The emperor sent Yamamoto his heartfelt congratulations on what everyone, including the admiral, believed was a highly successful operation. The message, forwarded through the naval general staff, read, “Please convey my satisfaction to the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, and tell him to enlarge the war result more than ever.”25
Evidently so taken with this lofty recognition, Yamamoto was prepared to believe the reports of his returning pilots concerning how much damage they had inflicted on the Allies. In his heart, he likely knew better, but, wanting the operation to be a great success, he did not question his pilots’ claims, and concluded I-GO on April 16. Despite the urging from some of his staff for additional raids, he returned the carrier planes back to Truk. He then decided to pay a personal morale-boosting visit to his successful pilots.
The Japanese still had no idea that American code breakers had for some time been listening to their transmissions. As soon as Yamamoto’s itinerary was distributed among Japanese insiders, the U.S. Navy learned of it. Admiral Halsey asked Admiral Nimitz for approval to carry out what was essentially an assassination. Although there is no paper trail—probably for good reason—Nimitz most likely asked Navy Secretary Knox for his approval. Knox is believed to have put the issue to the president, who discussed it with several close advisers. Everyone gave support. Nimitz sent Halsey an “execute” order, along with the comment, “Good luck and good hunting.”26
True to his schedule, at eight a.m. on April 18, Admiral Yamamoto and several members of his staff climbed aboard a “Betty” bomber at one of Rabaul’s airfields. A second bomber contained his chief of staff, Admiral Ugaki, and more high-ranking officers. The two aircraft lifted off and headed south, quickly joined by six Zero fighters as escorts. Waiting for them off the coast of Bougainville near their destination of Buin were sixteen U.S. Army P-38s. Halsey had specifically selected P-38s for this mission because, with added drop fuel tanks, the fighters could manage both the long range and the potentially long wait for Yamamoto’s arrival.
The 494-mile flight from Guadalcanal took the P-38 Lightnings of the 399th Fighter Squadron a few minutes shy of three hours. Yamamoto’s plane was scheduled to land at ten a.m., and the admiral had a reputation for being a stickler about being on time. The Americans were flying close to the water to reduce visibility when suddenly the two bombers approached and prepared to land at the nearby airfield. In the ensuing action, Yamamoto’s plane was decimated and hurtled down into the jungle. Japanese search teams later discovered his body. The second bomber crashed into the sea, and Admiral Ugaki, although injured, managed to swim to the nearby beach. The Zeros put up an impressive defense of their admiral, successfully destroying one Lightning, but with both bombers down, the P-38s turned and raced away.
The Americans kept quiet about the attack for fear of revealing how they had obtained Yamamoto’s itinerary. Not until May 21—when Tokyo acknowledged that the great admiral, “while directing general strategy on the front-line in April of this year, engaged in combat with the enemy and met gallant death in a war plane”—could the Allies be sure they had actually gotten him.27
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Meanwhile, Australian forces from Wau kept increasing pressure on the Japanese troops at Salamaua. MacArthur’s next major objective was Lae, now a powerful enemy base, but first he had to deal with Salamaua. He also had to carry out a directive from the Chiefs of Staff to invade and occupy two islands in the Coral Sea. The directive was part of an operation code-named Cartwheel.
