by Ernst Roets
Area-bound reaction forces; and
Home-and-hearth protection forces.8
Area-bound reaction forces were staffed by local commando members who were called up regularly in times of crisis for paid duty and issued with the necessary uniforms and other equipment to perform their commando responsibilities. They were also trained jointly with SAPS members and SAPS police reservists to conduct patrols, roadblocks, follow-up operations, cordon-and-search operations and farm visits.
The home-and-hearth protection forces comprised two sub-groups: the home-and-hearth protection reaction force commando members, and the home-and-hearth protection commando members.9
Both groups were staffed by farmers, smallholders and their workers. The first group was responsible for assisting other farmers and smallholders in the event of a farm attack, and the second group was responsible for their own protection.10
1998: NELSON MANDELA AND THE RURAL SAFETY SUMMIT
Despite the introduction of the RPP, there was a sharp increase in farm attacks at the time, rising from 433 attacks in 1997 to 767 in 1998.11 In October 1998, a Rural Safety Summit was convened on the instruction of former President Nelson Mandela ‘to deal with rural safety in general, but farm attacks in particular’.12 At the Summit, Mandela stated:
Beyond the immediate human suffering, lack of security and stability in our rural and farming community causes serious disruption to our economy. It threatens to bring reduced growth or production, loss of wages and profits and in time unemployment. It brings the spectre of deepening poverty, and potential social instability and upheaval.13
Mandela went on:
The government deplores the cold-blooded killings that have been taking place on the farms in the past few years. While killings on farms, like crime in general, have been a feature of South African life in general, the incidents of murder and assault in farming areas have increased dramatically in recent years.14
At the conclusion of the Summit, a declaration was adopted in which murders and other crimes affecting rural communities were condemned. The problem was recognised as complex and multi-faceted. The importance of effective law enforcement was stressed. The necessity of involving all people in the RPP was recognised. Better cooperation was pleaded for. Certain improvements to the criminal justice system were referred to. The rights of victims were recognised. The necessity for further research, sustained effort and the need to strengthen moral values was also stressed. Furthermore, three working groups were established to give effect to these issues, to deal with communication, information and research with operational interventions and with rural safety policy.15
1999: JOINTS COMMITTEE
The task team formed the basis of what eventually developed into the Priority Committee on Rural Safety in 1999.16 The Priority Committee was representative of a number of government departments such as the SAPS, SANDF, Justice, Land Affairs, and Agriculture, as well as agricultural organisations such as Agri SA, Transvaal Agricultural Union of South Africa (TAU SA), the African Farmers Union (AFU) and Action Stop Farm Attacks. The Priority Committee reported directly to the interdepartmental Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (JOINTS), which reported to the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS).17 It presided over a variety of responsibilities, including the management of the RPP, attending to reports or complaints by any group, investigating serious allegations, consulting with all role players on a regular basis, and compiling regular reports to the National Operational Coordinating Committee (NOCOC) and (from 2000) to its successor, the JOINTS.18
The NOCOC was the joint interdepartmental operational structure until 2000, representing the SAPS, the SANDF, Correctional Services, and the departments of Welfare and Justice. In 2000 NOCOC was replaced by JOINTS. The JOINTS is representative of the above departments as well as the rest of the departments of the JCPS.
Despite these interventions, farm attacks were still on the rise.
2001: INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
More and more farmers began to believe that there was more to farm attacks than ‘ordinary crime’. TAU SA pointed out that many of these attacks were executed with ‘military precision’ and that in many of these attacks, little to nothing was stolen, while the attacks were often accompanied by high levels of brutality.19
A committee of inquiry into farm attacks was established in 2001 by the then Minister for Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete.20 Tshwete’s announcement of a commission of inquiry was followed by another severe increase in attacks.21
The report by the committee of inquiry was released on 31 July 2003. In conclusion it stated among other things that:
The majority of cases were motivated by the desire to rob or steal.
Farm attacks were generally not carried out with ‘military precision’ and there was no indication of an organisation behind farm attacks in the narrow sense of the word, with the exception of certain incidents connected to land invasions.
Land invasions often led to farm attacks.
Many farm attacks were extremely violent and the high publicity given to these cases gave rise to the perception that all farm attacks were of that nature.
Just over 60% of the victims of farm attacks during 2001 were white but it seems that there is a considerably higher risk of a white victim of farm attacks being killed or injured than a black victim.
The investigation of farm attacks was given high priority and the conviction rate for farm attack cases was higher than for other similar crimes. This was linked to the fact that investigations were handled by specialised units.
Security on many farms was inadequate or non-existent and there was a general lack of alertness on farms.
