Eugene then said that he had obtained access to declassified files from the Manhattan project that described the efforts of the US Atomic Energy Commission to produce and test uranium-233 as the "fuel", or fissile material, in a fission atomic bomb. He said that the theoretical idea of producing U-233 from thorium in a nuclear pile (as a nuclear reactor was then called) was first proposed as early as May, 1943 but not seriously investigated until after the war. By 1950 about 300 g of U-233 were produced at the Hanford reactors in Washington State and separated from thorium at Oak Ridge, Tennessee by a chemical process that was called Thorex that he said was quite similar to the well-known Purex process used to separate plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel. After a long debate within the US-AEC, an actual test of a bomb core consisting of a mixture of plutonium and U-233 was carried out only in 1955 as part of the TEAPOT Operation and the explosion had a yield approximating the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. However, by the late 1950s the US increased the production of plutonium and enriched uranium sharply curtailing the requirement for U-233, though a few more tests were carried out until completely abandoned in 1968. Vassilly smiled when he heard this detailed account and proudly stated that the Soviet Union had tested a primary core containing a blend of U-233 and U-235 even before the 1955 US test. When David asked them if configuration of a bomb based on U-233 was more complicated than using the more standard U-235 or plutonium both scientists agreed that there were some differences but on the whole the technical details were the same.
David was not really surprised by these reports as he had already discussed this again with Professor Kaufman and with experts from the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. He felt that it was time for the three of them to jointly write a memo and to inform their respective governments about the potential of terrorist groups clandestinely producing fissile materials that could be used in an improvised nuclear device. He suggested that this should not be restricted to their three countries but that the information should also be passed on to the United Kingdom and France. He also proposed that they set up a task force to locate Professor Modena and his whereabouts as well as find out where all the radiation sources were shipped to and if there was a clandestine laboratory in which work for producing U-233 was being carried out. Eugene expressed his concern that if the IAEA got word of this it would disclose the plot and the source of information thus driving the perpetrators into deep cover. They deliberated whether Spain should be included in the loop as Professor Modena was officially a Spanish citizen but were afraid that he would be warned by some sympathizer of Catalonia in the Spanish establishment. Vassilly was not too happy about informing the UK and France but accepted the proposal to include them in the task force.
The participants knew that they could not really make these decisions without approval from their governments as they were not high enough on the totem pole. However, they were all aware of the historic precedent set by the letter sent by Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard to president Franklin Delano Roosevelt on August 2, 1939, which eventually set in motion the Manhattan Project that produced the first atomic bombs. They could only hope that their memo would produce similar results. In their memo they tried to explain the difference between an improvised nuclear device (IND) and a radiological dispersive device (RDD) in a simple language that would be understood even by politicians.
They explained that the IND is usually made clandestinely by non-government organizations for the sake of producing a nuclear explosion that can cause instant death and damage by radiation, burns, heat and blast overpressure within a radius of several hundred meters, or more, depending on the size, or yield, of the explosion. In addition radioactive fallout would lead to many more casualties who suffer from radiation sickness and may develop cancer which will cause further deaths and disabilities over a period of a few decades. The two atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II had demonstrated the lethality even of crude nuclear weapons.
Compared to the effects of an IND, the RDD is not much more than a terrorist weapon that can cause mass disruption rather than mass destruction. In RDD a standard explosive is used to disseminate radioactive materials, usually over quite a small area. The immediate effects due to the conventional explosives are no worse than that of a regular terrorist bomb, but the psychological effects may be disproportionally large, as panic is sure to spread among the public. In addition, decontamination of property may be prohibitively costly, especially if the RDD is detonated in a high value commercial area. They also pointed out that any government that suffered from the effects of an IND or even an RDD would have to react against the perpetrators and do so rapidly to pacify its citizens. An instant response, based on preliminary evidence, might be directed against the wrong culprit and invoke an unbalanced rejoinder which could further escalate to an all out confrontation.
The participants believed that this terse memo would serve as a wake-up call for their governments and agreed to meet again in Vienna two weeks later, hopefully as members of a formally sanctioned task force, with the full support from their respective governments.
David and Orna returned to her apartment – this time David had not even bothered about booking a hotel in Vienna as he knew that he had a much better arrangement for the night in Orna's bed. Although they yearned for each other their lovemaking was performed as a purely physical exercise for relaxation as both of them had other things on their minds. Nevertheless, both of them felt that they were getting closer and that their relationship was well beyond a one night, or two nights, affair.
January 25th, Tel Aviv
David set up an urgent meeting with the Deputy Director at the Mossad headquarters. Present at the meeting were several senior people including the heads of the intelligence gathering division and the operations division. David summarized his findings and concluded by saying that he thought that an international task force should be formed with the objective of locating Professor Modena and the clandestine laboratory, if it existed. The division heads were not pleased with the fact that David's actions had exceeded his authority and criticized him for taking unauthorized steps without consulting them. However, Shimony came to his aid and told them that David had acted with his authorization and they should all be grateful for his insights, and should now focus on solving the problems facing them. The mild rebuke did not placate the division heads but they knew that for the sake of the country they should forget their ego and turf wars and join forces.