This operation was the outgrowth of a plan developed by MacArthur to isolate the enemy’s primary base in the South Pacific, Rabaul. His strategy, he explained, was “massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed ‘island hopping’ which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved.” MacArthur was going to bypass strong enemy concentrations and invade places where airfields were lightly defended, or where the rapid building of a new airfield was possible. As he had decided after Buna-Gona, the general wanted no more costly fighting. He intended to isolate these strongpoints and let them “wither away.” Perhaps thinking of the massed frontal attacks of the last war that cost so many lives, he added, “Wars are never won in the past.”28
MacArthur’s plan went through several alterations but was finalized at his first face-to-face meeting with Admiral Halsey. Halsey and his staff arrived in Brisbane on April 15, 1943, and the two men spent three days discussing strategy and making plans. As commander of the South Pacific Area, Halsey was in the unenviable position of having two masters. On one hand, he was subordinate to Admiral Nimitz, who controlled his manpower and ships. On the other, he was subordinate to General MacArthur, who dictated his strategy.29
Halsey had what is best described as the typical Navy officer’s attitude toward MacArthur, who was widely known to bad-mouth the Navy over its failure to support his defense of the Philippines. Halsey’s feelings about the quarrelsome general prior to their meeting were conveyed to Nimitz in February: “I refuse to get into a controversy with him or any other self-advertising son of a bitch.”30
The two strong-minded leaders had clashed several times in recent months over the loan of forces to each other: ships from Halsey and B-17s from MacArthur. Yet the general had evidently decided to put that behind them. MacArthur welcomed Halsey like a returning hero. Standing at the wharf as Halsey’s PB2Y taxied to a stop, he vigorously shook the admiral’s hand and turned on the famous MacArthur charm.31
The explosions and fireworks many expected never happened. The pair, which one newspaper a month later described as “kindred souls,” established a bond that lasted for the remainder of the war. Describing this first meeting, Halsey wrote, “Five minutes after I reported, I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression.”
As for MacArthur, he found the admiral “blunt, outspoken, dynamic, and a battle commander of the highest order.”32 He described Halsey in his memoirs as being “of the same aggressive type as John Paul Jones, David Farragut, and George Dewey. His one thought was to close with the enemy and fight him to the death. No name rates higher in the annals of our country’s naval history.”33
The final plan on which these two men agreed called for thirteen separate operations within the overall Cartwheel. In the next eight months, forces from both commands were to advance in stages toward the ultimate goal, which was now the much more realistic isolation of Rabaul, rather than its capture. Rabaul, with its 100,000 infantrymen, five airfields, hundreds of planes, and dozens of warships, was virtually impregnable. Thus, MacArthur’s forces were to capture Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands in the Coral Sea, then move up the New Guinea coast and capture Salamaua, Lae, Finschhafen, and Madang, before finally invading Cape Gloucester on the western end of New Britain. Halsey’s forces would battle up the Solomons, capturing the Shortlands, Buin, and Bougainville.
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After the Okabe Detachment was driven from the Wau area, Allied cargo planes delivered several thousand troops and tons of supplies and equipment into the small airfield. On April 23 the Kanga Force ceased to exist as an independent unit and was absorbed in the newly arrived Australian 3rd Division. The commanding officer was Major General Stanley Savige, who as commander of the 17th Brigade had fought across North Africa, in Greece, and in Syria. In New Guinea, Savige’s assigned tasks were to maintain security of the Wau area and continue developing the region as a base for planned operations against Lae and Salamaua.34
Over the next few months, Australian troops kept up a series of attacks on Japanese positions leading to Salamaua. Both Blamey and MacArthur were considering an attack on Salamaua as a feint to draw off enemy troops from their primary target, Lae, although it is believ
ed Savige was not aware of this. With orders not to attack Salamaua directly, Savige established forward bases as close to enemy positions as possible and continued a campaign of harassing the Japanese.35
Salamaua was located on an isthmus about twenty-two miles from Lae. The surrounding country was full of high mountains, with numerous steep ridges interspersed by deep gullies filled with knife-edged kunai grass. The ridges varied from eight hundred to three thousand feet in height, forcing Australian units to constantly advance up and down them. The Japanese had taken advantage of the terrain to create well-fortified positions. Sheltered in coconut-log pillboxes reinforced with mud, they made extensive use of their heavy machine guns, which could easily trap approaching Allied soldiers in their cross fire. Deep trenches and tunnels allowed the defenders to move safely from one position to another.36
About six thousand Australian troops occupied the Wau area, and General Kenney saw to it that they were regularly supplied, and in some cases relieved and reinforced, through frequent flights of DC-3 transports escorted by fighters. The official Australian history of the campaign describes the importance of these flights to an area with no roads and only ancient foot trails: “Possession by the Allies of the DC-3 transport aircraft was thus a big factor in enabling the Australians to hold their positions in the forward area against the Japanese who had more accessible bases at Lae and Salamaua.”37
Although the Japanese bases may have appeared “more accessible,” they were not what Japanese commanders would have wished for. The Bismarck Sea debacle had all but eliminated the use of convoys to move troops and supplies from Rabaul. Now the Japanese were forced to rely on submarines to transport food and provisions to the 2,500 naval and 7,500 army troops in the Lae-Salamaua area. Many of these men had fought at Buna-Gona and were, in the words of a Japanese general, “sick and exhausted.” The defeat of the Okabe Detachment added considerably to the number of sick and wounded.
