HITLER: ‘Do you think Frederick the Great’s grenadiers were anxious to die? They wanted to live, too, but the king was right in asking them to sacrifice themselves. I believe that I, too, am entitled to ask any German soldier to lay down his life.’
I: ‘Every German soldier knows that in war-time he must risk his life for his country and our soldiers have certainly proved up to now that they are prepared to do so. But such a sacrifice may only be asked of a man if the results to be obtained from it are worth having. The intentions I have heard expressed will lead to losses that are utterly disproportionate to the results that will be achieved. My soldiers will not have protection against the weather and the Russians until they reach the Susha–Oka line and the fortified positions that were built there during the autumn. I beg you to remember that it is not the enemy who is causing us our bloody losses: we are suffering twice as many casualties from the cold as from the fire of the Russians. Any man who has seen the hospitals filled with frost-bite cases must realise what that means.’
HITLER: ‘I know that you have not spared yourself and that you have spent a great deal of time with the troops. I grant you that. But you are seeing events at too close a range. You have been too deeply impressed by the suffering of the soldiers. You feel too much pity for them. You should stand back more. Believe me, things appear clearer when examined at longer range.’
I: ‘Naturally it is my duty to lessen the suffering of my soldiers so far as that lies within my power. But it is hard when the men have even now not yet received their winter clothing and the greater part of the infantry are still going about in denim uniforms. Boots, vests, gloves, woollen helmets are either non-existent or else are hopelessly worn out.’
HITLER shouted: ‘That is not true. The Quartermaster-General informed me that the winter clothing had been issued.’
I: ‘I dare say it has been issued but it has never arrived. I have made it my business to find out what has happened to it. At present it is in Warsaw station, where it has been for the last several weeks, since it cannot be sent on owing to a lack of locomotives and obstructions to the lines. Our requests that it be forwarded in September and October were bluntly refused. Now it’s too late.’
The Quartermaster-General was sent for and had to admit that what I had said was correct. Goebbels’ campaign that Christmas for clothes for the soldiers was a result of this conversation. The clothes thus collected did not actually reach the soldiers during the winter of 1941–42.
The question of fighting strength and ration strength was next raised. As a result of the heavy vehicle losses, during the mud period and from the great cold, the transport available was insufficient both for the fighting troops and for the supply troops. Since we had received no replacements for the transports lost, the troops were having to supplement their insufficient vehicles by using whatever they could find in the country. This consisted mostly of sleds and sledges, which had a very limited load capacity. A great number of such vehicles was required to replace the lorries we had not got. Thus we needed a proportionately higher number of men to move the supplies. Hitler now insisted that the number of supply troops and of soldiers in the units’ supply columns, which he considered far too great, be drastically cut down to provide more rifles for the front. Needless to say this had been done to the greatest possible extent that was consistent with not endangering our supply services. Further reduction was only feasible if the condition of other supply means, and particularly of the railroads, was improved. It was difficult to make Hitler grasp this simple fact.
Then came the question of shelter. A few weeks before there had been an exhibition in Berlin of the arrangements which had been made by the OKH for the care of the troops during the coming winter. Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch had insisted upon personally showing Hitler around the exhibition. It was all most handsomely presented and was featured in the newsreels. Unfortunately, however, the troops possessed none of these beautiful things. As a result of the continual movement it had been impossible to do any building and the countryside had little to offer. Our living conditions were utterly wretched. And of this, too, Hitler was ignorant. The Armaments Minister, Dr. Todt, was present during this part of the discussion; he was a man of understanding and of normal, human sensibility. He was deeply moved by my description of life at the front, and he presented me with two trench stoves which he had just had made; these stoves, constructed to be shown to Hitler, were to serve as models for the troops who could then build them themselves with materials available in the countryside. This was at least one positive result of the lengthy discussion.
During the evening meal I sat next to Hitler and I took the opportunity to describe incidents of life at the front to him. But the effect of my anecdotes was not what I had expected. Both Hitler and his entourage were plainly convinced that I was exaggerating.
