Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965

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Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965 Page 47

by Asselin, Pierre


  134. BCGH to SEAD, 19 March 1964, FO 371/175505, NAUK, 1–2.

  135. Ottawa to Saigon, 7 July 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.

  136. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 81-CT/TW, ngay 7 thang 8 nam 1964,” 185.

  137. BCGH to SEAD, 18 August 1964, FO 371/175486, NAUK, 1.

  138. “Du thao de cuong gio thieu ve tinh hinh ve duong loi cach mang mien Nam,” 26–27.

  139. Ralph B. Smith, Viet-Nam and the West (London: Heinemann, 1968), 13.

  140. William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 88.

  141. Nguyen Vu Tung, “The 1961–1962 Geneva Conference: Neutralization of Laos and Policy Implications for Vietnam,” in Christopher E. Goscha and Karine Laplante, eds., L’échec de la paix en Indochine / The Failure of Peace in Indochina (1954–1962) (Paris: Les Indes savantes, 2010), 266.

  142. BES to FO, 23 June 1964, FO 371/175505, NAUK, 1.

  143. “Nam vung quy luat kinh te va thuc te trong nuoc de lam tot cong tac xay dung va quan ly nen kinh te xa hoi chu nghia (Bai noi cua dong chi Le Duan, Bi thu thu nhat Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 10, ngay 26 thang 12 nam 1964)” [Understanding Economic Law and Reality in the Country to Execute Well the Building and Administration of the Socialist Economy (Speech by Comrade Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee, 26 December 1964)], in VKD: 1964, 512.

  144. See Le Duan’s “Duong loi cach mang xa hoi chu nghia o mien Bac” [The Socialist Revolutionary Line in the North], in Cach mang xa hoi chu nghia o Viet-Nam, Tap I [The Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Volume 1] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Su that, 1976), 11–49.

  145. The assessment is quoted in Washington to Ottawa, 23 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 5.

  146. Le Duan, “Duoi la co ve vang cua Dang, vi doc lap tu do, vi chu nghia xa hoi, tien len gianh nhung thang loi moi (2–1970)” [Under the Bright Banner of the Party, for Independence and Freedom, for Socialism, to Bring About New Victories (February 1970)], in Cach mang xa hoi chu nghia o Viet-Nam, Vol. 2, 17.

  147. See Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982). Khanh stresses that the self-reliance of Vietnamese communists was one of their greatest strengths and assets.

  148. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 74-CT/TW, ngay 27 thang 1 nam 1964,” 57.

  149. “Survey of Developments in North Vietnam during 1964—Economic Affairs,” (1965), 20-VIET-N-1-4, Vol. 9001, RG 25, LAC, 1.

  150. “Nghi quyet cua Bo Chinh tri, so 92-NQ/TW, ngay 17 thang 1 nam 1964: Ve tang cuong quan ly phan phoi luong thuc, quan ly thi truong luong thuc va dieu chinh gia mua luong thuc” [Politburo Resolution, no. 92-NQ/TW, 17 January 1964: On Improving the Administration of Foodstuff Allocation, the Administration of Foodstuff Markets, and Adjusting the Price of Foodstuffs], in VKD: 1964, 12, 13, 15. A “number” of party members and government functionaries “engaged in acts of corruption,” a party report noted. While corruption itself was not a major hindrance to the fulfillment of revolutionary tasks, its implications for the relationship between the authorities and the people were troubling. Less widespread but also problematic were the loose morals of party and government personnel, especially their practice of “adultery.” Left unchecked, such “evils” would “damage the prestige” of the party and government. See “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 74-CT/TW, ngay 27 thang 1 nam 1964,” 59.

  151. “Final Minutes (Verbatim Record) of the 668th Meeting of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam,” 13 August 1964, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-8 [FP. 1], Vol. 10125, RG 25, LAC, 2; Washington to Ottawa, 8 August 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1. The United States at the time recognized DRVN territorial water to extend three, not twelve, nautical miles from its coast.

  152. For an authoritative account of those events, see Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

  153. Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 134.

  154. Nhan dan, 20 September 1964; “Thong cao cua UBTVQH, 10.8.1964” [Communiqué by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, 10 August 1964], Ho so 1235: Ho so phien hop thu 3 cua UBTVQH khoa III ngay 10.8.1964 ve su kien vinh Bac Bo ngay 5.8.1964 va bo nhiem dai su, Phong Quoc hoi, VNAC3, 1. Edwin Moïse concluded that the North Vietnamese conducted no attacks against Americans vessels on 4 August (Moïse, Tonkin Gulf).