Despite the hardships they faced, the Japanese were determined to defend Salamaua. Lieutenant General Hidemitsu Nakano, commander of the 51st Division, had survived the Bismarck Sea disaster and managed to land at Lae. He immediately moved to Salamaua, where he assumed command of all Imperial troops in the area.38 Nakano would prove to be a determined adversary to Allied forces attempting to seize the area. “Holding Salamaua is the Division’s responsibility,” he stated in an order distributed to his troops. “This position is our last defense line, and we will withdraw no further. If we are unable to hold, we will die fighting. I will burn our Divisional flag and even the patients will rise to fight in close combat. No one will be taken prisoner.”39
Fortunately for his men, Imperial General Headquarters ordered Nakano not to make a suicidal last stand. If he could not repel the enemy advance, he was to withdraw to Lae.
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While the fighting on the Salamaua front continued to rage in a dozen locations, General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey prepared for their first steps in Operation Cartwheel. Halsey was to land troops on New Georgia in the Solomons and capture an enemy airfield located at the village of Munda. Only 175 miles from Henderson Field, the American airstrip on Guadalcanal, the Japanese airfield at Munda had several cleverly concealed runways and was “a thorn in my side,” according to Halsey. Almost daily air strikes had produced minimal results, and the admiral knew the only way he was going to eliminate the threat from Munda was to land troops on the island and drive the enemy off New Georgia.40
Meanwhile, MacArthur’s troops were to make amphibious landings on and capture two islands one hundred miles from the New Guinea coast called Woodlark and Kiriwina, which offered the possibility of building airfields to house short-range fighters to escort heavy bombers heading to Rabaul. MacArthur assigned command of the invasion troops to General Krueger, while Admiral Barbey was responsible for getting them there and putting them ashore.
On June 20 Krueger set up his headquarters at Milne Bay. Barbey arrived the same day and raised his flag on the USS Rigel at anchor in the bay. MacArthur, who always exhibited a need to be close to the action, soon joined them.
Between June 23 and 30, the Seventh Amphibious Force under the command of Admiral Barbey made its first amphibious landings in hostile territory when it put American forces ashore on Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands. Most ranking officers knew from reconnaissance missions that no enemy soldiers defended either island, yet the troops were not informed of this so as to get some realistic practice landing on enemy-occupied beaches.
Krueger had learned from General Kenney that the Fifth Air Force would not be capable of providing fighter protection to his troops being convoyed to the islands because planes from his nearest airfield would not have enough fuel to linger over the ships. Krueger therefore decided the landings would be made at night. As it turned out, the Japanese were either completely ignorant of the landings or had decided to ignore them in favor of attacking Halsey’s landing parties at New Georgia.41
At a few minutes after midnight on June 23, six landing craft put ashore on Woodlark two hundred men of the 112th Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Major D. M. McMains. Although there were no Japanese on the island, McMains’s men were nearly fired on by a native guerrilla force led by an Australian Coastwatcher who had not been told of the landing. After forming his men in a skirmish line, the Coastwatcher heard the incoming troops speaking English with an American accent and soon joined them.42
The following day troops from 158th Infantry Regimental Combat Team, along with a company from the 59th Combat Engineers, landed on Kiriwina. Units from the 112th Cavalry, the 12th Marine Defense Battalion, and 134th Field Artillery Battalion landed at Woodlark.
