Sketch Map 25
Advance to Tula. Situation 27.10-14.11.41.
On the 27th and 28th of October I accompanied Eberbach in his advance. On the 27th the OKW was playing with the idea of switching us towards Voronezh, where Russian forces were reported to be arriving from the east. But no roads led there. In any case an essential preliminary to any such operation must be the capture of Tula. I asked Liebenstein to explain this to our superiors. I spent the night of the 27th–28th October in Chern, in a small, abandoned, bug-infested hospital for children. Our van had reached the neighbourhood of Plavskoie. LIII and XLIII Army Corps were enlarging their bridgeheads across the Oka. Fourth Army repelled fierce Russian attacks.
On October 28th I learned from Liebenstein that the OKW had given up the idea of the switch to Voronezh. The advance towards Tula continued. Owing to a lack of fuel, Eberbach allowed one battalion of Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland to ride on the tanks. We reached Pissarevo, 20 miles to the south of Tula. Reconnaissance troops of XLIII Army Corps penetrated to Odoievo. I again spent the night in Chern and in the morning flew back to my Army headquarters.
On October 28th we were informed of Hitler’s instructions that ‘fast-moving units should seize the Oka bridges to the east of Serpuchov.’ We could only advance as fast as our supply situation would allow. Travelling along the now completely disintegrated Orel–Tula road our vehicles could occasionally achieve a maximum speed of 12 miles per hour. There were no ‘fast-moving units’ any more. Hitler was living in a world of fantasy.
On this day First Panzer Army crossed the Mius and Seventeenth Army the Donetz.
On October 29th our leading tanks reached a point some 2 miles from Tula. An attempt to capture the town by a coup de main failed owing to the enemy’s strong anti-tank and anti-aircraft defences; we lost many tanks and officers.
General Heinrici, always a practical and sensible man, who commanded XLIII Army Corps, now came to see me and described the bad condition of his troops’ supplies: among other things, there had been no issue of bread since October 20th.
By October 30th the LIII Army Corps was advancing from the west along the Orel-Tula road. After the final destruction of the Bryansk pocket, on October 19th, the corps, commanded by General Weisen-berger, had moved east, the 167th Infantry Division through Bolchov–Gorbachevo and the 112th Infantry Division through Bielev–Arsenievo–Zarevo. During this march it had suffered much from the prevailing mud and had been unable to take all its motorised vehicles, in particular its heavy artillery, with it. The motorised parts of the corps had to make a detour by following the ‘good’ road from Orel to Mzensk. In view of the Russians reported to be arriving from the east since October 27th, I felt compelled to commit LIII Army Corps as flank guard on our right against the line Yepifan–Stalinogorsk.
The condition of the Orel–Tula road had meanwhile grown so bad that arrangements had to be made for 3rd Panzer Division, which was following behind Battle Group Eberbach, to be supplied by air.
In view of the impossibility of launching a frontal attack on Tula General Freiherr von Geyr suggested that in order to continue our advance we by-pass the town to the east. I agreed with this and ordered that the attack go on towards Dedilovo and the crossing-places over the Shat. General Freiherr von Geyr was also of the opinion that there was now no possibility of using motorised troops until the frosts set in. In this he was undoubtedly correct. It was only possible to gain ground very slowly and at the cost of great wear and tear to the motorised equipment. As a result of this the reopening of the Mzensk–Tula railroad assumed very great importance. Despite consistent exhortations to hurry, the repair work was making only slow progress. The lack of locomotives made me look around for alternative transport and I suggested the use of railway lorries, but none were sent me.
On November 1st XXIV Panzer Corps reached a point to the west of Dedilovo.