The head of the intelligence division said that they needed to find out what the intended target of the improvised nuclear device would be and whether it concerned Israel. David pointed out that in order to do that they had to first locate Modena and the people, or organizations that supported his project and knew its objective. The Deputy Director asked if any of the participants had any information regarding the acquisition or construction of unconventional weapons intended for use in major terrorist operations. The only concern raised about this was the capture of Syrian army camps in which chemical weapons were stored by the rebels including Islamic State forces. None of them had heard anything, even rumors, about the existence of an improvised nuclear device or a radiation dispersion device in Syria. Shimony summarized the meeting by saying that he would present the problem to the Mossad chief and to the Prime Minister and ask for their support for the international task force (ITF). He continued by saying that he believed that Mossad should create its own team and not solely rely on the ITF because its operation might be hindered by political considerations. He assigned David to be Israel's representative in the ITF and Gabi Golan from the operations section to head the independent Israeli team.
February 22th, Stockholm
Ollie was more and more concerned that his finely constructed plot would be exposed. He had two major problems to worry about. First that the laboratory in Padova would be discovered and closed down by the local authorities or by agents of Western countries and the secondly that Andreas and his
colleagues would find out that his real target was not to promote the Nationalist and separatist causes but to strike at the heart of Western society and Judeo-Christian civilization in the name of Islam. In either case his plan would fail and be terminated.
He wondered if there was a way to expedite the construction of the device and decided to visit the clandestine laboratory in Padova and see whether Doctor Jay was making headway. He was aware that the special explosives and timing mechanism were on their way from North Korea, disguised as heavy agricultural machinery originating from South Korea. They were due to arrive at the port of Venice the following week. Using the connections with Swiss bankers with a Eurocentric hatred of foreigners provided by Andreas and his Swedish movement, a senior North Korean, Kong Kwak Kim (called by his Swiss bankers simply KKK), with a large account in Zurich was contacted and made an offer he could not refuse of several million dollars for a few hundred kilograms of explosives and a handful of precisely timed fast detonators. KKK even suggested that for a substantial additional fee the explosives could be configured to any shape and size according to blueprints that would be supplied by the anonymous client. The blueprints of Dr. Jay's design were then delivered to KKK, who was glad to receive the additional information and extra money. The North Korean quickly understood that these were to be used in an improvised nuclear device and that only increased his motivation as he expected it to be exploded in a Western European city. He almost suggested that he would halve the price or that he would supply them with double the amount they requested but was afraid that this would show he understood the objective which may put him at risk.
KKK was not a simple greedy North Korean but was in fact a senior operative of the Ministry of State Security – MSS –the primary counterintelligence service in North Korea reporting directly to the First Chairman or Supreme Commander, to mention two of the titles of the Leader of North Korea. KKK, who valued his life and his family's welfare more than the commendable sum of money he was offered by Andreas's associates, reported the tender that had been made and was directed by his supervisors to proceed with the deal. In fact, he was told that the explosives and detonators were supplied from the stocks held by the North Korea Nuclear Program and was also assured that the merchandise was perfectly suitable for its intended use.
Chapter 6
March 1st, Padova
One of the drivers brought the container marked "agriculture machinery" to the clandestine laboratory. Ollie helped Doctor Jay and Professor Modena supervise the downloading of the packages and together they moved them into the closed street level parking garage above the laboratory. With great care they unpacked the shipment and removed the boxes of shaped explosives and the detonators and carried them downstairs into the chamber where Doctor Jay had started making preparations for the construction of the improvised nuclear device. He placed the detonators inside a metal cabinet that had been grounded in order to prevent the build-up of static electricity that might cause the detonation of these sensitive devices. The storage area also had temperature and humidity control.
After seven months of operation close to 9 kilograms of purified metallic U-233 had been produced with approximately one more kilogram currently being processed for extraction, purification and separation. This was below the goal of 500 grams a week but was a pretty good achievement considering the fact that they had some start-up problems and worked only in two shifts until the reinforcement from Greece arrived in mid-January. In addition they had to wait several weeks for the build-up of the U-233 from decay of the Pa-233. Ollie convened the two scientists and asked them once again about the minimal amount of the fissile material required to ensure a successful nuclear detonation. He emphasized that a fizzle, or partial detonation, was unacceptable. Furthermore, he said that in order to demonstrate how serious they were with their blackmail threats they would have to provide blueprints of the design and a sample of the fissile material. The scientists pointed out that in this case they did not really have to construct the complete device as they could already show the design blueprints and supply a sample of U-233. Ollie could not tell them that he needed a real operational device for his true objective, so he explained that they needed the real thing since the plan included bringing a representative of the government blindfolded to a secret location where he would verify that the device existed and was operational.
Ollie then contacted Andreas and brought him up to date on the situation and said that they urgently needed more funds as the deal with the North Korean official had completely exhausted their monetary reserves. He suggested that they reconvene all their European supporters and raise more contributions, promising them that construction of the device was on schedule and delivery was due in the summer. He further proposed that this time they only summon the representatives of the movements fervently dedicated to the cause and having the ability to contribute significant funding. Ollie emphasized the urgency of the meeting and proposed that they meet again in Umea, Sweden.
March 4th, Umea, Sweden
Once again the handpicked guests made their way to the small bed-and-breakfast place in Bjurholm, an hour's drive from Umea airport. After dinner they all gathered by the fireplace and Ollie gave a concise presentation in which he described the progress of the project, once again without disclosing the exact location of the laboratory. He discussed the timeline and the expenditures and told them that more funding was crucial for the rapid conclusion of the project since the chances of exposure increased with every passing day. The delegates applauded and congratulated Ollie and Andreas on a job well done and said that they should now start planning the order in which their respective governments would be notified of the nuclear device and blackmailed into passing laws for "cleansing" their countries of "unwanted foreign elements of inferior races". The delegates from the separation movements did not like this blatantly racist phrase and proposed something more moderate and ambiguous like "achievement of the declared goals of all the movements". Ollie could not be bothered with this semantic nitpicking as his own objective was completely different and he let Andreas chair the discussion while he himself tuned-out and thought about his own logistical problems. The heated debate came to an end without an agreement but they all realized that they were fighting about "dividing the bear's skin before she was taken", to quote a 17th Century Irish proverb. Then, with untypical consensus for such an opinionated gathering, they agreed that this discussion could wait a few months until the device was almost ready for deployment. As for contributing more funds they were all enthusiastic and agreed to double their contribution in order to expedite the production of the device. The next day they returned to their home countries and Ollie and Andreas headed back to Stockholm.
March 5th, Vienna
The first meeting of the international task force (ITF) with delegates from the US, Russia, the UK and France was chaired by David Avivi. The British representative, Colin Thomas, a senior member from MI6, said that they had a strong suspicion that a disgruntled former employee of the Aldermaston Atomic Weapon Establishment had disappeared from his home in London about six weeks earlier. He announced that Doctor Jason Smalley was fired from his job because of racist comments and unacceptable behavior toward his dark skinned colleagues of Muslim origin. He was also known as an avid supporter of the British National Socialist Party's cause and contributed funds to them for which he tried to claim tax deductions. Furthermore, he said that Dr. Smalley was a physicist with experience in the design and construction of nuclear devices and advanced warheads. David saw this as a highly relevant piece of information and asked if there was any evidence that Dr. Smalley may have left the UK but Thomas said that it was practically impossible to track travel within the European Union.
David asked if they could trace Dr. Smalley's credit card transactions and Thomas said that this had been done and the last known transaction was in January, after he was fired from his job, and Dr. Smalley withdrew a large amount in cash – 3200 pounds and 5000 Euros.
The only other irregular use of the credit card was one day earlier on January 20th in a small café in the City of London, quite a way from his residence in Reading. MI6 followed up on this and showed his photo around to the café's staff. The owner did not remember anything and suggested that they show the photo to the waitresses who served customers. Surprisingly, one waitress saw the photo and told them that she remembered Dr. Smalley only because she noticed the handsome blond man who was with him. When asked to describe the other man she said that he had a typically Scandinavian look with blue eyes and blond hair but he had a deep tan that looked to her a bit strange for mid-winter in London. She also noted that when he gave his order he had a slight foreign accent. Thomas had then asked her to come over to construct a picture of him with the help of a police artist and showed them the image she had constructed. He said that running the image on Interpol's database produced no certain hits but there were several dozen people who resembled the image. The list was too long so it was impractical to try and locate each one, even after eliminating those who were known to be presently serving time in jail.
The other delegates had no useful information that would help locate the clandestine laboratory if it existed. David then asked the US and Russian delegates if they could provide some physical and engineering data on a possible design of a nuclear device based on uranium 233. They refused to provide classified information for reasons of "national security" but referred the participants to Professor Google, a nickname given to the know-all internet website. According to Dr. Wikipedia, it was believed that the US produced over 2 tons of U-233 at Hanford and Savannah River at a price estimated as 2-4 million US dollars per kilogram and that there was scant public information about its potential use in a nuclear weapon. The same source noted that the presence of uranium-232 complicates its use in nuclear devices as well as posing a health hazard, so that very high purity, freshly produced U-233 is needed for a construction of a nuclear device. They also estimated that producing 15 kg of U-233 would cost 30-60 million USD according to the estimate given above. However, if indeed Professor Modena has developed a different process for producing U-233 then these cost estimates might be irrelevant and there was no data regarding the level of U-232 in such a process.
The Dreadful Alchemist: A Thrilling Espionage Novel (Techno thriller, Mystery & Suspense Book 1) Page 9