by John France
The subsequent course of events suggests that the count never intended to march to Jerusalem with his relatively small force. He left Ma‘arra on 13 January barefoot as a pilgrim, but in reality the campaign which followed was never intended as anything more than an extended raid whose continuation was provisional on better conditions, and one which might be made to serve self-interest if all else failed.52 Raymond of Aguilers indicates the small size of the army which travelled with the count. He was accompanied only by Tancred whose force was small, and Robert of Normandy; Robert of Flanders and Godfrey stayed behind at Antioch with Bohemond. They set off inland, marching south via Kafartab to Shaizar, Raphania and Homs, the rulers of which were more than ready to grant them free passage and the right to buy goods, even including vital horses which they were able to obtain in large numbers.53 The willingness to come to terms with Islamic rulers denotes a conjunction of zeal for Jerusalem and a new pragmatic approach to getting there. For those who were eager to reach the Holy City nowhere else much mattered, while the count must have been anxious to avoid taking on any serious major military commitment. These arrangements greatly facilitated the march, although enemy forces did attack the army’s stragglers forcing Raymond of Toulouse to mount a strong rearguard. In late January, as the army turned westwards north of Homs towards the coast, their foragers were attacked by enemy forces based on the Hisn al-Akrad, the later Crac des Chevaliers. The count of Toulouse attacked them forcing them to abandon their flocks and take refuge inside the fortress. Many of his men drove off the animals and the enemy were emboldened by this. Raymond was now dangerously exposed, but he feigned an attack and then withdrew before the two groups of the enemy, one in the castle, the other on the mountain, could join to attack him. Even so he escaped only narrowly and vented his rage on his knights. It was a nice example of the problems of controlling a medieval army. By the next day the enemy had fled and Crac was taken.54 However, there are strong hints of uncertainty about where they were going. Shortly after the departure from Ma‘arra it was suggested that the army should turn towards the coast to attack Jabala. This was probably made as the army approached Hamah (ancient Epiphanea) from where a road leads across the Jebel Ansariye range to Jabala (see fig. 4). We are not told who made this suggestion, but it was attacked by Tancred who spoke in favour of marching on to Jerusalem. Raymond of Aguilers clearly sympathised with this viewpoint and his failure to indicate the proposer suggests the count of Toulouse. Indeed this would make sense, for it is probable that he controlled Laodicea and the acquisition of a neighbouring port would have strengthened his emerging Syrian dominion. The idea was rejected but this same lack of purpose was soon evident again. To the south of the mountains the army debated whether to take the inland route to Damascus, or to turn towards the coast, eventually taking the latter and much less dangerous alternative which had the benefit of giving access to shipping.55 Even then, doubts and hesitations were at work, for at first the count of Toulouse seems to have been of a mind to come to an agreement with Tripoli, and was only persuaded to attack his city of ‘Akkār (Caeserea Libani) by his envoys in the hope of extorting yet more wealth from him.56 Such a policy must have seemed militarily wise for his army numbered only some 6,000–7,000 including not more than 1,000 mounted men, hardly a force with which to challenge the might of the Fatimid Caliphate, which in any case might yet offer terms. For the moment the prosperity of the march from Ma‘arra seems to have quelled agitation in the army. A siege of ‘Akkār might prove highly profitable; it would put pressure on the dissenting leaders, Godfrey de Bouillon and Robert of Flanders whose forces remained aloof at Antioch, while keeping the Provençals reasonably close to friendly Laodicea only about 100 kilometres to the north. Moreover, from the point of view of the count of Toulouse, the acquisition of ‘Akkār would strengthen his Syrian redoubt. The capture of the port of Tortosa by Raymond Pilet and the surrender of Maraclea on terms must have encouraged the crusader army and helped their communications with the north.57
The attitude of Godfrey de Bouillon and Robert of Flanders, whose forces remained with Bohemond at Antioch, is very difficult to understand. They had clearly rejected the leadership of the count of Toulouse and preferred to wait on events. Albert of Aachen, who is usually at pains to present Godfrey as a Christian hero, casts no light on their reasons, but admits that popular pressure built up within their armies in favour of completing the journey to Jerusalem. Their forces and those of Bohemond were eroded by troops leaving them for Count Raymond, and in an assembly on 2 February the two leaders announced their intention of gathering their forces at Laodicea which they reached at the end of February; there Bohemond left them. On 1 March they besieged Jabala – but still held off joining the Provençals. It was only when news came from ‘Akkār of the approach of an enemy army threatening the Provençals that Godfrey and Robert took a tribute from Jabala and rallied to their aid on 14 March 1099. The spirit of unity was strong enough to prevent them standing by while Count Raymond’s force was attacked by the enemy, but it extended little further for they were greatly annoyed to discover that the rumour was false. Albert of Aachen’s story that Count Raymond was bribed by the people of Jabala to draw Godfrey and Robert south probably reflects the bitterness felt amongst the rank and file which enabled Tancred to plant this story. There was great tension between the two contingents: Raymond of Aguilers says that Tancred stirred up discontent, anxious to leave the service of Count Raymond for that of Godfrey and Albert adds that Tancred had quarrelled with Raymond over money. However, Count Raymond was able to reconcile Godfrey by diplomacy and the gift of a horse and so all pursued the siege, although Tancred remained hostile. In fact we later find that Tancred seems to have become the vassal of Godfrey ‘whose knight he was’ by the time of the capture of Jerusalem, and this statement of Albert’s seems to confirm Raymond of Aguilers’ assertion that the young Norman had abandoned Raymond for Godfrey.58 At last a substantial proportion of the crusaders had been brought together in a single army, but they were far from united, and the difficulties of the siege created problems. The junction of the Provençals and the North French was fortuitous and the crusader host remained fissured. It was lucky for them that they were operating in a military vacuum. Even so the sapping effect of these quarrels made itself felt in the siege of ‘Akkār.