As the leading elements of LIII Army Corps were nearing Teploie, on November 2nd, they were surprised to run into the enemy. This turned out to be a very strong Russian force, consisting of two cavalry divisions, five rifle divisions and a tank brigade, which was advancing along the Yefremov–Tula road with the apparent intention of attacking the flank and rear of the formations of XXIV Panzer Corps that were immobilised outside Tula. The Russians were plainly as surprised by the appearance of LIII Army Corps as LIII Army Corps was by theirs. A long-drawn-out battle developed in the Teploie area which lasted from November 3rd to November 13th; after being reinforced by the tanks of Eberbach’s brigade, LIII Army Corps finally succeeded in defeating the enemy and throwing him back on Yefremov. The Russians lost 3,000 men taken prisoner in addition to a great number of guns.
During the night of November 3rd–4th there had been a frost and this made it easier for the troops to move; on the other hand we were now confronted with the constant problem of the cold, from which our soldiers were already beginning to suffer. To defend the deep flank of the Panzer Army in the Mzensk–Chern area and farther east I employed the unarmoured elements of the 17th Panzer Division which had recently arrived from Karachev. Engineers, construction battalions and units of the Reich labour service were working without pause in an attempt to improve the Orel–Tula road.
It was at this time that XLVIII Panzer Corps took Kurst.
On November 5th I received a brief visit from Field-Marshal von Bock. Army Group had reached the conclusion, on November 4th, that the Russians were systematically withdrawing from the territory west of the Don between Voronezh and Stalinogorsk. This view had been forwarded to the OKH. Events in Second Panzer Army’s area proved it to be quite incorrect. On the contrary, the enemy was attacking in the Teploie area.
On November 6th I flew to the front. The impressions I gained during this flight may best be given by quoting the following passage from a letter which I wrote at the time:
It is miserable for the troops and a great pity for our cause that the enemy should thus gain time while our plans are postponed until the winter is more and more advanced. It all makes me very sad. With the best will in the world there is nothing you can do about the elements. The unique chance to strike a single great blow is fading more and more, and I do not know if it will ever recur. How things will turn out, God alone knows. We can only go on hoping and keep our courage up, but this is a hard time that we are passing through …
I hope that I’ll soon be able to strike a more cheerful note. I don’t enjoy complaining. But for the moment it is difficult to keep one’s spirits up.
On November 7th we suffered our first severe cases of frost bite. We heard that First Panzer Army had been attacking Rostov-on-Don since November 5th.
On November 8th LIII Army Corps made progress in the Teploie area. XXIV Panzer Corps repulsed enemy attacks from Tula.
On November 9th it was plain that the enemy was planning to attack both to the east and the west of Tula. As a result XXIV Panzer Corps, after having sent Panzer Brigade Eberbach to the support of LIII Army Corps, had itself gone over to the defensive. 17th Panzer Division, less its tanks, was attached to XXIV Panzer Corps and moved forward to Plavskoie. Since fresh enemy formations were appearing to the east of Chern the division responsible for protecting our flank in the Mzensk–Chern area was strengthened by further elements of XLVII Panzer Corps. As an example of how critical the situation in the Tula area was at this time, four weak rifle battalions of the 4th Panzer Division were responsible for a front of 20 miles to the west of Dedilovo with the additional task of maintaining contact between LIII Army Corps and the 3rd Panzer Division fighting outside Tula.
On November 12th the temperature dropped to + 5° (Fahr.) and on the 13th to — 8. On this date a conference took place at Army Group Centre at which the chiefs of staff of the various armies were present: the Chief of the Army General Staff presided. This was the occasion on which the ‘Orders for the Autumn Offensive, 1941’ were issued. The objective assigned to Second Panzer Army was the city of Gorki (formerly Nijni-Novgo
rod) which was approximately 400 miles from Orel, and 250 miles east of Moscow—with the intention of cutting off the Russian capital from its rearward communications. Liebenstein immediately protested that our Army in present circumstances could not advance beyond Venev. This was not the month of May and we were not fighting in France! I completely agreed with my chief of staff and I immediately informed the commander of Army Group Centre in writing that the Panzer Army was no longer capable of carrying out the orders that had been issued it. While writing my report I had in mind the impression I had gained during a visit to the front on November 13th and 14th when I had visited LIII Army Corps and XXIV Panzer Corps.
On November 13th I set off in my little Fieseler–Storch from Orel, but soon flew into a snowstorm to the north of Chern and was compelled to land on Chern airfield. I drove from there by car, in 40 degrees of frost, to General Weisenberger’s headquarters at Plavskoie. This was the last day of the Teploie battle and General Weisenberger described his experiences to me. He was told to push on towards Volovo–Stalinogorsk, and I promised him that he might keep Panzer Brigade Eberbach until such time as 18th Panzer Division was in a position to cover his left flank against the Russians who had been thrown back on Yefremov. The combat strength of the infantry had sunk to an average of 50 men per company. The lack of winter clothing was become increasingly felt.
In XXIV Panzer Corps the frost was unpleasantly in evidence, since the tanks could not move up the ice-covered slopes for lack of the requisite calks for the tanks. General Freiherr von Geyr did not believe that he would be able to mount an attack before November 19th. To do so at all he would need the return of Panzer Brigade Eberbach and fuel for four days; at present all that he had was one day’s supply. My opinion was that he should attack on the 17th of November, since he would thus keep in accord with the movements of LIII Army Corps and would stop the enemy from forming a new defensive front in the area Volovo–Dedilovo. Apart from that, XLIII Army Corps was being attacked west of Tula and needed relief. The right flank was to be protected by XLVII Panzer Corps with the 18th Panzer Division and the 10th and 29th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions.
I spent the night at Plavskoie.
In the morning of November 14th I visited the 167th Infantry Division and talked to a number of officers and men. The supply situation was bad. Snow shirts, boot grease, underclothes and above all woollen trousers were not available. A high proportion of the men were still wearing denim trousers, and the temperature was 8 below zero! At noon I visited the 112th Infantry Division, where I heard the same story. Our troops had got hold of Russian overcoats and fur caps and only the national emblem showed that they were Germans. All the stocks of clothing that the Panzer Army held were immediately sent to the front, but the shortages were so great that these provided a mere drop in the ocean.
Eberbach’s fine brigade had only some fifty tanks left, and that was all we had available. The establishment for the three divisions should have been 600. Ice was causing a lot of trouble, since the calks for the tracks had not yet arrived. The cold made the telescopic sights useless; the salve which was supposed to prevent this had also not arrived. In order to start the engines of the tanks fires had to be lit beneath them. Fuel was freezing on occasions and the oil became viscous. This unit, too, lacked winter clothing and anti-freeze mixture.
XLIII Army Corps reported heavy casualties.
I again spent the night at Plavskoie.
On November 15th the Russians resumed their attacks on XLIII Army Corps.
On November 17th we learned that Siberian troops had appeared in the Uslovaia sector and that more were arriving by rail in the area Riasan–Kolomna. The 112th Infantry Division made contact with these new Siberian troops. Since enemy tanks were simultaneously attacking the division from the Dedilova area, the weakened troops could not manage this fresh enemy. Before judging their performance it should be borne in mind that each regiment had already lost some 500 men from frostbite, that as a result of the cold the machine-guns were no longer able to fire and that our 37 mm. anti-tank gun had proved ineffective against the T34. The result of all this was a panic, which reached back as far as Bogorodisk. This was the first time that such a thing had occurred during the Russian campaign, and it was a warning that the combat ability of our infantry was at an end and that they should no longer be expected to perform difficult tasks. By switching the 167th Infantry Division to Uslovaia LIII Army Corps was able to rectify the situation in the 112th Infantry Division’s sector without having to ask for outside support.
Meanwhile the deep right flank of the Panzer Army had been secured by the arrival of units of XLVII Panzer Corps. In a letter dated the 17th of November, 1941, I wrote:
We are only nearing our final objective step by step in this icy cold and with all the troops suffering from the appalling supply situation. The difficulties of supplying us by railroad are constantly increasing—that is the main cause of our shortages, since without fuel the trucks can’t move. If it had not been for this we should by now be much nearer our objectives. Yet the brave troops are seizing all their advantages and are fighting with wonderful endurance despite all their handicaps. Over and over again I am thankful that our men are such good soldiers….
While these winter battles went on, we had to deal with the problem of supplying the homeland, the Army and the Russian civilian population with food. The 1941 harvest had been a rich one throughout the country and there was ample grain for bread. Nor was there any shortage of cattle. As a result of our wretched rail communications only a small amount of this food could be sent to Germany from the area of Second Panzer Army. But the needs of the troops were assured as were those of the Russian civilians in the towns, of which Orel was our most important; indeed stock sufficient to last until March 31st, 1942, was issued now and the Russian administration was entrusted with its distribution. Posters were stuck up on the walls in order to inform the civilians of this provision that had been made for them and to calm any anxiety they might otherwise have felt. In the rich and fruitful black earth country the Russians had built huge grain silos in which the golden harvest was stored. Though the Russians had destroyed some of these during their retreat, a number were unscathed, and even when a silo was burning when we arrived it was possible to rescue a portion of its contents which could at least be given to the populace.
In Orel a number of factories, whose machines the Russians had not had time to take away with them, were started working again. This provided some of the needs of the Army and also meant employment and bread for the workers. Among these was a factory producing tin goods and a shoe factory where leather and felt boots were made.
As an indication of the attitude of the Russian population, I should like to quote a remark that was made to me by an old Czarist general whom I met in Orel at this time. He said: ‘If only you had come twenty years ago we should have welcomed you with open arms. But now it’s too late. We were just beginning to get on our feet and now you arrive and throw us back twenty years so that we will have to start from the beginning all over again. Now we are fighting for Russia and in that cause we are all united.’
On November 18th Second Panzer Army launched the attack which had been ordered in Orel on the 13th. The following units were involved:
XLVII Panzer Corps.
18th Panzer Division attacked the industrial town of Yefremov which was captured after violent street fighting on the 20th and was held against heavy counter-attacks.
10th (Motorised) Infantry Division attacked through Yepifan to Michailov.
29th (Motorised) Infantry Division attacked towards Spaskoie–Gremiatchi with the task of guarding the Army’s eastern flank against the Russian forces which had recently arrived in the area Riasan–Kolomna.
25th (Motorised) Infantry Division had been ordered to stay where it was by the OKW in order to harvest the corn. As soon as it was freed it was to follow the other divisions as corps reserve.
LIII Army Corps.
&nbs
p; 167th Infantry Division attacked through Stalinogorsk towards Venev.
112th Infantry Division was in the Stalinogorsk area where it was to remain on account of its lack of strength until relieved by the 56th Infantry Division, which was being brought up from Army Group reserve in the Karachev area and which was to capture a bridgehead across the Don.
XXIV Panzer Corps.
With the 17th, 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland and the 296th Infantry Division moving up from the south, this corps was to take Tula by an attack on that town from both east and west. A battle group of the 17th Panzer Division was to advance ahead of this corps and of LIII Army Corps to Kashira, with the purpose of capturing the Oka bridges and thus preventing the arrival on the battlefield of any reinforcements that might be sent down from Moscow.
XLIII Army Corps.
This corps, with the 31st and 131st Infantry Division, was to advance through Lichvin and Kaluga, between the Upa and the Oka, with the task of mopping up any enemy forces in that area and of ensuring contact between Second Panzer Army and Fourth Army.
Second Army, which was on our deep right flank, was ordered to advance eastward from Orel. So we could expect no support from this army. In any case it was almost immediately held up by Russian entrenchments to the west of the Yeletz–Yefremov road and was forced to conclude that it had been mistaken in maintaining that the Russians had withdrawn to the east bank of the Don.
Panzer Leader Page 31