by M. Dobbs
Military statisticians later estimated: Ibid.
"barreled gas oil": NSA Cuban missile crisis release, October 1998.
McNamara estimated Soviet troop: JFK2, 606. The CIA had estimated 3,000 Soviet "technicians" in Cuba on September 4. By November 19, they increased the estimate to 12,000-16,000. In January 1963, they concluded retrospectively that there were 22,000 Soviet troops in Cuba at the peak of the crisis. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), 35.
"For the sake of the revolution": Author's interview with Capt. Oleg Dobrochinsky, Moscow, July 2004.
citing a "traffic accident": Final report by Maj. Gen. I. D. Statsenko on Operation Anadyr (hereafter Statsenko report);see Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 345-53.
"we may not have confused": Yesin, et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 219. Author's interviews with Viktor Yesin, lieutenant engineer in Sidorov's regiment, July 2004 and May 2006.
Four more missile launchers were stationed: In order to avoid confusion, I have stuck with the CIA designation of Sagua la Grande as the site of Sidorov's regiment. In fact, his regimental headquarters were seventeen miles southeast of there, closer to the village of Calabazar de Sagua, at 22deg39'N, 79deg52'W. One battalion (diviziya in Russian) of four missile launchers was stationed near Calabazar de Sagua; the second was between Sitiecito and Viana, six miles southeast of Sagua la Grande.
"Just remember one thing": Malakhov, MAVI.
"The minute you get back": Pierre Salinger, John F. Kennedy: Commander in Chief (New York: Penguin Studio, 1997), 116.
A surprise air strike: Minutes of October 20,1962, ExComm meeting, JFK2, 601-14.
"Gentlemen, today": Stern, 133. See also Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 314, and Reeves, 388.
"My fellow Americans": Havana 2002, vol. 2. The author of the air strike speech has not been identified, but circumstantial evidence including the formatting suggests that it was written by Bundy or one of his aides.
"We are very, very close": Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 1–2; Theodore Sorensen OH, 60–66, JFKL.
CHAPTER TWO: RUSSIANS
the "highest national urgency": Salinger, John F. Kennedy, 262.
"They've probably discovered": Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisy i Rakety (Moscow: Novosti, 1994), 263, author's translation.
"It's a pre-electoral trick": A. A. Fursenko, Prezidium Ts. K. KPSS, 1954–1964 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2003), Vol. 1, Protocol No. 60, 617, author's trans. English translations of the Presidium protocols are available through the Kremlin Decision-Making Project of the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.
"If they were to use": Sergo Mikoyan, Anatomiya Karibskogo Krizisa (Moscow: Academia, 2006), 252. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali attributed this quote to Mikoyan rather than Khrushchev in Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 472. They subsequently said they made a mistake. Sergo Mikoyan is the son of Anastas Mikoyan. His book includes extensive citations from notes made by his father in January 1963, three months after the missile crisis, which are now in his possession.
"He's either all the way": Taubman, xx.
"enough emotion": James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1990), 329.
It was "only natural": Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, hereafter NK2), 510.
"The tragic thing is that": Presidium Protocol No. 60.
Khrushchev was proud of his humble roots: Taubman, xvii.
"like the old joke": Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1990), 217.
"Not strong enough": Reeves, 166.
"young enough to be": See, e.g., William Knox's account of his visit to Khrushchev, October 24, 1962, JFKL.
"a merciless business": NK2, 499.
"America recognizes only": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 62.
"How can you say that": Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 130.
"Your voice must impress": Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 416.
"their own medicine": Aleksandr Alekseev, "Karibskii Krizis," Ekho Planety, 33 (November 1988).
"the same shit": Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 413.
"I see U.S. missiles": John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 264.
"Now we can swat": FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XV: Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963, 309-10.
the "best kept secret": Sorensen OH, JFKL. The thirteen full members of the ExComm were President Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor, Under Secretary of State George Ball, Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, and Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen. Several other aides were invited to attend ExComm sessions on an ad hoc basis. (National Security Action Memorandum 196, October 22,1962.)