The engineers quickly set about building an airfield on each island. By July 14, C-47 cargo planes were able to land on Woodlark’s 5,200-foot runway, and in less than ten days the airfield was home to P-47 Thunderbolts. Hampered by heavy rains and the need to build a three-hundred-yard-long coral causeway across the reef surrounding the island, the airfield on Kiriwina was not completed until the end of July. Its five-thousand-foot runway welcomed RAAF Spitfire fighters on August 18. P-40 Kittyhawks soon joined them. On both islands, antiaircraft and anti-invasion defenses were put in place, yet other than two minor bombing raids and several surveillance flights, the Japanese paid little attention to the Allied invasions and occupations of the two islands. As the war moved farther up the New Guinea coast, the utility of these two airfields gradually declined, although they continued providing fighter protection to bombers heading to Rabaul.43
At about the same time the missions on Woodlark and Kiriwina were taking place, another set of amphibious landings were under way up the coast of New Guinea at Nassau Bay, ten miles south of Salamaua. Nassau Bay was an important target for MacArthur, who was anxious to support the troops facing Salamaua and to find a better way to provide the food and matériel they needed. Flights into Wau were fine, but the cargo then had to be carried, usually by hired local villagers, across jungle-cloaked mountains, ridges, and rivers to soldiers at the front. Opening up a beachhead at a locale such as Nassau Bay would speed up the process and enable the Allies to pour more combat troops and equipment into the fight.
To add to the enemy’s potential confusion, the Nassau Bay landings were scheduled for June 30, the same day as the landings at Woodlark, Kiriwina, and New Georgia were to take place. The operation would also deceive the enemy into believing that MacArthur’s target was Salamaua because he was massing so much firepower there, when his real goal was Lae itself. He hoped to draw off Japanese troops from Lae toward Salamaua.44
This time the Navy played no role. Instead, the landings were conducted by a U.S. Army force known as the “Seahorse Soldiers,” a name derived from an oval uniform patch they wore bearing a red seahorse bordered in blue. Officially designated the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, it was one of several units, known as ESBs, that were developed by the Army Corps of Engineers when the Navy proved
unable to provide “shore-to-shore” amphibious landing support to the Army.
On the night of June 28, a reconnaissance platoon from the 162nd Infantry Regiment installed navigation lights on offshore islands along the route leading to Nassau Bay. With the operation to unfold under the cover of darkness, the pilots of the invasion boats needed all the help they could get finding the correct beach. The reinforced 1st Battalion of the 162nd Regimental Combat Team of the United States 41st Infantry Division, called the MacKechnie Force after its commander, Colonel Archibald MacKechnie, formed the main body of the troops for the landings. Once ashore, they would link up with the Australian 3rd Division and come under the control of Major General Stanley Savige, commander of all Allied forces facing Salamaua.
Company D of the Australian 2/6th Infantry Battalion was to create a diversion, drawing Japanese attention away from the landing zone. A platoon from that company arrived at the beach prior to the landing and set up guide lights to bring the landing craft in safely. Company A of the Papuan Infantry Battalion stealthily moved to Cape Dinga on the southern flank of the landing zone. There were about 150 Japanese, both infantry and naval guard, at Cape Dinga. The PIB troops were to guard against enemy infiltration during the landings.
The invasion force consisted of twenty-nine LCVPs (landing craft, vehicles, personnel), one LCM (landing craft, mechanized) and two Japanese motorized barges that had been captured by PT-boat crews. On board were 1,090 troops and several artillery pieces, as well as ESB troops for operating the vessels. Accompanying them were four PT boats, three of which carried seventy men each while the fourth kept its decks cleared for action and patrolled ahead and to seaward of the convoy, which moved in three waves. The convoy began heading toward their destination at six thirty p.m. The weather could hardly have been worse. Rain and high winds rocked the vessels, and the sea grew rougher as the night wore on. Visibility was extremely poor.
War at the End of the World Page 24