by Robert Pisor
147 Westmoreland . . . accomplishment: Soldier, and Nalty, p. 27, and Marines—1968, p. 294, and Comments.
148 “turkey shoot”: “History Book Battle,” U.S. News and World Report.
6. GIAP
Vo Nguyen Giap remains an elusive figure a quarter century after his triumph at Dienbienphu—even after his years of war leadership against the United States. The only lengthy conversation with him to appear in English is in Oriana Fallaci’s Nothing and So Be It, but this was a recollection/reconstruction of an audience he gave to a group of French women Communists—not a sit-down interview. Some of Giap’s remarks are so out of character, and some are so hauntingly like remarks he made to others years before, that this remembered pastiche must be approached warily. Still, in a world of paucity, it is a source.
Bernard Fall, and Jules Roy, and Douglas Pike, and Wilfred Burchett offer pieces for a portrait of Giap, and Robert J. O’Neill, who taught history in the Royal Military College of Australia, tried to put them all altogether in General Giap: Politician and Strategist.
Giap’s journalism and his academic papers seem to have disappeared from history. Some, of course, were seized and destroyed by the French secret police. What survives are his military writings—musings on the art of war, manuals on infantry tactics, assessments of the French and American forces he faced. Reading these turgid tracts, it is easy to imagine a dour, stiff, unimaginative dullard, and to wonder how the bright, young student writer of the 1930s became the plodding dogmatist of the 1960s.
Then I came across “Unforgettable Months and Years,” a piece Giap wrote in 1970 to celebrate Ho Chi Minh’s eightieth birthday. It was a revelation. The article was beautifully written, with an eye for color and detail, an affection for people, and especially a love for history. Here was the Vo Nguyen Giap who had impressed teachers at the prestigious Quoc Hoc School in Hue. It’s an extraordinary document, and I tried to locate the Vietnamese woman who translated it—just to see if American military translators had stiffened Giap’s prose. My letters were unanswered.
Giap has all but vanished from the world stage. Frank Snepp, in Decent Interval, reported Giap was so sick in 1975 (“decrepit and ravaged by Parkinson’s disease”) that he no longer directed North Vietnamese military affairs.
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149 bold strike into . . . South Vietnam: North Vietnam’s preparations for invasion were noted by almost every visitor to Hanoi from 1965 on, including Harrison Salisbury, Wilfred Burchett, Mary McCarthy, and others.
149 “Beethoven-like”: Giap, Banner, p. vii.
149 “Volcano Under the Snow”: O’Neill, General Giap, p. 17, insists it should be “ice-covered volcano.”
149 300,000 soldiers . . . at home: Littauer, p. 188, says 270,000, but notes that Giap had 450,000 in the reserves.
150 “soldiers of the just cause”: it was a name taken by Vietnamese guerrillas in the seventh century A.D., Burchett, Catapult, p.18.
151 two muskets . . . fourteen flintlocks, and a Chinese pistol: These weapons are listed in Giap’s own writing and in other sources, but Burchett, Catapult, p. 122, asserts that on the eve of the raid he received “one American machine gun with 150 cartridges, six fire bombs and a case of time bombs.”
151 Giap . . . knew the history: Vietnam’s history of invasion and resistance comes from a wide variety of sources, notably Buttinger, Fall, Lamb and McAleavy (see Sources).
152 “use the jungle like a weapon”: Bloodworth, p. 244.
153 “an abundance of tropical diseases”: Burchett, Catapult, p. 27.
153 Tran Hung Dao had written: Pettit, p. 358.
153 “a perpetual struggle . . . with invaders”: Catapult, p. 11.
154 the Death of a Thousand Cuts: MacAleavy, p. 52.
155 “Giap is still beautiful like a girl”: O’Neill, Giap, p. 20.
157 “We forgot we were only thirty-four human beings”: from a 1964 newspaper article published in Hanoi; cited in Giap, How We Won, p. 7.
157 “made without cocks”: Lancaster, p 425.
157 “women are against regulations”: Langer, p. 113. See also Miller, Captured!, in which the North Vietnamese cadre is described as “morally almost puritanical.”
158 “even if the . . . mountains go up in flames”: Giap, “Unforgettable,” p. 16.
158 Archimedes Patti: Charleton, Many Reasons, p. 3.
159 “no longer scattered like . . . sparrows”: Giap, “Unforgettable,” p. 71.
159 “one inch of ground . . . one citizen”: from Jean Lacoutre’s preface to Giap, Banner.
159 angry crowd . . . Hanoi: McAlister, p. 267, and Lancaster, p. 148.
160 “you probably . . . will not succeed”: Tran Van Don, p. 143.
160 white duck suit . . . trilby hat: O’Neill, General Giap, pp. 45–46.
160 met again in Dalat: O’Neill, General Giap, p. 41, and preface to Giap, Banner.
160 The rest of 1946: Fall, Two Vietnams, pp. 101–130, and O’Neill, General Giap, pp. 45–46.
162 Giap spent 1946–1950: O’Neill, General Giap, p. 52.
162 political officer: Kinnard, p. 64, discusses the supremacy of the political officer, but more detailed information can be had in Pike, Viet Cong.
163 “a whole ideological struggle” cited in Fall, Two, p. 114.
163 “Without the people”: from Giap, Banner of People’s War.
163 “the soul of the Army”: Fall, Two, p. 343.
163 held Dong Khe: Fall, Two, pp. 110–111.
164 Civil War in the United States: Morison, The Oxford History of the American People.
164 26th Regiment: Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963).
164 “Comrades, forward!”: Roy, p. 105.
164 American bombers destroyed: the bomb statistics: Department of Defense Target Summary, cited in Van Dyke, p. 26.
166 One thousand civilians died . . . every week: a McNamara memo to President Johnson, cited in Littauer, p. 48.
166 500,000 worked at bomb repair: Van Dyke, p. 44.
166 “It is a sacred war”: Salisbury, p. 75.
167 U.S. losses: Littauer, p. 41, argues that in early 1968 the United States was losing one plane for every forty sorties. See also Van Dyke, pp. 60–70, and Thompson, No Exit, p. 96, and Visions of Victory, p. 32.
167 “We would welcome them”: Burchett, Catapult, p. 42.
168 “in the end it is you that will tire”: Ellsberg, p. 30.
168 “Prepare for the Worst”: Burchett, Vietnam North, p. 7.
168 “The enemy will pass slowly”: Fall, Two, p. 113.
168 “I’m the one who usually gives the orders”: Burchett, Vietnam North, p. 120.
169 Task Force Delta: U.S. Marines—1966, p. 85.
170 “ass in the grass”: Herbert, p. 139.
170 “His forces remain insufficient”: Giap, Big Victory, p. 86.
170 “We cannot compare our weapons”: Visions, p. 84.
170 “They are greenhorns”: Burchett, Vietnam North, p. 124.
171 “eat soup with forks”: Visions, pp. 137–38.
171 “morale of American soldiers is lower than grass”: Visions, p. 138.
171 the one-year tour: discussed in many sources, including Mylander, p. 79, and Palmer, Summons, p. 97.
171 “grueling, protracted war of attrition”: Visions, p. 40.
171 “have a good fighting method”: Giap, Big Victory, p. 86.
171 “our answer to the B-52s”: Langer, pp. 158–59.
172 “you can see the worried expressions”: Harvey, p. 10.
173 “an unshakeable conviction that their cause was just”: Martin, Reaching, p. 219
173 “you need time. . . . Time”: Fallaci, Nothing, pp. 84–86.
173 Giap counseled patience: Oberdorfer in Tet! and Palmer in Summons argue that Giap was the driving force for the Tet Offensive, but Kinnard (p. 65) believes that Giap opposed a go-for-broke offensive, and urged a protracted war strategy. Sul
livan in Winter-Spring Offensive, and McGarvey in Visions of Victory also paint Giap as a reluctant dragon—as do his own military writings in the fall of 1967. I believe the evidence shows that Giap did not think a surprise attack would drive America out of the war—that years of warfare would still be required.
174 “prolong the war”: Visions, p. 17.
174 “We are in no hurry”: “The Enemy Strategist,” New York Times, March 8, 1968.
175 “the puppet army . . . impotent”: Giap, Big Victory, p. 31.
176 “Our soldiers . . . fear no sacrifices”: Giap, Big, p. 91.
176 “sharp, shrewd . . . drops of black light”: Fallaci, Nothing, pp. 77–78.
177 “Surprise is very important”: Giap, How We Won, pp. 53–54.
7. THE TET OFFENSIVE
The clearest and most thoughtful study of the enemy’s 1968 Tet offensive, and especially its impact on America, is Don Oberdorfer’s Tet! I am indebted in this and successive chapters to his research and reporting. Peter Braestrup’s Big Story is essential for an understanding of the period between January and April of 1968. Lieutenant General Willard Pearson’s The War in the Northern Provinces, especially the chapter “The Bleak Picture” (pp. 29–65), was very helpful. And Herbert Y. Schandler, in The Unmaking of a President, wrote an insider’s view of the powerful political and economic forces working on President Johnson.
