On October the 3rd I met Hitler at the frontier near Asch and was able to inform him of the successful move forward by my divisions. Then I drove through Asch to a field kitchen immediately in front of Eger where I had a meal, as did Hitler. It was the normal soldiers’ field rations, a thick stew with pork in it. When Hitler realised that the stew contained meat he contented himself with eating a few apples; he also asked me to arrange for the field kitchen to prepare a meatless meal for the following day. Our entry into Eger was a gay and joyful occasion. The majority of the population were dressed in the pretty and becoming Egerland national dress and they gave Hitler a most enthusiastic ovation.
On the 4th of October I met Hitler at the field kitchen of 1st Panzer Division staff. I sat opposite him while we ate and took part in a very friendly conversation, in which all present expressed their deep satisfaction that we had managed to avoid war. There were troops all along the road down which Hitler now drove. He saluted them and was impressed by their smart appearance. Everything was gay. As in March in Austria the tanks were covered over and over again with flowers and branches of greenery. I drove on to Carlsbad, where a guard of honour was waiting before the theatre, consisting of three companies, one each from the 1st Panzer Regiment, the 1st Rifle Regiment and the SS-Leibstandarte. On the right flank of the Panzer Company, next to his C.O., stood my elder son, who was Adjutant of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Panzer Regiment.
There was only just sufficient time to close the side roads before Adolf Hitler arrived. He walked through the ranks of the guard of honour into the theatre, where he was greeted by the populace. Outside the rain poured down in sheets, but inside the theatre the most touching scenes now took place. The women and young girls in their national costume burst into tears, many knelt down, and the cheers were deafening. The Sudeten Germans had had to go through a great deal, endless poverty, unemployment and persecution. Many had lost all hope. Now a new day had dawned. We immediately set to work distributing food from the field kitchens until such time as the charitable organisations could take over this task.
Between the 7th and the 10th of October a further German-inhabited zone was occupied. I drove through Kaaden and Saatz to Teplitz-Schönau. Everywhere our soldiers were greeted with the same pathetic joy. A wreath of flowers hung on every tank and every motor vehicle. The dense crowds of young men and girls in the streets sometimes made it difficult for us to move forwards. Thousands of soldiers of German blood, released from the Czech Army, were marching homewards on foot, most of them still wearing their Czech uniforms, carrying a box or a kitbag on their backs—an army defeated without a blow having been struck. We passed through the first lines of the Czech fortifications. These were not so strong as we had expected them to be; all the same we were glad that we did not have to capture them in bloody battle.
But our greatest joy was the peaceful turn the political situation had taken. A war would have hit this strip of German land particularly hard, and the German mothers would have had to make many sacrifices.
In Teplitz I took up my quarters in the Kurhaus that belonged to Prince Clary-Aldringen. The Prince and Princess received us in the most friendly and gracious fashion. We got to know numerous members of the German-Bohemian aristocracy and rejoiced to discover how truly German they had remained. I believe that Lord Runciman judged the situation in Czechoslovakia correctly and that his views had a great deal to do with the preservation of peace at this time.
In any event the political tension was for a while relaxed, a matter of rejoicing for all of us. I had the opportunity to go deer stalking, and in two weeks I managed to account for quite a few good animals.
The hectic year of 1938 was nearing its close and soldiers who, like me, had no connection with politics were hoping that despite past storms a period of peaceful progress would ensue. We thought that Germany would now settle down to the lengthy business of assimilating its newly-acquired territories and populations: we believed that once it had strengthened the positions gained, Germany would be so powerful in Europe that it would be able peacefully to achieve its national aims. I had seen Austria and the Sudetenland with my own eyes; despite all the enthusiasm with which the populations greeted their incorporation into the Reich, the economic situation in both territories was so bad, and the differences between their administration and that of the old Reich so great, that a long period of peace appeared to me essential to carry out a successful and durable amalgamation of the German lands. The Munich agreement seemed to offer the possibility of this.
Hitler’s great achievements in the field of foreign policy had, furthermore, dissipated the evil impressions made by the crisis of the previous February. Even the replacement of Beck by Halder as Chief of the General Staff in September lost its significance in view of the success in the Sudetenland. General Beck had resigned because he could not subscribe to Hitler’s foreign policy, which he regarded as dangerous. When he proposed that the whole corps of generals should make a unanimous declaration in favour of peace, Brauchitsch unfortunately turned the proposal down and the generals were never told of this suggestion. So when I returned from the Sudetenland to Berlin, it was with the anticipation of a long period of peace that I set to work again. Unfortunately I was to be proved wrong.
