They then moved on to discuss practical matters. Each movement was asked to contribute one million Euros to the joint fund and to try to get hold of as many gamma radiation sources as possible. Ollie directed them to the prime locations where such sources could be found – mainly hospitals that performed radiation therapy and industrial facilities that used such sources to test pipe welds or measure the level of liquids in closed holding tanks. He told them that the sealed sources were safe but heavy because of the protective shielding. If they did not care about the safety of the people handling and transporting the sources, and if removing a heavily shielded source was impossible, then the bare sources could be taken, risking external radiation exposure to the people close to them. In order to keep the location of the laboratory secret all stolen sources were to be brought to an address in Milan and from there they would be taken to the clandestine laboratory by the two drivers who knew its exact location. Goals were set for each participant according to the technological development of their country, their access to the sources and the number of trustworthy members. A cover story was established claiming that the radioactive materials would be used to make a radioactive dispersion device known in short as RDD or to public as a "dirty bomb". This would seem plausible enough for the underground movements and yet make them aware of the necessity of keeping the activity in secret.
July 10th, Padova
Ollie suggested that the joint venture receive the codename Astraea after the mythological goddess of innocence and purity that was often also associated with justice and this was supported enthusiastically by the Greek Golden Dawn faction and accepted by the other members.
Professor Modena, with the help of Ollie and a few handpicked technically skilled people from the European countries that participated in the project, started acquiring the equipment needed for the laboratory and moving the personnel and materials to the vicinity of the famous Botanical Gardens of Padova. They rented a warehouse with a large deep basement and they converted the street level floor into offices that served as the front of the high-tech company they named Astraea. It was presented as a research and development company involved in innovative industrial chemical processing.
On the first floor level they constructed a small dormitory and rigged a couple of bathrooms to serve as the lodging of the small workforce. They also converted some space into a kitchen and dining area as they did not want to be seen frequently in restaurants in the neighborhood. This well-travelled section of town provided excellent cover for the handful of international scientists, engineers and technicians involved in the clandestine project.
The acquisition of the raw materials needed for Professor Modena's plan was quite easy as none of them were closely scrutinized. Thorium oxide was purchased through a fictitious front company from India and quantities of beryl mineral were shipped from Argentina enabling the chemists to produce beryllium oxide on site. Other common multi-purpose chemicals such as mineral acids, ion exchange resins, lead bricks and organic solvents were acquired mainly from China and from several companies in Europe.
In the deep basement the walls were lined with the lead bricks that served for radiation shielding. Four irradiation tunnels from the same materials led from the corners of the largest room in the basement to the center where a large stainless steel reactor vessel was placed.
As the stolen radioactive sources arrived at the laboratory site from all over Europe, they were moved to the basement and placed in the four lead covered tunnels. Measurements showed that only a very small amount of radiation reached the surface level. Due to the 27.5 days half-life of the protactinium-233 intermediate radio-nuclide the irradiated thorium oxide needed to be stored for three months before the uranium-233 could be efficiently extracted. For this purpose a storage space shielded with lead bricks was constructed in an adjoining room of the basement.
In the same room a chemical pilot plant was constructed to dissolve the "cooled" irradiated thorium oxide targets and to separate the uranium-233 produced through the sequence of nuclear reactions from the thorium and beryllium oxides. The thorium and beryllium were then recycled by precipitation as a mixed oxide and returned to the central reactor vessel for another irradiation cycle. The U-233 product was to be transferred to another section of the basement where it would be further purified by solvent extraction and ion-exchange.
Finally it was to be converted into a metallic form through a number of well-known chemical conversion steps. The uranium metal product was to be stored in a sealed vault, also coated with lead bricks, until processed into the shape and dimensions required for the core of the improvised nuclear device.
By the end of July all the parts were set in place. Stocks of thorium and beryllium oxides were admixed and ready for placement in the reactor. A sufficient number of gamma radiation sources had arrived and were placed in the lead tunnels. The staff had practiced using the separation and purification equipment with thorium and natural uranium that were only slightly radioactive and managed to produce high purity uranium metal. According to the calculations, overseen by Professor Modena, every week each batch would produce about 500 grams of U-233, so that the critical amount needed for a simple improvised nuclear device of 15 kg could be completed within about eight months of continuous operation of the facility.
After the production of the uranium metal it had to be cast and shaped to enable it to produce a fast chain reaction that would release enough energy to obliterate every living being and structure within a radius of a few hundred meters. It was assumed that this would take another couple of months to complete or somewhat less time if an experienced scientist would be put in charge of this stage. Professor Modena intended to ask Ollie to try and enlist a suitable candidate for this or at least obtain detailed blueprints of the device.
The irradiation of the first batch took a little longer than one week due some minor hitches, but then they had to wait for several weeks before uranium could be extracted from the irradiated thorium oxide. Extensive chemical and isotopic analyses showed that the U-233 produced did contain small amounts of the highly radioactive isotope of uranium-232 which made handling of the product more hazardous.