The actual siege attracted very little attention in the chronicles. Raymond of Aguilers says that there were many deaths including that of his co-author Pontius of Baladun killed by a stone from an enemy catapult, while Anselm of Ribemont was killed in the same way while repelling an enemy sally. The Anonymous mentions the deaths of Anselm, William the Picard ‘and many others’ but says nothing of the circumstances. He reports the raids conducted by the crusaders which gave them possession of Tortosa and control of Maraclea, then provided booty from el-Bukeia and terrorised Tripoli itself.59 Albert of Aachen describes ‘Akkār as a strong place against which the crusaders constructed catapults, to which the enemy replied in kind, and there is similar information in Ralph of Caen. It was in a duel between these machines that Anselm of Ribemont was killed. Albert and Guibert of Nogent say that the leaders tried to sap the walls of the city, but were foiled by enemy counter-mines.60 The impression we have is of an attack which at first was sharp, causing heavy casualties, but then tapered off. Indeed, it has been suggested that after the arrival of Godfrey and Robert of Flanders no serious attack was launched on the city, but this seems to be a result of the way Fulcher, who was not present, reports the siege.61 In fact too little attention has been paid to the situation of ‘Akkār which was formidable (see fig. 15). It stands on a spur on the lower slopes of Mount Lebanon, projecting due west at a height of 147 metres above sea-level. The modern road across the plain at its foot from Homs to Tripoli runs at 90 metres. The top of the spur is a small plain some 600 metres long and 250 metres wide from which stone columns and masonry project at intervals and around which the remains of walls can clearly be discerned. The sloping fla
nks of the spur have probably been artificially sharpened, strengthening what is in any case a formidable position. The southern flank of the city is very steep, forming the wall of the gorge of the river ‘Akkār; in spring this would have been in spate, making an impassable barrier. To the north the slope is less steep, though still very sharp, and an attacker can mount the slope to get access to the neck of the spur. It is this feature which truly makes ‘Akkār impregnable. The neck of the spur has been cut into by the river and perhaps by human action as well, so that the eastern approach is almost as high and certainly as steep as any other, and very narrow indeed. Although the neighbouring mountain spurs are actually higher than ‘Akkār, they are so far away as to be of no value to an attacker. The natural strength of its position made it difficult to approach and this probably ruled out the use of a siege-tower. Ralph of Caen says that the army was divided by the river which was crossed by an ancient stone bridge; probably the Provençals attacked from the north while Robert of Normandy and Tancred (and perhaps later Godfrey and Robert of Flanders) attempted to assault from the east. That mining formed part of the assault is evident because Albert says that the army became exhausted by it but we do not know anything of the direction of this attack though common sense would suggest that it was concentrated on the north and east of the city. The steep slopes would have made mining difficult from any direction.62 But the failure before ‘Akkār was, above all, a failure of will resulting from divisions within the crusader army. The army was never defeated – a fact which the emir of Tripoli recognised when he payed them generously to pass on their way south. The siege simply languished while internecine politics were dominant.
