By the end of 1990, even as the United States prepared to invade Iraq with a multinational force from Saudi Arabia, Saddam declared that his army would leave Kuwait only if Israel withdrew from all Arab lands in an unsuccessful bid to divert public opinion.80 In January 1991, on the eve of the first US war with Iraq, Arafat met with Saddam in Iraq. A former treasurer for the PLO reportedly saw Saddam hand Arafat a $50 million check for supporting him.81 Arafat soon announced that the Iraqi president remained confident that he would prevail over the US-led forces.82 Moreover, Arafat announced that the PLO would side with Iraq.83 On January 17, 1991, the United States led the attack against Iraqi installations in Kuwait, and within days, Saddam’s army was decimated.
In the wake of the Gulf War, Arafat was clearly discredited. Yet the United States continued to pursue the notion of Middle East peace and even championed Palestinian nationalism. In May 1991, Baker stated that Israel’s policy of building in the West Bank was an obstacle to US peace efforts.84 Later that year, he sent a “letter of assurance” to the Palestinians, affirming US commitment to the concept of land-for-peace negotiations with Israel, recognizing “how much importance Palestinians attach to the question of East Jerusalem” and underscoring the “legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.”85
On October 30, 1991, the first conference of the nascent Arab–Israeli peace process began in Madrid.86 Informal contacts grew between Israel and the PLO. The Palestinians were undoubtedly emboldened by this recognition of their national aspirations, which was endorsed primarily by the United States. The importance of supporting Arafat gained acceptance internationally, particularly as the terrorist group Hamas began to amass power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
President Bill Clinton began his presidency with the peace process well under way. By the summer of 1993, secret talks were being held between Israelis and Palestinians. The result of the talks was an agreement to move forward with a “Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Self-Rule,” which was signed by Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 11, 1993. The two men then famously shook hands on the White House lawn.87
Parallel to the diplomatic progress and the plans to create the PA, Washington took steps to ensure a strong Palestinian economy. The State Department hosted a gathering of several hundred Jewish and Arab-American businessmen, who committed to a joint effort to invest in the Palestinian territories.88 As the peace process progressed, the United States also agreed to support Palestinian industrial zones in the West Bank and Gaza with duty-free status on goods exported from those areas.89
But even then, Palestinian violence against Israel continued to undermine the process. It also took the lives of Americans. For example, an April 1995 Palestinian Islamic Jihad bus bombing killed a young girl from New York. In August 1995, Hamas carried out a bus bombing that killed one American. In 1996, another Hamas bus attack killed 26, including three Americans. A suicide bombing in 1996, carried out jointly by both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, killed another two Americans.90
But Palestinian violence was not the only challenge to peace. Rabin was assassinated in 1995 by Israeli extremist Yigal Amir, bringing to power Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu. The new Israeli leader was less enthusiastic about the concept of “land for peace,” however. In 1996, eight former high-ranking US officials sent a letter to Netanyahu, pushing him to make further concessions to the Palestinians.91 For the next two years, it was apparent that Clinton believed Netanyahu was the problem. The White House criticized Netanyahu’s plan to extend the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and expressed further frustration that the Israelis would not commit to more redeployments from the West Bank.92 Although Netanyahu signed the Wye River Memorandum, an addendum to the existing peace structure, the Clinton administration actively worked to derail Netanyahu from getting reelected. Clinton even sent a team of political consultants to Israel to undermine his electoral bid.93
In December 1998, Clinton addressed the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and other Palestinian groups in Gaza, becoming the first US president to address an audience of Palestinians in a Palestinian city. After the address, the PNC voted, almost unanimously, to remove from the PLO’s Palestinian National Charter the articles calling for the destruction of the state of Israel. Clinton promised the Palestinians that “America is determined to do what we can to bring tangible benefits of peace. . . . I am pleased to announce we will also fund the training of Palestinian health care providers, and airport administrators, and increase our support to Palestinian refugees. And next year I will ask the Congress for another several hundred million dollars to support the development of the Palestinian people.”94
The Oslo Process culminated in a final push for peace as the Clinton presidency came to a close. Clinton believed that he had earned the trust of Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, who succeeded Netanyahu, thanks in part to the efforts Clinton had put forth to ensure that Netanyahu fell. But Arafat remained another story.
The Camp David II peace summit took place from July 11 to July 25, 2000. In short, it failed. Multiple accounts indicate that Arafat was unhappy with what he was offered, and that he ultimately chose violence over continued negotiations. Somewhere around halfway through the summit, Clinton proposed to Arafat a state with 92 percent of the West Bank and all of Gaza, as well as compensation for land lost to Israel, the removal of the majority of the contentious settlements, and Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian Quarters of Jerusalem. Arafat refused. To this, Clinton reportedly replied, “You are leading your people and the region to a catastrophe.”95
Even after Arafat launched the Al-Aqsa Intifada, a low-level war, against the Israelis in late September 2000, Clinton did not give up. In late December, he presented to Arafat the Clinton Parameters, calling for roughly 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank to become a Palestinian state. Clinton also suggested a bifurcated Jerusalem (including the Old City) and offered US assistance in leading an international commission to address the issue of refugees.96 Arafat rejected this offer, too. Frustrated, Clinton left office in January, and war continued to rage.
President George W. Bush, who assumed office amid the second intifada in early 2001, pressed Arafat repeatedly to condemn the violence,97 but Arafat would condemn only specific attacks and only did so under duress.98 With the understanding that even Clinton’s generous proposals were met with violence, Bush declared that all previous proposals were off the table. He indicated that he would not deal with the Palestinians until they renounced violence. Al Qaeda’s attacks against America on September 11, 2001, reinforced this decision. In the wake of the attack, Reuters captured footage of Palestinians dancing in celebration.99
To be sure, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was a lower threshold on the part of Bush administration officials for tolerating Palestinian violence. From the White House spokesman100 to Secretary of State Colin Powell101 to President Bush himself,102 the message to the Palestinians was consistent: curb the violence. By June 2002, the United States was openly looking for an alternative to Arafat’s leadership, claiming that he continued to encourage terrorism.103
With the PA in crisis, Bush began to tout a new policy of promoting Palestinian economic and political reform.104 As one State Department spokesman noted, “The focus is really on working with people who can make a difference, who can be effective leaders, spokespeople, for the Palestinian community.”105
In what is now known as the “Rose Garden Speech,” Bush called on the Palestinians “to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals . . . the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state.” Bush used the term “roadmap” to describe his way forward out of the Middle East crisis.106
In 2003, the president officially unveiled his roadmap, delineating speci
fically what was needed to achieve peace and Palestinian independence.107 He did so after the spring appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as the first Palestinian prime minister, which was seen as a position created and engineered by the West to create new institutions, dilute the power of the presidency, and perhaps directly challenge Arafat’s authority.
Bush’s roadmap had three phases: (1) ending terror and violence, normalizing Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions; (2) transition; and (3) permanent status agreement and end of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.108 At a May commencement speech at the University of Southern California, Bush stated, “If the Palestinian people take concrete steps to crack down on terror, continue on a path of peace, reform and democracy, they and all the world will see the flag of Palestine raised over a free and independent nation.”109
The Bush administration worked almost singularly with Abbas thereafter, highlighting his importance to the project of Palestinian reform and development.110 But Arafat marginalized Abbas, ultimately prompting the new premier to resign in September 2003.111 The move was a blow to Washington, given how much US leaders had cited him as an alternative to Arafat.
On November 11, 2004, Yasser Arafat died. Initially, his death appeared to be a blessing, particularly for an administration seeking political reform. However, Arafat’s grip on power had been all encompassing; his death left a leadership vacuum. The territories soon fell into disarray.
Although none of Fatah’s leaders seemed to know how to regain control, the United States continued to express full confidence in Abbas to weather what was termed a “difficult leadership transition.” The State Department pledged to “continue to provide a substantial overall package of assistance for Palestinians, which in 2004 has totaled about 200 million dollars.” Washington further pledged an additional $3.5 million for elections and election monitoring, plus another $20 million in “direct budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, reflecting our confidence in the direction of the PA’s reform program.”112
On January 9, 2005, the Palestinians held elections for their new president. Bush lauded the elections, which were basically free and fair, and affirmed that the United States stood “ready to help the Palestinian people realize their aspirations.”113 Bush was further heartened that the winner of the elections was none other than the man he had personally endorsed as an alternative to Arafat.
Amid continued promises for assistance to Palestinian reform and growth, Bush met with Abbas in May 2005, five months after the elections. “We will stand with you, Mr. President, as you combat corruption, reform the Palestinian security services and your justice system, and revive your economy,” Bush said. He also announced a $50 million aid package to help build homes in the Palestinian territories.114 The two men met at the White House again on October 20, and Bush reiterated his confidence that Abbas was an advocate of peace, political reform, and economic growth.115
Sandwiched between these two cordial presidential visits was the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. After more than 38 years of control there, the last Israeli tanks left the area on September 12, 2005.116 The move was seen as a victory for Hamas and, in retrospect, likely bolstered the group’s standing ahead of the legislative elections scheduled just four months after the pullout.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, however, welcomed Sharon’s decision to allow for Palestinian elections in January 2006, including Hamas’s participation, citing it as a first step in the
“[d]evelopment of a Palestinian democracy based on tolerance and liberty.”117 Hamas won the election by a landslide. The Islamist faction, best known for acts of violence against Israel, claimed 76 of 132 seats (74 under the Hamas banner, plus 2 independents), granting it the right to form a government. It had been a free and fair election.118
Despite the Hamas electoral victory, Rice insisted, “[t]he Palestinian people have apparently voted for change, but we believe that their aspirations for peace and a peaceful life remain unchanged.”119 Rice seemed to imply that it did not matter who led the Palestinian government, and that the United States would support statehood as long as there was hope for a two-state solution.
Sharon suffered a stroke on January 4, 2006, bringing his deputy Ehud Olmert to power. Olmert’s government worked with Congress to isolate Hamas.120 However, the United States never ceased providing aid to the Palestinians. Rice announced in April 2006 that humanitarian aid to the Palestinians would increase by 57 percent, to $245 million, but because the new Hamas-led Palestinian government failed to accept the basic nonviolent principles of the Middle East Quartet, a diplomatic body consisting of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia, “the United States is suspending assistance to the Palestinian government’s cabinet and ministries.”121 Still, other aid reportedly flowed through temporary mechanisms to PA institutions that did not have Hamas ties.122
In December 2006, Bush invoked the ire of Palestinians when he signed into law the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act. The bill sought to: (1) support a peaceful, two-state solution to end the conflict with Israel; (2) oppose those terrorists and terrorist groups that thwarted peace; (3) promote the rule of law, democracy, the cessation of terrorism and incitement, and good governance; and (4) urge members of the international community to avoid contact with and refrain from supporting Hamas until it agreed to renounce violence against Israel.123
In the meantime, Rice continued to work with the Palestinian leaders who were not overtly committed to violence in the hopes of getting back to peacemaking with the Israelis. To that end, she met with Abbas and Olmert and affirmed the US commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state, as long as it was not “born of violence and terror.”124 Bush extended further support to Abbas in June 2007, when he authorized extended direct aid to the PA to pay for Abbas’s administrative and personal security costs, saying that it was “in the national security interest of the United States.”125
As it turned out, Abbas needed more security. Between June 7 and June 14, 2007, Hamas launched a military offensive against his PA and seized control of the Gaza Strip. The group took command of major arteries, commandeered the media, and took over PA government buildings and installations. The PA’s security compound fell to Hamas after fighters burrowed a tunnel beneath the building, detonated deadly explosives, and breached the building.126
The coup was unquestionably a setback for the Bush administration, which had been advocating for the spread of democracy throughout the Arab world. As Bush stated,
The alternatives before the Palestinian people are stark. There is the vision of Hamas, which the world saw in Gaza—with murderers in black masks, and summary executions, and men thrown to their death from rooftops. By following this path, the Palestinian people would guarantee chaos, and suffering, and the endless perpetuation of grievance. They would surrender their future to Hamas’s foreign sponsors in Syria and Iran. And they would crush the possibility of any—of a Palestinian state. There’s another option, and that’s a hopeful option. It is the vision of President Abbas and Prime Minister [Salam] Fayyad; it’s the vision of their government; it’s the vision of a peaceful state called Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people. . . . By following this path, Palestinians can reclaim their dignity and their future—and establish a state of their own. Only the Palestinians can decide which of these courses to pursue.127
With these words, the president effectively affirmed that the United States still sought to support a peaceful Palestinian state, even as chaos had enveloped the Gaza Strip. The president then announced on November 20, 2007, that he would host a peace conference in Annapolis, the coastal state capital of Maryland, to “signal broad international support for the Israeli and Palestinian leaders’ courageous efforts” that would lead to “the establishment of a Palestinian state and the realization of Israeli-Palestinian peace.”128
When the Annapolis Conference was launched
on November 27, Bush announced that a steering committee, led by Washington, would work to implement the roadmap for peace, with the goal of establishing a Palestinian state by 2008.129 As Rice later recalled, it was “the first major Middle East peace conference in 16 years, and the only one of its kind to be held on U.S. soil. Representatives of more than 50 countries, including 14 Arab states, sat with the Israeli prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister to pursue a different future for the region.”130
While an atmosphere of cynicism cast a cloud over the conference, the White House launched yet another initiative on behalf of the Palestinian people. In early December 2007, Rice asked Congress to approve $400 million in aid for the Palestinians for 2008 while also calling for US companies to fund Palestinian projects.131
Within months, the aid was released, and the loans began to be issued. Bush continued to promise the Palestinians that he sought a “viable state . . . a state that provides hope.”132 In addition, Rice announced in June 2008 that the United States had spent $86 million to train and equip Palestinian military forces and requested additional funds to continue the program.133
Despite these efforts, the Bush administration came to an end without tangible results for the Palestinians. The civil war between Hamas and Fatah remained an obstacle, as did the lack of progress toward a comprehensive peace. Nevertheless, Bush arguably left office as the president who had gone further than any other to promote Palestinian independence.
President Barack Obama, who came to office in January 2009, continued Bush’s policy of promoting a two-state solution, but he seemed ready to support Palestinian statehood, even without the backing of the Israeli government. Obama sought “to do things differently in the region.”134 The new president was more forceful in his insistence that the Israeli government stop all construction settlements in the West Bank and even in contested lands in Jerusalem, indicating it was territory that would become part of a Palestinian state.
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