In the “noble cause” speech Reagan had also said that the Carter administration was turning a blind eye to Soviet hegemony. The White House response to developments in Poland illustrated his point. Workers across that Eastern Bloc nation, led by an unassuming, pipe-smoking electrician named Lech Walesa, had gone on strike for the right to create their own labor unions and to protest the abysmal conditions in their country, where simple consumer goods that Westerners took for granted—light bulbs, toiletries, stationery—were either luxury items or unattainable. Poland's Communist government called out the riot squad, sending thousands of troops and policemen into the street to quell the protesters. Despite the Communists' heavy-handed response, the Carter administration refused to support the striking workers. Secretary of State Ed Muskie called for “restraint.”33 Such was the Carter administration's fear of antagonizing the Kremlin.
THE MEDIA DETONATED ANOTHER bomb over Reagan's comments about “upgrading” relations with Taiwan without reducing recognition of China. The Communist regime that controlled the Chinese mainland was outraged by Reagan's desire to return to the “two-China” policy that existed before Carter canceled relations with the island country. Reagan had been to Taiwan in 1978, accompanied by Peter Hannaford and Dick Allen along with their wives. Like all anticommunists, he had deep feelings of support for the beleaguered Taiwan Chinese, often referring to their country by its official name, the Republic of China.
The Reagan campaign had sent Bush—a former envoy to China—off to Asia. The goal was to showcase Bush's foreign-policy expertise, but even before he left the matter of China and Taiwan had become a subject of dispute. At the send-off event for Bush, the media pressed the campaign over whether Reagan would reject Carter's policy and reinstitute recognition of Taiwan. The campaign unsuccessfully tried to assure the media that the policy would not be reversed.34
Now the Chinese used the opportunity of their old friend Bush's visit to attack Reagan in the state-controlled media. Bush had a two-hour meeting in private with Communist Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and emerged “looking chastened,” according to Newsweek. He was also reported to be in a state of “testiness.”35
When Bush was asked about Reagan's comments concerning improving U.S.–Taiwan diplomacy, “He put his hand to his forehead and groaned,” the Washington Post reported.36 Reporters kept pressing Bush on the matter, but the running mate refused to elaborate on his outward display.
REAGAN PRESSED ON TO Dallas, where he gave a barnburner of a speech to thousands of religious leaders, who four years earlier had overwhelmingly supported the born-again Carter. Reagan made a profound statement that later became emblematic of his political skills: “I know you can't endorse me, but I endorse you.”37 The event was organized by the televangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell and his Moral Majority. Anderson and Carter also had been invited to speak but had turned Falwell down. Billed as the Roundtable National Affairs Briefing, the conference was officially nonpartisan, yet these pastors and laymen were gearing up to mobilize their congregations for the fall election.
The audience and Reagan had far more in common than not, especially when Reagan said the theory of evolution was just that, a theory, and that the “Biblical story of creation should be taught as well.”38 Reagan then knocked it out of the park, concluding, “The First Amendment was written not to protect the people and their laws from religious values but to protect those values from government tyranny.”39
But the event was not stress-free for Reagan. Because of poor advance work by his campaign, he was stuck on the stage with a fire-and-brimstone pastor who said America should be governed by the Bible and not the Constitution.40 The entire national media took note of Reagan's discomfort.
The year before, Falwell had said that a liberal could not be a good Christian. When reporters caught up with Reagan, he went out of his way to disagree with Falwell, saying that it was possible “for a true Christian to support the Equal Rights Amendment” and “homosexual rights.”41
Reagan represented a paradox: although culturally conservative by nature, he also had been steeped in Hollywood's more tolerant, cosmopolitan way of life. Throughout his life and especially as an actor the gregarious Reagan socialized with all types. He never disavowed his days in Hollywood Babylon and always reminisced fondly of his old movie pals.