The trauma had serious consequences for the victims of farm attacks and had not been given sufficient attention.22
The appointment of a committee of inquiry into farm attacks in 2001 was the last comprehensive step taken by the South African government that gave an indication that farm attacks should be regarded as a priority. In 2003, the same year in which the report was published, the process of deprioritising farm attacks effectively began.
2003: COMMANDOS SHUT DOWN
On 14 February 2003, during the State of the Nation Address at the opening of Parliament, former President Thabo Mbeki announced that the commando system would be phased out. This came as a shock at the time, as there had been no indication of any plans to take such a step. The commando system was the cornerstone of the RPP and the closing down of the commandos effectively implied the end of this plan.23
‘Given the structure and staffing of the RPP, closing down the commandos would obviously mean the death knell for this particular plan,’ write Burger and Henri Boshoff from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). ‘There has been no indication that this plan was or is to be substituted by another, other than the announcement by the South African president on 14 February 2003 that with the phasing out of the commandos a “new system” was to be created “whose composition and ethos accord with the requirements of all rural communities”.’24
‘The effectiveness of the RPP (and the commandos) is reflected in the notable decrease in farm attacks which fell by 40,5% from 1069 incidents in 2001/2002 to 636 incidents in 2005/2006,’ writes Burger.25 Similarly, farm murders decreased by 41,4% from 140 cases in 2001/2002 to 82 cases in 2004/2005. This achievement attests to the impact of the RPP and the work of the Priority Committee. However, with the phasing out of the commandos in 2003 and a clear change in government’s perception of the problem, the early indications were that the situation was again deteriorating. In 2006/2007, the last financial year for which the police reported on farm attacks and related murders, there was a 24,8% increase in the number of attacks (from 636 to 794) and the number of murders increased from 82 in 2004/2005 to 88 in 2005/2006.26
Burger was in charge of rural safety in the SAPS at the time when the commandos were shut down. On the reasons for the abolishment, he writes:
The ANC had been
opposed to the continuation of the commando system, partly because of the role these units played in support of the apartheid system, but also because the commandos were perceived to represent the security interests of the white farming community only.27
This correlates with the explanation provided by Siphiwe Nyanda, Chief of the SANDF at the time:
We thought that they were a nest of reaction and that they had to go because they had been part of the security apparatus at that time (referring to the 1980s). We thought that they were a nest of reaction and most of the activities really were reactionary and even were in the defence when we took them over. We didn’t think that they had a positive role to play in the new defence force we were creating because we wanted to create a new defence force comprising both black and white soldiers with a new mindset and we thought that the commandos had a different mindset from the one that we wanted to inculcate.28
With the disbanding of the commandos, an undertaking was given that the system would be replaced by a new plan and/or strategy that would fall under the SAPS, instead of the SANDF. The following were to be put in place:
A revised SAPS reservist system based on an amendment of the National Instruction for Reservists;
A substantial increase in SAPS personnel figures;
The implementation of sector policing;
The restructuring of specialised investigation units; and
The establishment of area crime combating units.29
However, as Burger points out, in 2014, National Instruction 3 of 2014 replaced National Instruction 1 of 2002. National Instruction 3 of 2014 provides for two categories of police reservists, namely functional policing and specialised operational support. ‘As a consequence, the provision for dedicated rural and urban sector police reservists disappeared.’30 This effectively means that the promise that was made in 2003 – that the commando system would be replaced – was not kept.
The closing down of the commandos can be seen as the first step in a decade of the deprioritisation of farm attacks.
2007: SEIZURE OF STATISTICS
Without any announcement or explanation, the publication of statistics on farm attacks and farm murders was summarily discontinued in the financial year of 2007.31 This happened despite a 25% increase in farm attacks in the last year in which statistics were published: According to SAPS data, there were 794 farm attacks in the financial year of 2006/2007, up from 636 in 2005/2006.
According to this new policy, farm attacks were, despite the sharp increase, officially no longer a priority.
