by Tim Saunders
German M42 general purpose machine gun.
In the centre, D Company had the main task: to occupy the Orchard. John Majendie was watching:
′D Company had advanced forward pretty well to the edge of Cornwall Wood and ran straight into trouble. A lot of machine-gun fire and a lot of bullets were ricocheting off knocked out tanks and were causing casualties. One of their platoons veered off to the right and wasn′t seen again.′
Opposing 4/Somerset LI was SS-Mann Hans Greiesinger of 19th SS Panzer Grenadiers who had crept forward to a position just to the east of the Orchard:
′We were on the left next to the shell shattered Kastenwäldschen. Tommy came twice in the darkness with shock troops but we were able to drive him off. One of the attackers was hit and burned to death before he could get his flamethrower going. We tried to contact our neighbours on the other side of the Kastenwäldschen but we found no one there. They had cleared off without telling us.′
It is almost certain that Hans Greiesinger had mistaken the explosions of a phosphorus grenade for that of a man pack flame thrower. These vulnerable devices were in common use in the SS pioneer battalions but not in the British Army. A British observer saw and heard what happened to a soldier in D Company to his front:
′We saw ahead of us a brilliant flash of light 200 to 300 yards ahead of us. We wondered what it was at the time and we afterwards heard that some poor private soldier had been hit in the stomach by machine gun fire and a phosphorus grenade in his pouch set him alight. He was lying on the ground, with no hope at all. One of the officers was there and he said to him ′Please sir, shoot me′ and the officer shot him and the soldier said ′No sir, not there, in the head′, which was done.′
Hill 112 as No Man′s Land
On headquarters′ map boards, red and blue chinagraph pencil ′duck eggs′ marked both British and enemy positions. Commanders, peering at the contours in the dim light of paraffin lamps saw that the hilltop was most definitely No Man′s Land. It was far too important for either side to let the other hold, as possession would enable observers to see deep into opposition territory. Artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire swept through the Orchard and effectively denied the area of the crest to infantry of both the Wessex Division and II SS Panzer Corps. On the plateau′s northern and southern slopes, casualties mounted as bombardments of potential attackers′ forming-up points became a regular feature of daily life. If, however, commanders thought that the Orchard was unoccupied, they were wrong. Sheltering in dugouts and under knocked-out armoured vehicles were small groups of soldiers. Private Gordon Mucklow was one of them.
Gordon Mucklow
′Sometime during the next day we moved forward to take up positions on the [forward] edge of the orchard. There didn′t seem to be so many of our lot about and we were short of ammunition. Someone volunteered to get some ammunition and quite soon appeared with a canvas bag of loose 303 rounds. We divided it up between us. We knew we could hold our own and wondered why we were not being supported and hadn′t had any compo packs [ration packs of tinned food]. I suppose we had been four days without food or water, and having survived so far became adventurous. We did wonder if we could use the abandoned anti-tank gun lying in the corner of the Orchard. None of us knew how, which was just as well as the firing mechanism had been taken out during the retreat.
Allied aerial photograph taken 6 July 1944 and marked with the position of the British front line after Operation JUPITER.
′We had not been shelled for a while and we decided to find out what was on the other side of the hedge. Some, groping around, discovered a hole in the ground far deeper than any we had managed to shelter in at night (we had spent the previous night under a Sherman tank). Before I was prepared to enter this dugout, I fired a burst from my Bren. Imagine my surprise when out popped four Jerries with their hands above their heads shouting something we didn′t understand. One of us volunteered to march them back rather too quickly and we feared that we might be in trouble for not searching them.
′Later that day a runner came into the orchard saying "What in hell are you doing here? The order came to retreat days ago!" It didn′t take us long to pull out! We must have looked a motley lot, not having shaved for days and stinking of rotting corpses.′
Such was the determination and self confidence of the opposing infantry, that small groups of resolute men held positions despite a lack of orders.
The Scots and Welch at le Bon Repos.