The Situation Deteriorates Once Again
Towards the end of October a district Party celebration (Gautag) took place on the occasion of the opening of a new wing of the Elephant Hotel at Weimar. Hitler was present and I, as Commanding General of the XVI Army Corps and senior officer of the Weimar district, was also invited to attend. The Gautag was officially opened in the Stadtschloss and reached its climax with an open-air speech by Hitler to a mass audience. In this speech Hitler spoke sharply against England, being particularly bitter about Churchill and Eden. Owing to being in the Sudetenland at the time, I had not heard his previous speech at Saarbrücken and so was extremely surprised to note this new, tense atmosphere. After Hitler’s speech there was a tea-party at the Elephant. Hitler invited me to sit at his table and I was able to have a two-hour conversation with him. In the course of this I asked him why he had spoken so sharply against England. His attitude, I discovered, was based on what he took to be the improper behaviour towards himself of Chamberlain at Godesberg and the deliberate rudeness of certain prominent visitors who had come to see him. He had informed Ambassador Henderson: ‘The next time one of your people comes to see me sloppily dressed, I’ll tell my ambassador to call on your king in his pullover. Tell that to your Government.’ He went on angrily to describe what he regarded as the rebuffs that he had received, and he said that the English were not really interested in honestly establishing friendly relations with Germany. He felt this all the more deeply since he had originally had great respect for England and had cherished the dream of close co-operation between the two countries.
Despite the Munich conference Germany was confronted with a very tense and anxious state of affairs. This disappointing and worrying fact had to be faced.
On the evening of the Gautag a performance of Aïda was given in the Weimar theatre. I sat in the Führer’s box and was invited to dine at his table during the dinner party which marked the end of the celebrations. Conversation was on general and artistic matters. Hitler spoke of his trip to Italy and of a performance of Aïda which he had seen at Naples. At two o’clock he moved over to the actors’ table.
When I returned to Berlin I was sent for by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He told me of his intention to create a post controlling both the motorised troops and cavalry, a sort of superior inspectorate for these two arms of the service, which he referred to collectively as ‘mobile troops.’ He had himself composed a draft of the duties and responsibilities which this post would carry with it, and he gave me this document to read. This draft outlined the authority that the officer in charge would have, which included the right of inspection and the making out of a yearly report. He was to have no command powers, no control over the preparation and is
suing of service manuals, no authority in matters of organisation or personnel. I declined this dummy appointment.
A few days later the Chief of the Army Personnel Office—General Bodewin Keitel, younger brother to the head of the OKW— came to see me and urged me on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to reconsider my decision and to accept the appointment. I declined once again, fully stating my reasons. Then Keitel confided to me that the creation of this new post was not in fact Brauchitsch’s idea but had originated with Hitler. I could not therefore properly refuse it. I was unable to conceal my disappointment that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had not told me in the very first place where the orders for this new appointment originated; but I still declined to accept it and I asked Keitel to give the reasons for my refusal to Hitler and to say that I was prepared to explain them personally to him if that were desired.
A few days later Hitler sent for me. He saw me alone and I was able to give him my views on the matter. I described the command organisation of the Army High Command and I told him of the proposed functions of the new post as outlined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the draft that he had shown me. Meanwhile, in my present position as Commanding General of three Panzer Divisions, I was able to exert more influence on the development of panzer troops than I would ever be able to do in the proposed new appointment. In view of my detailed knowledge of the important personalities in the Army High Command, and of their varying attitudes towards the problem of developing the armoured force as a largescale weapon for offensive operations, I was forced to regard this suggested innovation as a step in the wrong direction. I explained the ruling tendency in the Army High Command to subdivide the tank force among the infantry, and I said that in view of past conflicts on this score I could not be convinced that future progress might not be blocked. Furthermore, this proposed coupling of the armoured force with the cavalry would inevitably be against the wishes of the older arm of the Service, since they regarded me as their adversary and must view this new dispensation with distrust. Modernisation of the cavalry was urgently required, but even on this subject strong resistance was likely to be encountered from the Army High Command and from the senior cavalry officers. I ended my detailed exposition with the words: ‘The proposed powers that would be vested in this appointment would be insufficient to enable me to overcome that resistance and the consequence would be continual friction and argument. I must therefore beg you to allow me to retain my present position.’
Hitler had let me talk for some twenty minutes without interruption. When I had finished he told me that he intended the new post to have all the necessary authority for exercising centralised control over the development of all motorised and cavalry troops; he therefore declined my request and ordered me to take up the new appointment. He finished: ‘If you feel that you are being in any way hindered in the exercise of your functions by the resistance of which you spoke, you are to make a direct report to me personally. Together we’ll see that the necessary modernisation is carried through. I therefore order you to accept the new appointment.’
Naturally there was never any question of my writing a direct report, despite the difficulties that immediately arose.
So I was promoted General of Panzer Troops and appointed Chief of ‘Mobile Troops’ and as such supplied with modest office accommodation in the Bendlerstrasse. I was alloted two General Staff Corps officers, Lieutenant-Colonel von le Suire and Captain Röttiger; my adjutant was Lieutenant-Colonel Riebel. I received a clerk for each branch of the Services entrusted to me. And then I went to work. It was a labour of Hercules. Up to that time the panzer troops possessed hardly any training manuals. We drew them up and submitted the drafts for the approval of the Army Training Department. This department did not contain a single tank officer. So our drafts were not judged according to the needs of the panzer troops but from quite other points of view. They were usually returned with the annotation: ‘The subject-matter is not arranged according to the pattern adopted by the infantry manuals. The draft is therefore unacceptable.’ Uniformity in the arrangement of subject-matter and ‘nomenclature,’ those were the two vital aspects according to which our work was judged. The needs of the troops played no part in all this whatever.