"How long do I have": Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 631.
By Monday afternoon: Cuba Fact Sheet, October 27, 1962, NSAW.
"Call Operator 18": Reeves, 392.
"A great nation": Dean Acheson OH, JFKL.
"by an inadvertent act": Air Defense Command in the Cuban Crisis, ADC Historical Study No. 16, 116, FOIA. See also sections on 25th and 30th Air divisions.
"the dumbest weapons system": June 2002 e-mail to the author from Joseph A. Hart, former F-106 pilot.
"booming off the runway": ADC Historical Study No. 16.
"If they want this job": Beschloss, 481.
"clearly in a nervous": Dobrynin cable, October 22, 1962, CWIHP, 5 (Spring 1995), 69. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 235.
"Is this a crisis?": WP, October 23, 1962, A1; Beschloss, 482.
"This is not a war": Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 474.
"We've saved Cuba": Oleg Troyanovsky, Cherez Gody y Rastoyaniya (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), 244-5.
The 11,000-ton Yuri Gagarin: I have reconstructed the positions of Soviet ships on October 23 from CIA daily memorandums for October 24 and 25, NSA intercepts, plus research in Moscow by Karlov. See also Statsenko report.
Her cargo included: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 114.
After a sixteen-day voyage: For the positions of the Aleksandrovsk and Almetyevsk, see NSA Cuban missile crisis release, vol. 2, October 1998.
In addition to the surface ships: Svetlana Savranskaya, "New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Journal of Strategic Studies (April 2005).
The vessels closest to Cuba: The ships that continued to Cuba were the Aleksandrovsk, Almetyevsk, Divnogorsk, Dubno, and Nikolaevsk, according to CIA logs and Karlov research.
"In connection with": Havana 2002, vol. 2, Document 16, author's trans.
"Order the return": Fursenko, Prezidium Ts. K. KPSS, 618-19.
"caught literally with his pants": Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, hereafter NK1), 497; Troyanovsky, 245.
"He is a genuine revolutionary": Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 39.
"He made a deep": NK2, 478.
"like a son": Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 190.
the code name AVANPOST: Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 55.
"He had a weakness": Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 203.
"Are you or are you not": Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble,
29, quoting interview with Alekseev.
"understand that there are limits": Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 8.
"it would be foolish": NK1, 494.
When Khrushchev's son-in-law: Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 153.
"One thought kept": NK1, 495.
"What if we were": Dmitri Volkogonov, Sem'Vozdei (Moscow: Novosti, 1998), 420; the English version of Volkogonov's book, Autopsy for an Empire (New York: Free Press, 1998), 236, provides a slightly different translation.
that "something big": Author's interviews with F-102 pilots Dan Barry and Darrell Gydesen, November 2005-February 2006.
The first five planes: USAF incident report, October 22, 1962, AFSC.
By mobilizing the reserves: Alekseev message to Moscow, October 23, 1962, CWIHP, 8–9 (Winter 1996-97), 283.
Even before Castro issued: Tomas Diez Acosta, October 1962: The Missile Crisis as Seen from Cuba (Tucson, AZ: Pathfinder, 2002), 156.
"The Americans": Fernando Davalos, Testigo Nuclear (Havana: Editora Politica, 2004), 22.
"The goofiest idea since": Dallek, 335.
"Patient too tired": JFK medical file, JFKL.
"ready to quit": Kraus files, JFKL.
"I'm sorry, doctor": Reeves, 396.
It was a short twenty-minute hop: Author's interview with Ruger Winchester, former B-47 pilot, February 2006.
Logan was totally unprepared: History of 509th Bombardment Wing, October 1962, and Special Historical Annex on Cuban Crisis, FOIA, Whiteman AFB.
The 509th would have had difficulty: Author's interview with Ross Schmoll, former B-47 navigator, December 2005.
