tiple sources), the historian avoids the savage and cruel stereotypes of some later writers (Asheri et al. 2007: 545–72). Interestingly, amid the many chapters dealing with the Scythians’ customs (Hdt. 3.46–82), the
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 47
historian avoids discussing the structure of their rulership apart from mentioning the tribal division and earliest kings (Hdt. 4.6–7) and the
“governor” of each Scythian district ( nomarche ̄ s, Hdt. 3.66.1), as if he were implying a kind of loose, simple regional tribal organization, at least in part nomadic. Whether the “Scythians” were an ethnic group or a
political entity is a matter of much current debate (Asheri et al. 2007: 554). The Indo‐Europeanist and structuralist Dumézil interestingly suggested that, of the three “castes” – priest, warrior, and farmer – the highest among the Scythians was the warrior (Dumézil 1978: 178–92). In
such circumstances the Scythians may, for Herodotus, represent a people with a minimally clear hierarchy of rule ( arche ̄), but wielding considerable
“physical power” ( kratos) as warriors, whence their use as military auxil-iaries by fifth‐century Greeks.
The Scythian campaign of Darius starts with his march from Susa to
the Ister River (present‐day Danube; Hdt. 4.83–98), prefiguring the
great march of Xerxes across the Hellespont and into Greece (Hdt. 7.26–
130). An excursus on the geography of Scythia underlines the vastness of the territory and the ambition of the undertaking (Hdt. 4.99–101; see
Immerwahr 1966: 108–9). The campaign proper (Hdt. 4.121–41) is an
orderly narrative of Persians facing Eastern and Western Scythians. Darius’
bridge over the Ister prefigures Xerxes’ over the Hellespont, symbolizing the excessive ambition of the monarch. But the twist in the Scythian
campaign is that the Ionians accompanying Darius are given charge of
guarding the bridge until, as Darius is fleeing, the Ionians debate dismantling it (Hdt. 4.137). Miltiades of Athens, later the great general at
Marathon, proposes thereby freeing Ionia, but Histiaeus of Miletus holds the opposite view, saying, in a politically charged discussion, that Darius’
rule allows each prince to “act as tyrant” ( turanneuei) in his city. If Darius’
power ( dunamis) were destroyed, each city would prefer to be ruled democratically ( de ̄ mokrateesthai) rather than by a tyrant ( turanneuesthai).
Histiaeus’ “pro‐tyranny” view wins, all voting against Miltiades. This is an implicit denunciation of the Greeks’ lack of resolve at this point, but also a foreshadowing the Ionian Revolt. The Persians then escape across the bridge from the Scythians (Hdt. 4.140–41).
Book 5
Prior to the Ionian Revolt proper (Hdt. 5.28–6.42), there is an account of Darius’ generals in Europe, Megabazus and Otanes (Hdt. 4.143–4
and 5.1–27); the account includes the Hellespont and Thrace (5.1–10),
the Paeonians, Pangaeum, and Macedonia (Hdt. 5.14–23), and the
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy Hellespont and Lemnos (Hdt. 5.25–7). A digression on the Persians in
Libya interrupts at 4.145–205, notably mixing the ethnography and his-
tory of Cyrene and describing the Persian ambitions for Africa.
The Ionian Revolt was dubbed “the beginning of evils” for the Greeks
and the barbarians (Hdt. 5.97) since it involved the Athenians and
Eretrians, especially in the burning of Sardis, and angered Darius, which led to the battle of Marathon and the invasion of Xerxes. After Otanes
had subdued the Hellespont and “after there had been a short letup in
the troubles, evils begin again; now it was from Naxos and Miletus that they befell the Ionians” (Hdt. 5.28, Grene). The Naxian democratic faction has taken refuge at Miletus, administered by the tyrant Aristagoras (Hdt. 5.30.3–4). The Naxians there ask the tyrant for “some power”
( dunamin tina; here specifically “military forces”) to help them return to Naxos. Aristagoras says that he is not able to give them “such power” to bring them back to Naxos against the will of those holding the city. But the tyrant pledges to get, and in the end secures, military help from the Persians in the form of 200 ships to take Naxos, and in the end, he hopes, also the Cyclades. The revolt is a classic, extended narrative of how local disputes devolve into transnational ones, raw naval resources being the bargaining tool. Aristagoras and the Persians seek to intervene for their own personal gains of wealth, influence, and territory.