The U.S. Navy library in Washington, D.C. keeps a dozen, perhaps sixteen, thick volumes of Xeroxed newspaper clippings, literally thousands of articles that were clipped from American newspapers in the late 1960s, pasted on paper, duplicated, and published at the Pentagon as a twice-daily digest on Vietnam war journalism. In the grey seas of print in these volumes are many dramatic snapshots of the war, and especially of Tet.
Finally, I was in Saigon during the Tet Offensive and heard Westmoreland assess the meaning and impact of the enemy attacks from the steps of the U.S. embassy. I twice traveled the length of South Vietnam to see the results of the surprise offensive, and my own notes have a place in this chapter.
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179 the scene in the Situation Room: Tet!, pp. 18–19.
179 Westmoreland stood: my notes, and Tet!, p. 34.
180 492,000 American servicemen: Schandler, p. 343.
180 “It did not occur to us”: Report, p. 158.
181 “about to run out of steam”: my notes.
181 “dismay and incredulity”: Soldier, p. 332.
182 “By the skin of our teeth”: Chaisson, p. 214.
182 “We did not expect”: my notes.
182 a collective gasp of astonishment: Tet! tells the story best.
182 “maximum effort”: Johnson, p. 385.
183 “We should be prepared”: Schandler, p. 88.
183 “seriously imperiled”: Report, p. 158.
183 “nuclear weapons or chemical agents”: Schandler, p. 88.
183 an honest evasion of truth: See George C. Wilson, “No A-Arms Requested for VN, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1968, p.1; or Joseph C. Goulden, “U.S. Denies A-Weapon Plan, But Keeps Viet Option Open,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 10, 1968. p. 1; or John W. Finney, “Anonymous Call Set Off Rumors of Nuclear Arms for Vietnam,” New York Times, Feb. 13, 1968, p. 1, among others in Newspaper Files.
183 “the enemy could drive us back”: Soldier, p. 350.
184 the first through-trip . . . in years: Report, p. 182.
184 twenty-five bridges and eleven culverts: Operations of U.S. Marine Forces in Vietnam, January, 1968. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. p. 63.
184 The logistics situation turned critical: Pearson, p. 58.
184 “a high measure of surprise”: Marine Corps Operations—1968, p. 3.
184 Quang Tri City: Pearson, p. 55.
185 fighting . . . in Hue: This account is drawn from Don Oberdorfer’s excellent account in Tet!, and from Pearson, Braestrup, and my own notes.
186 116,000 fled their homes: Report, p. 160.
187 from the north: Pearson, p. 62.
187 Tolson . . . fuel shortages: Braestrup, p. 239.
187 “beans, bullets, and gasoline” and the 1st Cav at Hue are from Pearson, pp. 29–65.
188 “Their presence . . . previously unsuspected”: Pearson, p. 49.
188 8,000 died: Soldier, p. 328.
189 Whispers of discontent: “General Westmoreland Shift Held Unlikely,” Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1968, p. 4.
189 “complete confidence in your judgment”: Soldier, p. 336.
189 “I desperately need reinforcements”: The message traffic between Wheeler and Westmoreland is in Soldier, pp. 352–56. See also Schandler, p. 98, and Johnson, pp. 386–91.
190 rockets near . . . [Wheeler]: Both Schandler, pp. 98–100, and Westmoreland, Soldier, p. 354, tell the story and suggest it influenced Wheeler.
190 “second wave of attacks”: Soldier, p. 356. (General Chaisson briefed reporters in Saigon on Feb. 22 with the same information. Author’s personal notes.)
190 “heightened risk”: Johnson, pp. 386–91.
190 “in the rack”: Soldier, p. 354.
190 with substantial reinforcements: Soldier, p. 354, and Johnson, p. 386.
191 Wheeler reported: Johnson, p. 390, and Schandler, Oberdorfer, Soldier, and Braestrup, pp. 433–64.
191 a wrenching reassessment: The mood, and the accelerated pace of events of this time, are captured best in Tet!, especially pp. 241–46, and analyzed again in Braestrup’s Big Story.
191 “A tidal wave of defeatism”: Palmer, Summons, p. 201.
192 “General Westmoreland is confident he can hold”: Johnson, p. 391.
8. BITTER LITTLE BATTLES
These accounts of combat come from Marine Corps files, unit chronologies, and especially Shore, pp. 64–71.
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193 a thick, wet fog: Comments.
194 sensors . . . targeting was guesswork: Nalty, p. 93.