"We shouldn't worry": Carlos Franqui, Family Portrait with Fidel (New York: Random House, 1984), 192.
Soviet commanders had been gathering: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 130.
Pliyev had accepted the Cuba post: M. A. Derkachev, Osoboe Poruchenie (Vladikavkaz: Ir, 1994), 24–28, 48–50; Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 79. For Pliyev's personality, see also Dmitri Yazov, Udary Sudby (Moscow: Paleya-Mishin, 1999), 183-5.
The general explained the situation: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 143; Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 306.
"Cuba si, yanqui no": Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 234.
Orders had already gone out: Karlov interview.
The submarines were still: Mikoyan notes dictated in January 1963; see Mikoyan, 252-4.
"in the interests of the motherland": Vladimir Semichastny, Bespoikonoe Serdtse (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), 236.
CHAPTER THREE: CUBANS
Radiation detection devices: U.S. Navy message, November 14, 1962, from DNI to CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
The photo interpreters had identified: October 22, 1962, transcript, JFK 3, 64. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 542.
An initial shipment of ninety: The NSA incorrectly identified the Indigirka on September 25 as an "icebreaker," but correctly noted that she had left from the Murmansk area. See NSA Cuban missile crisis release, October 1998. For Aleksandrovsk shipment, see Malinovsky report for Special Ammunition for Operation Anadyr, October 5, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2. Details on the Indigirka shipment come from Karlov notes and interview. The Soviet officer in charge of the deployment, Col. Nikolai Beloborodov, said in 1994 that six nuclear mines were also sent to Cuba, but this claim has not been confirmed by documents ― James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford: Routledge, 1998), 58.
nicknamed "Tatyanas": The formal name for the bomb was RDS-4. Author's interview with Valentin Anastasiev, May 2006.
The Tatyanas were an afterthought: CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 259. See also draft directive to commander of Soviet forces on Cuba, September 8, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.
The absence of security fences: Based on the details provided by Anastasiev, the storage site for the Tatyana bombs appears to have been 23deg1'13''N, 82deg49'56''W, on the coast about five miles west of Mariel.
Like the Indigirka: A January 1963 reconstruction by the CIA located the Aleksandrovsk at the Guba Okolnaya submarine facility near Severomorsk on October 5. See "On the Trail of the Aleksandrovsk," released under CIA historical program, September 18, 1995, CREST.
Three 37mm antiaircraft guns: Malinovsky report, October 5, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.
Demolition engineers had placed: See Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 208, for the story of the Indigirka crossing. Aleksandrovsk procedures were similar.
for "saving the ship": Report by Maj. Gen. Osipov, MAVI; Karlov interview.
The Aleksandrovsk kept radio silence: For the escort ship, see, e.g., NSA intercepts, October 23, 1962; Cuban missile crisis release, vol. 2, October 1998.
a "dry cargo" ship: See CIA memorandum on "Soviet Bloc shipping to Cuba," October 23, 1962, JFKARC. On October 24, after the Aleksandrovsk had already docked in La Isabela, the CIA gave an incorrect position for the ship, and said she was not expected in Havana until October 25 ― CIA memorandum, October 24, 1962, CREST. The Aleksandrovsk was located through electronic direction-finding techniques rather than visually.
"an underwater demolition attack": Mongoose memo, October 16, 1962, JFKARC.
The raiders later boasted: CIA report on Alpha 66, November 9, 1962, JFKARC; see also FBI report, FOIA release R-759-1-41, posted on Internet by Cuban Information Archives, www.cuban-exile.com. The Alpha 66 raid took place on October 8.
The Aleksandrovsk and the Almetyevsk: Ship's log inspected by Karlov, arrival recorded as 1345 Moscow time. The NSA located the Almetyevsk twenty-five miles from La Isabela at 3:49 a.m., NSA Cuban missile crisis release, vol. 2, October 1998.