When it came to his personal dealings with individuals, Reagan was nothing like the man his enemies tried to portray. He was nonjudgmental with a generosity of spirit. Consequently, Reagan's relationship with the Religious Right would always remain a complicated one, a pas de deux. He periodically—and convincingly—threw them rhetorical red meat and they, in turn, threw him their votes. Whether Reagan—or anyone—could tangibly deliver what they actually wanted was, given the realities of modern American society, another matter.
THE CARTER BATTLE PLAN was taking shape. They would paint Reagan as a warmonger, a dangerous, trigger-happy nuclear cowboy unfit to hold high office. Rafshoon was preparing a hit commercial on Reagan named “Places he would attack.” Carter wasn't going to bother convincing voters that he was up to the task but rather would convince them that Reagan was not. Pat Caddell bluntly summarized his mission: to separate the voters who thought “Reagan is going to be worse” from those who felt “Reagan can't be any worse.”42 A Carter campaign memo clearly spelled out this agenda: “Our goal must be to establish the shadow of doubt about Reagan's ability to handle the Presidency. His age, lack of foreign- policy experience, and simplistic economic philosophy are exploitable.”43
As most vice presidents do, Walter Mondale had become bored with his job. He was known to sometimes take a nap in his office or knock off early and go home. So getting back on the stump and making the partisan case against Reagan suited him just fine. Talking tough with reporters, Mondale said, “The other thing is that I believe when Reagan starts to fall, he'll fall like a crowbar.” He was asked, “Just how does a crowbar fall?” Mondale deadpanned, “Awfully fast.”44
The Reagan campaign continued to worry—deeply—that the White House was planning to spring an October surprise. Reagan strategists lay awake at night visualizing Carter going on national television to announce that the hostages had been released from Iran and were flying to Andrews Air Force Base, where Carter would greet them. Then there would be a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House and a procession up to Capitol Hill. Carter would get such a boost from the grateful American voters that he would bound right over Reagan and into a second term.
AMBASSADOR BUSH RETURNED TO bad reviews from his trip to Asia. Indeed, many media outlets pronounced the trip a failure.45 Bush was in a difficult position, in part because of Reagan's comments about “upgrading” an American presence on Taiwan as part of a “two China” policy.46 Even former president Ford criticized Reagan's position on China, saying that Carter had done the right thing in canceling relations with Taiwan. But Ford did say he thought the controversy would not affect the outcome of the election.47 Lyn Nofziger agreed, telling reporters, “This campaign is not going to be won or lost on China.”48
Rather than backing away from the controversy, Reagan showed that he would not knuckle under to the Chinese. In Los Angeles, with Bush standing at his side, he read a two-thousand-word statement in which he said, “As president I will not accept the interference of any foreign power in the process of protecting American interests.” Reagan conceded that he might have “misstated” what he really meant about recognizing both countries, and he now made clear, once and for all, that if elected he would maintain full relations with the People's Republic of China but would also embark on reinstituting official recognition of Taiwan.49
The media tried repeatedly to get both men off stride. Reagan's jaw clenched and he raised his voice several times. Bush strongly rejected the reports that his trip had been unsuccessful and said clearly that the Chinese understood Reagan's position.50 The two men then swung into an attack on Carter, accusing him of creating the mess in the first
place with the abrogation of the mutual-defense treaty with Taiwan that had been supported and endorsed by every president since Truman.
The New York Times turned to John Sears, Reagan's former manager, for his analysis of the imbroglio. Vengefully, he remarked, “You can find yourself explaining every day why you're not an idiot. He's got some work left to do.”51
The Reagan-Bush press conference was important, though, as it got Reagan off the defensive. He realized the situation was a test of his command abilities and he had but three choices: to continue to stew in his own juices, to back off and essentially endorse the Carter position, or to enunciate his policies, firmly. Reagan chose the third option, and after his show of strength and decisiveness, the matter began to fade. Even the oft-critical columnists Germond and Witcover said, “Reagan's defense of his friends in Taiwan could be considered an act of political principle, conviction above pragmatism.”52
At another press confab, three thousand miles away in Washington, Governor Pat Lucey announced at the National Press Club that he would go on the ticket with Anderson. Lucey took a jab or two at Reagan, as would be expected, but he saved his strongest punches for Carter. He referred to “the human wreckage Jimmy Carter's presidency has left in its wake. Jimmy Carter has not seen this. He has been hiding in the Rose Garden trying to escape debates.” Lucey said he would campaign among labor unions, attack Carter, and make the case for Anderson.53
It was now clear that Anderson and Lucey would run as unreconstructed liberals, the left of Carter. Paul Corbin's plan was coming together. With Carter battling Anderson for liberal votes, Reagan, with conservatives in his hip pocket, could move toward the middle.
In yet a third press conference, Ted Kennedy emerged from a one-hour meeting at the White House with Carter. The Carter White House had tried since the end of the convention to get a meeting with Kennedy to put on a show of unity. Teddy finally agreed, having nothing to gain at this point by being seen as a poor loser. He did his best to talk up Carter, but the skeptical White House press corps wasn't buying it.54
WITH THE REAGAN CAMPAIGN still happy to include Anderson in three-way debates, Carter tried to get ahead of the story by accepting an invitation from the National Press Club—which his White House had generated—to debate Reagan one-on-one. Carter also accepted the offer of Ladies' Home Journal to debate Reagan, again without Anderson.55 Jim Baker, representing Reagan in preliminary negotiations on debates, defended Anderson's right to debate because he was a viable candidate. The Carter debate proposal would not work because it excluded the ladies of the League of Women Voters, “Gentleman Jim” added with a straight face.56
Reagan headed for Ohio, where he spoke to the Teamsters. Labor unions traditionally did not endorse Republicans, but the Teamsters had supported Nixon over George McGovern in 1972 as part of the deal to release Jimmy Hoffa early from prison, so there was an outside chance they would support Reagan as well.57
Reagan attended a private lunch with Teamster officials including William Presser, who had been convicted of bilking employees; his son Jackie Presser, who was under constant investigation over his handling of the pension fund; and Roy Williams, who only the day before had “taken the Fifth” before the Senate Investigations Committee.58 Press reports did not indicate whether the union officials' parole officers accompanied them. Reagan aides could only shrug their shoulders about the Teamsters' choices of luncheon guests and the poor advance work.
Reagan's speech before the Teamsters rank and file was warmly received, however. He charged that Carter had created a “depression” and that American families were “suffering more than at any time since the Great Depression of the thirties.”59 Reagan was knocked for using the term “depression,” but the head of his Economic Advisory Group, Alan Greenspan, came to his defense, saying, “The facts are that the economy is in terrible shape and what you choose to call it is a terribly secondary question.”60
Carter responded to Reagan's rhetoric about the awful economy by proposing his own tax cuts for businesses and individuals, as well as a new bureaucracy to deal with the recession. Carter made clear that while the government must defend the American people when it came to the economy, Washington was not the generator of jobs—the marketplace was. Washington's job was to be the referee and help business and labor, he said. It wasn't quite Adam Smith, especially since he also called for $4 billion in stimulus spending, but it was to the right of liberals such as Kennedy.61 The president was sometimes more moderate on economic issues than many others in his own party. In fact, his tax-cut pitch was in direct violation of the Democratic platform.62
Still, Reagan blasted Carter's economic proposal. Because Carter's tax-cut plan was linked to an increase in Social Security taxes, the Reagan campaign slammed it as “the pickpocket theory.” The Reaganites produced a report showing that for a worker making $15,000 a year, Carter's tax cut was almost entirely wiped out by the Social Security tax increase. Over the course of a year the worker would end up netting two dollars. Reagan warned that the president's proposal would have “only delayed the day of reckoning in Social Security.”63
The Carter proposal was small-bore—a little here, a little there, a distillation of Carter's minimalist approach to problems. The plan was not easily understood, as Reagan's was. It was not bold, and it did not go over well.