As preparations continue, the Milesian despot Histiaeus, earlier the
advocate of Darius at the Ister bridge, is now held in Susa owing to
Darius’ suspicions. Histiaeus urges Aristagoras to revolt against Persia (5.36). Aristagoras takes counsel with those in his faction, among whom Hecataeus, the chronicler, was the greatest proponent for not waging war against the king, “mentioning as reasons all the nations that Darius ruled and his power [ dunamin]” (Hdt. 5.36.2). When he did not convince them, Hecataeus argued for building a strong naval power by seizing the treasures of the shrine in Branchidae, since he “was aware that the power
[ dunamin] of Miletus was weak” and only by this treasure could they build a navy and “master the sea” ( epikrate ̄ sein te ̄ s thalasse ̄ s). Hecataeus here refers to potential military power, comparatively of Persia versus Miletus. It designates a potential to rule the sea by force ( epikrateo ̄), a power never actualized. Though Hecataeus’ opinion is not followed,
Herodotus gives significant attention to it as a sound strategy based on a rational assessment of the imbalances of power.
A digression on the political histories of Athens and Sparta occupies a substantial part of the Ionian Revolt narrative (Hdt. 5.39–96). The
account of Sparta informs readers of the working and complexities of
succession of the kings (Hdt. 5.39–48) and Spartan isolation from foreign
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 49
expeditions (Hdt. 5.49–54). The story of Athens begins with Aristagoras’
visit there to ask for help and refocuses on the story of power manipulation in Athens under the tyrants, the murder of the tyrant’s brother,
Hipparchus, and the Spartan expedition at the advice of the Delphic
Pythia, which ultimately frees Athens of tyrants (Hdt. 5.55–65). Athenian internal strife is characteristic of its political history, illustrated here by the struggle of the partisan Cleisthenes and Isagoras for factional power ( estasiasan peri dunamios) in Athens after the fall of the Pisistratids, when Cleisthenes “made the people his companions” ( ton de ̄ mon prosetairize-tai, Hdt. 5.66; Rhodes 2004: 280–3). There follows the narrative of Cleisthenic reforms and of the Spartan Cleomenes’ unsuccessful attempts to oust him (Hdt. 5.66–76). The power of Athens through democracy is
extolled: “So Athens [after the tyrants] had increased in greatness …
when freed they sought to win, because each was trying to achieve for his very self” (Hdt. 5.78, Grene). The next sections describe how Athens
resists the hostilities of Aegina and then of Sparta, so that its position is strengthened (Hdt. 5.79–96). Amid Sparta’s failed attempt to reestablish tyranny in Athens comes a discussion weighing the best form of
government for Athens, in the view of outsiders.
The Spartans sought to reestablish Hippias in Athens, for fear that the people of Attica ( genos to Attikon), “in its freedom,” that is, without control of a tyranny ( turannidos), would become the equal of Sparta ( isorrhopon), but if it had a weak ruler it would be ready to be ruled ( peitharcheesthai hetoimon) (Hdt. 5.91). The Corinthian Socles opposes the Spartan attempt to “abolish the rule of equality [ isokratia] in the cities” and put tyrannies
in their place (5.92). When specific forms of government within Greece are discussed, the vocabulary used is not of
general power terms, but of types of organization within the polis. Both Sparta and Corinth here debate the best form of self‐governance for
Athens in view of the self‐interest of each. Note that Socles introduces the stronger ethical terms of isocratia (egalitarian rule), which Sparta does not and for which the historian shows sympathy.
The next crucial episode comes with Aristagoras of Miletus’ speech
before the Athenian assembly, which succeeds in getting Athens to
promise to send twenty ships to help the Ionians, leading to the phrase noted above: “These were the ships that were the beginning of evils for both Greeks and barbarians” (Hdt. 5.97, Grene). This turning point sets in motion a causal chain leading to Xerxes’ invasion, and it is based on a speech that falsifies the degree of risk: “It seems that it is less troublesome to fool many men than one,” Aristagoras continues (Hdt. 5.97), meaning
the 30,000 in Athens’ assembly versus Cleomenes of Sparta, who had
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy turned down the request there. The power of persuasion, the gullibility of a democratic body, and the almost fated progress of events are the key points made here.