"The ship Aleksandrovsk… adjusted": Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 254. The authors incorrectly report that the Aleksandrovsk arrived later in the day.
"So you've brought": Author's interview with Gen. Anatoly Gribkov, July 2004.
The port soon became: Author's interview with Rafael Zakirov, May 2006; Zakirov article in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, October 5, 2007. See also report by former nuclear weapons chief Beloborodov in Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 204-13. Writing three decades after the crisis, Beloborodov is unreliable on dates and some other details, but his report is the most authoritative account available about the handling of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba.
The six RF-8 Crusader jets: U.S. Navy records, NPIC Photographic Interpretation Reports, CREST; raw intelligence film for Blue Moon missions 5001, 5003, and 5005, NARA; author's interviews with Comm. William Ecker, Lt. Comm. James Kauflin, and Lt. Gerald Coffee in October 2005. Ecker flew mission 5003.
One thousand feet was the ideal: Author's interview with John I. Hudson, who flew Crusaders over Cuba, October 2005. Other pilots remember taking photographs from lower altitudes, but Arthur Lundahl and Maxwell Taylor told JFK on October 24 that the previous day's photographs were taken from "around 1,000 feet" ― JFK3, 186-7. The raw film, now at NARA, has numerous markings stating that it was shot at 1,000 feet.
"Chalk up another chicken": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 374.
"You're a pilot": Ecker interview.
Fernando Davalos: Davalos, 15.
Valentin Polkovnikov: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 189.
"Why can't we retaliate?": Anatoly I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1993), 57.
"Only someone with no": Ibid., 55.
By October 23, 42,822 Soviet: Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 100.
Overnight, the missile sites: Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 173; blast information provided by Gen. Viktor Yesin ― interview, May 2006.
"Other people are deciding": Tomas Gutierrez Alea and Edmundo Desnoes, Memories of Underdevelopment (Pittsburgh: Latin American Literary Review Press, 2004), 171.
"The poster": Adolfo Gil
ly, Inside the Cuban Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), 48.
"It looks like it's going": I have relied on Stern, Averting "The Final Failure," 204, for the unexpurgated version of this exchange.
"I fought in three": Abel, 116.
"Here lie the Soviet diplomats": Reeves, 397.
"Why is it": David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 269.
"In the Navy, the ethos": Author's interview with Capt. William D. Hauser, Gilpatric naval aide, May 2006.
"Keep a firm grasp": Time magazine profile of Anderson, November 2, 1962.
"From now on": Anderson memo to McNamara, October 23, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
"locking the barn door": Transcript of Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, Havana 2002, vol. 2.
The admiral resented McNamara's: George Anderson OH, USNHC.
"We'll hail it": Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 64.
"It's all in there": Abel, 137; Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 115. Abel and other writers misidentified the publication cited by Anderson as the Manual of Naval Regulations. As Bouchard points out, this manual contains no guidance on the conduct of blockades. Law of Naval Warfare is available through USNHC, no. NWIP 10-2.
"This is none of your goddamn": Roswell Gilpatric OH, JFKL. Anderson denied using strong language, but conceded making "a good-humored remark" about the Navy knowing how to run blockades.
"You heard me": McNamara interview.
The clash between: Following Abel, 135-8, most authors say this scene took place on the evening of Wednesday, October 24, despite McNamara's recollection that it was the evening of October 23, prior to the imposition of the quarantine. The records show that Anderson left the Pentagon at 2035 on October 24; McNamara visited Flag Plot at 2120, where he met with one of Anderson's deputies ― CNO Cuba files, CNO Office logs, USHNC; see also McNamara office diaries, OSD.
"I don't know how": Sources for this scene include Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 65-6; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence (New York: Random House, 1995), 81-2; and the reports filed by both men immediately afterward. RFK's version is reprinted in FRUS, Vol. XI, 175; an English trans. of Dobrynin's October 24, 1962, cable can be found in CWIHP, 5 (Spring 1995), 71-3.