After dinner, when our discussion was resumed, I proposed that general staff officers who had had actual experience of front-line fighting during this war be transferred to the OKW and the OKH. I said: ‘Judging by the reactions of the gentlemen of the OKW I have reached the conclusion that our messages and reports are not being correctly understood and, as a result, are not being properly interpreted to you. It seems to me, therefore, necessary that officers with front-line experience be transferred to fill general staff positions at the OKH and OKW. It’s time the guard was changed. In both these headquarters officers have been sitting miles away from the fighting since the beginning of the war, that is to say for over two years, without even once seeing the front. This war is so different from the First World War that service at the front in that war is no help in understanding this one.’
I had stirred up a hornet’s nest with this suggestion. Hitler replied angrily: ‘I cannot now be separated from my personal staff.’
I: ‘There is no need for you to change your adjutants. That’s not the point. What does matter is that the important general staff positions be occupied by officers who have had recent experience of the front, and particularly of the front during the winter war.’
This request, too, was gruffly refused. My conversation with Hitler was thus a complete failure. As I left the conference room I heard Hitler say to Keitel: ‘I haven’t convinced that man!’ The breach was now complete and could no longer be closed.
The next morning before starting the flight back I telephoned General Jodl, the chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, and repeated to him that present methods must lead to intolerable sacrifices of life for which there could be no possible justification. Reserves were needed urgently to occupy positions behind the front and out of contact with the enemy. This call of mine had no recognisable effect.
After my telephone conversation with Jodl, on December 21st, I flew back to Orel. By Hitler’s orders the left-hand boundary of my Army was changed to the junction of the rivers Shisdra and Oka. This alteration increased the responsibilities of my Panzer Army to an undesirable extent. I spent the rest of the day working out and issuing orders in accordance with Hitler’s intentions.
With the object of ensuring that these orders were carried out I drove, on December 22nd, to the divisions of XLVII Panzer Corps. After a brief conversation at corps headquarters I went to Chern, where the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division was located, and explained to General von Loeper the purpose of the orders issued and the reasons that led Hitler to make his decision. In the afternoon I visited the 18th and 17th Panzer Divisions for the same reason. I arrived back in Orel after a freezing drive at about midnight. The commanders of the western end of my front were at least now fully informed, by me personally, of the change in the situation resultant on Hitler’s orders; I thought, therefore, that I could face the coming events of the next few days with a clear conscience.
I spent December 23rd instructing the other corps commanders. LIII Army Corps reported that the 167th Infantry Division was also being heavily attacked now. The 296th Infantry Division fell back on Bielev. The defensive power of the corps
could by this time only be rated as poor. Between its left wing and the XLIII Army Corps a great gap still existed which could not be closed on account of the almost total immobility of the troops once they were off the roads; the countryside was, in fact, impassable. I therefore decided to withdraw the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions to Orel by way of the Tula–Orel road, to give them a short period of rest for three days to recuperate, and then to move them north under command of XXIV Panzer Corps through Karachev and Bryansk with the object of attacking the flank of the enemy forces that were pressing towards the Oka. But deep enemy penetrations of Second Panzer Army’s front necessitated the switch of part of this force to the new danger-points and delayed their assembly in the Lichvin area. The immobile elements of XXIV Panzer Corps were collected together at Orel for the protection of that town.
I spent December 24th visiting a number of hospitals to see the Christmas festivities. I was able to bring a little good cheer to many a brave soldier. But it was a heart-rending business. 1 spent most of the evening working alone; later Liebenstein, Büing, and Kahlden came to see me and we spent a short time together in comradely fashion.
On December 24th Second Army lost Livny. To the north of that place the enemy crossed the Oka. By order of the OKH the 4th Panzer Division was sent off to Bielev to check the enemy advance. The unified counter-attack by XXIV Panzer Corps which I had planned thus seemed likely to become impossible on account of the dispersal of the corps’ forces.
