by Bobby Akart
Working with state authorities and private-sector organizations, the Department of Homeland Security should develop draft protocols for implementation by emergency and other government responders following EMP attack, Red Team these extensively, and then institutionalize validated protocols through issuance of standards, training, and exercises.
KEEPING THE CITIZENRY INFORMED
Support to National leadership also involves measures to ensure that the President can communicate effectively with the citizenry. Although the US can improve prevention, protection, and recovery in the face of an EMP attack to levels below those that would have catastrophic consequences for the Nation, an EMP attack would still cause substantial disruption, even under the best of circumstances. Many citizens would be without power, communications and other services for days—or perhaps substantially longer—before full recovery could occur. During that interval, it will be crucial to provide a reliable channel of information to those citizens to let them know what has happened, the current situation, when help of what types for them might be available, what their governments are doing, and the host of questions which, if not answered, are certain to create more instability and suffering for the affected individuals, communities, and the Nation as a whole.
PROTECTION OF MILITARY FORCES
The end of the Cold War relaxed the discipline for achieving EMP survivability within the Department of Defense, and gave rise to the perception that an erosion of EMP survivability of military forces was an acceptable risk. EMP simulation and test facilities have been mothballed or dismantled, and research concerning EMP phenomena, hardening design, testing, and maintenance has been substantially decreased. However, the emerging threat environment, characterized by a wide spectrum of actors that include near-peers, established nuclear powers, rogue nations, sub-national groups, and terrorist organizations that either now have access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or may have such access over the next 15 years have combined to place the risk of EMP attack and adverse consequences on the US to a level that is not acceptable.
Current policy is to continue to provide EMP protection to strategic forces and their controls; however, the end of the Cold War has relaxed the discipline for achieving and maintaining that capability within these forces. The Department of Defense must continue to pursue the strategy for strategic systems to ensure that weapons delivery systems of the New Triad are EMP survivable, and that there is, at a minimum, a survivable “thin-line” of command and control capability to detect threats and direct the delivery systems. The Department of Defense has the capability to do this, and the costs can be within reasonable and practical limits.
The situation for general-purpose forces (GPF) is more complex. The success of these forces depends on the application of a superior force at times and places of our choosing. We accomplish this by using a relatively small force with enormous technological advantages due to superior information flow, advanced warfighting capabilities, and well-orchestrated joint combat operations. Our increasing dependence on advanced electronics systems results in the potential for an increased EMP vulnerability of our technologically advanced forces, and if unaddressed makes EMP employment by an adversary an attractive asymmetric option.
The United States must not permit an EMP attack to defeat its capability to prevail. The Commission believes it is not practical to protect all of the tactical forces of the US and its coalition partners from EMP in a regional conflict. A strategy of replacement and reinforcement will be necessary. However, there is a set of critical capabilities that is essential to tactical regional conflicts that must be available to these reinforcements. This set includes satellite navigation systems, satellite and airborne intelligence and targeting systems, an adequate communications infrastructure, and missile defense.
The current capability to field a tactical force for regional conflict is inadequate in light of this requirement. Even though it has been US policy to create EMP-hardened tactical systems, the strategy for achieving this has been to use the DoD acquisition process. This has provided many equipment components that meet criteria for durability in an EMP environment, but this does not result in confidence that fielded forces, as a system, can reliably withstand EMP attack. Adherence to the equipment acquisition policy also has been spotty, and the huge challenge of organizing and fielding an EMP-durable tactical force has been a disincentive to applying the rigor and discipline needed to do so.
EMP durability should be provided to a selected set of tactical systems such that it will be practical to field tactical forces that cannot be neutralized by an EMP attack. The Department of Defense must perform a capabilities-based assessment of the most significant EMP threats to its tactical capabilities and develop strategies for coping with these threats in a reliable and effective manner.
Overall, little can be accomplished without the sustained attention and support of the leadership of the Department of Defense and Congress. This will require the personal involvement and cooperation among the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs, and the appropriate congressional oversight committees in creating the necessary climate of concern; overseeing the development of strategy; and reaffirming the criticality of survivable and endurable military forces, including command, control, and communications (C3) in updated policy guidance, implementation directives, and instructions. Congressionally mandated annual reports from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the status and progress for achieving EMP survivability of our fighting forces will emphasize the importance of the issue and help ensure that the necessary attention and support of the DoD leadership continues.