‘Suddenly it was said that farm murders is no longer a priority and the moment when this happened, gone are the statistics, gone are the data, gone is the information and we cannot plan anymore,’ commented Dirk Hermann, Deputy General Secretary of the trade union Solidarity in an interview done in 2012.32
2008: SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (SAHRC) REPORT
Following the 2003 report, a second investigative hearing into farm attacks was convened by the SAHRC in 2008. Some of the recommendations in the report included that it was necessary for a nationwide discussion to be carried out between the state and civil society to agree on the true underlying causes of farm attacks in order for effective strategies to be developed to address these causes; that the RPP should remove all references to farm attacks or farm killings from its text ‘as this nomenclature served to create a perceived hierarchy of crimes that was racially defined in terms of who the victim was’; that the RPP should address all forms of crime; and that the recommendations of the 2003 report receive the highest possible support from the state, and the implementation of the recommendations should be based in the Office of the President.33
2014: SAHRC INVESTIGATIVE HEARING ON FARM ATTACKS
In 2014, upon receiving a written request to this effect by AfriForum, the SAHRC organised a national investigative hearing into safety and security challenges in farming communities. In the subsequent report, the SAHRC expressed its concern that farm attacks remained a serious concern, despite previous attempts at intervention.34 The recommendations made in the report included the following:
Follow-up dialogues to keep farm attacks on the national human rights agenda.
A stepping up of involvement by law enforcement agencies such as the SAPS and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in the combating of farm attacks.
Particular attention should be given to race relations in farming communities.
Stereotypes in farming communities need to be addressed.
Continued research into farm attacks.
A policy document should be developed to establish a standard on the specification of housing provided to farm workers.
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development should:
Include farming communities more concretely in the Promotion of the Rights of Vulnerable Groups (PRVG) programme.
Provide a report on the programmes the Department conducts in farming communities.
Ensure that the NPA brings to the courts’ attention the circumstances of the farming communities, particularly with reference to providing bail with regard to farm attacks.
Ensure that the court officers are better prepared to attend to victim support, with specific regard to farming communities. A report to this effect should be provided to the SAHRC within 12 months.
Evaluate the Victims’ Charter, with particular emphasis on marginalised communities, rural communities and farming communities.
8. The SAPS should:
Review the National Rural Safety Strategy (NRSS) and involve the SAHRC in the review process.
Create an Agricultural Forum in cooperation with all role players and stakeholders.
Conduct a crime threat analysis for farming communities.
Organise a farming safety summit.
Provide the steps taken to ensure that programmes on family violence, domestic abuse and sexual offences are in place at police stations close to farming communities.
Issue guidelines for visible policing of rural and farming communities and distribute these to the community policing forums (CPFs) and the farming community.
Implement the NRSS in farming communities.
Establish and implement sensitisation programmes for police officers working with vulnerable groups in rural communities.
Implement effective policies on dealing with stock theft, which includes the appointment of personnel in vacant positions.
Inform the SAHRC about all programmes and outcomes on safety in farming communities.
9. More CPFs should be established in farming communities and they should be incorporated into crime-prevention strategies."
10. Multi-pronged strategies should be introduced to reduce violence in farming communities. This includes an improvement of attitude towards a human rights-based culture and a political encouragement of social cohesion.
11. The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) should take note of the report and its recommendations and the SAHRC should be provided with feedback with the implementation of programmes in this regard.
12. The Department of Labour (DL) should take note of the report and its recommendations.
13. A special sub-committee should be established by the JCPS Cluster Priority Committee to develop an action plan to address the issues raised, to engage with the community and also to monitor and evaluate the related activities of the departments.
14. The South African Institute for Judicial Education (SAIJE) should provide sufficient detail as to how the court processes are attended to, the improvement of the judicial system, and in particular address impunity in farming communities.35
Three years after the publication of the 2014 SAHRC Report, no substantial progress could be shown on any one of the above-mentioned recommendations.
SHORT-LIVED PRIORITISING OF FARM ATTACKS IN 2016
In May 2016, acting National Police Commissioner Khomotso Phahlane met with AfriForum to discuss farm attacks a
nd possible counter-strategies. After the meeting, during a joint press conference, Phahlane announced that farm attacks would again be treated as a national priority by the SAPS.36
Shortly thereafter, facing charges of corruption and suspension, Phahlane agreed to resign from his position37 and the short-lived prioritisation of farm attacks led by Phahlane became shipwrecked once again.
A COLD SHOULDER
The South African government’s reaction to farm attacks should not be evaluated just on the basis of the policies implemented, the reports published and the projects initiated. What is even more concerning than the process of deprioritisation outlined above, is the repeated mocking, ridiculing and shunning of the victims of farm attacks and those campaigning for its prioritisation.
‘The next thing I remember was lying in the veld. I had been shot in the neck. I was still tied up. I looked up and I remember that it was a beautiful night. There were stars everywhere. When I saw the stars, I could hear the bakkie going up the road. I heard some talking. Then I heard two shots and I heard the tyres spinning on the dirt road.’ Robert was covered with stab wounds, burns and bruises. The bag was still tied around his neck.
‘I managed to stumble towards the road. It was about 20 to 30 metres up the road. That’s where I found her.’