eased the population: Coghlan, “The Taliban in Helmand,” 140.
as a fourth tenet: This was originally a suggestion of Jeff Eggers in his memo, “Patience Is Paramount but Time Is of the Essence” (memorandum), June 5, 2009.
last four summers: Stephen Grey, “Cracking On in Helmand,” Prospect (September 2009), 46–51.
Nawa and Garmsir districts: Dressler, Securing Helmand, 38.
“Soviet Invasion of 1979”: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, “Abstracts of Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Theses and Special Studies, Annual Edition 1987–88,” 16–17.
left them feeling spurned: A 1993 New York Times article notes: “For five years, the Reagan and Bush Administrations certified that Islamabad did not possess the cability [sic] to detonate a nuclear bomb, a finding widely considered to be a good will effort toward a country that was helping guerrillas fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In 1990, after Soviet soldiers had withdrawn from Afghanistan, the Bush Administration stopped protecting Pakistan from the amendment’s sanctions and the aid was cut off.” Steven A. Holmes, “Clinton Plans Change in the Law Banning Military Aid to Pakistan,” New York Times, November 27, 1993.
crisis of confidence: Stanley A. McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” International Security Assistance Force, August 30, 2009, section 1, 1.
“continued underresourcing”: Ibid., Section 2, 1.
“focusing on force”: Ibid., Section 1, 1.
“from all threats”: Ibid., Section 1, 1-3. Emphasis in original.
“per square foot”: Ibid., Appendix F, 1.
more insurgents: For more on this, see Steve Coll, “Ink Spots,” New Yorker, September 28, 2009.
aggressive use of fires: Chapter 5 of Gilles Dorronsoro’s Revolution Unending is an informative take on the Soviets’ later approach and the Najibullah regime they left in place. Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (Columbia University Press, 2005), 173–201.
thirty-two candidates: Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2012, 22.
burst the cinderblocks: Interview with U.S. military officer present at the scene.
killed seven people: Carlotta Gall, “Bomb Kills 7 Near NATO’s Afghan Headquarters,” New York Times, August 15, 2009.
women-only voting stations: United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan: Enhancing Legal & Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow, “Annual Progress Report–2009,” 31.
tunics for poll workers: Ibid., 29–30.
Taliban attacks was extremely high: The BBC reported that ISAF said there were 400 attacks, but in 2012 the Congressional Research Service reported that there were roughly 280 (“NATO/ISAF announced that there were about 380 total attacks, about 100 more than in 2009”). Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government,” 28.
90 percent of the polling sites: The IEC website indicated that it opened “95.1% of the planned number” of polling centers, but this turned out to be a slight overestimate. Originally, there were 6,970 polling centers planned, but before election day that number was whittled down to 6,210 due to security concerns. A further 760 polling centers were closed the day of the election, again for security reasons. “Press Release of the Independent Election Commission with Reference to Announcement of Preliminary Results of 2009 Presidential Elections,” Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan website, September 16, 2009.
threats inactivated just 12 percent: Ibid.
39 percent of voters turned out: Voter turnout was at 38.7 percent according to the IEC (ibid.); it was 35 percent according to the Congressional Research Service (Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government,” 24).
“a lot of talk in Washington”: The full transcript of the interview, parts of which aired in the episode “Obama’s War” on October 13, 2009, is available on the Frontline website.
CHAPTER 19: DECIDE
From our vehicles: My recollection of these events was confirmed and augmented by interviews with two team members present on this trip.
“We need these kinds of operations”: The dialogue of this scene comes from a publicly available video of the meeting. “Stanley McChrystal in Kunduz After 2009 Air Strike” (video), YouTube, May 22, 2009.
my team contacted them: Interview with a senior military officer involved in coordinating the civilian advisers.
lowered to 328,000: These numbers reflect our calculations at that time and come from notes taken by a team member on October 6, 2009.
approved to grow to 134,000: Numbers for the Afghan National Army come from an annex in my assessment, an unclassified version of which was printed by the Washington Post. McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” Annex G, 1.