August 12, Vienna
At the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, in the section responsible for tracking radiation sources, a flurry of activity started when an unexplained increase in the number of "orphan" sources was noted. Numerous reports of missing radiation sources were received from Sweden, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and other European countries. These included gamma radiation sources of all kinds – Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, Iridium-192 and a few others. Strangely there was no change in the number of reports on missing sources for other types of radiation like beta or alpha sources. The Section Head, who was a political appointee from a South American country with financial ties to the president of that country, could not care less about this. However, Dr. Eugene Powers his permanent deputy, a professional health physicist from the United States, became deeply concerned about these missing sources. He contacted his Russian colleague who was also his opposite number in the Safeguards Section, Dr Vassilly Nomenkov, and proposed a private meeting over lunch.
They met in the IAEA employees' cafeteria and Eugene described his concerns about the increase in the number of reports of missing gamma sources and they both discussed the implications. Vassilly asked if this could just be a coincidence but Eugene told him that the extent of reports and their geographical distribution made this an unlikely explanation. Vassilly then suggested that perhaps some international conspiracy aiming to detonate several "dirty bombs" simultaneously in different European capital cities was involved. The immediate suspect was a terrorist organization with a global network of supporters and naturally El Qaida was the first one that came to mind. They decided to consult with an expert on global terrorism to try and get to the bottom of this. They both knew that Colin Thomas, a former counter-terror department head at the British MI6, was now a m
ember of the UK delegation to IAEA, and arranged to meet with him on an urgent matter after dinner.
Thomas heard them out with growing interest and looked very worried when they expressed their fear of a coordinated "dirty bomb" attack in several cities. He explained that although the expected number of direct casualties from each of these attacks would be very small, involving mostly people injured from the detonation of the conventional explosives used to disperse the radioactive material, the disruption of normal life that would follow could upset the global economy. In addition, the financial costs of cleaning contaminated areas could be extensive, particularly if the most expensive commercial real estate areas were involved. Another aspect to consider was the panic factor – people who were nowhere near the incident site would overcrowd the hospitals demanding to be examined and this could lead to a collapse of the medical services further enhancing the public's panic.
With these sobering words the three people each went their own ways. Eugene immediately called his contacts at the US Embassy who in turn sent an urgent message to the White House, the State Department and the director of the CIA. Vassilly went directly from the meeting to the FSB Resident who represented the Federal Security Bureau (FSB) of the Russian Federation and Colin Thomas used a secure line to phone the duty officer at Thames House. In addition, Eugene made sure that all the major security services in Europe received warning that a terrorist plot to deploy unconventional radioactive dispersion devices was suspected.
August 25th, Stockholm
The result of the actions of the European secret services and police forces was exactly what Ollie had hoped for – increasing security in the centers of the major cities, drawing troops and police forces from the countryside and smaller cities. Furthermore, Ollie had advised Andreas to invest most of the funds contributed by the different movements in companies that manufactured radiation detectors. The stock value of these companies jumped fivefold within two weeks, just as they had after the Fukushima accident. The manufacturers of personal radiation detectors, especially those that could be worn on a person's wrist like watches, could not meet the huge demand and opened new production lines in China. Ollie cashed the stock holdings and the coffers of the Astraea joint venture increased accordingly.
Professor Modena flew to Stockholm to report the progress of the project and to describe the small delay in production of the first batch. Ollie and Andreas took advantage of the opportunity that the professor was in Stockholm for a strategy discussion. The three of them debated whether to disclose the existence of their improvised nuclear device after completion of the first one or to wait until they had a second device so they could demonstrate that they meant business by detonating one device and using the other for blackmailing the governments. They could not reach an agreement on this point as the professor wanted an early demonstration to prove to the world his genius while Andreas and Ollie said that they were afraid that they would not be believed until they used one device for a demonstration and in that case a second device had to be held in reserve to make their threats credible and their demands acceptable.
At this early stage of the project there were only a dozen or so people who knew where the laboratory was and what its true purpose was. These included Andreas and Ollie, Professor Modena and his team of seven professionals (three scientists, two engineers and two technicians), the administrator responsible for the purchasing and running of the laboratory and the executive head of the Italian separatist party who was involved in setting up the laboratory. The two local drivers in charge of transporting the gamma sources from Milan to the laboratory knew where it was but not its objective, and then there were the several delegates and the top people in their organizations who knew the alleged purpose of the Astraea project but not the location of the warehouse. Nobody was aware of Ollie's real purpose that had nothing to do with blackmailing European governments to dispose of "undesirable elements".
The small size of the production workforce in the laboratory meant that they could only work two shifts a day with each shift consisting of a scientist, an engineer and a technician. The third scientist and the professor shared the responsibility for overseeing the other employees. Andreas and Ollie asked the professor whether they should not enlist a few more people in order to expedite the production of uranium-233, but he said that finding professionals who were dedicated to the cause would be difficult and could detrimentally affect the strict security measures, while taking in dedicated, unprofessional people, would increase the safety risks.
The direct result of this situation, the three of them realized, was that the production of the fissile material might take a full year.
Chapter 4
North-East Syria, December 28th
El Kahiri lay mortally wounded after his Toyota jeep was attacked by a crowd of angry women on the way from his headquarters to the front lines. Apparently he had received a distress call for help from one of his units that was in charge of controlling the local population in a small village, mainly by using intimidation and random brutality intended to induce fear by exemplary punishment of innocent bystanders.
He travelled with three of his bodyguards in a lone jeep as he did not expect any real resistance from a bunch of women. However, when he reached the small village he saw that perhaps 100 women were encircling his fighters, shouting and pointing at the small blood covered bodies of what looked from a distance like dead dogs. When they got a little closer he saw that the bodies belonged to three babies. His men were holding their weapons pointed at the angry mob but hesitated to fire.
El Kahiri took in the situation and immediately drew his own AK47 and started shooting at the closest group of women, cutting them down. His bodyguards joined him and within seconds there were three dozen dead and injured protesters.
The remaining women stormed the jeep with short daggers and kitchen knives they drew from the folds of their chadors and some of them managed to stab El Kahiri and his bodyguards before being mowed down by the combined firepower of the encircled unit and the bodyguards.
The area looked like a scene from hell with dozens of bodies of dead women scattered around a handful of uniformed men. The cries of anguish and pain from the wounded were the only sounds but they called in vain as there was no one left to aid them. An old Kurdish woman wearing a black chador and veil crawled towards El Kahiri and with her last breath stuck her kitchen knife through his left eye into his brain and collapsed dead over his body. All the women who were still able to run fled the spot as fast and as far as they could.
Fifteen minutes later, three Toyota jeeps carrying machine guns arrived at the site of the massacre. The Islamic State fighters on board could not believe their eyes. In front of them their Supreme Commander lay dead, obviously killed by the old woman lying on his body with the handle of a kitchen knife in her right hand and the blade buried in El Kahiri's head. They picked up his body and the bodies of his fighters, loaded them all on one of the jeeps and set out to take revenge. They then entered every house in the village, forced the inhabitants that comprised old men, women and children out into the village main square next to the mosque. They forced all of them to lie down along the mosque's wall and summarily executed every living soul by a single shot to the head.
During his life El Kahiri made sure that no one could replace him or threaten his position as the Supreme Commander. He did this by nominating several unit leaders that answered directly to him alone, and kept shuffling them around so that they could not develop a cadre of loyal followers. As a result, after his death, brawling among the unit leaders broke out, with each trying to gain control of the entire Islamic State forces. This led to withdrawal of troops from the front lines and loss of ground to their enemies – the Iraqi government forces, the Peshmergah Kurds and the coalition forces. Even the Turks and Iranians managed to gain ground and control some of the Iraqi and Syrian territories that were held by the ISIS forces.
January 1st, Stockholm
Word
of the fate of El Kahiri and the Islamic State movement reached Ollie just as he was about to leave for Padova. The TV news stations displayed cellphone photos of El Kahiri's body with the old woman on top of him. These were taken by ISIS fighters in order to incite the troops to avenge the disgraceful circumstances of their Supreme Commander's death, but were sold to the networks once the leadership infighting broke out. Adding insult to injury was the fact, known to all radical Islamists, that dying in the hands of an inferior person, like a woman, would prevent El Kahiri from reaching the 72 virgins awaiting him in heaven. In between showing these gory photos on all TV channels and the internet, the New Year celebrations all over the globe were broadcasted. Many of the revelers made the V sign for victory and cursed ISIS and its dead leader – a sight that further enraged Ollie.
Ollie now had second thoughts on the Astraea project. He was not sure whether any of the current ISIS chieftains who were still fighting amongst themselves had any knowledge about the project, as he had not contacted El Kahiri after leaving for Sweden to reduce the likelihood of being discovered. He had not tried to contact the old man in Uppsala for the same reason and now had no way of knowing what was going on in Syria and Iraq except what he saw on TV.
In the end, Ollie decided that he could not avoid going on a trip to that region in order to find out if a new leader had emerged to take over the role of Supreme Commander. Ollie estimated that he would need at least one week for this mission and wondered how to explain his sudden disappearance to Andreas. He thought the best cover story would be that he needed to travel to Greece to meet with the heads of the Golden Dawn movement ,now posing as legitimate politicians, in order to discuss their reneging on the financial commitments to the project. He planned to then cross over into Turkey and sneak into Syria. Andreas accepted the story but was a bit suspicious about this sudden need to travel to Athens and suggested that Agda should join him. This would provide some cover, he added, as a young, handsome couple pretending to enjoy a vacation in Greece was less likely to draw the attention of the counter-terror forces. Ollie did not like the idea but could not decline the suggestion. He started to think of a plan that would turn Agda's presence from a burden to an asset and came up with a win-win idea.
The Dreadful Alchemist: A Thrilling Espionage Novel (Techno thriller, Mystery & Suspense Book 1) Page 5