Roving bands of raiders struck at outlying targets near Exeter and Berwick, and surprised the inhabitants of Rye, New Hampshire, killing or carrying off twenty-one of their number. Small war parties, numbering but a few men, still lingered on the outskirts of the frontier towns, but overall the government of Massachusetts was relieved that no major attack had materialized. As for the current raids, given the colony’s resources little more could be done.1
After Schuyler’s raid on La Prairie, all fell quiet along the New York frontier as well. Taking advantage of the lull, Governor Sloughter placed detachments of militia north of Albany at Half Moon and among the ruins of Schenectady in hopes of thwarting a French attack. He then pleaded with the surrounding governments for reinforcements. “I need not relate unto you of how great import the preservation of this place (Albany) is,” he wrote the various governors, and if “the French should assault and gain Albany how far your Government and all the English Colonys on both sides of us would be endangered, you can easily judge. For we have nothing but that place that keeps our Indians steady to us, and the loss of that must be the loss of them, and the loss of them must be the loss of all the King’s interest on this Continent.” Although compelling, the governor’s pleas accomplished little. One after another, each of the colonies stated their pressing needs. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland could not afford the cost of raising men but did send a small amount of money. Rhode Island was afraid to release soldiers for fear of landing parties from French privateers that prowled the New England coast.
Connecticut claimed similar fears, while Massachusetts was in need of every man the colony could muster to stabilize the Maine-New Hampshire frontier.2
This proved to be one of the last acts attempted by Sloughter, who died suddenly on July 23, 1691, leaving Ingoldsby in charge of the New York government. Ingoldsby was eventually able to convince Pennsylvania to send 150 troops to help garrison the frontier forts during the winter, and Connecticut offered to let New York recruit a company from within its borders. Another company of New York troops was raised and dispatched to Albany while the fortifications there were repaired and expanded. When combined with the arriving Pennsylvania forces, a company of English regulars brought by Sloughter, and the troops raised by New York and local militia forces Albany, had well over six hundred men ready to answer for the town’s defense. A bigger problem was the lack of supplies. Many troops did not have swords so hatchets were issued and spears made when these ran out. There was also a shortage of artillery supplies for the guns in the various blockhouses and in Fort Albany itself. “There are so many things wanting that we grieve to think of it,” one officer wrote of the garrison’s plight. It all seemed like too little with the rumors that a large French fleet had reached Quebec and that an all-out attack on Albany was to follow.3
If the war had stabilized for New York and New England, the same could not be said for their Iroquois allies. Repeated attacks by New France’s allies had driven many of the Seneca out of their villages and forced the confederacy to hold off on any large-scale raids against the French. It was not until December that the Iroquois turned their attention back toward New France. A force of two hundred Onondaga and one hundred Cayuga were ordered to rendezvous near the headwaters of the St. Lawrence with the aim of falling upon Montreal and other targets downriver. Unfortunately for the Iroquois, a 325-man French and Indian war party headed for the high country surprised an early arriving detachment of fifty Iroquois not far from the rendezvous site. Caught unaware in their camp, the Iroquois crumbled before the sudden onslaught. Twenty-four Onondaga and Cayuga warriors were killed and another sixteen taken prisoner. Those that escaped soon spread word of the disaster and the presence of a large French and Indian force in the area, all of which was enough to convince the Iroquois to abandon their plans.