84,000 strong: Ibidi., Annex G, 2.
than any other force: In 2008, 880 ANP policemen died; 646 died in 2009 and 961 in 2010; 155 American troops died in 2008; 312 in 2009; and 499 in 2010. Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, and Michael O’ Hanlon, Afghanistan Index, Brooking’s Institution, March 30, 2012, 14, 11.
“a war of necessity”: These comments by the president—“This will not be quick, nor easy. But we must never forget: This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity”—were delivered on August 17, 2009, during a veterans convention. “Remarks by the President at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention,” White House website, August 17, 2009.
districts along Pakistan’s border: Details of the TTP come from a fuller account of their rise by Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008.
border areas: Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.”
CHAPTER 20: EXECUTE
instinctive aversion to violence: President Karzai has noted that his role models are famous pacifists—Gandhi, and his friend and contemporary, a Pashtun leader named Ghaffar Khan. See Elizabeth Rubin, “Karzai in His Labyrinth,” New York Times Magazine, August 4, 2009.
trump card: Content of Taliban propaganda comes from an interview with an intelligence analyst deployed to Helmand 2009–11.
more than sixty tribes: Interview with intelligence analyst deployed to Helmand 2009–11.
slow, dangerous work: Jeffery Dresser, Operation Moshtarak: Taking and Holding Marjah, Institute for the Study of War, March 2, 2010, 4–5.
Taliban they had encountered: Julius Cavendish, “Afghanistan War: Marjah Battle as Tough as Fallujah, Say U.S. Troops,” Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 2010.
apologizing for the incident: Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force, “ISAF Weapon Fails to Hit Intended Target, 12 Civilians Killed” (press release), February 14, 2010.
On Wednesday, February 17: Details of Governor Mangal’s appearance that day can be found in Patrick Baz, “Afghans Raise Flag as U.S. Says Offensive ‘Going Well,’” Sydney Morning Herald, February 18, 2010.
on top of a bamboo pole: “Afghan Governor Raises Flag over Marjah Bizaar,” AFP, February 17, 2010.
staff from a few days earlier: Ibid.
seven hundred Marjah residents: Dressler, Operation Moshtarak, 6, citing the Associated Press, “Afghan Government Claims Taliban Stronghold,” MSNBC website, February 25, 2010.
that week, was in attendance: They had been there since Tuesday (ibid).
“the point at which you have”: Carter and Zazai are quoted in Michael M. Phillips, “Afghan Flag Marks a Turning Point in Marjah,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2010.
school into bases: Sangar Rahimi and Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Afghanistan’s President Receives a Mixed Reception in a Visit to Newly Won Marjah,” New York Times, March 7, 2010.
an old man: Mel Preen, “President Karzai Visits Marjah” (news video), NATO TV, March 8
, 2010. Available on the NATO TV website.
“Their hands have been stained”: Mohammed Elyas Daee and Abubakr Siddique, “In Marjah, New Gains Could Offer Escape from Tragic Past,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 9, 2012.
to gain a toehold: Ibid.
actively campaigning against: Paul Wiseman, “Despite U.S. Gains, Afghan City Still Feels Intimidation,” USA Today, June 11, 2010. The article reports that Abdul Rahman Jan accused the Americans of bringing in an “outsider,” since Abdul Zahir was from Musa Qala, not Marjah.
crowd erupted in cheers: Rahimi and Oppel Jr., “Mixed Reception,” New York Times, March 7, 2010.
“Shame on you”: Aziz Ahmed Tassal, “Karzai Faces Anger in Marjah,” Asia Times, March 19, 2010.