During the night of December 24th–25th the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division lost Chern as a result of a Russian enveloping attack. The Russian success became unexpectedly great, because the elements of LIII Army Corps fighting on the left of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division were unable to hold and the enemy thus achieved a break-through. Parts of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division were encircled in Chern. I immediately reported this misfortune to Army Group. Field-Marshal von Kluge accused me in violent terms, saying that I must have ordered the evacuation of Chern and, what is more, must have done so at least twenty-four hours before. The exact contrary was the case. I had, as already mentioned, personally given Hitler’s orders according to which the town was to be held. I therefore angrily denied the unjust accusations that Field-Marshal von Kluge made against me.
On December 25th the elements of the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division which had been encircled succeeded in breaking out and reaching our lines with several hundred prisoners. I ordered a withdrawal to the Susha–Oka position. In the evening I had another sharp argument with Field-Marshal von Kluge, who accused me of having sent him an incorrect official report. He hung up with the words: ‘I shall inform the Führer about you.’ This was going too far. I told the Chief of Staff of the Army Group that if I was to be treated in this fashion I had no wish to continue to command my Army and that I would request that I be relieved of my command. I immediately sent off a telegram to this effect. But Field-Marshal von Kluge was ahead of me. He had requested the OKH that I be removed, and on the morning of December 26th I was informed that Hitler had transferred me to the OKH officers’ reserve pool. My successor was to be the commander of Second Army, General Rudolf Schmidt.
On December 26th I said farewell to my staff and issued a short order of the day to my troops.
On December 27th I left the front, spending the night in Roslavl; the night of the 28th-29th I passed in Minsk; the 29th-30th in Warsaw, the 30th-31st in Posen, and on New Year’s Eve I arrived in Berlin.
Further disagreement arose between Field-Marshal von Kluge and my staff concerning my final order of the day to my soldiers. Army Group wished to prevent publication of the order, since Field-Marshal von Kluge was afraid that it might contain criticisms of higher commanders. Needless to say the order was quite unobjectionable. Liebenstein ensured that my men at least received a parting greeting from me.
My final order ran as follows:
The Commander of Second Panzer Army. Army headquarters 26.12.1941.
Daily Army Order.
Soldiers of the Second Panzer Army!
The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has today relieved me of my command.
At this time when I am leaving you I remember our six months of battle together for the greatness of our land and the victory of our arms, and I recall with honour and respect all those who have bled and died for Germany. From the bottom of my heart I thank you, my comrades-in-arms, for the trusty devotion and true comradeship which you have at all times shown during these long months. We have been together in success and in adversity and my greatest joy has lain in my chances to help you and to protect you.
Good luck to you!
I know that you will continue to fight as bravely as ever and that despite the hardships of winter and the numerical superiority of the enemy you will conquer. My thoughts will be with you in your hard struggle.
You are waging it for Germany!
Heil Hitler!
signed, GUDERIAN.
7. ON INACTIVE SERVICE
The unfair treatment that I had received began by making me feel, understandably I think, very embittered. I therefore requested, during the early days of January, 1942, in Berlin, that a military court of inquiry be set up to examine my past conduct; this would have led to the refutation of the charges that Field-Marshal von Kluge had made against me and would have made clear the reasons underlying my past behaviour. My request was turned down by Hitler. I was not informed on what grounds he did this. It was, however, plain that a clarification of the business was regarded as undesirable. It was fully recognised that I had been unjustly treated. Immediately before my departure from Orel, Colonel Schmundt had appeared; he had been sent by Hitler to discover what was the truth. Liebenstein and a number of the front-line generals had told him the whole story, which he had passed on to his colleagues at Supreme Headquarters with the following comment: ‘The man has been treated unjustly. His whole army is on his side and believes in him. We must see what we can do to put this business to rights.’ There can be no doubt concerning the goodwill of Schmundt, who was a high-minded and honourable man. He did not, however, succeed in having his good intentions realised. The reason for his failure was the attitude of various other personages involved.