  155. “Final Minutes (Verbatim Record) of the 668th Meeting of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam,” 3.

  156. Robert S. McNamara, James Blight, and Robert Brigham, Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 186.

  157. BCGH to SEAD, 2 September 1964, FO 371/175481, NAUK, 2.

  158. FGDH to MFA, 1 September 1964, #76, AO: VN, ADF, A6.

  159. “Memorandum for the Commissioner [Saigon] from the Permanent Representative, Hanoi,” 24 August 1964, 20-VIET-N-1-4, Vol. 9001, RG 25, LAC, 1.

  160. “North Viet-Nam: Annual Review for 1964,” 1.

  161. “Memorandum for the Commissioner [Saigon] from the Permanent Representative, Hanoi,” 17 August 1964, 20-VIET-N-1-4, Vol. 9001, RG 25, LAC, 1.

  162. Saigon (from Hanoi) to Ottawa, 17 August 1964, 2.

  163. “North Viet-Nam: Annual Review for 1964,” 4.

  164. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 249–50.

  165. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf, 252.

  166. Turley, Second Indochina War, 84.

  167. Bo Quoc phong—Vien Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Tap 11, 155; Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang Cong san Viet Nam, 267 (emphasis in original).

  168. Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang Cong san Viet Nam, 267.

  169. Bo Quoc phong—Vien Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Tap 11, 155.

  170. BCGH to SEAD, 2 September 1964, FO 371/175481, NAUK, 1.

  171. Turley, Second Indochina War, 103–4.

  172. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Between the Storms: An International History of the Second Indochina War, 1968–1973” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2008), 35.

  173. Bo Quoc phong—Vien Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Tap 11, 156.

  174. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 128.

  175. “But we are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves,” Johnson remarked in a speech in Akron, Ohio, in October 1964.

  176. From the testimony of a PAVN prisoner of war reproduced in Canadian Delegation, ICSC, Saigon, to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, “Report on Interrogation of Prisoners of PAVN 325th Division,” Enclosure 2, Appendix C, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4, Vol. 10124, RG 25, LAC, 13.

  177. McNamara, Blight, and Brigham, Argument without End, 185–86; Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 126; Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 332–33; 50 nam Quan doi nhan dan Viet Nam [50 Years of the People’s Army of Vietnam] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Quan doi nhan dan, 1995), 199; and Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang Cong san Viet Nam, 268. I am grateful to Bill Turley, Mark Moyar, and Ang Cheng Guan for personally helping me in elucidating this matter.

  178. “Report on Interrogation of Prisoners of PAVN 325th Division,” Enclosure 2, Appendix C, 15.

  179. See, for instance, Porter, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 49.

  180. Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 80–81.

  181. Tai Sung An, “Hanoi’s 15th Plenum Resolution—M
ay 1959,” Folder 010, Box 30, DPC: Unit 05—National Liberation Front, VATTU, 282n226. An official history of the PAVN confirms that assessment, stating that Resolution 9 “laid out correct, timely policies and directions” for “sending main force troops to the South.” See Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 72. The same conclusion is presented in Ralph. B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Vol. 2: The Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1961–65 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 346–49; and Gunter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 39.

  182. Qiang Zhai, “Uneasy Relationship,” 110–11.

  183. Turley, Second Indochina War, 104.

  184. Bo Quoc phong—Vien Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Hau phuong chien tranh nhan dan Viet Nam, 1945–1975 [The Rear Base of the Vietnamese People’s War] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Quan doi nhan dan, 1997), 174; Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 127. According to the latter, only approximately nine thousand cadres and PAVN troops infiltrated the South in 1964.

  185. Xiaoming Zhang, “The Vietnam War, 1964–1969: A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Military History 60, no. 4 (October 1996): 741–42.

  186. “North Viet-Nam: Annual Review for 1964,” 4.

  187. FGDH to MFA, 5 October 1964, B1, B3–B4.

  188. BCGH to SEAD, 17 October 1964, FO 371/175486, NAUK, 1.

  189. “Traduction de la lettre du 21 Octobre adressée par M. Pham van Dong, Premier Ministre du Gouvernment de la RDVN, à M. Chou En-lai” [Translation of a Letter Dated 21 October from Mr. Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the DRVN Government, to Mr. Zhou Enlai], 23 October 1964, #38, AO: VN, ADF, 1.