“We exchanged views”: Preen, “Karzai Visits Marjah” (news video).
folksy greetings: Interview with Afghan military officer present on the trip. The New York Times similarly noted that Karzai “appeared to win [the crowd] over on occasion with his crisp and simple language, spoken in the accent of his native Kandahar.” Rahimi and Oppel Jr., “Mixed Reception.”
large, roving mahaz: Before he was killed, Mullah Dadullah went on Al Jazeera and bragged about the connections between his mahaz, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the central leadership of Al Qaeda: “We consider it a friendly and brotherly organization, which shares our ideology and concepts. We have close ties and constant contacts with it . . . may have sent our people to Iraq, and [the Iraqis] may have sent their friends to us. We have continuous contacts with them, whether by phone or by other means” (“Taliban Military Commander Mullah Dadallah: We Are in Contact with Iraqi Mujahideen, Osama bin Laden & Al-Zawahiri,” Middle East Media Research Institute, June 2, 2006).
beheadings: Dion Nissenbaum, “Knocked Out of Power in Afghan Town, Taliban Turn to Intimidation,” McClatchy, March 14, 2010. The article reports on decapitations, once a trademark of Zarqawi’s in Iraq, and a tactic that was on display in an infamous Taliban propaganda video featuring a twelve-year-old executioner, who according to the caption on the video was trained by Dadullah. Bryan Glyn Williams, “Mullah Omar’s Missiles, A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy Council, Winter 2008.
pep talk to Marjah’s Taliban: In this way, as Dadullah had, the front’s new leader—Qayyum Zakir—was well known for stealing over from Pakistan to personally motivate his troops. Anand Gopal, “Qayyum Zakir: The Afganistan Taliban’s Rising Mastermind,” Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 2010.
sixteen key cities: Correspondence with Matt Sherman.
the only known mutiny: Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In (Da Capo Press, 2007), 194–95.
decimation of Kandahar: For a description of the devastation the Soviets wrought, see Robert Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Vintage, 2001), 187–88.
two hundred thousand: Ibid., 188.
Karzai walked in: The sequence of events comes from notes taken by a member of my ISAF strategic advisery group, as do the paraphrased remarks, originally transcribed from the live English translation of Karzai’s speech. Quoted remarks are from Golnar Mortevalli, “Karzai Rallies Tribes, Distances Self from West,” Reuters, April 4, 2010.
would join the Taliban: According to a CRS report, an English translation of the exact comments was never produced. Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2012, 11.
put that trip in jeapardy: In an April 6 press briefing, a reporter asked if the White House was considering canceling Karzai’s visit. Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary answered, “We certainly would evaluate whatever continued or further remarks President Karzai makes as to whether that’s constructive to have such a meeting, sure.” “Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs,” White House website, April 6, 2010. Three days later, Denis McDonough said the trip was still on.
in rejection of Mullah Omar’s layha: The United Nations calculated that from January through June 2010, the insurgency killed and wounded 2,477 Afghans, a 53 percent increase from the same period in 2009, and 76 percent of all civilian casualties. ISAF and Afghan security forces, meanwhile, caused 30 percent fewer civilian casualties than they had during the first six months of 2009, decreasing their share of the civilian toll to 12 percent. “Mid Year Report 2010 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2010,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, August 2010, i–iv.
assassination campaign: Details of Taliban activity in early 2010 are from Ibid., 2–3, 6.
responsible for fewer civilian casualties: Ibid., i.
Index
The page numbers in this index refer to the printed version of this book. To find the corresponding locations in the text of this digital version, please use the “search” function on your e-reader. Note that not all terms may be searchable.
