Ju 290 continued to shadow various ships, signalling three locations at 1529 hrs at 25° West 4422, then at 1715 hrs at 25° West 5442, at which point the crew reported counting 55 motor vessels and nine destroyers, which it wrongly assumed were heading for Gibraltar. Fliegerführer Atlantik instructed the Junkers to continue shadowing this grouping and to send beacon signals, but fuel shortage compelled the aircraft to break off and head back to Mont de Marsan. As it did so, it transmitted a final sighting at 1750 hrs at 25° West 3473, comprised of 39 motor vessels and five destroyers on course 50°, which was probably UT.7.
A third Ju 290, identified as ‘D’ and thus possibly 9V+DH of 1./FAGr 5, took over duties for the evening and was expected to be over the convoy area at 2330 hrs. At 2210 hrs, this aircraft was picked up receiving a list of positions, probably as a route of approach. In the early hours of the morning of the 28th, the aircraft picked up two groups of shipping at 25° West 2449 and at 25° West 3557.
The BdU war diary demonstrates the pattern of reporting from the Ju 290s on the 27th:47
Aerial reconnaissance confirms westbound and northbound convoys in:
1) Ju 290 04.55 convoy in AM 4938 course 230 degrees
09.55 " " AM 4955 " 230 "
11.15 " " AM 7928 " 230 "
2) Ju 290 15.29 " " AM 4872 " 230 "
17.12 " " AM 7212 " 270 "
17.50 " " AM 7346 " 50 "
3) Ju 290 00.23 " " AM 7128 " 270 "
00.46 " " AM 4917 " North "
At 0230 hrs, Fliegerführer Atlantik instructed the Junkers ‘D’ to shadow the first group and to make beacon signals. Two minutes later, the Rügen boats were signalled that the Ju 290 had found a convoy and was beaconing.
Though nothing is known of the results of this shadowing operation, the presence of the Ju 290s in the area prompted the RAF’s No. 19 Group, covering the south-western British Isles, to intensify its over-water fighter sweeps, and it moved No. 235 Squadron equipped with Beaufighters from Portreath to St Angelo in Northern Ireland specifically to counter the Junkers and Bv 222s. 48 Additionally, the C-in-C Western Approaches was able to draw upon a healthy number of well organized escorts and escort groups as well as eight escort carriers – the American-built convoy veteran Biter, together with Fencer, Tracker, Striker and Pursuer, and three British-built vessels, the Activity, Vindex and Nairana. The Fleet Air Arm fighters aboard these carriers were now placed on high alert.49
A review of the air reconnaissance against the convoys over 26/27 January in the BdU war diary reveals a damning indictment of the FuG 200:
Convoy was picked up at long range. Indications on the radar gear were insufficient, no exact details of the convoy. When aircraft made their run-in and obtained more precise orientation on the targets, it was established that the radar gear did not indicate at short range. When the aircraft moved away to N.E. in order to approach the targets from longer range, a second convoy was observed. When it was realized that the second convoy in AM 4917 was a northbound one that had been picked up by a Ju 290 at 1115 in AM 7928, a fresh run-in was made on the first convoy. It was then noted that the radar equipment was not working properly and gave no further indications. Visual observation was not possible because of weather conditions. The pilot decided, although the targets were not definitely established, to send a radio report of the position located as ‘convoy report reconnaissance blue’ and then broke off his task.50
Thick fog blanketed the waters of the Bay of Biscay and the mid-Atlantic during the last days and nights of January 1944, suspending all Luftwaffe long-range reconnaissance. At Mont de Marsan the only flying was limited to night-flying training flights. In a typical such exercise, Leutnant Hellmut Nagel of 1./FAGr 5 was airborne in Ju 290A-5 Wk-Nr 0172 9V+BH with a full crew on nine flights of between seven and 13 minutes duration over the space of just over three hours during the evening of the 28th, probably to practise night take-offs and landings, and equipment procedures.51
But in the coming weeks, the stakes were about to rise very dangerously for the crews of Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5.
Supreme Command of the Navy.
Naval War Staff (2.Abteilung)/B.d.U. Op.
Staff Headquarters ‘Koralle’
[Bernau, nr. Berlin]
25 March 1944
Operation against MKS.35 from 8–11.1.44 (‘Borkum’)
A. Aim of air reconnaissance: To pick up the convoy two days after it had sailed; to pick it up again at 12-hourly intervals until U-boats had been brought up by means of beacon signals.
B. Forces available: There were six Ju 290 available belonging to Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5. By great efforts on the part of this unit, the number was raised to eight by 10.1.44.
8 January:
Situation at sea:
U-boats in patrol lines:
I from CF 5229 to 5318
II from 2958 to 3758
III from 3574 to 3676
Air situation:
Reconnaissance by one Ju 290.
Take-off: 0827, landed: 0016/9/2.
Area covered: DJ 1237 – CG 7855 – CG 4889 – CG 8192. Convoy not found.
9 January:
Air situation:
Reconnaissance by Ju 290.
Take-off: 0530. Landed: 2150 and 2236.
Area covered: CG 5757 – CG 7877 – CG 7771 – CG 4467 and CG 4139 – CF 9597 – CF 9575 – CF 6355 not being covered.
1339 convoy in CF 9311. Strong air escort, clear weather. Course (estimated by wake): N.W. Composition: about 39 merchant ships.
Situation at
sea:
U-boats, as Group ‘Borkum’, in patrol line from CF 2945 to CF 3556.
10 January:
Air situation:
Reconnaissance by three Ju 290s. First Ju 290 entered reconnaissance area 0425, left 0931. Second Ju 290 entered reconnaissance area 1241, left 1950. Third Ju 290 entered reconnaissance area 2040, left 2249 after being fired upon by one of our own boats.
Area covered: CF 9365 – CF 8345 – CF 5821 - CF 5293 – CF 5133 – CF 3188 – CF 3465 – CF 2975 – CF 5337 – CF 3663 – CF 3936 – CF 3946 – CG 4145. Convoy not found. Convoy was not picked up by patrol line by 0100/11.1.
Situation at sea:
As air reconnaissance was unsuccessful and no further information was available, it was assumed that the convoy had made a detour to the west. At 0100 Group ‘Borkum’ was ordered to form a new patrol line from CF 2447 to 2357 at high speed. This might catch the convoy on the evening of 11.1 if it had been diverted to the W.
11 January:
Air situation:
Reconnaissance by two Ju 290s, take-off 1302 and 1310, landed 1809 and 0149. First Ju 290 broke off because of engine trouble, second Ju 290 broke off in CF 2253 because radar had failed.
Area covered: CF 3471 – CF 2558 – CF 2252 – CF 2399. Convoy not found.
Situation at sea:
While Group ‘Borkum’ was proceeding W., the most westerly boat of the line sighted the convoy at 1819 in CF 2452. The remaining boats were directed against the convoy. Except for the sighting of one destroyer, no further reports were received. It must be assumed that the boats, which were approaching from the east individually at considerable distance from one another, passed the convoy.
Conclusion:
The fact that the boats picked up the convoy shows that it must have passed through both reconnaissance areas on 10.1 unnoticed. It was afterwards discovered that the Hohentwiel aerials in the aircraft fitted with radar had been wrongly adjusted by the manufacturing firm and the range of the set had thereby been greatly reduced. This was the reason why these aircraft did not detect the convoy.
Shadow over the Atlantic Page 16