The capture of the cross roads at le Bon Repos (The Good Rest!) and the hills overlooking Esquay was a subsidiary attack designed to secure the left flank of a larger operation to the west. On the evening of 15 July, 2/Glasgow Highlanders were to launch their attack against positions held by 3/21 SS Panzer Grenadiers, organized in only three companies due to their losses during EPSOM. However, they were generously supported by the Churchills of 107/Regiment RAC, and by 79th Armoured Division′s ′Funnies′ in the form of the Armoured Vehicles Royal Engineers (AVREs) with their demolition guns and the more familiar Crocodiles. 1/Middlesex were also on call with their heavy mortars and machine guns to add to the weight of fire available to the Glasgow Highlanders.
The attack was to come from the north-east across the lower slopes of Hill 112. A Company on the right was to advance up to the road and wheel right to follow it down to le Bon Repos. B and D Companies were to fight through the German outposts on the southwest slopes of Hill 112 and head for their objectives in Esquay.
The divisional history of 15th Scottish Division describes how, as they emerged from the low ground, the attackers were,
′…greeted with a storm of mortar fire which temporarily threw the battalion out of control. To make matters worse, the very welcome smoke-screen which our guns were putting down on Point 112 and the slopes to the south-west of it, had turned into fog which was obscuring the whole area. In consequence there was a proper mix up on the start line. None the less A and B Companies managed to cross it on time at 930 p.m.
′From that point the attack went without a hitch. First the Crocodiles did their stuff, quickly burning the enemy garrison out of the entrenchments dug along the road between le Bon Repos and the Croix des Filandriers. The survivors surrendered…′
The advance continued down the slope, illuminated by Monty′s Moonlight: the diffused beams of searchlights reflected off the clouds. The Churchills, firing HE from the ridge into the village below, continued the work that the artillery had started in numbing the defenders. Round after round of HE was fired into any likely enemy position in Esquay The Glasgow Highlanders had completed clearing the village by 23.00 hours but,
′They had no intention of occupying it, however. Down in the bottom of a saucer, Esquay was nothing but a shell-trap. Companies at once moved out to consolidate the area on the surrounding slopes, which Lieutenant Colonel Campbell had already allocated to them on air photographs. Thus the Glasgow Highlanders were now positioned for their task of protecting the left flank of the main attack.′
It is clear from German records that the Glasgow Highlander′s activity between the Croix des Filandriers and le Bon Repos also had the effect of making the Germans believe that the British were mounting a new major assault on Hill 112. They deployed the Tigers up the hill into the smoke, where they sat inactive while the battle developed to the west. The main attack of Operation GREENLINE is not within the scope of this book′s geographical area but suffice it to say that 15th Scottish Division gained a tenuous hold on Point 113 but failed to take Evrecy. Consequently the Glasgow Highlanders found themselves in exposed positions between Hill 112 and Point 113, which no amount of smoke could render safe for movement above ground level. Overlooked at le Bon Repos and around Esquay they were constantly shelled while the enemy wasted a lot of time, energy and resources engaging non-existent positions in Esquay. The repeated counter-attacks, mounted by 5 Company 1/10 SS Panzer Regiment and Grenadiers from 1 and 2 Companies 21 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, came only after the mai
n British attack had been ′controlled′. Initially, A Company at le Bon Repos was the focus of most attention. Sergeant Jimmy Blair′s section of 6-pounder anti-tank guns stood their ground and kept firing despite seeing shells bounce off the approaching enemy tanks′ armour. Eventually, the Mark IVs got so close that the 6-pounders′ last shots penetrated the frontal armour of the two leading tanks at almost point-blank range. On other occasions the Glasgow Highlander′s forward platoons were forced to withdraw, returning to their original position only after the SS infantry′s counter-attack had been broken by the medium guns of the Royal Artillery.
Sergeant Jimmy Blair
After two days under fire the Glasgow Highlanders were relieved from their unenviably exposed positions by 5/Welch from 53rd Welsh Division. On 21 July 1944, 10th * SS Panzer Division made a determined attack on the le Bon Repos crossroads from where the British could see down the valley between the key features of Hill 112 and Point 113. Driving 5/Welch and their supporting artillery observers back over the 1 ridge would greatly improve the German positions. Sergeant Jim Machin, with Battalion Headquarters in the Intelligence Section, describes the attack:
′These are unforgettable moments when the whole front leaps into violent life. These are moments of agony, of drama, of heroic deeds, which nothing will ever erase from living memory.