A second Iroquois force, consisting of twenty Mohawk and eleven Oneida chieftains, descended Lake Chaplain and, skirting around Fort Chambly, attacked a party of French mission Indians hunting near Mount St. Hilaire. The experienced Iroquois war party made quick work of their adversaries, killing five and capturing sixteen of their number, but three of the French Indians managed to escape and quickly sounded the alarm. A large French and Indian war party set out in pursuit of the Iroquois, who, slowed by their captives, were discovered five days later along the west bank of Lake Champlain. Having seen tracks the day before, the Mohawk and Oneida warriors knew that their pursuers were nearby, but it was not enough to prevent their destruction. Scores of musket barrels silently tracked the column as it snaked its way through the ice-draped pines and broken birch trees. When the van and main body of the column had entered the trap, a shot burst forth, followed in rapid succession by war whoops and the clatter of musketry. The Iroquois column collapsed upon itself as fire poured down upon it from all sides. The battle was decided at this point, but the Iroquois refused to yield. Crouched behind whatever cover they could find, they fired back at their assailants. When their powder ran out, they met their enemy’s rush with tomahawks and knives. It was a valiant but futile stand. A few braves in the rear of the column managed to escape. As for the remainder, only three were captured, the rest having chosen to resist to the end.4
The two events, coupled with the losses from Schuyler’s expedition and a wave of French and Indian attacks on the Five Nations villages, had undermined Iroquois morale and sapped its fighting strength. The loss of so many chieftains and leading men had rattled the Mohawk in particular. “The Mohawk are very loath to go out upon any occasion. This great loss of men hath struck such a terror in them that they are quite out of heart,” the Albany council wrote the governor. Another New York officer agreed, saying, “All the principal captains of the Maquas and Oneida are dead, to the great grief of us all. We have not one leading man of their Castles now that we can depend on.”5
Militarily the Iroquois were being ground down. The confederacy, led by the Seneca and Mohawk, had repeatedly criticized their English ally’s disinterested conduct. Instead of gathering a powerful Anglo-Iroquois force to deal a major blow to the French, the English colonies either acted only upon their own concerns or seemed content to allow the Iroquois to bear the brunt of the French attacks. Despite this indifference the Iroquois had remained loyal to the cause, but it was not without consequence. French and Indian attacks on the western and most powerful member of the confederacy, the Seneca, had proven quite successful. New France’s allies had driven this tribe back upon the Onondaga, where they found refuge. At a September 4 conference in Albany, the Seneca representative informed the English of the tribe’s plight, saying, “we are a nation dispersed and scattered.” The Mohawk had been hit hard as well. By the winter of 1691 the three primary Mohawk castles were only capable of fielding 130 warriors, while the Oneida, a smaller tribe, could only muster half as many.6
In England, Sir William Phips spent the early summer personally reporting the details of his failed campaign to the king and then pressing the monarch to allow him to lead a second effort against Quebec. Phips requested a ship-of-the-line to escort the New England fleet, a hundred cannon, powder, and two thousand small arms to see this task through. This time he would land on the Island of Orleans and set up cannon to completely block the St. Lawrence. From here the force would advance until it got close enough to erect batteries, at which point Quebec would be bombarded into submission. Phips specifically asked for “Four good mortars, with shells in proportion,” pointing out that “there is a hill from which the enemy cannot hinder us, and this will so annoy them that the conquest will be easy.”7
The king showed interest in the scheme and asked Phips for more information, but given the time of the year this request meant that it was unlikely that the expedition would go forward, even though Phips was soon able to secure a warship, the HMS Dinant, to act as escort. The prodding by the adventurer turned admiral did have some positive effects. Two hundred barrels of powder and ten siege guns were forwarded to Boston, and at Phips’s u
rging, it was agreed to assign a frigate to patrol New England waters to counter the growing number of French privateers. Although a second expedition against the capital of New France was not to be, the Board of Trade and the Admiralty had taken notice of a memorandum Phips wrote concerning the ability of the New England colonies to provide all the major needs of the English navy. Timber abounded particularly in southern New Hampshire and Maine. Yardarms, masts, pitch—almost every naval need could be met by the colonies at typically half the cost that the Admiralty was currently paying in England. This statement was supported by a number of other witnesses including Sir Edmund Andros. Taken all together, when the new royal charter was completed for Massachusetts, Phips seemed the obvious choice and was appointed governor in late November 1691.8
After coming close to destroying Schuyler’s force at La Prairie, Frontenac turned his attention toward Acadia and plans to strike back at the English. In September the frigate Soleil d’Afrique left Quebec bound for Acadia. On board was the colony’s new governor, Joseph Robinau, the Chevalier de Villebon. The chevalier’s appointment carried several directives. First, through encouragement, gifts, and supplies he was to keep the Wabanaki constantly engaged against the English. Second, he was to reestablish the colony and if possible secure and defend Port Royal. The journey to Port Royal was uneventful save for the capture and burning of a small English prize. The Soleil d’Afrique dropped anchor before the ruins of the fort in late September 1691. Villebon came ashore and met with the French sergeant that Phips had left in charge the year before. After meeting with a few of the French colonists in the area, and replacing the English flag flying over the fort with a French one, the governor quickly came to the conclusion that he could not defend the town. Hence, he left the French sergeant in charge and set sail for the St. John River.