I regarded it as essential that the cavalry be reorganised into easily handled divisions with modern weapons. I therefore proposed a new organisation which was promptly turned down by the head of the General Army Office, General Fromm, since it involved the acquiring of 2,000 horses which that officer did not feel justified in purchasing. In consequence the cavalry retained its old unsatisfactory organisation until the outbreak of war. As a result of this, save for a single brigade that was stationed in East Prussia, the cavalry could only be used for the creation of mixed Reconnaissance Battalions for Infantry Divisions; these consisted of each one horse squadron, one motor-cycle squadron, and one motorised squadron with an insufficient number of armoured cars, of anti-tank guns and of cavalry weapons all mixed up together. To command this remarkable conglomeration was well-nigh impossible. On mobilisation, moreover, the cavalry would only be capable of providing these Reconnaissance Battalions for the regular peace-time divisions. The newly formed ones would have to make do as best they could with motor-cyclists. It was therefore urgent that an altogether fresh approach to the problem be made. The cavalry had reached this hopeless position despite the fact that all its senior officers felt a particularly deep love for their arm of the Service. Such is the difference between theory and practice.
One other incidental circumstance may serve to throw light on the situation as it then was: my mobilisation order informed me that in the event of mobilisation the Chief of Mobile Troops was to take command of a Reserve Infantry Corps. It was only after considerable trouble that I managed to get this changed for a command of armoured troops.
4. THE BEGINNING OF THE DISASTER
The Drift to War
In March of 1939 the Czechs were incorporated into the Reich in the name of a Protectorate. This led to a serious aggravation of the international situation. Hitler was exclusively responsible for the taking of this step.
On the morning of the occupation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army sent for me; he informed me of the accomplished fact and ordered me to go at once to Prague, where I was to collect data concerning the advance made in wintry weather by our panzer units and to examine the Czech armoured equipment.
In Prague I found my successor as commanding general of XVI Army Corps, General Hoeppner, who informed me of his experiences during the advance. I also visited various units in order to collect first-hand impressions. In Brno I examined the Czech armoured equipment and found it serviceable. It was to prove useful to us during the Polish and French campaigns. During the Russian campaign it was finally replaced by heavier German equipment.
After Czechoslovakia, Memel was incorporated into the Reich without a blow being struck.
On April 20th Hitler celebrated his fiftieth birthday with a huge parade. All the colours of the armed forces were assembled into one colours battalion and the massed flags were dipped before him. He was now at the pinnacle of his success. Would he have the necessary self-control to consolidate it, or would he overreach himself? The situation was highly inflammable.
On the 28th of April he repudiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and announced the signature of a Non-aggression Pact with Poland.
On the 28th of May the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, visited Berlin. The German Foreign Minister gave a great reception in his honour. In order to make more room, two huge tents were set up which almost filled his garden. But that was a cold May, and so the tents had to be heated, a difficult undertaking. Hitler was present at this reception. The guests were entertained by cabaret turns, including dances by the Höpfner Sisters; this took place inside one of the tents in which a stage had been erected. There was a wait before the performance could begin, since Hitler wanted to sit next to Olga Chekova and this lady had first to
be found. Hitler was partial to artistes and enjoyed their company. The political motive of Ciano’s visit was clearly to warn Hitler against the danger of war. I am not capable of judging whether he possessed sufficient continuity of purpose and tact to carry out Mussolini’s instructions up to the end of his visit.
FIG.1. At an artillery observation post
FIG.2. Polish summer landscape
FIG.3. Battle for an emplacement near Vizna
June brought the visit to Berlin of the Prince Regent Paul of Yugoslavia and his beautiful bride. Again there was a great parade, mostly of motorised troops; so many units took part in this march past that the effect was more exhausting than impressive. It was significant that the Prince Regent went on to London from Berlin. So far as I know Hitler did not achieve the results that he had hoped for from this visit.
There was no lack of political warnings. But Hitler and his Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, had persuaded themselves that the Western Powers would never risk war with Germany, and that they therefore had a free hand in Eastern Europe.
During the summer months of 1939 I was engaged in preparing for the large-scale manœuvres of motorised troops that were to be held in the autumn. They were to take place in the Erz Mountains and the Sudetenland. The considerable work involved was to be in vain.
The Polish Campaign
On the 22nd of August, 1939, I was ordered to the military training area Gross-Born to take command of the newly created XIX Army Corps staff which was to be re-christened ‘Fortification Staff Pomerania.’ This staff was to be responsible for the construction of field fortifications along the German border as protection against any possible Polish attack. The XIX Army Corps had under command the 3rd Panzer Division and the 2nd and 20th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions, together with corps troops. The 3rd Panzer Division was reinforced by the Panzer Demonstration Battalion, which was equipped with our newest tanks, the Panzer III and the Panzer IV. Among the corps troops was included the Reconnaissance Demonstration Battalion from Döberitz-Krampnitz. These demonstration units from our training schools were attached at my request, so that they might learn by practical experience. This was to stand them in good stead when they later returned to their primary functions.
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