Book 6
The Ionian Revolt is narrated at the end of Book 5 and early on in Book 6 (Hdt. 5.99–103 and 5.116–6.32), first describing the uprisings, then
the Persian suppression of them, with the account of the Cypriote
campaign in between (Hdt. 5.104–16.1). The Athenian fleet lands at
Ephesus and then invades, captures, and burns Sardis, including its temple of Cybele (5.101–2). The latter act, Herodotus notes, gave the Persians the reason to burn the Greek temples in return (including those in
Athens). The revolt then spreads to other towns of Cyprus, the Carians, and the Greeks in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Darius prayed to Zeus
to give him the chance to punish the Athenians and dramatically had a
servant tell him at each turn: “Master, remember the Athenians” (Hdt.
5.105). The deceitful Histiaeus of Miletus, pressed by Darius, commands an army for him (Hdt. 5.106–8), then he escapes the Persians only to be rejected by his countrymen (Hdt. 6.1–6). Histiaeus’ lively story ends
with his recapture by the Persians and his beheading (Hdt. 6.26–30).
This gruesome end for the author of the Ionian Revolt is ironically
punctuated by Darius’ ultimate respect for the man (Hdt. 6.30). Miletus is eventually taken, after the Persians, aided by a Phoenician fleet, take the island of Lade and cut off the Milesians by sea and land (Hdt. 6.6–25).
The end of the revolt describes how the king took all the cities on the islands and on the mainland, captured the peoples, castrated the best-looking boys, had the girls sent to himself, and burned the cities. The epilogue points up the despotic oppression: “So for the third time the
Ionians were enslaved, once by the Lydians, and twice, in order, by the Persians” (Hdt. 6.32).
As the Phoenicians were threatening to take Caria, Miltiades, the
Athenian acting as governor of the cities of the Chersonese agreed to help a Thracian tribe, the Dolonci, in their resistance to the invasion. Miltiades was motivated by dissatisfaction with the rule of Pisistratus ( arche ̄) and wishing to be away (from Athens). “At that time, the supreme power [lit.
“all the power,” to pan kratos] in Athens was held by Pisistratus; but there was also a man of great influence [ edunasteue], one Miltiades, son of Cypselos,” whose influence came specifically from his Olympic chariot
victory and from his noble lineage (Hdt. 6.35). Thus the Athenian sought to form his own power base by success in an independent, local military
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 51
expedition. He also looms larger in the greater story of Greek resistance to the Scythians and to the Persians at Marathon and can be seen as an
antidespotic despotic crusader. The phrase “total power” occurs three
times in Herodotus (here and at 7.3 and 7.96). In all cases holding to pan kratos is not a compliment but an unflattering description of a tyrant figure wielding oppressive power: Pisistratus, Darius’ domineering wife, and the Persians who make virtual slaves of the Ionian leaders of forces made to fight for Xerxes. Miltiades for the time being took refuge in
Athens when the Persian fleet approached (Hdt. 6.41).
Mardonius’ campaign against Athens and Eretria is aborted when his
fleet is wrecked by a storm at Mount Athos and the Persians are attacked by Thracian Brygoi (Hdt. 6.42–5). Like the Scythian expedition in Book
4, this is seen as a failure by Herodotus. Then Thasos is subjugated when a messenger of Darius orders them to disarm and they comply (Hdt.