Fig. 16 The march south
The Anonymous and the works which derive from his, and also that of Fulcher of Chartres, provide a very bland account of events but Albert of Aachen and Raymond of Aguilers, from their very different viewpoints give a different picture. Albert says that after Raymond had mollified Godfrey the leaders faced popular pressure resisted by Raymond of Toulouse, to abandon the siege of ‘Akkār and to move on to Jerusalem. Raymond of Aguilers says that the siege was never popular and describes repeated quarrels amongst the leaders after Godfrey came, fanned by Tancred who wished to leave Count Raymond’s service; Albert says that he and Raymond had quarrelled over money.63 In addition, the question of the Holy Lance was raised; Raymond of Aguilers reports a vision of Peter Bartholemew which blatantly supported the case of the count of Toulouse for continuing the siege of Akkār and accused the leaders and members of other armies of offending against God in their faint-heartedness. The visionary had prospered by representing the views of ordinary crusaders, but now his support for Count Raymond was at odds with the popular desire to get to Jerusalem, and this enabled his enemies to attack him and to force a trial by fire. This is widely reported in the sources and though Raymond of Aguilers defends Peter Bartholemew its result was at best inconclusive and must have harmed the prestige of the count of Toulouse.64 The ruler of Tripoli had attempted to buy off the crusaders but the resistance of ‘Akkār encouraged him to resist, so in mid-April a strong raid was mounted on Tripoli with heavy fighting along the line of the aqueduct into the city, resulting in a major crusader success. The more generous terms now forthcoming seem to have further sapped the army’s resolution, and Raymond of Aguilers suggests that the visions of Stephen of Valence and Peter Desiderius encouraged the people to demand a resumption of the march.65 According to Albert of Aachen, Godfrey set himself at the head of the popular clamour to press on to Jerusalem, and when Count Raymond resisted he, Robert of Flanders and Tancred burned their camp and marched to Tripoli, and desertion from within his own army forced Raymond to follow. Raymond of Aguilers presents a strikingly similar picture, but he sets the debate in a different context. According to him it was the arrival of an embassy from the Emperor Alexius in early April of 1099, asking the army to delay until he arrived in June, which triggered off the debate.66 The count wanted to stay and in the meantime press the siege of ‘Akkār whose abandonment, he pointed out, would be a great blow to their prestige, and he expressed great concern that the army on its own would not be strong enough or well enough supplied to take Jerusalem. Other princes poured scorn on Alexius’ offer which they suspected was intended to embroil them in his dispute with Bohemond, and urged the army on, but the count’s influence was strong enough to prevail for a while. Ultimately, Godfrey put himself at the head of the discontent and, on 13 May, marched to Tripoli; he was followed by many in the Provençal army who burned their tents, forcing Count Raymond to follow along to Tripoli where he unsuccessfully pressed for a siege. The leaders then concluded a favourable treaty with Tripoli and the whole army marched south on 16 May 1099. In fact the imperial embassy arrived at ‘Akkār in early April, before Easter as Raymond says, so this points to a long running debate in the army from that time onward. The fact was that in military terms there was little point in the siege of ‘Akkār for it had no special military value and once Godfrey and Robert of Flanders had joined, the army had reached its maximum strength. A number of factors, including the weakness of his army, led the count to attack ‘Akkār in the first place. Once battle was joined, however, and even when Godfrey and Robert of Flanders had come, considerations of ‘face’ and prestige, and perhaps a not unreasonable caution about attacking the Fatimid Caliphate with what remained quite a small army, moved the Provençal leader. And then there was self-interest – his Syrian bastion. We need not see this as totally opposed to his desire to go on to Jerusalem, but it was certainly a factor in his stubborn resistance to popular agitation.67 But the whole rationale of the siege of ‘Akkār collapsed as anxiety within the ranks to press on to Jerusalem arose.
The departure from ‘Akkār marked the end of an era for the First Crusade. They had set out under the rule of a committee of leaders, pre-eminent amongst whom was the Papal Legate, Adhémar of Le Puy. From early 1098 their affairs were increasingly dominated by Bohemond. His desire to hold Antioch precipitated a crisis in their affairs and led to a bitter conflict with the count of Toulouse who stood for the rights of the Emperor Alexius and responded to agitation in the army to continue on to Jerusalem. In the vacuum of authority after the death of Adhémar on 1 August 1098 he associated himself uneasily with the visionary Peter Bartholemew and his clerical associates. In the end this forced him to abandon his position in Antioch and to make a bid for leadership of the crusade. However, he was never able to convince all the other leaders that they should accept him, perhaps because he was an abrasive and domineering personality and without them he lacked the military strength to satisfy the popular enthusiasm for the journey to Jerusalem. Both Bohemond and Raymond of Toulouse, for all their abilities and resources, succeeded only in establishing a transient pre-eminence. Bohemond had great military ability, but he settled at Antioch. Raymond commanded the largest army in the crusader force but his dominance was undermined by events at ‘Akkār. He insisted too stubbornly on persisting with an unpopular siege on the success of which he felt his prestige depended and he was damaged by the death of Peter Bartholomew. Above all, he had long occupied a paradoxical situation: he was apparently the leader who wanted to press on to Jerusalem, yet he seems to have had considerable doubts about the wisdom of attacking it with the limited resources the crusaders controlled: this was part of his reason for awaiting the emperor and it was probably from him that doubts appeared at Ramla.68 This enabled Godfrey to undermine his position without in any way attacking him. But Raymond of Toulouse had served the crusade well. At a crucial time when the army was becoming infected by the political culture of North Syria he was responsive to the basic driving force of the crusade and, however reluctantly at times, he helped to keep the whole enterprise together. He remained important, but he was an isolated figure, and increasingly the crusade reverted to what it had been before, an alliance led by a committee. The long and painful course of events from the defeat of Kerbogah showed that there could be no single c
ommand of the army – it had been a crisis of authority and it was one which would infect crusader armies in the centuries to come. But the army now had to confront a third enemy, the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt (see fig. 3).
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1 GF, p. 71.