MACV
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: arrived in Saigon in February 1962 as a unified command under the Commander in Chief, Pacific, managing the U.S. military effort in South Vietnam
MAAG
Military Assistance and Advisory Group: arrived in South Vietnam in November 1955 to provide support and training to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Its function was absorbed by MACV in 1964.
MASA
Military Assistance Security Adviser: U.S. military officer who manages a security assistance program in a foreign country
MAT
Mobile advisory team: team of U.S. military personnel assigned to CORDS, charged with training and supporting the Territorial Security Forces of South Vietnam in a province or district
Mike Forces:
Mobile strike force commands: corps-level units under the command of the 5th Special Forces
MOI
Ministry of the Interior: branch of the GVN with authority over pacification, including Phung Hoang
MSS
Military Security Service: counterintelligence branch of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
MSUG
Michigan State University Group: employees of Michigan State University contracted in 1954 to provide technical assistance to the GVN
NIC
National Interrogation Center: CIA facility built in 1964 inside CIO headquarters in the naval shipyard in Saigon
NLF
National Liberation Front: formed in 1960 by the various insurgent groups in South Vietnam
NPC
National Police Command: organized in June 1971 to incorporate Phung Hoang within the existing National Police structure
NPCIS
National Police Criminal Information System: computer system designed to track identified VCI
NPFF
National Police Field Force: paramilitary branch of the National Police
NPIASS
National Police Infrastructure Analysis Sub-Section: data bank containing biographical information on the VCI, used to plan countermeasures
NPIC
National Police Interrogation Center: located at National Police headquarters on Vo Tanh Street in Saigon
NVA
North Vietnamese Army
oco
Office of Civil Operations: formed in Saigon in November 1966 to manage U.S. pacification programs in South Vietnam
OSA
Office of the Special Assistant: code name for the CIA station in Saigon
PA&E
Pacific Architects and Engineers: private company that did construction work for the GVN
PAAS
Pacification Attitude Analysis System: computer system designed to assess the political effects of CORDS pacification programs
PAT
People’s action team: CIA version of the standard Vietcong armed propaganda team
PCOC
Phoenix Coordinators Orientation Course: begun November 1968 at Vung Tau’s Seminary Camp to train Phoenix coordinators
PHMIS
Phung Hoang Management Information System: computer system containing biographical and organizational data on the VCI, created January 1969
PHREEX
Phung Hoang reexamination: study begun in 1971, designed to critique the Phoenix program
Phung Hoang:
The mythological Vietnamese bird of conjugal love that appears in times of peace, pictured holding a flute and representing virtue, grace, and harmony. Also the name given to the South Vietnamese version of Phoenix
PIC
Province Interrogation Center
PICC
Province Intelligence Coordination Committee: established by decree in November 1964 to serve as the senior intelligence agency in each province, but never put into effect
PIOCC
Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center: headquarters of the Phoenix adviser in each of South Vietnam’s forty-four provinces
PIRL
Potential intelligence recruitment lead: VCI removed from the Phoenix blacklist and approached to become an agent of the CIA
PM
Paramilitary: branch of the CIA that obtains intelligence through unconventional warfare operations
POIC
Province officer in charge: senior CIA officer in a province, supervising both police liaison and paramilitary operations
PP
Political and Psychological: branch of the CIA that manages black propaganda and political liaison activities
PRG
Provisional Revolutionary Government: formed in June 1969 by the NLF to negotiate the reunification of North and South Vietnam
PRP
People’s Revolutionary party: created in January 1962 as the southern branch of the Vietnamese Communist party
PRU
Provincial Reconnaissance Units: mercenary forces under the control of the CIA in South Vietnam
PSA
Province senior adviser: senior CORDS official in each of South Vietnam’s forty-four provinces
PSC
Province Security Committee: nonjudicial body charged with the disposition of captured VCI
PSD
Public Safety Division: branch of CORDS responsible for advising the National Police
PSCD
Pacification Security Coordination Division: CIA component of CORDS
PSDF
People’s self-defense forces: South Vietnamese civilian militia
psyops
Psychological operations
psywar
Psychological warfare
PTSD
Post traumatic stress disorder: stress that continues after the traumatic event that caused it
RD
Revolutionary Development: CIA program to build support for the GVN in the provinces of South Vietnam
RDC
Revolutionary development cadre: South Vietnamese trained by the CIA at Vung Tau to persuade the citizens of South Vietnam to support the central government
RDC/O
Revolutionary Development Cadre, Operations: CIA officer in charge of paramilitary operations in a province
RDC/P
Revolutionary Development Cadre, Plans: CIA officer in charge of liaison with the Special Branch in a province
RF/PF
Regional Forces and Popular Forces: a National Guard under the control of district and province chiefs
RMK/BRJ
Raymond Morrison Knudson, Brown Root Jorgansen: private company that did construction work for the GVN
ROIC
Region officer in charge: senior CIA officer in each of the four corps and Saigon
RVNAF
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S2
Sector intelligence adviser: senior MACV intelligence adviser to the South Vietnamese forces in a province
SACSA
Special Assistant (to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities: office within the Joint Chiefs with responsibility for Phoenix policy
SARC
Special airmobile resource control: method of interdicting VCI attempting to resupply armed Vietcong guerrillas
SAVA
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs: office in the CIA reporting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence on developments in South Vietnam
SCAG
Saigon Capital Advisory Group
SEAL
Sea-Air-Land: the U.S. Navy’s Special Forces
SES
Special Exploitation Service: formed in April 1964 as the JGS counterpart to SOG, renamed Strategic Technical Directorate in September 1987
SIDE
Screening, interrogation, and detention of the enemy: ICEX program begun in September 1967 to resolve the problem of separating genuine VCI from innocent civilian detainees
SIFU
Special Intelligence Force Units: small units formed in 197
1 to replace PRU, composed of Special Branch and Field Police
SMIAT
Special Military Intelligence Advisory Team: formed in 1965 to mount sophisticated operations against the VCI
SMM
Saigon Military Mission: CIA office formed in 1954 to help the South Vietnamese conduct psychological warfare against the Vietminh
Snatch and snuff
Kidnap and kill
SOG
Special Operations Group: joint CIA-military organization formed in 1964 to conduct operations outside South Vietnam in support of MACV, but under the control of SACSA
SP
Special Police: term used in reference to the CIA-advised and -funded Special Branch of South Vietnamese National Police
Trung-doi biet kich Nham dou:
people’s commando team, formed by Frank Scotton in 1964
USARV
United States Army Republic of Vietnam: created July 1965 at Long Binh to control all logistical and administrative units of the U.S. Army in Vietnam
USIS
United States Information Service: branch of the U.S. government responsible for conducting psychological operations overseas
TDY
Temporary duty
TRAC
Target Research and Analysis Section: created in January 1965 to develop targets for Strategic Air Command B-25s in support of MACV
VBI
Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation: precursor organization to the Special Branch, also known as the Cong An
VC
Vietcong: Vietnamese Communist
VCI
Vietcong infrastructue: all Communist party members and NLF officers, plus Vietcong and NVA saboteurs and terrorists
VCS
Vietcong suspect: Vietnamese civilian suspected of being VCI
VIS
Vietnamese Information Service: branch of the GVN responsible for conducting psychological operations in South Vietnam
VNQDD
Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang: Vietnamese branch of the Kuomintang
VNTF
Vietnam Task Force: office within ISA responsible for Vietnam
NOTES
CHAPTER 1: Infrastructure
1. “Vietnam Policy and Prospects 1970” (Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 17–20 and March 3, 14, 17, 19, 1970), p. 723.
2. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1982), p. 60.
3. Karnow, p. 76.
4. Karnow, p. 82.
5. Karnow, p. 87.
6. David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964) p. 80
7. Robert Slater, “The History, Organization and Modus Operandi of the Viet Cong Infrastructure” (Defense Intelligence School, March 1970), p. 3.
8. Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 347.
9. Nguyen Ngoc Huy, Understanding Vietnam (The DPC Information Service, the Netherlands, 1982), p. 85.
10. Interview with Jack.
11. Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 70–72.
12. Lansdale, p. 72.
13. Kevin Generous, Vietnam: The Secret War (New York: Bison Books, 1985), p. 94.
14. Generous, p. 66.
15. Lansdale, p. 211.
16. Huy, p. 85.
17. J. J. Zasloff, “Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam 1954–1960” (Rand Memorandum RM-5163), p. 8.
18. Noam Chomsky, Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda (A Warner Modular Publication, 1973, USA), p. 57–18.
19. Huy, p. 85.
20. Lansdale, p. 340.
21. Lansdale, p. 343.
22. Lansdale, p. 344.
CHAPTER 2: Internal Security
1. Graham Greene, The Quiet American (New York: Viking, 1956), p. 8.
2. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 19.
3. Race, p. 67.
4. Race, p. 52.
5. Ralph Johnson, Phoenix/Phung Hoang: A Study of Wartime Intelligence Management (Washington D.C.: American University, 1985), pp. 37–38.
6. Lansdale, pp. 82–88.
7. Interview with Clyde Bauer.
8. Don Schrande, “Father Hoa’s Little War,” The Saturday Evening Post, February 17, 1962, p. 76.
9. Schrande, p. 76.
10. Interview with Bernard Yoh.
11. Slater, pp. 38–39.
12. Slater, p. 56.
13. Johnson, A Study, p. 64.
14. Johnson, A Study, p. 72.
15. “Vietnam Policy and Prospects 1970,” p. 724.
16. Karnow, p.. 410.
17. Race, p. 196.
18. Interview with William Colby.
19. Karnow, p. 284.
CHAPTER 3: Covert Action
1. Interview with Stu Methven.
2. Ralph Johnson, Phoenix/Phung Hoang: Planned Assassination or Legitimate Conflict Management? (Washington D.C.: American University, 1982), p. 5.
3. Methven interview.
4. Ralph Johnson, Phoenix/Phung Hoang: A Study of Wartime Intelligence Management (Washington D.C.: American University, 1985), p. 441.
5. Methven interview.
6. Race, pp. 239–240.
7. “Vietnam Policy and Prospects 1970,” p. 245.
8. “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders” (94th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 94–465: Church Select Committee, Senate Select Committee on Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence [U.S. G.P.O., 1975], p. 278.
9. “Alleged Assassination Plots,” p. 139.
10. “Alleged Assassination Plots,” p. 336.
11. “Vietnam Policy and Prospects 1970,” p. 722.
12. Interview with Frank Scotton, July 1986.
13. Ngo Vinh Long, “The CIA and the Vietnam Debacle” in Uncloaking the CIA, ed. Howard Frazier (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 72.
14. Scotton interview.
15. Scotton interview.
16. Karnow, p. 281.
17. Huy, p. 97.
18. Huy, p. 101.
19. Huy, p. 110.
20. Scotton interview.
21. Interview with Walter Mackem.
CHAPTER 4: Revolutionary Development
1. Scotton interview.
2. Peer DeSilva, Sub Rosa (New York: New York Times Books, 1978), p. 249.
3. DeSilva, p. 247.
4. DeSilva, p. 245.
5. DeSilva, p. 250.
6. Lansdale, p. 75.
7. Seymour Hersh, Cover-Up (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 85.
8. Interview with Tom Donohue.
9. Huy, p. 123.
10. Huy, p. 123.
11. Scotton interview.
12. William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 298.
CHAPTER 5: PICs
1. Galula, p. 117.
2. Slater, p. 21.
3. Galula, p. 124.
4. Scotton interview.
5. John Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate (New York: New York Times Books, 1979), p. 178.
6. Marks, p. 179.
7. Johnson, A Study, p. 400.
8. Major General Joseph McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence 1965–1967 (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), p. 14.
9. McChristian, p. 71.
10. McChristian, p. 50.
11. McChristian, p. 26.
CHAPTER 6: Field Police
1. Interview with William Grieves.
2. Letter to the author from Nguyen Van Dai.
3. Interview with Douglas McCollum.
CHAPTER 7: Special Branch
1. Interview with Nelson Henry Brickham.
2. Interview with Tom Donohue.
3. Warren Milberg, “The Future Applicability of the Phoenix Program” (Research
Study, Report #1835–74, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, May 1974), pp. 33–34.
4. Galula, p. 120.
5. The Herald Tribune, October 21, 1965.
6. Anthony Herbert, Soldier (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp.
105–106.
7. Herbert, p. 106.
8. Milberg, p. 50.
9. Milberg, p. 34.
10. Galula, p. 110.
11. Interview with James Ward.
12. Interview with Sam Drakulich.
CHAPTER 8: Attack on the VCI
1. The Pentagon Papers (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1971), Vol. V, p. 58.
2. Brickham interview.
3. The Pentagon Papers, Vol. V, pp. 120–122.
4. Nelson Brickham, “Attack on the VCI” (Saigon: November 1966), p. 1.
5. Brickham, “Attack,” p. 1.
6. Brickham, “Attack,” p. 4.
7. Brickham, “Attack,” p. 4.
8. McChristian, p. 72.
9. MeChristian, p. 72.
10. McChristian, p. 74.
11. Interview with Tulius Acampora.
12. Interview with Dang Van Minh.
13. Interview with Lawrence Tracy.
14. McChristian, p. 78.
15. Interview with Robert Wall.
CHAPTER 9: ICEX
1. Brickham interview.
2. Nelson Brickham, “A Proposal for the Coordination and Management of Intelligence Programs and Attack on the VC Infrastructure and Local Irregular Forces (Saigon: June 1967), p. 1.
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