by Bobby Akart
With respect to NS/EP telecommunications, capabilities exist for prioritizing phone calls through the wireline, wireless, and satellite networks during the time interval when call volumes are excessive and facilities are damaged, giving priority to restoring services that may be damaged or degraded, and getting new circuits into operation.
According to recent testimony by a DHS official, “The NCS is continuing a diverse set of mature and evolving programs designed to ensure priority use of telecommunications services by NS/EP users during times of national crisis. The more mature services—including the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP)—were instrumental in the response to the September 11 attacks. FY 2005 funding enhances these programs and supports the development of the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program and upgrade to the Special Routing Arrangement Service (SRAS). Specifically, priority service programs include: (1) GETS, which offers nationwide priority voice and low-speed data service during an emergency or crisis situation; (2) WPS, which provides a nationwide priority cellular service to key NS/EP users, including individuals from federal, state and local governments and the private sector; (3) TSP, which provides the administrative and operational framework for priority provisioning and restoration of critical NS/EP telecommunications services; (4) SRAS, which is a variant of GETS to support the Continuity of Government (COG) program including the reengineering of SRAS in the AT&T network and development of SRAS capabilities in the MCI and Sprint networks, and; (5) the Alerting and Coordination Network (ACN), which is an NCS program that provides dedicated communications between selected critical government and telecommunications industry operations centers.”6
For example, due to concerns with respect to getting calls through during intervals of high network call volumes that follow disaster events, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) utilizes the Government Emergency Telecommunications System (GETS) and other NS/EP telecom services such as wireless priority services to communicate with commercial nuclear power plants and to relay critical status information. This use of GETS grew out of lessons learned from the Three Mile Island incident in 1979. During the initial days of this incident, NRC personnel experienced communication problems that were attributed primarily to call volume overload at the local telephone company switch.
Another NS/EP service is the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program, which exists to assign priority provisioning and restoration of critical NS/EP telecommunications services in the hours immediately following a major disaster. In place since the mid-1980s, more than 50,000 circuits are protected today under TSP, including circuits associated with critical infrastructures such as electric power, telecommunications, and financial services.
The telecommunication system consists of four basic and primary physical systems: wireline, wireless, satellite, and radio. In general, the national telecommunications infrastructure may be farther advanced then others in its ability to address the particular consequences of EMP. This is due in large measure to the recognized alternative threats to this system, as well as broad recognition of its importance to society. The three primary and separate systems (excluding radio) that make up the broad telecommunications infrastructure each provide specialized services; they also overlap heavily. Thus the loss or degradation of any one of these somewhat redundant subsystems subjects the remaining functional subsystems to heavier service loads.
Each of these four primary systems is unique in their capability to suffer insult from EMP. The wireline system is robust but will be degraded within the area exposed to the EMP electromagnetic fields. The wireless system is technologically fragile in relation to EMP, certainly in comparison to the wireline one. In general, it may be so seriously degraded in the EMP region as to be unavailable. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) communications satellites may also suffer radiation damage as a result of one or more high-altitude nuclear bursts that produce EMP (see Space Systems, page 44).
The radio communication sub-system of the national telecommunications infrastructure is not widespread, but where it is connected to antennas, power lines, telephone lines, or other extended conductors, it is also subject to substantial EMP damage. However, radio communication devices not so connected or not connected to such conductors at the time of the EMP attack are likely to be operable in the post-attack interval.
EMP EFFECTS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Based upon results of Commission-sponsored testing, an EMP attack would disrupt or damage a functionally significant fraction of the electronic circuits in the Nation’s civilian telecommunications systems in the region exposed to EMP. The remaining operational networks would be subjected to high levels of call attempts for some period of time after the attack, leading to degraded telecommunications services.
Key government and civilian personnel will need priority access to use public network resources to coordinate and support local, regional, and national recovery efforts, especially during the interval of severe network congestion.
To offset the temporary loss of electric power, telecommunications sites now utilize a mix of batteries, mobile generators, and fixed-location generators. These typically have between 4 and 72 hours of backup power available, and thus will depend on either the resumption of electrical utility power or fuel deliveries to function for longer periods of time.
For some of the most critical infrastructure services such as electric power, natural gas, and financial services, assured communications are necessary—but aren’t necessarily sufficient—to the survival of that service during the initial time-intervals after an EMP attack. Therefore, a systematic approach to protecting or restoring key communications systems will be required.
RECOMMENDED MITIGATION ACTIVITIES
The following actions are recommended as particularly effective ones for mitigating the impacts of EMP attack:
· Expand the respective roles of the National Communications System (NCS) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) as the Federal Focal Point for EMP within the Code of Federal Regulations Part 215 to address infrastructure interdependencies related to NS/EP telecommunications services.
· Ensure services targeted at NS/EP operate effectively as new technology is introduced into the telecommunications network. Specifically, services such as Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority Service (WPS) that are intended for use in emergency situations to improve the call completion probabilities for key personnel must operate effectively. Within the next 15 years, new technologies will be introduced into the public networks that will play major roles in operation of these services. EMP is just one of the potential threats that could stress the telecommunications networks; therefore, ensuring that NS/EP services perform effectively as new technology is introduced has benefits beyond providing robustness to EMP, and moreover is consistent with avoiding failures from other hostile actions.
· Determine the effects of EMP on different types of telecommunication equipment and facilities, using tests and theoretical analyses of the type done in the course of Commission-sponsored work and previous EMP-related studies conducted by the National Communications System (NCS).. A comprehensive, continuing telecommunications testing program, along with the use of existing national and international standards, may be a model activity that would be a key part of this overall National effort.
· Improve the ability of key network assets to survive HEMP. There are key elements in the network such as the Signal Transfer Points (STPs) in the signaling system (Signaling System 7 (SS7)), Home Location Register (HLR), and Visiting Location Register (VLR) in the wireless networks whose degradation can result in the loss of service to a larger number of users. Effective mitigation strategies include a combination of site hardening and installation of protective measures for the fast rise-time (E1) component of EMP.
· Improve the ability of telecommunications to withstand the sustained loss of utility-supplied electric power. This mitigation
strategy would entail the use of best practices, review and improvement of existing programs such as the Telecommunications Electric Service Priority (TESP) program, and the increased use of alternative backup power sources.
· Conduct exercises to refine contingency operations. Conduct exercises that test and provide for improved contingency operations, assuming widespread multi-infrastructure degradation. The adequacy of mutual aid agreements, cross-organizational planning and coordination, and critical asset prioritization are examples of elements that should be tested and developed.
Managers of these critical services must design their systems and operating procedures to take into account the potential vulnerabilities introduced by EMP-driven failure of telecommunications devices and sub-systems.
BANKING AND FINANCE
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The financial services industry comprises a network of organizations and attendant systems that process instruments of monetary value in the form of deposits, loans, funds transfers, savings, and other financial transactions. It includes banks and other depository institutions, including the Federal Reserve System; investment-related companies such as underwriters, brokerages, and mutual funds; industry utilities such as the New York Stock Exchange, the Automated Clearing House, and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications; and third party processors that provide electronic processing services to financial institutions, including data and network management and check processing.
Virtually all American economic activity depends upon the functioning of the financial services industry. Today, most financial transactions that express National wealth are performed and recorded electronically. Virtually all transactions involving banks and other financial institutions happen electronically. Essentially all record-keeping of financial transactions involves information stored electronically. The financial services industry has evolved to the point that it would be impossible to operate without the efficiencies, speeds, and processing and storage capabilities of electronic information technology.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities arising from the significant interdependencies of the Nation’s critical infrastructures. The attacks disrupted all critical infrastructures in New York City, including power, transportation, and telecommunications. Consequently, operations in key financial markets were interrupted, increasing liquidity risks for the United States financial system.
The Interagency Paper, which was jointly issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), specifies clearing and settlement systems as the most critical business operations at risk for financial markets. Because financial markets are highly interdependent, a wide-scale disruption of core clearing and settlement processes would have an immediate systemic effect on critical financial markets.
Moreover, in December 2002, the FRB revised its policy and procedures for NS/EP telecommunications programs administered by the National Communications System (NCS) to identify those functions supporting the Federal Reserve’s NS/EP mission to maintain national liquidity. The FRB expanded the scope of services that would seriously affect continued financial operations if a telecommunications disruption of “a few minutes to one day” occurred. These functions, which are listed below, require same-day recovery and are critical to the operation and liquidity of banks and the stability of financial markets:
· Large-value inter-bank funds transfer, securities transfer, or payment-related services, such as FedWire, Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)
· Automated clearinghouse (ACH) operators
· Key clearing and settlement utilities
· Treasury automated auction and processing system
· Large-dollar participants of these systems and utilities
The increasing dependence of the United States on an electronic economy, so beneficial to the creation and preservation of wealth, also adds to the adverse effects that would be produced by an EMP attack. The electronic technologies that are the foundation of the financial infrastructure are potentially vulnerable to EMP. These systems are also potentially vulnerable to EMP indirectly through other critical infrastructures, such as the electric power grid and telecommunications.
RECOMMENDED MITIGATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
Securing the financial services industry from the EMP threat is vital to the national security of the United States. The Federal government must assure that this system can survive sufficiently to preclude serious, long-term consequences.
The Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Department of the Treasury, in cooperation with other relevant agencies, must develop contingency plans to ride out and recover key financial systems promptly from an EMP attack.
Key financial services include those means and resources that provide the general population with cash, credit, and other liquidity required to buy food, fuel, and other essential goods and services. We must protect the Nation’s financial networks, banking records, and data retrieval systems that support cash, check, credit, debit, and other transactions through judicious balance of hardening, redundancy, and contingency plans.
The Federal government must work with the private sector to assure the protection and effective recovery of essential financial records and services infrastructure components from all deliberate adverse events, including EMP attack. Implementation of the recommendations made by the Department of the Treasury, the FRB, and the SEC in their Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the US Financial System to meet sabotage and cyber-threats that could engender requirements for protection and recovery should be expanded to include expeditious recovery from EMP attack:
· “Every organization in the financial services industry should identify all clearing and settlement activities in each critical financial market in which it is a core clearing and settlement organization or plays a significant role” that could be threatened by EMP attack.
· Industry should “determine appropriate recovery and resumption objectives for clearing and settlement activities in support of critical markets” following an EMP attack.
· Industry should be prepared to cope with an EMP attack by maintaining “sufficient geographically dispersed resources to meet recovery and resumption objectives…. Backup sites should not rely on the same infrastructure components (e.g., transportation, telecommunications, water supply, electric power) used by the primary site. Moreover, the operation of such sites should not be impaired by a wide-scale evacuation at or inaccessibility of staff that service the primary site.”
· Industry should, “Routinely use or test recovery and resumption arrangements…. It is critical for firms to test backup facilities of markets, core clearing and settlement organizations, and third-party service providers to ensure connectivity, capacity, and the integrity of data transmission” against an EMP attack.
FUEL/ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
The vulnerabilities of this sector are produced by the responses of the electronic control systems that provide and utilize the near-real-time data flows needed to operate the fuel/energy infrastructure efficiently, as well as to identify and quickly react to equipment malfunctions or untoward incidents. EMP could also cause control or data-sensor malfunctions that are not easily discernible, leading to counterproductive operational decisions. Process control systems are critical to the operation and control of petroleum refineries, and little or no notice of an outage significantly increases the potential for damage during an emergency shutdown. Communications systems that are critical for operational control represent another locus of vulnerability. Communications are also critical in refineries to ensure safety of on-site personnel, the adjacent population, and the surrounding environment. The energy distribution infrastructure is also critically dependent on the availability of commerci
al power to operate the numerous pumps, valves and other electrical equipment that are required for a functional infrastructure.
DHS must develop a contingency plan that will provide strategy for protection and recovery for this sector, to include actions to be taken by both Government and industry. Government should establish a national inventory of parts for those items with long lead-times or that would be in demand in the event of a catastrophic event such as an EMP attack. The Energy Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC) should, with government funding, expand its mission to address EMP issues, and the government should work with the private sector to implement the general approach described in Strategy and Recommendations.
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
America’s transportation sector is often addressed as a single infrastructure, but in reality its multiple modes provide for several separate infrastructures. Rail includes the freight railroad and commuter rail infrastructures; road includes the trucking and automobile infrastructures; water includes the maritime shipping and inland waterway infrastructures; and air includes the commercial and general aviation infrastructures.
As recognized by the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) Information Infrastructure Group Report: