There is no indication the candidate knew Page and, in fact, the “adviser” (if he could even be called that) informed Congress, “I’ve never spoken with him any time in my life.”39 He stressed that he never communicated with Trump in any form, including texts or emails. Page was not even in attendance at the one meeting the council had in the presence of Trump.40 The policy council itself appears to have been a device to add some patina to the nominee’s credentials on foreign policy where experience was lacking. To suggest that Page was an incidental participant in the campaign is an overstatement. In his testimony before Congress, he described himself as “a junior, unpaid adviser.”41
Page made a trip to Moscow to speak at a commencement ceremony for the New Economic School. In 2009, President Obama spoke there too, so it may have been the case that the school was simply interested in inviting someone associated, however tangentially, to the upcoming presidential election in 2016.42 Page alerted the campaign of his speaking engagement and received permission to proceed, although campaign manager Corey Lewandowsky cautioned, “If you’d like to go on your own, not affiliated with the campaign, you know, that’s fine.”43
Page was not a fan of America’s foreign policy toward Russia, especially in the Obama era. In this respect, his views were largely consistent with the various public statements made by Trump. Following the speech, Page provided to the campaign what he referred to as a “readout” or synopsis of his visit to Russia.44 The information contained therein was derived mainly from listening to other speeches, reading Russian newspapers, and watching Russian television. It was not, he insisted, acquired during surreptitious meetings with Russian leaders who were hoping to influence the 2016 election.
According to a transcript of his testimony before the House Intelligence Committee on November 2, 2017, Page suggested to the Trump campaign that the candidate visit Moscow himself to deliver an Obama-like speech on foreign relations. “The idea there was bearing in mind Barack Obama’s speech as a candidate in Germany in 2008,” said Page. “That was what I was envisioning.”45 The idea was roundly rejected by the campaign.
Page readily admitted to lawmakers that while in Moscow he had several brief encounters with people in attendance who may have been “some senior government officials” connected to the Kremlin.46 This would not have been unusual, given the university’s prominent position among elite Russian institutions. He described his interactions as “greetings and brief conversation.”47 All of them, he said, were benign and inconsequential.
Representative Adam Schiff, the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, seemed to find something sinister in these incidental encounters, even though Page insisted they were innocuous and did not involve some grand conspiracy to interfere in the presidential election.
Undaunted, Schiff grilled Page about having run into Arkady Dvorkovich, the deputy prime minister of Russia, at the conclusion of the speaking event. According to Page, the two men shook hands and said hello in an exchange that lasted less than ten seconds.48 Nonetheless, in the congressman’s warped view, this constituted some illicit “meeting” as he tried to conflate “met” with “meeting.” Page did his level best to explain the difference to Schiff who seemed unwilling to comprehend or accept the difference:
CARTER PAGE: I did not meet with him. I greeted him briefly as he was walking off the stage after his speech.49
Perhaps Schiff was gullible enough to believe the contents of the “dossier.” More likely, he knew it was worthless but was determined to use it as a political weapon to impugn Trump with a tall tale of corruption and “collusion” with the Russians.
The 208-page transcript of Page’s testimony makes for interesting reading. Schiff comes across as someone who believes that any individual with a foreign-sounding name, especially a Russian, must be a nefarious character who is up to no good. Hence, any interaction with such a person necessarily rises to the level of suspected criminality. It does not.
Page is identified several times in the “dossier.” On page 9 of the document (the July 19, 2016, memo), it is alleged that Page held “secret meetings” with Igor Sechin, the president of the Russian energy giant Rosneft, and Igor Divyekin, a senior Kremlin internal affairs official. The “dossier” claims the “lifting of western sanctions” were discussed and the Russian officials allegedly “hinted” that they had “kompromat” (compromising information) “on Trump which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.”50 The document notes that “Page was non-committal in response.”
As with all of the allegations in the “dossier,” this conversation was based on double and even triple hearsay. In other words, someone in Russia supposedly told someone else who allegedly told Steele who then purportedly summarized the information in his “dossier” accurately and without prejudice. Single hearsay is unreliable which is why it is often inadmissible in a court of law. Double hearsay is never allowed. Triple hearsay is a farce.
But beyond the anonymous sourcing obstacles based on rank hearsay, there was never any evidence to corroborate that these conversations with Russians happened. No proof has emerged in the nearly two years the FBI has been searching for it.
Page described the “dossier” as “totally preposterous.”51 The meetings recounted therein never happened, he said. He insisted he did not discuss the Trump campaign with any Russian, never “colluded” with them, and was not involved in the hacking of Democratic emails.52
Page 30 (the October 18, 2016, memo) of the “dossier” asserted even more outrageous allegations against Page:
He (Sechin) offered Page/Trump’s associates the brokerage of up to 19 percent (privatized) stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. Page had expressed interest and confirmed that were Trump elected U.S. President, then sanctions would be lifted.53
Page vociferously denied this event took place, much less a promise to lift sanctions in exchange for what would surely be billions of dollars in a share of Rosneft. “Beyond a shadow of a doubt, there was never any negotiations, or any quid pro quo, or any offer, or any request even, in any way related to sanctions.”54
It is laughable for anyone to believe that Russia would confer a 19 percent stake in one of its most valuable assets, the state-run oil company Rosneft, in exchange for the prospect of lifting Western sanctions. Based on the asset value and capitalization of the company, the pay-out would approximate $11 billion. Indeed, at the end of 2017, Rosneft executed an agreement to sell 19.5 percent to Glencore, a Swiss company, and Qatar’s state-owned wealth fund. The deal was valued at approximately $11 billion.55
Why would leaders at the Kremlin offer such an exorbitant amount of money to an American candidate who might not get elected or otherwise carry out a promise to lift sanctions that, by any objective economic model, had not caused anything approaching the equivalent damage to the Russian economy? It makes no sense. If the alleged bribe was intended for Page himself, why would Moscow give such money to a volunteer “unpaid, junior advisor” who had never met the candidate and had few real connections to the campaign? It is a screwball concept that would never pass the “smell test” of even the wackiest conspiracy theorist.
That, of course, did not stop Schiff from advancing the theory. In his opening statement on March 20, 2017, at the committee hearing on Russian interference in the 2016 campaign, the Democratic congressman laid bare his conspiracy theory:
According to Steele’s Russian sources, Page is offered brokerage fees by such (Igor Sechin) on a deal involving a 19 percent share of the company (Rosneft). According to Reuters, the sale of a 19.5 percent share of Rosneft later takes place with unknown purchases and unknown brokerage fees.
Is it a coincidence that the Russian gas company, Rosneft, sold a 19 percent share after former British intelligence officer Steele was told by Russian sources that Carter Page was offered fees on a deal of just that size?56
It turns out that Schiff’s claims of “unknown purchases and unknown brokerag
e fees” were not unknown at all. Glencore and the Qatar fund were the purchasers of the stake.57 It had nothing to do with, and had no connection to, Page, Trump, or anyone else in the campaign. Glencore, as Page pointed out in his letter to the committee, was founded by none other than Marc Rich, a billionaire commodity trader who was friends with the Clintons and was infamously pardoned by Bill Clinton in the waning hours of his presidency.58
As for Schiff’s facetious interpretation of a “coincidence,” it was nothing of the sort. It was well known in the energy sector and other markets that Rosneft was cash poor and looking for investment infusions outside the country to avoid what Bloomberg called “self-privatization.”59 Indeed, a July 2016 publication reported that a 19.5 percent stake was up for sale “to the large foreign investors.”60 Before that, the company had been shopping around its investor presentation searching for buyers. Thus, Steele’s reference to the 19 percent figure would have been known by anyone who was paying attention to Russian energy companies which dominate their economy. It was not a secret. Rosneft desperately needed the $11 billion and the state-run company was in no financial position to give it away as a speculative political bribe. All of this appears to have been lost on Schiff.
Whoever composed the “dossier,” whether it was Steele or someone else, learned that Page had traveled to Moscow to give a speech. It was well publicized and even televised within Russia. It would serve as an effective way to smear Trump in the media and tangle him up with an FBI investigation. Perhaps some incriminating evidence could be discovered along the way, but that was only a secondary purpose.
When the FBI learned of the “dossier” in early July 2016, it could have simply questioned Page about its allegations and asked him to account for his whereabouts and conversations while in Moscow. This would have made sense since Page had assisted the bureau once before and became a cooperating witness in prior Russian prosecutions. Indeed, under the FISA law, U.S. law enforcement is required to undertake “normal investigative techniques” before resorting to surveillance, as former federal prosecutor Andrew McCarthy pointed out.61 The FBI did not comply with the law which speaks volumes about their own political motivations to intercede in the presidential contest.
You’d have to be intolerably ignorant not to recognize the Steele “dossier” for what it was: a politically driven collection of fables designed to defame and discredit Trump. Regardless, once created, it was then appropriated by high government officials at the FBI and DOJ to try to commandeer the election process, defeat Trump, and elevate Clinton. When the odious plot failed to succeed, the conspirators doubled-down and sought ways to destroy the new president.
Spying on Trump was one of their gambits. It was the kind of government abuse of surveillance powers that Justice Holmes argued against.
Chapter 7
Government Abuse of Surveillance
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government.
—JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, OSBORN V. UNITED STATES, 385 US 323, 341 (1966)
To convince a judge to issue a warrant to search, seize, or surveil someone, the government must demonstrate that its information is reliable. It must present facts it has gathered that come from a credible person. In this case, both the facts and the individual who provided them were untrustworthy. The FBI and DOJ surely knew it.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution demands what is called “probable cause” whenever the government desires a warrant from a judge. This means there must exist a fair probability that a search (or surveillance) will produce evidence of a crime.1 The affidavit or application submitted to the court must present sufficiently credible information, normally from witnesses, to establish the probable cause. If the information is hearsay, it is vital that the source of the information be a reliable person.
In the FISA warrant application to spy on Page, the FBI knew, early on, that Steele was not a credible source. They learned that his assignment from Fusion GPS was purely for political reasons to damage Trump. They also learned that his efforts were funded by Trump’s election opponent, Hillary Clinton’s campaign, and the Democratic National Committee. This alone should have been enough for the FBI to disregard Steele and discard his “dossier” as lacking reliability as the law demands.
Then there is the “dossier” itself. As explained previously, it was outlandish in its claims and phony in its composition. Any serious person who bothered to scrutinize its contents would conclude it was bogus on its face. The fact that it was supposedly conveyed from anonymous foreign sources and then purveyed through an alleged series of multiple hearsay conversations made it seem all the more puerile and silly.
The sourcing of the “dossier” was insufficient, by American legal standards, to establish probable cause.
Fusion GPS and Glenn Simpson
The “dossier” may have been sifted from the creative imagination of Christopher Steele, but the endeavor was the brainchild of a former journalist by the name of Glenn Simpson. He, more than anyone else, was responsible for initiating and proliferating the “collusion” myth.
Simpson founded the company Fusion GPS, which conducts investigations and research. Initially, a conservative website hired Fusion to create opposition research on candidate Trump in September 2015. But when it became obvious that the businessman and television impresario would become the GOP nominee, the website stopped funding the work in the spring of 2016.2
The Clinton campaign and the DNC, through their lawyer Elias, hired Fusion to develop new negative research on Trump.3 Only thereafter did Simpson retain the services of Steele and his company, Orbis. Their assignment was to investigate Trump and establish the claim that he was collaborating with Russia. Almost immediately, Steele produced the first in a series of memos that became the infamous “dossier” based on his anonymous, supposed sources.
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 22, 2017, Simpson was repeatedly questioned whether he took any steps to verify the allegations in the document. It appears he did little because, he said, he trusted the ex-spy.4 Did that mean Steele’s information was equally trustworthy? Here, Simpson’s answer seemed muddled: “Chris (Steele) deals in a very different kind of information, which is human intelligence, human information. So by its very nature, the question of whether something is accurate isn’t really asked.”5
It should have been asked. It was reckless and irresponsible not to ask. Specific and detailed information about the origins and methods of soliciting and securing the materials should have been demanded. The report was so offensive and the accusations against Trump were so severe, that anything less than the strictest scrutiny would have been irresponsible. But it seems that Simpson was more interested in the political havoc he could wreak on the Republican nominee than in accuracy and truth.
One by one, Simpson was questioned about the succession of memos compiled by Steele and whether Fusion GPS ever corroborated any parts of the “dossier.” As to one memo, he stated, “Most of this I did not seek to independently verify and was relatively new information.”6 As to another memo, he said, “I can’t talk about this as a verification, but I was analyzing this. I analyzed this information in the same manner I analyzed the other stuff.”7 When questioned about still another memo, there was this exchange:
Q: Just moving on to the next memo . . . again, when you take a look at that, was there anything that you independently verified that comes out of this memo?
A: I don’t think so.8
Simpson gave similar answers as to other memos from Steele. To summarize, he appeared to have done almost nothing to verify the explosive allegations in the “dossier.” Beyond its content, what about Steele’s anonymous sources? Here is an exchange with Senate investigators addressing that question:
Q: Did you take any steps to try to assess the credibility of (Steele’s) sources in the material that he was providing you?
Perhaps he declined to talk about it because there was no “sourcing information.” It is hard to imagine that Simpson, who did not speak Russian and did not travel to the country while developing his anti-Trump opposition research, would have been in a position to verify Steele’s so-called sources, especially since they were anonymous. He admitted that none of his own work made it into the “dossier,” which suggests he did little except pay Steele for his tall tale of Trump’s “collusion” with the Kremlin.
A full reading of Simpson’s 311 pages of testimony will leave you with the distinct impression that he may never have asked whether Steele’s information was accurate. Moreover, there is no indication Simpson or anyone at Fusion GPS searched for any independent proof to substantiate the many scurrilous claims contained therein.
That did not, however, stop Simpson from conveying the information to journalists. He and Steele shared with reporters the contents of the “dossier” in the summer and fall of 2016,10 yet he conceded he did not tell them it was opposition research funded by the Clinton campaign and Democrats which would surely have affected the media’s view of it. He was asked this question about providing material to journalists:
Q: And they’re aware you’re being paid to do that research for a client?
A: I don’t know. Generally, that’s not an issue.
(Brief exchange with Simpson’s lawyer)
Q: My question was whether or not they knew you were being paid to do that research.
The Russia Hoax Page 13