6.48‐46). There follows a lengthy narrative (Hdt. 6.49–93) regarding the island of Aegina, which agrees to the king’s request for submission (he asks them for “earth and water”); this prompts a reaction from Sparta
against the island, then the deposition of the Spartan king Demaratus,
who obstructs efforts against Aegina, Demaratus’ departure to Persia, the madness and death of the Spartan King Cleomenes, and the continuation
of the war with Aegina by Athens. The story not only shows the Persian
undermining of Greek unity, it illustrates power tensions within Sparta and explains how Demaratus came to be an advisor to both Darius and
Xerxes during their invasions. Just as importantly, it contains a digression on Spartan kingship (Hdt. 6.50–60), how Sparta’s own legends of its origins are unreliable, and the special honors paid to the king. In this latter section there are comparisons of specific Spartan customs with those of non‐Greeks, notably how their kingship resembles that of the Persians in one custom and how Spartan inheritance customs resemble those of
Egypt (Hdt. 6.59–60). Herodotus presents a partial “othering” of Sparta as an exceptional polis with some practices of hierarchical power closer to non‐Greeks.
The Aegina story leads to the narrative of the great battle of Marathon (6.94–120). The Marathon confrontation in 490 bc prefigures the war
proper in 480 bc and was a direct result of Athens’ involvement in the
Ionian Revolt. Darius’ defeat at Marathon prompts Xerxes’ invasion of
Greece. Acts of mutual aggression are the causes of war. Prior to Marathon, the Persians attack some sanctuaries (Naxos, Eretria), but revere others (Delos). There is a virtual “proem” introducing the Marathon story
(Hdt. 6.94) and reciting Darius’ motives for the expedition, foremost his daily mantra to “remember the Athenians” after their siege of Sardis
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HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy (Hdt. 5.105), while also using as a “pretext” for the invasion the
Pisistratids’ encouragement against their fellow Athenians. Retribution is therefore underscored as the impetus for the invasion. The Persian generals move across the Aegean, while an earthquake at Delos serves as a
portent for the evil to come (Hdt. 6.98). The ominous shaking of Delos
is later echoed by Thucydides, both in his record of an earthquake there (also at the start of the Peloponnesian War) (“Delos was moved,” ekine ̄ the ̄, Th. 2.8.3, the same word Herodotus uses) and in his proem to that work, when he describes the war itself as “the greatest movement” ( kine ̄ sis, Th.
1.1.2). Human conflict is foreshadowed by a quasi‐divine, chaotic
upheaval of nature. Finally, near the mainland, the Persians enslave the people of Eretria on Euboeia (Hdt. 6.100–1) and make for Marathon.
The Athenians go to Marathon under ten generals, of whom Miltiades
is the foremost (Hdt. 6.103–4) and is eventually portrayed as the greatest he
ro of the battle. A messenger, Philippides, is sent to Sparta to ask for help, arrives there after a two‐day run of about 150 miles, having met Pan along the way, and then quickly runs back to Marathon to report that
Sparta will not come until after the full moon (presumably in view of its festival of Karneia; Hdt. 6.105). For Herodotus, Philippides’ run is
remarkable not as an extraordinary physical feat for a military messenger, but as an event to mark the Spartans’ crucial failure and the divine appa-rition that prompts Athens to build a shrine to Pan as a divine ally.
Miltiades’ cogent appeal to the man casting the tie‐breaking vote to go to battle lays out the high stakes, the great risk, and the need for courageous action (Hdt. 6.109). Throughout this narrative, there is a tension between the threat to Greece as a whole unity (e.g. Philippides to the
Spartans, Hdt. 6.106.2), and the speech of Miltiades before battle, saying that victory will make Athens the greatest city (Hdt. 6.109).
The god Pan caused fear in the foe during the battle proper, when the
Persians take fright at seeing the Athenians in armor coming at a run at them across eight stades, as they attributed to them “madness and [a
desire for] utter self‐destruction” (Hdt. 6.112). The Athenians eventually beat the Persians and made them flee (Hdt. 6.113), being “the first
Greeks we know of to charge the enemy at a run and first to face the sight of the Median dress” (Hdt. 6.112). When the Persians sail off quickly to reach Athens before the Athenians, the latter “rush with all speed to
defend their city” (Hdt. 6.116). The Athenians succeed and the Persians sail back home. The historian’s account of Marathon is a virtual paean to the Athenians, in tune with the Athenians’ own long celebration of the
achievement in the fifth century (the event decorated the Painted Stoa in the city center). The run of Philippides and of the Athenian soldiers
HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 53
themselves throws their quickness and enterprise into contrast with the hesitation of the Spartans.
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