′At 16.00hrs A Coy 5/Welch commanded by Major Nethercott reported being attacked by four tanks. The enemy – SS troops – had attacked our right forward company at le Bon Repos with the intention of over-running it and then turning right to roll up the whole of our forward defences.
′At 18.00hrs, a platoon of B Coy holding a left forward position was over-run by enemy tanks and infantry. At 19.30hrs two squadrons of our tanks opened up with their Besas in the general direction of le Bon Repos church. Despite urgent DF [Defensive Fire] tasks fired by the divisional artillery the SS troops pressed on. They killed two stretcher bearers with a four foot square Red Cross flag, trying to save a wounded tankman. At 20.00hrs A Coy reported tanks fifty yards away from their positions. The last communication came at 21.30hrs by which time A Coy had been totally swamped and were entirely lost.′
Lieutenant Mostyn Thomas, commander of 18 Platoon, recalls:
′Observation became poor due to smoke and debris. LMGfire cracked over us and thudded into the ground. Tanks could be seen and our artillery response was heavy. It was bedlam. Jerry rolled up the front,′A Coy went down in the late evening.
We were submerged in German mortar and artillery fire when their infantry advanced. Ian Evans′s voice came over loud and clear repeatedly saying ′Get your heads up′. Heads did come up but I was caught by a Nebelwerfer which exploded to my right.′
Sergeant Machin again:
′As night fell the battered forward line contracted into the area of ′C′ Coy under Major JH Morgan. Permission to vacate the top of Baron Hill was denied until 06.00hrs in the morning when the remnants of 5/Welch retired under cover of smoke. Private George won the DCM for knocking out an enemy tank.′
The battle at le Bon Repos cost 5/Welch a total of one hundred and forty killed, wounded and missing. The Churchill tanks sent to help them had been totally out-gunned by the six Tigers that worked their way around the western slope of Hill 112 to support the SS infantry Despite the fire support of the entire corps artillery, which is difficult to fully utilize once close quarter combat is joined, the enemy were able to fight their way through the 53rd Welsh Division′s positions around le Bon Repos.
On the evening of 23 July, 4/Welch set out in force to raid the German positions at le Bon Repos. Supported by the divisional artillery and six Crocodiles, two companies of Welshmen attacked the Germans in their sister battalion′s old positions. In half an hour′s blood-letting, fuelled by weeks of frustration, 2/21 SS Panzer Grenadiers were badly mauled and their morale seriously undermined. The battle on the British front had become one of attrition.
129 Brigade′s attack on Maltot.
Before the Wessex Division left the Odon/Orne battlefield, they were given one last attack: Operation EXPRESS. Maltot had been the Operation JUPITER objective of 7/Hampshires and 4/Dorsets. Both of these battalions had suffered cruelly in the attempt to take and hold the village. Twelve days later, the same task was to fall to 4 and 5/Wilts.
To describe Maltot as a village would be wrong. The fighting of 10 July 1944, and the subsequent bickering exchanges of artillery and mortar fire had reduced the village to rubble. Infantrymen of German 272nd Infantry Division, who arrived by foot from the Pas de Calais, now held the rubble pile of Maltot. Less potent than an SS panzer division, these were none the less experienced soldiers who had been blooded on the Eastern Front. By 22 July, the German infantrymen had taken over 10 SS Panzer Division′s defensive positions, built into the ruins of the village. Forcing them out of the rubble would not be an easy task. Elements of 10th SS Panzer Division had moved back into reserve in the St Martin area, in a counter-attack role.