195 applauded themselves: Captain Baig called it “general euphoria” in testimony before Congress, Electronic Battlefield, pp. 83–89.
195 till 861 Alpha: Shore, pp. 64–66, and Stubbe, p. 948.
197 Lang Vei: the story of Lang Vei comes from many sources, but primarily from the excellent account by John A. Cash in Albright, Seven Firefights, pp. 120–27, and Shore, pp. 66–68.
197 Luong Dinh Du: Stubbe, p. 972, and Seven, p. 112.
198 “Be prepared to execute the contingency plans”: from the First Battalion/26th Marines’ Command Chronologies, January to March, 1968; and Comments.
198 On January 14: Nalty, p. 32.
200 “built to take a regiment”: Stubbe, p. 971.
204 The Marines said no: Shore, pp. 67–68, and Seven, p. 129.
204 “They told me to get out”: Braestrup, p. 327.
204 message . . . to Westmoreland: Soldier, p. 340.
205 Gen Tompkins passes word Negative: This penciled note is in a folder marked “26th Marines—Messages,” in the Marine Corps library.
207 “was a failure”: 1968 Summary. HQUSMACV. Office of Information, Saigon. 1969.
208 “Maybe it’s a spade”: Herr, p. 161.
208 “One of Westy’s best days”: Tet!, pp. 189–90.
208 Radio Hanoi was boasting: AP dispatch, A120, Feb. 9, 1968.
208 “I grew more and more shocked”: Soldier, p. 342. See also Chaisson, Oral History, p. 230.
209 A Company: from Shore, pp. 69–70; Pearson, p. 75; Stubbe, p. 1025, and records of the 26th Marines.
210 losses . . . “light”: Electronic Battlefield, p. 86.
210 mob: Shore, p. 69; Soldier, p. 341; Wheeler, AP dispatch, Feb. 8, 1968.
211 “mostly old men, women, and children”: Nalty, p. 66.
211 “I don’t know what we’ll do”: from George E. Esper’s AP dispatch (AP-A032), Feb. 9, 1968.
212 “we are not . . . going to be defeated”: Soldier, p. 328.
9. LIFE IN THE V-RING
The chapter title comes from a piece
written by John Wheeler, the Associated Press correspondent who spent more days and nights at the combat base than any other journalist. A basement flood had turned clippings of his original dispatches into goo, but Wheeler willingly shared his memories and his hospitality in New York City in August, 1978. The microfilm library at Associated Press provided the original Wheeler reports from Vietnam.
Other descriptions of the base during the siege come from Shore’s The Battle of Khe Sanh, Braestrup’s Big Story, the brooding black and white photographs of David Douglas Duncan in I Protest!, Stubbe’s Chaplain at Khe Sanh, and Michael Herr’s Dispatches, pp. 86–166. Herr does not always put the right unit on the right hill, and he sometimes confuses dates or minor facts, but no other writer more perfectly captured the mad pace and contradictions of the Vietnam war. Herr writes with his nerve ends, and his book is an important contribution to understanding the war.
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214 “It hangs, hangs”: Herr, p. 108.
214 “like a shanty slum”: cited in Braestrup, p. 308. Herr wrote “like a Colombian slum” in Dispatches, p. 106.
215 U.S. Air Force was confident: Nalty, p. 24.
216 “The airstrip seemed . . . bedeviled by fog”: Nalty, p. 9.
216 “Why I Defected to the Viet Cong”: Miller letter.
216 “a severe obstacle”: Guay, “The Khe Sanh Airlift.”
217 “Zero, zero, day after day”: Electronic Battlefield, p. 90.
217 not supposed to be in Vietnam: Nalty, p. 12.
217 February 10, a Hercules: Shore, p. 76; Nalty, p. 43.
218 “too valuable to be risked”: Nalty, pp. 36–38.
218 LAPES mission: Shore, pp. 76–78, and Nalty, pp. 51–52. (Nalty says the first LAPES delivery was Feb. 16.)
220 “hello Momma”: “CBS Evening News,” Feb. 15, 1968. (The Marines would later claim they delivered forty-three tons of mail to Khe Sanh during the siege—fourteen pounds of letters and packages for every man at the base.)
220 parachuted supplies: Shore, p. 79, and Nalty, p. 47.
221 “Thank God, Jesus Christ”: Herr and Braestrup and many others wrote about this mad dash, but this is from Lewis M. Simon’s AP dispatch (AP070-854A), Feb. 27, 1968.
221 The airlift . . . unexpected problems: Nalty, pp. 42–50.
221 “Theoretically . . . six times as much as the French”: Nalty, p. 42