In view of the possibility of a war against several enemies simultaneously, there was a strategic choice between defending secondary fronts and attacking the principal enemy. There was also the problem of switching the attack from one front to another.
The strict limitations of our resources compelled the General Staff to study how a war could most quickly be concluded. From this there followed the concept of using motors in every form. As a result of the success of our rapid campaigns at the beginning of the Second World War our enemies coined the word Blitzkrieg or ‘lightning war.’
On account of its geographical position Germany has always been compelled to fight ‘on interior lines,’ and in that sort of fighting attack alternates with defence. ‘Europe now is one family and when discord breaks out in the home it is hard for any member of the family to stand aloof, particularly if he lives in the middle of the house.’1 In this very apt phrase Schlieffen described our eternal situation which has involved us—very often unwillingly—in every European conflict. The German nation is no more warlike than the other nations of Europe but it lives ‘in the middle of the house’ and therefore in its long and varied history has seldom managed to avoid involvement in its neighbours’ conflicts. As a result of this both its statesmen and its military leaders have repeatedly been confronted with difficult, if not actually insoluble, problems. In view of its limited resources Germany has always striven for a rapid end to any conflict and has of necessity done its best to avoid long wars of attrition and the danger of intervention by third parties. The solving of this problem was the supreme achievement of Bismarck’s statecraft and Moltke’s strategy.
After the defeat of 1918 the Army was entirely led by officers drawn from the old Imperial Army. There were no others. These officers were prepared to serve the Weimar Republic, even though they did not approve of everything involved in the change from monarchy to republic. They had to sacrifice many a privilege and many a well-loved tradition and this they did in order to prevent their country being at that time overwhelmed by the Asiatic Bolshevik flood that threatened Germany from the East. The Weimar Republic never succeeded in transforming this mariage de convenance into a true union of love. There was never any real feeling of mutual affection between the new State and the Officer Corps, even though individuals such as Dr. Gessler, for many years Defence Minister, tried intelligently, skilfully and with genuine feeling to bring this about. This fact was to be significant later on in the attitude adopted by the Officer Corps towards National-Socialism. It is true that the various governments of the Weimar period did do their best to give the armed forces whatever they could in view of the external political situation and the bad state of Germany’s economy. But they did not succeed in achieving any close contact with the Officer Corps or in giving that corps any enthusiasm for their political ideals. The armed forces always, basically, remained estranged from the new regime. The cool and sensible attitude of Seeckt increased the already existing tendency of the Officer Corps to stand aloof from politics. The General Staff, or the Truppenamt as it was then called, contributed markedly to this attitude of mind.
When National-Socialism, with its new, nationalistic slogans, appeared upon the scene the younger elements of the Officer Corps were soon inflamed by the patriotic theories propounded by Hitler and his followers. The completely inadequate state of the country’s armaments had lain like a leaden weight on the Officer Corps for many long years. It is no wonder that the first steps towards rearmament inclined them to favour the man who promised to breathe fresh life into the armed forces after fifteen years’ stagnation. The National-Socialist Party further increased its popularity in military circles since to begin with Hitler showed himself to be well disposed towards the Army and refrained from interfering in its private affairs. The previous gap in the Army’s political life was now filled, and interest was aroused in political questions, though hardly in the manner that the democrats seem to have expected. Be that as it may, once the National-Socialists had seized power, the leaders of the armed forces could hardly remain aloof from National-Socialist politics, even had they wished to do so. The General Staff certainly played no leading role in this new development; if anything, the contrary was true. The prime example of the sceptical attitude of the General Staff was that of General Beck. He had a number of adherents at the centre, but no influence over the Army as a whole and even less in the other services. Beck and his successor, Halder, might try to put the brake on the swing towards National-Socialism at the hub of military authority; their effect on policy in general was nil and it simply followed its course without the support of, and in opposition to, the General Staff. Once again—as before the First World War—Germany found itself in a political situation from which there seemed to be no way out and which made the war look difficult, if not hopeless, before ever it began. Once again the soldiers, led by the generals and the General Staff Corps officers, had to find a way out of an impasse for which they were not responsible.
All the reproaches that have been levelled against the leaders of the armed forces by their countrymen and by the international courts have failed to take into consideration one very simple fact: that policy is not laid down by soldiers but by politicians. This has always been the case and is so today. When war starts the soldiers can only act according to the political and military situation as it then exists. Unfortunately it is not the habit of politicians to appear in conspicuous places when the bullets begin to fly. They prefer to remain in some safe retreat and to let the soldiers carry out ‘the continuation of policy by other means.’
National policy conditions the theories of the soldiers in the preparations for war during the period of so-called ‘mental warfare.’ The international legal tribunals of the last few years have proved that up to 1938 the plans of the German General Staff were exclusively defensive in nature. The military and political condition of Germany permitted no other. Despite the re-armament that had been in progress since 1935, the specialists of the General Staff had no illusions concerning the long period of time that must elapse before the armed forces, and in particular the new weapons—the air force and the armoured force—would be fit for active service. It was only a direct order from Hitler, the political Head of the State, that forced another course of action on the unwilling soldiers.
Until the autumn of 1938 there existed within the Army a system by which the chiefs of staff, down to and including the chief of staff of an army corps, shared the responsibility for the decisions taken by their respective commanding generals. This system, which involved the forwarding of a report by the chief of staff should he disagree with his commander, was discontinued on Hitler’s orders. This resulted in a basic change to the positions of the chiefs of staff in general and to that of the Chief of the Army General Staff in particular. The system of joint responsibility by commanders and chiefs of staff was one inherited from the old Prussian Army and preserved in the 100,000-man army and which had simply been taken over by the armed forces of the Third Reich when re-armament began. During the First World War it had often led to chiefs of staff of strong personality dominating their respective commanders. In accordance with the leader principle (Führerprinzip) which he propagated, Hitler now logically ordered that the man who was in command must bear the entire and undivided responsibility; by this decree he automatically abolished the joint responsibility of the Chief of the Army General Staff in relationship to himself in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
As already indicated, the Army General Staff was reluctant to accept the concept of a combined armed forces command. Had this not been so we should, before the outbreak of the Second World War, have possessed an Armed Forces General Staff and an Armed Forces Supreme Command existing as effective bodies instead of the caricatures of them that we actually had. The fact that a few individuals in the General Staff favoured the concept of an armed forces command made no difference to the general situation, particularly since the air force and the navy als
o opposed it. Indeed, in their attitude towards an Armed Forces Supreme Command the commanders-in-chief of the three Services behaved like true republicans. The logical result of all this was the attitude of the General Staff towards the actual OKW that was in fact formed—a brain child of General Reichenau’s, who did his best to make his good and great idea attractive to Hitler and Blomberg—and which, in view of the firmly unco-operative attitude of all three Services, was inevitably a failure. So long as Reichenau remained head of the Armed Forces Staff he managed to continue to develop his ideas. Once he was replaced by Keitel the driving-force was no longer there. Keitel was not the man to prevail against the opposition of the three Service heads.
At this point I should like to say a few words about the OKW. Field-Marshal Keitel was basically a decent individual who did his best to perform the task allotted him. He soon fell under the sway of Hitler’s personality and, as time went on, became less and less able to shake off the hypnosis of which he was a victim. He preserved his Lower Saxon loyalty until the day of his death. Hitler knew that he could place unlimited confidence in the man; for that reason he allowed him to retain his position even when he no longer had any illusion about his talents as a strategist. The Field-Marshal exerted no influence on the course of operations. His chief activities were in the administrative field, which had previously been the domain of the War Ministry. It was Keitel’s misfortune that he lacked the strength necessary to resist Hitler’s orders when such orders ran contrary to international law and to accepted morality. It was only this weakness on his part that permitted the issuing to the troops of the so-called ‘Commissar Order’ and other notorious decrees. He paid for this with his life at Nuremberg. His family were not permitted to mourn at his grave.
Colonel-General Jodl, the chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, had in fact controlled the operations of the combined armed forces ever since the Norwegian Campaign of April, 1940. He like Keitel, was a decent man; originally he too had fallen under Hitler’s spell, but he had never been so hypnotised as was Keitel and therefore never became so uncritical. After his quarrel with Hitler during the Stalingrad period he withdrew completely into his work, most of which he did with his own hands and without the customary office and clerical assistance. He was silent and resigned on the question of reforming the military and political command, and adopted the same attitude towards the reorganisation and unified leadership of the General Staff. Only in the last few weeks of the war did he rise to fresh heights. He was to share Keitel’s bitter fate.
If these two officers had assumed a different point of view in their dealings with Hitler they could have prevented much evil from taking place. Hitler only tended to give in when confronted by a unified opposition. But such unity in military matters scarcely ever existed, and this enabled him to make the OKH increasingly powerless and to ignore any objections that it might raise.
For all that—they were my comrades.
So far as the OKH was concerned, during the Polish Campaign its authority was more or less complete. But even then differences of opinion must have arisen, and this led Hitler to entrust the operations in Norway entirely and directly to the Armed Forces Command Staff. The OKH played no part in this campaign whatever. The discussions concerning the operational plan to be employed against the Western Powers in 1940 served only to sharpen mutual opposition. In Russia profound divergences of opinion soon came to light, culminating in December, 1941, in Hitler’s quarrel with Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch. This latter was a well-trained General Staff officer. Unfortunately he was not the man to stand up to an opponent of Hitler’s calibre. From the very beginning he was never in a position of complete independence in his relationship to Hitler. In consequence his behaviour was always influenced by his consciousness of lack of freedom, and this in turn decreased his power to act.
After Brauchitsch’s departure there was never again a Commanderin-Chief of the Army. In this command—as the name implies—there were vested command powers. Such powers must be either unlimited or non-existent. And after December 19th, 1941, they were exercised exclusively by Hitler. That date marks the practical decease of the General Staff of the old Prusso-German stamp.
For myself, I wore the uniform of the General Staff Corps proudly for fifteen years. Among my teachers and my superiors I met a whole series of exemplary characters for whom I have emotions of eternal gratitude. Among my comrades I found many good and loyal friends and among my subordinates the best possible assistants and advisers. I thank them all from the bottom of my heart.
Twice, after the loss of a World War, the General Staff has been dissolved on the orders of the victors. Both these actions show the unwilling respect in which our former enemies hold that most excellent organisation.
‘The rest is silence.’
‘To Be, or Not to Be, That is the Question!’
My story is ended. It has been very difficult for me to show what it was that led to our second defeat and to describe what I myself experienced. I am only too well aware of the inadequacy of all human endeavour not to recognise the mistakes we made and my own shortcomings.
At a difficult time a prince of my royal family once sent me a small portrait of Frederick the Great on which he had inscribed these words that the great king addressed to his friend, the Marquis d’Argens, when his own defeat seemed imminent. ‘Nothing can alter my inner soul: I shall pursue my own straight course and shall do what I believe to be right and honourable.’ The little picture I have lost, but the king’s words remain engraved on my memory and are for me a model. If, despite everything, I could not prevent the defeat of my country, I must ask my readers to believe that this was not for lack of a will to do so.
This book is intended as a token of gratitude to the dead and to my old soldiers, and as a monument to preserve their fame from oblivion.
APPENDIX I
My Career
17 June, 1888 Born at Kulm on the Vistula.
1894 School at Colmar in Alsace.
1901–3 Cadet School, Karlsruhe.
1903–7 Chief Cadet School, Gross-Lichterfelde, Berlin.
28 February, 1907 Ensign in 10th Hanoverian Jaeger Battalion, Bitche.
April–December, 1907 War School, Metz.
27 January, 1908 Second lieutenant, with seniority 22 June, 1906.
1 October, 1909 Transferred with my battalion to Goslar in the Harz.
1 October, 1912–30 September, 1913 Attached 3rd Telegraph Battalion, Koblenz.
1 October, 1913–outbreak of war Attached War Academy, Berlin.
First World War
2 August, 1914–April, 1915 Commanding a wireless station, originally with 5th Cavalry Division in the West, then with Fourth Army in Flanders.
October, 1914 Promoted lieutenant.
April, 1915–January, 1916 Assistant Signals Officer with Fourth Army.
December, 1915 Promoted captain.
January, 1916–August, 1916 Assistant Signals Officer with Fifth Army and with various headquarters subordinate to this army.
August, 1916–April, 1917 Signals Officer with Fourth Army.
April, 1917 Transferred to a General Staff position with 4th Infantry Division.
May, 1917 Attached temporarily to 52nd Reserve Division as an acting General Staff Officer during the Battle of the Aisne.
June, 1917 Similar attachment to the headquarters of the Guards Corps.
July, 1917 Similar attachment to the headquarters of the X Reserve Corps.
August, 1917 Return to 4th Infantry Division.
September, 1917 Commander of IInd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment.
October, 1917 A General Staff position with Army Command C.
January–February, 1918 General Staff Officers’ Course, Sedan.
28 February, 1918 Transferred to the Army General Staff.
May, 1918 Transferred to the staff of XXXVIII Reserve Corps as quartermaster.
October, 1918 Transferred to the General Staff of the German military
administration in occupied Italy as Ia (operations officer).
Freikorps and Frontier Defence
November, 1918 Central Office for Eastern Frontier Defence in the Prussian War Ministry, Berlin.
January, 1919 Frontier Defence Command South, Breslau.
March, 1919 Frontier Defence Command North, Bartenstein.
May, 1919 General Staff of the 'Iron Division,’ Riga (later Mitau).
October, 1919 Reichswehr Brigade 10, Hanover.
January, 1920 Commanding 3rd Company, 10th Jaeger Battalion, Goslar.
March, 1920 Disturbances in the Hildesheim and Ruhr areas.
Autumn, 1920 Occupation of the neutral zone at Friedrichsfeld, near Wesel.
March-May, 1921 Disturbances in Central Germany, Dessau and Bitterfeld.
Between the Wars
16 January–31 March, 1922 Attached 7th (Bavarian) Motorised Transport Battalion, Munich.
1 April, 1922 Transferred to Defence Ministry, Motorised Troops Department.
1 October, 1924 Transferred to the staff of the 2nd Division, Stettin.
1 February, 1927 Promoted major.
1 October, 1927 Transferred to the Defence Ministry, Army Transport Department of the Truppenamt.
1 October, 1928 Simultaneously tactical instructor at the Motor Transport Instructional Staff, Berlin.
Panzer Leader Page 60