Carter then proposed a 9 percent pay hike for all federal employees, higher than what Congress was considering.64 Reagan watched Carter's speech on television and dismissed the proposal out of hand, commenting, “[He] seems to be saying more government will solve the problems government itself has caused.”65
ANDERSON'S CAMPAIGN STRUGGLED TO get on track. He was in debt, despite having created an impressive mailing list, and he had not received any federal funds, as had Reagan and Carter.66 The White House was pressuring the Federal Election Commission not to release any funds to Anderson. This became just another reason for Anderson to despise Carter.
Garry Trudeau's popular political cartoon strip, “Doonesbury,” had taken lighthearted jabs at the kids running the Anderson campaign, and it obviously bothered the candidate. Anderson defensively said his operation was not a “Doonesbury campaign.” To show how serious he was, he handed his campaign over to New York political consultant David Garth—a feared and reviled figure. Garth was so despised that when Anderson announced that he was taking over, three top aides promptly resigned and several volunteers broke into tears.67
Reagan also worried about the quality of his campaign operation. “To get his faltering presidential campaign back on track,” as Jack Germond reported, Reagan called an emergency all-hands-on-deck meeting at his rental home, Wexford, in the Virginia countryside.68 Attending the meeting were Bill Casey, Ed Meese, Lyn Nofziger, Dick Wirthlin, Bill Timmons, Mike Deaver, Drew Lewis, Jim Baker, and Dean Burch. (Stu Spencer hadn't been invited to the meeting and Nancy Reagan was furious when she found out.)69 Reagan wanted to know why he was not being properly briefed on the trail, why he couldn't shake bad media coverage, and why the campaign plane was coordinating so poorly with the national office in Virginia.70 Also, leaks had become a big problem again, for the first time since John Sears had been fired. Indeed, all the major media reported on this supposedly top-secret, hush-hush meeting.71
The gathering ended inconclusively, with no major changes instituted, though shortly thereafter, Meese and Spencer asked Ken Khachigian, a Nixon vet, to come aboard the plane to help with speechwriting. Khachigian, short, swarthy, and affable, agreed, met the plane in Los Angeles, and then didn't get off for five weeks, writing nearly all of Reagan's day-to-day speeches. Doug Bandow worked on research, assisting the speechwriters as they huddled in a little corner of the plane. Khachigian had to come up with new content every day in order to keep the press satisfied.72
Reagan and his aides certainly weren't satisfied with what had happened to their lead. A new poll released by the Roper organization confirmed the earlier numbers: Reagan was at 38 percent, C
arter at 37, and Anderson at 17.73 Morale was low at the Reagan campaign, and the Republican's top advisers were “clearly apprehensive about the general election outlook,” as the Washington Star reported. One Reaganite was even more blunt, saying, “The way things are going now, we are going to lose.”74
Once again, Reagan had been coasting. The campaign had made too many mistakes since Detroit and had squandered his lead. Reagan had wasted August, to the delight of the Carter campaign.
IN PREPARATION FOR THE Labor Day campaign kickoff, President Carter retreated to Camp David. He wanted to rest and, more importantly, to work on his speeches. Carter's chief speechwriters—Rick Hertzberg and Chris Matthews—were generally regarded as good writers. The problem was that Carter could not stop tinkering and then inviting everybody else to tinker with his speeches, which they were more than happy to do. Tribute for White House staffers is often measured in small, even petty ways. Nothing gets attention in a Washington saloon after work more quickly than for a staffer to say, “Well, as I told the president today,” or “That draft speech was a piece of shit until I cleaned it up.” Such were the rewards for the unctuous factotums who sniffed power in Washington.
Rendezvous with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America Page 64