Near the mouth of the river the Soleil d’Afrique surprised a pair of New England vessels. Both vessels surrendered after a short chase, and the larger of the two proved to be carrying an influential New England merchant and the recently appointed English governor of Port Royal, Colonel Edward Tyng. Villebon released the two crews and vessels under the agreement that they would return with a like number of French soldiers captured at the fall of Fort Royal the year before. Until then, he held Tyng and several of the more prominent captives in his new post on the Jemseg River, about fifty miles up the St. John. From here, with the help of Castin and Jesuit father Louis-Pierre Thury, Villebon began to focus on his primary task.9
At Quebec there were several plans put forth for major expeditions against the English. Most prevalent was the old plan to seize Manhattan and Albany. The scope of the plan would have to be changed, Frontenac informed the new minister of the marine, Louis Phelypeaux de Pontchartrain. Regardless of what had been considered in the past, the idea that a Canadian detachment could penetrate as far south as New York City was simply out of the question. It was more a matter of logistics and sheer distance to be traveled rather than English arms that called this task into question. Even an expedition against Albany, Frontenac added, would require reinforcements to prevent stripping the colony of its defenders. The best approach would be an attack on Albany coordinated with a French naval expedition against New York City. A small French fleet would engage Fort William Henry, as Fort James was now known, while French marines landed to attack the town from the landward side. The governor reiterated his support for this plan to the new minister of the marine, stating that “the capture of Manath and New-York,” was the “most assured means of terminating this war and of utterly reducing the Iroquois.”10
Frontenac was not alone in recognizing the potential benefits of a coordinated attack on New York. The intendant Champigny and the governor of Montreal, Callières, both wrote the king’s ministers in support of such a plan, and the new French governor of Acadia, the Chevalier de Villebon, made it clear that such a move was the fastest way of terminating the Iroquois War, which would open the west to French dominion. “The expedition against Manatte would be the most advantageous for Canada,” Villebon wrote the minister of the marine in October 1691. “It would render the King master of a fine Country, and put an end at once to the Iroquois war. The expense incurred for Canada during two years would be more than sufficient for this expedition.”11
As enthusiasm for the project faded, the plan was altered to a more palatable form. Canada would launch an attack on Albany while a French fleet bombarded New York City and several other places along the coast as a diversion. Within the last element of this scheme, Boston was a particularly tempting target. Striking at New England’s capital was attractive on several levels. First, it is where Phips’s expedition had originated, and as such, an attack would send a political message while striking at the heart of New England morale. Second, it would have a crippling effect on the sea-based economy of New England. With Boston burned, as called for under the plan and a French squadron in the area, the New England cod fleet would be trapped in port for fear of capture. The Yankees, “loving their trade better than war,” would be thrown into a panic, and perhaps would even seek peace terms, the pragmatic author of a memoir on the subject informed the French court. Such a peace treaty, “however indifferent it may be, would always be more beneficial to us than the greatest victories and advantages that we might gain over them, short of their utter annihilation which is very difficult to effect.” Third, and perhaps most importantly, a successful naval attack against Boston was not out of the question. The town’s defenses were suspect. Fort William, a small four-bastioned stone-faced structure, stood sentinel on Castle Island, guarding the narrow channel into Boston harbor. Mounting a dozen cannon, it was hardly an obstacle to block the efforts of frigate-sized warships, no matter how narrow the channel. Once into the main harbor there were only two gun batteries, located on the north and south edge of the town, to contend with. The New England capital was also an ideal target because of its construction. Wood-framed houses arranged along narrow streets would mean that any fire was likely to spread and consume large parts of the town. There was concern that the defenders, if they found themselves threatened, might sink several vessels in the main channel to halt a French fleet, but even this was beneficial from the attacker’s perspective as it would have a crippling effect on the local economy, cut the town off from receiving supplies, and perhaps just as importantly, leave French warships free to roam New England waters in search of prey.12