So now I sat in Berlin with nothing whatever to do, while my soldiers continued their hard struggle. I knew that I was being watched, that every step I took and every remark I made was being observed. As a result, for the first few months I lived in complete retirement and hardly ever left my home. I received only a few guests. One of the first was Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the Leibstandarte, who telephoned me from the Chancellery to say he was coming to see me. He explained to me that he had done this deliberately in order to show ‘the people at the top’ that they had treated me unjustly and to make it plain to them that he did not wish to be identified with such behaviour. Nor did Dietrich make any bones about telling Hitler how he felt about my case.
The changes in the higher levels of command in the Army were by no means limited to the dismissal of Field-Marshal von Rundstedt and of myself. Many generals of hitherto high repute were deprived of their office either for no reason at all or on some very slender excuse. Among these were Generals Geyer, Förster, and Hoeppner. Field-Marshal Ritter von Leeb and General Kübler went at their own request. Colonel-General Strauss reported that his health had broken down.
This ‘house-cleaning’ was not carried out without arousing considerable protest. Most noticeable was the case of Colonel-General Hoeppner; when Hitler dismissed him he simultaneously denied him the right to wear his uniform or decorations, cancelled his pension and deprived him of the use of the house previously allotted to him. Hoeppner refused to recognise these illegal orders and the lawyers of the OKH and the OKW showed sufficient courage on this occasion to stand up to Hitler; they pointed out to him that he was not entitled to give such orders without first arranging for a disciplinary investigation of Hoeppner’s conduct, the findings of which would undoubte
dly be in Hoeppner’s favour. In the course of a telephone conversation with his immediate superior, Field-Marshal von Kluge, Hoeppner had referred in terms of irritation to the ‘civilian leadership’; Kluge had believed that the reference was to Hitler and had repeated the remark. Hitler became extremely angry when he heard of this. The result of the ill-feeling thus engendered was the law passed by the Reichstag on April 26th, 1942, which removed the last checks to totalitarian authority in the legislative, executive, and judicial spheres.1 This law marked the culmination of a long process which had begun with the unfortunate Authorisation Act of March 23rd, 1933; the German dictator was now given complete despotic power. Germany had thus ceased to be a modern state whose structure was based on the rule of law. The soldiers had played no part in the passing of either of these two Acts. They had simply to bear their evil consequences.
The unpleasantness of the past few months had increased the weakness of my heart, which was already beginning to show sign of strain; on the advice of my doctor I therefore decided to go with my wife to Badenweiler for a four weeks’ cure at the end of March, 1942. The peacefulness of the beautiful countryside in spring and the medicinal baths of the little spa combined to soothe both heart and soul after the strain of events in Russia. But when we returned to Berlin my dear wife caused me great anxiety; as a result of a most malignant blood-poisoning she was confined to her bed for many months. Apart from this, my personal situation in Berlin had become so unpleasant as a result of the endless stream of visitors with their tiresome questions that we decided to spend a small inheritance on buying a little house near Lake Constance or in the Salzkammergut; thus we would escape from the atmosphere of the capital. At the end of September I asked General Fromm, the Commander of the Training Army, to arrange that I be given the necessary leave to do this; in reply he asked that I come to see him. A few days before Rommel had sent me a telegram from Africa in which he said that he had to return to Germany on account of ill health and that he had proposed to Hitler that I deputise for him during his absence. This proposal had been turned down by Hitler. Fromm now asked me whether I was anticipating renewed employment. I said that I was not. On the day of my return from the Salzkammergut Fromm telephoned me again and requested that I go to see him. He informed me that he had had a conversation with Schmundt on the previous day and had learned from him that there could be no question of my being re-employed. But the Führer had heard that I was contemplating buying a property in southern Germany. He knew that I came from the Warthegau, or West Prussia, and he therefore desired that I settle there and not in South Germany. It was his intention to make a national donation to all men who had been decorated with the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross, and such donations were to consist primarily of land. It was suggested that I look for a suitable property in the country of my origin. When I heard this I realised that I could now put my grey uniform away and settle down once and for all to civilian life.
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