Abd al-Rahman, Sheikh, 216–31, 234
death of, 231–33
Abdullah, Abdullah, 334, 342, 354
Abizaid, John, 55, 56, 59, 78, 81, 94, 95, 104, 108, 116, 128, 129, 131–33, 135–37, 140, 141, 144, 147, 149, 158, 177, 180–82, 254–55, 279
Abizaid, Kathy, 59
Abrams, Creighton, 12, 288
Abu Ghraib, 124, 136, 172, 200–201, 208
Addis Ababa, 249–50
Afghan Hands, 307, 385–86
Afghanistan, 52, 68, 75, 77, 79, 93, 95, 100, 108, 109, 264–66, 275–78, 280
air strikes in, 311–12, 339–42, 367
Al Qaeda in, 113, 124, 192, 285
Bagram, 122–24, 168, 347–49
Barg-e Matal, 331–32
British forces in, 320–23, 337, 349
British India and, 326–27
civilian casualties in, 294–95, 307, 310–13, 321, 339–42, 369, 386
civilian-military strategy in, 292–93, 305, 355
civil war in, 74, 281
Coalition forces in, 295–96, 304, 305, 307, 320, 322, 347; see also International Security Assistance Force
Combined Joint Task Force 180 in, 76–78
Duranni empire in, 377
elections in, 283, 296, 318, 323, 330, 333–35, 336–37, 342–43, 354, 385
Farah bombing in, 289
French forces in, 300, 301
Helmand Province, 265, 296, 309, 310, 314, 315, 318–26, 336, 337, 349, 363, 373–75, 377
“ink spot” strategy in, 321, 322, 331, 332
insurgencies in, 266, 308, 329; see also Taliban
Iraq compared with, 376–77
ISAF in, see International Security Assistance Force
Kabul, 68, 275, 276, 281, 282, 292–94, 297, 305, 323
Kandahar, 74, 76, 309, 310, 318, 323, 336, 377–83, 386
Kunduz Province incident, 339–42
Marines in, 322, 323, 337
Marjah, 320, 372–73, 380, 381, 382
Marjah offensive, 276, 363–70, 375–76
McChrystal appointed to command in, 277–78, 294
McChrystal’s deployment to, in 2002, 76–78
McChrystal’s listening tour in, 297, 300–308, 311, 318
McChrystal’s resignation from command in, 388
NATO in, 278, 282, 289, 296, 310; see also International Security Assistance Force
1978 coup in, 77, 280, 296
Northern Alliance in, 305, 306, 346
Operation Enduring Freedom in, 76
Operation Hamkari in, 380–81, 383, 385, 386
Operation Moshtarak in, 363–70, 372, 378, 380, 385
Operation Winter Strike in, 108–9, 111n
opium trade in, 319, 368
Pakistan’s border
with, 327
roots of conflict in, 280
rule of law in, 348–49
Soviet war with, 45, 48–49, 50, 264–65, 280–81, 282, 319, 327, 332, 381
strategic assessment of, 294–95, 305, 306–7, 316–17, 329, 330–33, 337–38, 342, 343, 349–53, 355
strategic assessment leaked, 344–46, 350, 356
suicide bomb attacks in, 265, 314, 341, 386
Taliban in, see Taliban
troop increases for, 284–87, 289, 306–7, 332–33, 342, 345, 355–57, 359–61, 376
U.S. invasion of, 281, 299, 319
U.S. withdrawal from, 355, 357
Vietnam compared with, 351, 356
White House assessments of, 283, 285
Afghan National Security Forces, 318, 329, 346–47, 356, 357
Aimma Bridge stampede, 195–96
AirLand Battle, 37
Akhundzada, Nasim, 318–19, 320
Akhundzada, Sher Mohammad, 320, 373, 374–75
Akhundzada clan, 319–20, 321
Albu Mahal tribe, 186–87, 259
Alexander the Great, 377
Al Jazeera, 131, 166, 265
Allawi, Ayad, 147, 160
Allen, John, 264
Al Qaeda, 48–49, 52, 68, 74, 75–77, 83–84, 92, 95, 108, 109, 113–16, 118, 125, 147, 149, 152, 156, 158, 159, 161, 167, 168, 170, 181, 277, 283, 289, 309, 349–50, 355, 359
in Afghanistan, 113, 124, 192, 285
Al Shabab and, 249
Dadullah Lang and, 265
East Africa embassy bombings by, 68–69, 71, 75, 113, 249
franchises of, 115
Haqqanis and, 304
McChrystal’s first contact with, 48
9/11 attacks of, see 9/11 attacks
organization of, 113, 114–15
in Pakistan, 113, 124, 285, 292
senior leadership of, 113, 115
in Somalia, 249–50
Taliban and, 265, 281
Tampa I meeting on, 116, 118
TF 714’s focus on, 175–76
training camps of, 113–14
Zarqawi and, 152, 161, 166, 235–36
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