The plan for Operation EXPRESS was simple and limited in scope: the attack was to come from the north-east along the bottom of the Orne Valley with the river on the attackers′ left. On 10 July, 130 Brigade and 9/RTR had attacked across the open ground south of Chateau Fontaine and Eterville, which had been overlooked by anti-tank guns on Hill 112. The divisional artillery and the medium guns of two AGRAs pounded 130 Brigade′s objectives. The new attack was to be astride the road from Louvigny. 5/Wilts and B Squadron 7/RTR were responsible for clearing the village and orchards to the north of the road, while 4/Wilts with A Squadron were to attack the woods, orchards and spur to the south-east of the village. The task of clearing these woods was complicated by the presence of defended quarries and caves in the area of the Escarpment, on the banks of the Orne. 4/Som LI were in reserve, ready to exploit success.
Ruined houses in Maltot.
5/Wilts
The attack started at 17.30 hours and progressed well for 5/Wilts who had a fairly clear run to the village. Their history describes how:
′They made an impressive sight as they surged forward through the tall corn widely deployed but moving steadily on, for all the world as though they were on a parade ground. Ahead, a smoke screen had been laid, and into it crashed our artillery barrage.
′The enemy were undoubtedly caught by surprise, nevertheless by the time the rear companies had followed the leading companies across the start line, the enemy were retaliating with shell and mortar fire amongst the advancing troops.′
Once in the village, 5/Wilts found the German defenders initially stunned by the ferocity of the British artillery fire. As the Wiltshires penetrated into Maltot the enemy recovered and the defence became more dogged. As ammunition ran low, hand-to-hand fighting became the norm. During the battle, Private Long formed a low opinion of German bayonet fighting:
′They would come rushing at you like wild bulls, with bayonet raised above their heads; all we had to do was wait for them, parry their bayonets to one side, up with our rifle butt to smash their jaws and then as they fell stick them.′
The Wehrmacht infantry may have been surprised, but the SS were fully prepared for the Wiltshires′ attack. 102 /SS Heavy Panzer Regiment and Grenadiers from 10th SS Panzer Division were already counter-attacking as the British entered Maltot. The Tigers advanced through the 43rd Wessex Division′s barrage and met the tanks of 7/RTR coming in the opposite direction. SS-Mann Trautmann, gunner in a Tiger of 1st Company has written that:
′The voice of the tank commander crackled on the set ′Half left – 500′. Looking left as the turret swung around I could see four tanks coming down the road towards us. Long hull, small, short turret – Churchills. Then came the fire order ′Targets – the leading tank and the rear tank, fire!′ The first Churchill blocked the road, the crew baling out. The rear tank soon burned. The two in the middle were trapped. Number three gets hit twice in succession in the hull – nobody gets out of that one. The last one is hit in the stern, white smoke come
s out of the hatches and then the ammunition explodes, a sheet of flame leaps from the engine and the heavy plates fly into the air′
Churchills advancing through standing corn in the Caen area.
The signals officer, Captain John McMath, recalls the bravery of one of his signallers who rescued the dismounted armoured soldiers:
′Private Cooling dressed the tank crew′s wounds as they lay on the road amid bursting shells from the tanks. One by one he lifted six badly wounded men onto a Jeep and drove through the rubble back to the RAP.′
Luckily for the Wyverns, the Tigers′ intervention in Maltot was mercifully brief. A British Forward Air Controller saw the enemy tanks coming down the slope to the west and had called up the RAF Typhoons from the ′cab rank′ of aircraft circling above, off the coast. The German counter-attack was quickly halted and the Tigers fled back to positions on the south-west ridge of Hill 112. Grenadiers from 10 SS Panzer Division joined their Wehrmacht colleagues in Maltot′s rubble as welcome reinforcements.
The taste of success, confirmed by the sight of the dreaded Tigers withdrawing, was sweet on the tongues of the Wiltshiremen, especially as it followed the losses in the bitter JUPITER battles twelve days earlier. Initial success was a crucial element in maintaining the forward momentum that took the 5/Wilts and B Squadron through the enemy positions, blasting enemy infantry out of the rubble as they went. As small arms ammunition and the all-important grenades ran out, Corporal Wiltshire resorted to knocking Germans out by hurling tins of bully beef at them. Surely the most unusual house clearing weapons ever.