APPENDIX A THE COMMISSION AND ITS METHOD
The Commission used a capability-based methodology to estimate potential EMP threats over the next 15 years.1 The objective was to identify the range of plausible adversary EMP attack capabilities that cannot be excluded by prudent decision makers responsible for national and homeland security.
Bases for this assessment included current intelligence estimates of present and near-term military capabilities; current and past engineering accomplishments (what are adversaries likely to be capable of achieving, given accomplishments in other programs at comparable stages of development?); and trends impacting adversary military capabilities through 2018. In line with its capabilities-based approach, the Commission did not attempt to establish the relative likelihood of EMP strikes versus other forms of attack.
Intelligence community organizations and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapon laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia) provided excellent technical support to the Commission’s analyses.2 The Institute for Defense Analyses hosted and developed technical analyses for the Commission. While it benefited from these inputs, the Commission developed an independent assessment. Views expressed in this report are solely attributable to the Commission.
The Russian Federation (RF) has a sophisticated understanding of EMP that derives in part from the test era when the Soviet Union did high-altitude atmospheric tests over its own territory, impacting civilian infrastructures. To benefit from Russian expertise, the Commission:
· Sponsored research projects at Russian scientific institutions.
· Hosted a September 2003 US/RF symposium on EMP at which presentations were given by Russian general officers.
· Sponsored a December 2003 technical seminar on EMP attended by scientists from the Russian Federation and the United States.
The Commission also reviewed additional relevant foreign research and programs and assessed foreign perspectives on EMP attacks.
In considering EMP, the Commission also gave attention to the coincident nuclear effects that would result from a detonation that produces EMP, e.g., possible disruption of the operations of, or damage to, satellites in space.
Different types of nuclear weapons produce different EMP effects. The Commission limited its attention to the mo
st strategically significant cases in which detonation of one or few nuclear warheads could result in widespread, potentially long-duration disruption or damage that places at risk the functioning of American society or the effectiveness of US military forces.
In addition to examining potential threats, the Commission was charged to assess US vulnerabilities (civilian and military) to EMP and to recommend measures to counter EMP threats. For these purposes, the Commission reviewed research and best practices within the United States and other countries. Early in this review it became apparent that only limited EMP vulnerability testing had been accomplished for modern electronic systems and components. To partially remedy this deficit, the Commission sponsored illustrative testing; results are presented in the full text of the Commission’s report.
Go Back to Contents
Table of Contents
Dedications
Acknowledgements
About the Author
INTRODUCTION BY FREEDOM PREPPERS About EMP: Electromagnetic Pulse and the Prepping for Tomorrow Series
Epigraph
PART ONE WHAT IS AN ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE?
Chapter One Let’s Get Technical
Chapter Two What are the characteristics of a nuclear EMP?
Chapter Three What are the differences between a Nuclear EMP, a CME, and an RF Weapon?
PART TWO HISTORY OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
Chapter Four Significant Events in the History of EMP
PART THREE PRESENT DAY USE OF EMP TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Five Recent Events in the Use of EMP
Chapter Six Technological Advances; Non-Military Uses
Chapter Seven Military Uses
PART FOUR THE THREAT IS REAL
Chapter Eight Components of a Credible EMP Attack
Chapter Nine The Players
PART FIVE WHO IS RINGING THE CLARION BELL?
Chapter Ten Respected Advocates
Chapter Eleven The EMP Commission
Chapter Twelve United States Policy Stance
Chapter Thirteen Recent Legislative History
Chapter Fourteen U. S. Department of Defense Preparations
PART SIX THE AFTERMATH
Chapter Fifteen A Collapse Event
Chapter Sixteen Critical Infrastructure
Chapter Seventeen Effects on People
PART SEVEN EMP SHIELDING – FARADAY CAGES
Chapter Eighteen Meet Michael Faraday
Chapter Nineteen Introduction to the Faraday Cage
Chapter Twenty Construct a Simple Faraday Cage
Chapter Twenty-One Sophisticated Shielded Rooms
Chapter Twenty-Two Shielded Cables, Cabinets and Accessories
Chapter Twenty-Three Contents of your Faraday Cage
PART EIGHT PREPARING FOR AN EMP ATTACK
Chapter Twenty-Four Effects of an EMP on Vehicles
Chapter Twenty-Five It’s Time to Get Ready for the Coming EMP Attack
APPENDIX A Excerpt from The Loyal Nine
APPENDIX B PREPAREDNESS CHECKLIST Provided by www.FreedomPreppers.com
APPENDIX C EMP COMMISSION REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY