My Share of the Task

Home > Other > My Share of the Task > Page 60
My Share of the Task Page 60

by General Stanley McChrystal


  On the receiving end of a bear hug from my classmate, comrade, and friend General Ray Odierno at my retirement ceremony, held at Fort McNair on July 23, 2010. At the time, Ray was commanding general of U.S. forces in Iraq. He has gone on to become chief of staff of the army.

  We met these two young boys during a visit to Jalez, Afghanistan, a hotly contested area not far from Kabul. I thought their faces captured what was ultimately at stake in the war. I had this picture hung in the small room at our Kabul headquarters where we ate meals.

  Acknowledgments

  The people who made this book possible fall into two groups. The first are those who made the life I’ve enjoyed all that it has been. Beginning with my parents, that group includes a cast of family, friends, teachers, coaches, comrades, and countless figures who shaped me and the age I experienced. To them, I hope the life I led, imperfect as it has been, reflected my admiration and gratitude.

  To the officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, who taught me the profession of arms I owe more than I can adequately describe. Possibly more important than the commanders were the experienced noncommissioned officers, who epitomized the professionalism the U.S. military regained in the decades following Vietnam.

  As an American, I owe special thanks to a collection of people, military and civilian, who answered the call time and again. The decade following September 11, 2001, confronted a small military with years of relentless combat, often waged by the same selfless professionals. Alongside our civilian and allied partners, this generation served, often at great cost.

  Much of the first group is also part of the second: those who directly contributed to the creation of this book. The common denominator has been selfless and generous donations of time and wisdom to a novice author. Where the book soars toward real literature, you have been the reason. Where the wings fall off and Icarus plummets, I am to blame. In every case I am in your debt. A number of the soldiers, civilians, and diplomats who shared their insights and recollections are still out there—keeping the bridge. Their continued service, and in some cases their safety, requires that they go unnamed here. I have thus chosen not to list anyone by name, though I hope all who participated see how their generosity of time and energy has left a positive mark on the book—and know, thus, how indebted I am.

  This book would not have been possible without the fine reporting of a number of true professionals. I’ve relied on their articles, books, and stories to augment my own memory and in some cases to build out descriptions of events. I did not always agree with them, nor they with me, but their ability to consistently produce clear-eyed and humane stories from the midst of political turmoil and war is testament to their courage and integrity. My research assistants and I found ourselves returning to the work of a number of journalists who’ve become household names to those who’ve sought to understand the past decade of war; they populate the endnotes.

  Mark O’Donald and David Alvarado were not just skilled photographers, but were welcome travel companions on our many shared trips around Afghanistan. I appreciate their generous permission, and that of Joshua Treadwell, to use their fine work in this book.

  To help craft the book into something coherent, I relied on the sage wisdom of colleagues and friends, including Jim Levinsohn and Jeff Siegel. John Gaddis, Mike O’Hanlon, Michele Malvesti, and others read repeated drafts and provided invaluable counsel. As he did in Afghanistan, Matt Sherman shared his frank advice and good humor. Dan Darling leavened the book through his always-impressive feedback.

  The team at Penguin, led by Adrian Zackheim, were trusted partners throughout the process. Their encouragement to write the kind of book I wanted was key—and appreciated.

  Building the book required the dedication and skill of a team of professionals. I’d become friends with Ben Skinner while we were both at the Council on Foreign Relations years ago, and Ben provided me the initial encouragement to attempt the project. His constant partnership and candid but loyal sagacity were essential. Martin Beiser brought his skills as an editor and storyteller. Alexandra Everett put in long, tedious hours transcribing interview after interview. Eric Robinson and Spencer Bradley contributed rich research, as did Phil Kaplan who, from the start of the project to its end, was relentless and meticulous in his work.

  But it was Sam Ayres, a young Yale graduate whom Ben Skinner introduced me to in the fall of 2010, who made my story come alive. Building on his extraordinary gifts as a writer, Sam immersed himself in the history, personalities, politics, and emotions of the entire sweep of my life. Becoming expert in even the most arcane aspects of special operations and counterinsurgency, Sam became my constant partner, confidant, and counselor for almost two years as we attempted to reconstruct and make sense of a lifetime of experiences. I’ve never known a better young man.

  I want to thank my family. Through ups and downs I enjoyed the love and support of a family who guided and encouraged. Without them neither this book nor my life would have been even a shadow of what it is. And thanks to my son, Sam, who was an integral part of all that made our lives so special. I could have been a better father, but not a prouder one.

  Finally, and most important, I want to thank my wife, Annie. From the day we met in 1973, she has been a gift to my life. Almost nothing I did, nor who I was, would have happened without her. She was the patient partner as this book consumed our first years of long-awaited retirement, knowing I believe that it is as much her story as mine.

  Notes

  CHAPTER 2: JOURNEY TO THE PLAIN

  1,378 new cadets: Exactly 1,378 new members arrived on July 3, 1972 (U.S. Military Academy, “1973 Annual Report of the Superintendent,” 4).

  before the summer was over: During New Cadet (“Beast”) Barracks, 180 cadets were separated (“for all reasons”), which was roughly 13 percent of the class (ibid., 38).

  when all rooms went dark: U.S. Military Academy, “West Point 1973–1974 Catalog,” 132.

  “The subjects which were dearest”: Winston Churchill, My Early Life, 1874–1904 (Touchstone, 1996), 15.

  the Rutgers football game: U.S. Military Academy, “West Point 1972–1973 Catalog,” 142.

  “surrounded by attacking Indians”: Rick Atkinson, The Long Gray Line (Holt, 2009), 396.

  “prima donnas and spoiled brats”: Ibid.

  dramatically upset Air Force: Gordon S. White, Jr., “Long Run Decides: Hines Races 49 Yards for Cadet Score with 5:53 Remaining,” New York Times, November 5, 1972.

  rooms were to be kept: During the 1976 honor code hearings, Lieutenant General Sidney Berry explained, “Now, regulations require cadets to keep their rifles cleaned and without rust. If a cadet has a dirty rifle bore and rust on the trigger housing guard, he has violated regulations and will get a minor number of demerits but we do not believe that that is indicative of a lack of integrity” (House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the United States Military Academy Honor Code [U.S Goverment Printing Office, 1977], 24).

  usually in a formal fistfight: A report completed as part of the congressional investigation states that such an issue of honor “was then settled in some sort of duel, the most popular type in the Corps being fisticuffs,” (House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the United States Military Academy Honor Code, 152).

  scope of the code narrowed: The report indicates that this emphasis on cadet honesty was the only “tenent [sic] which had been consistently in existence since the early 1800’s [sic]” (ibid.).

  “Don’t let the bastards grind you down”: Atkinson, Long Gray Line, 319. While the charges against Koster were ultimately dropped, he was censured and demoted and left the Army in disgrace.

  an electrical engineering exam: By April 4, 1976, 117 cadets had been implicated (ibid., 398), but by graduation Time magazine was reporting it might be a larger scandal: “There is talk . . . that hundreds of others may be in
deep trouble” (“What Price Honor?” Time, June 7, 1976). Atkinson notes that one West Point lawyer and graduate of the academy, Arthur Lincoln, suspected as many as 600 cadets were “involved”; eventually, 149 cadets left the academy because of the scandal (Long Gray Line, 405 and 416). In August 1976, Secretary of the Army Martin Hoffmann granted amnesty, and 93 of these cadets were allowed to rejoin the academy after a “year of reflection” (ibid., 414–15).

  commandant almost always expelled: “Report of Superintendent’s Special Study Group on Honor at West Point,” House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on the United States Military Academy Honor Code, 154.

  near the Cambodian border: United Press International, “Viet Cong Regiment Is Cut to Ribbons,” Williamson Daily News, June 30, 1966.

  fewer than seventy thousand: Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (Simon & Schuster, 2010), 181–82.

  only three years earlier: Ibid., 171.

  broke apart in mid-December: Kissinger writes that talks “finally exploded” on December 13, 1972. Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (Simon & Schuster, 2003), 407.

  an intense bombing campaign: The bombings took place from December 18 to 29. It is worth noting that Kissinger quotes the Economist when writing in his book that the civilian death toll in Hanoi from the Christmas bombings was “smaller than the number of civilians killed by the North Vietnamese in their artillery bombardment of An Loc in April” (ibid., 415).

  quit their academy posts: James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (Simon & Schuster, 1995), 142. Kitfield writes that thirty young officers quit their posts in one eighteen-month period around 1973.

  “The last two years wore”: Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs (Penguin, 1999), 19.

  834 other members of my class: “The Class of 1976 graduated 835 cadets on 2 June” (United States Military Academy, “1976 Report of the Superintendent,” p. 2), while others graduated later in the summer, bringing the total for the class of 1976 to 855 members (United States Military Academy, “2008 Register of Graduates and Former Cadets,” Biographies 3–459).

  CHAPTER 3: THE ARMY IN WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO FIGHT

  historical and fresh political animosities: Bernard K. Gordon, “The Third Indochina Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, (Fall 1986), 66–68.

  “There was no fighting”: “Transcript of President Carter’s Statement on the Hostage Situation,” New York Times, April 26, 1980. Carter delivered the address at 7:00 A.M. from the Oval Office on Apirl 25, 1980. Hours earlier, at 1:00 A.M., the White House had released a short statement about the operation. Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (Grove, 2006), 468.

  seized sixty-six Americans: Of the sixty-six hostages they initially seized, the Iranians held fifty-two captive for the next fourteen months. “The Hostages and the Casualties,” Jimmy Carter Library and Museum website, July 5, 2005.

  Many Iranians believed: Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford University Press, 2009), 39.

  the hostages’ release: Bernard Gwertzman, “Reagan Takes Oath as 40th President; Promises an ‘Era of National Renewal’—Minutes Later, 52 U.S. Hostages in Iran Fly to Freedom After 444-Day Ordeal,” New York Times, January 21, 1981.

  first out of their planes’ doors: James M. Gavin, On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1943–1946 (Viking, 1978), 105.

  two discs in his back: Stephen E. Ambrose, The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys: The Men of World War II (Simon & Schuster, 1998), 239.

  carried a rifle: Gavin, On to Berlin, 103.

  high-profile weapons: David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Ballantine, 1992), 22. Ironically, the staffer who suggested Kennedy “adopt” the Green Berets was Daniel Ellsberg; he later said the excesses of the Green Berets were a final motivation for leaking the Pentagon Papers (United Press International, “Ellsberg: Beret Case Caused Disclosure Move,” Modesto Bee, July 15, 1971).

  “mark of distinction”: Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, rev. ed. (University of Kansas Press, 2002), 156.

  “unrest and ethnic conflicts”: John F. Kennedy, “Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy” (West Point, NY, June 6, 1962), The American Presidency Project website.

  “enveloped in the sinister”: “Mystery of the Green Berets,” Time, August 15, 1969.

  hostage at two locations: Charles Cogan, “Desert One and Its Disorders,” Journal of Military History (January 2003), 208.

  more than four million people: Cogan writes there were four million (“Desert One and Its Disorders,” 206), while Bowden estimates “more than 5 million” (Guests of the Ayatollah, 435).

  outskirts of Tehran: The site was fifty miles outside Tehran (Cogan, “Desert One and Its Disorders,” 210).

  forty-four aircraft: Ibid., 211.

  columns of suspended dust: James L. Holloway, “The Holloway Report,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1980, 9.

  for hours, obscuring anything: “He climbed to one thousand feet and was still in the cloud. . . . For three hours they flew like this on instruments” (Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah, 449).

  insufficient bandwidth of every type: “When the on-scene commander happened to be away from his radio to consult with others, his radio operator broadcast that the RH-53 and the C-130 had collided. Unfortunately, the transmission was incomplete and no call sign was given. This resulted in several blind radio calls from support bases in an attempt to find out what had happened and where. These unnecessary transmission blocked out other radio calls” (ibid., 51). Years later, I would still face the need for ever more bandwidth to transmit information and support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  pilots later admitted: Ibid., 50.

  fully rehearsed: Ibid.

  security concerns prevented: “The AWS team . . . did not have direct contact with the helicopter and C-130 aircrews. Weather information was passed through an intelligence officer to the pilots on regular visits to the training sites. . . . Information flow to the mission pilots was filtered as a result of organizational structure. The traditional relationship between pilots and weather forecasters was severed. This was done to enhance OPSEC” (ibid., 38).

  “directed against” the United States: Holloway, “Holloway Report,” 61.

  Iranian state television looped footage: Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 44.

  press conference in Tehran the next day: Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah, 479.

  CHAPTER 4: RENAISSANCE

  produce the real metal ones: U.S. Army, “Fort Stewart History,” Fort Stewart website.

  the size of Rhode Island: U.S Army, “Fort Irwin History,” Fort Irwin website.

  Patton’s 2nd Armored Division: Anne W. Chapman, The Origins and Development of the National Training Center, 1976–1984, Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010, 7.

  train as they would fight: Information on the NTC comes from Chapman, Origins and Development of the National Training Center, 8, 17, and 20–22.

  major in the commandos: Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 204.

  rising to two hundred: Numbers on Afghan Arabs come from Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of al-Qa’ida and the Arab Jihadists (Saqi Books, 2010), 16–19.

  four thousand strong: Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin Press, 2004), 201.

  behind the wheel of bulldozers: Mary Anne Weaver, “The Real Bin Laden,” New Yorker, January 24, 2000, 34.

  Beal Brothers boots: Ibid.

  between the two quickly shifting: Steve Coll, in his biography of the family, notes that at this time, “
Osama associated himself with Azzam’s radical voice, yet he remained an entirely orthodox Saudi figure, a minor emissary of its establishment.” Steve Coll, The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century (Penguin Press, 2008), 256.

  al-qaeda al-sulbah: Thomas Hegghammer, “Abdullah Azzam, the Imam of Jihad,” in Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Belknap Press, 2008), 100.

  his homeland of Egypt: Wright, Looming Tower, 150.

  through coordinated coups: Hegghammer, “Imam of Jihad,” 100.

  “To establish the truth”: Al Qaeda’s bylaws can be found on the website of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center. These lines are also quoted in Wright, Looming Tower, 162.

  September 10, 1988: “Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements: U.S. v. Enaam M. Arnaout,” United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, January 6, 2003, 36–37. This document, which has served as a basis for much of the public understanding of Al Qaeda’s founding, is a court document from the 2002–2003 case U.S. v. Enaam M. Arnaout. It provides a summary of one of the files recovered in March 2002, when Bosnian authorities raided the Sarajevo offices of the Benevolence International Foundation, an Islamic charity. The file, “Tareekh Usama” (“The History of Usama”), contained a firsthand account of Al Qaeda’s founding and the events surrounding it. Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (Free Press, 2006), 75.

  “Trusted sources” would vouch: “Government’s Evidentiary Proffer,” 36.

  separate from the conventional one: Wright, Looming Tower, 162. Bergen notes that “prosaic” concerns over security—as Middle Eastern governments may have been trying to infiltrate the volunteer ranks—prompted Al Qaeda’s creation and that the organization was mostly a separate guesthouse to prevent its being compromised. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (Free Press, 2001), 62.

 

‹ Prev