The plan also made sense in terms of what was required to maintain the defenses of the colony. Frontenac and the leadership of the colony agreed that, at minimum, a squadron of four forty-gun frigates was needed to keep the mouth of the St. Lawrence free from English privateers and to challenge any future attempts by the English to launch an attack on Quebec. These vessels could cruise the Nova Scotia and New England coasts in search of prizes and even make up part of the squadron sent from France to undertake the attack on Boston or New York.
Attacking Boston or New York aside, there were more pressing matters for the French court to consider. It was imperative that supplies and reinforcements quickly reach Quebec. Two years of warfare had taken its toll on the colony’s manpower. At the start of 1690 the thirty-two Free Companies of the Marine stationed in New France had numbered some 1,300 men. By the end of the 1691 campaign, Iroquois attacks and illness had cut their numbers by more than half, with some companies being left with a little over a dozen men in their ranks. In all, it was estimated that Canada had lost over two thousand militia and regulars over this period. If these men were not replaced and the attrition continued at the same rate, the colony would ultimately be lost. A thousand men were needed—nearly a full regiment by French army standards. Flour and foodstuffs were needed as was clothing and almost every manner of arms and munitions. Money was needed to pay the troops, to build a series of armed row galleys to patrol the lower St. Lawrence, and to build new fortifications, especially at Montreal, which was vulnerable to both English and Iroquois excursions.13
Althoug
h an attack on Boston or New York City never materialized, such an effort was hardly out of the realm of possibilities. Under the guidance of Colbert, the French navy, which in 1661 numbered only eight vessels, had been transformed into a fleet of sixty warships half a dozen years later. And to ensure the future of the kingdom’s navy Colbert established armories at Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, Dunkerque, and Le Havre. Officers and men were recruited from France’s growing merchant marine.
In 1690 France combined her Atlantic and Mediterranean flotillas and engaged an Anglo-Dutch fleet of some sixty ships near Beachy Head, England, not far from where William the Conqueror landed at Pevensey. Outnumbering his opponents, the French admiral, Anne-Hilarion de Cotentin, Count de Tourville, managed to bring his numerical superiority to bear by isolating the Dutch squadron at the head of the allied fleet. The English squadrons did not move forward to engage and the Dutch, after taking a severe pounding, broke off the engagement, which panicked and scattered the rest of the allied fleet. Several Dutch vessels were sunk or captured and for a brief period the French fleet controlled the English Channel.14
The Battle of Beachy Head demonstrated the usefulness and effectiveness of French naval power. More warships were on the stocks, and there appeared no reason why the fleet built and nurtured by Colbert and his son would not soon contest naval superiority in the Atlantic with the combined Anglo-Dutch fleets. It was in all practicality an opportune time to detach a small flotilla of French warships to contest American and Caribbean waters. English and Dutch commercial efforts would be damaged by such actions and their resources further stretched. Given the value placed on their American colonies, any territory seized by the French during such an effort would also prove a valuable trading tool at the peace table when the hostilities finally concluded.
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