  190. FGDH to MFA, 21 October 1964, #38, AO: VN, ADF, 1, 5–6.

  191. FGDH to MFA, 26 October 1964, #38, AO: VN, ADF, 2–3.

  192. BCGH to SEAD, 29 September 1964, FO 371/175486, NAUK, 1.

  193. BES to SEAD, 15 October 1964, FO 371/175487, NAUK, 1.

  194. “Memorandum for the Commissioner [Saigon] from the Permanent Representative, Hanoi,” 8 September 1964, 5.

  195. On the CPSU Central Committee’s 15 October decision to relieve Khrushchev of his duties as head of the party and the government, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 3–17.

  196. Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam, 210.

  197. FGDH to MFA, 9 November 1964, #36, AO: VN, ADF, 10.

  198. “Relations between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam,” 17 February 1966, 20-USSR-1-3-VIET N [Part 1], Vol. 10853, RG 25, LAC, 2; Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam, 206.

  199. Porter, “Hanoi’s Strategic Perspective,” 16–17.

  200. FGDH to MFA, 9 November 1964, #76, AO: VN, ADF, B4.

  201. BCGH to SEAD, 17 October 1964, FO 371/175486, NAUK, 1.

  202. Lorenz Lüthi, “Twenty-Four Soviet Bloc Documents on Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1964–1966,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 16 (2008) [hereafter CWIHPB 16]: 368.

  203. Nicholas Khoo, Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 20–21.

  204. “Remarks by the GDR Embassy in Hanoi on the Article in Hoc tap No. 11/1964, 12 November 1964 [Excerpts],” in CWIHPB 16, 372.

  205. Ibid. That episode is also related in FGDH to MFA, 9 November.

  206. FGDH to MFA, 8 December 1964, #76, AO: VN, ADF, B4.

  207. “Note: Position soviétique sur les affaires du Sud-Est asiatique” [Note: Soviet Position on Southeast Asian Affairs], 9 December 1964, #313, AO: VN, ADF, 2.

  208. Saigon (from Hanoi) for Ottawa, 21 November 1964, 20-VIET N-1-3 [Part 1], Vol. 8892, RG 25, LAC, 1, 2, 4.

  209. Gaiduk, “Soviet Policy towards US Participation,” 49.

  210. “Letter from A. A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to Xuan Thuy, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DRV,” 30 December 1964, reproduced in L. V. Kotov and R. S. Yegorov, Militant Solidarity, Fraternal Assistance (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 31–33.

  211. Gaiduk, “Containing the Warriors,” 74; French Embassy, Moscow, to MFA, 27 November 1964, #313, AO: VN, ADF, 1–2.

  212. “Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State,” 1 November 1964, in FRUS: I, VN, 1964, 873.

  213. Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang Cong san Viet Nam, 268–69.

  214. Quoted in King C. Chen, “Hanoi vs. Peking,” 812.

  215. Quoted in Washington, DC, to Ottawa, 19 December 1964, 20-22-VIET S-1, 9387 [Part 2], RG 25, LAC, 6.

  216. “North Viet-Nam: Annual Review for 1964,” 2.

  217. The comments by the Cambodian foreign minister are reported in French Mission at the United Nations to MFA, 19 December 1964, #313, AO: VC, ADF, 1.

  EPILOGUE

  1. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945—1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 135. Possibly, a local commander planned and ordered the attack on Pleiku without sanction from Hanoi. See Robert S. McNamara, James Blight, and Robert Brigham, Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 173.

  2. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 344, 363; and Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 636.

  3. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 88-CT/TW, ngay 2 thang 1 nam 1965: Ve cuoc van dong chinh huan mua xuan nam 1965” [Politburo Instruction, no. 88-CT/TW, 2 January 1965: On Re-education Activities during Spring 1965], in Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang—Toan tap, Tap 26: 1965 [Party Documents—Complete Series, Vol. 26: 1965] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2003) [hereafter VKD: 1965], 3.

  4. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 90-CT/TW, ngay 1 thang 3 nam 1965: Ve viec mo cuoc van dong nang cao tinh than canh giac cach mang, y thuc to chuc ky luat, lam tot cong tac tham tra chinh tri va cai tien cong tac quan ly doi ngu can bo, dang vien de bao ve dang (goi tat la cuoc van dong bao ve dang)” [Secretariat Instruction, no. 90-CT/TW, 1 March 1965: On the Matter of Beginning Activities to Elevate Revolutionary Vigilance, Promoting Organizational Discipline, Performing Well the Task of Political Investigation and Improvement of the Administration of Cadres and Party Members to Protect the Party (All Known as Activities to Protect the Party)], in ibid., 44.

  5. Ibid., 47.

  6. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 95-CT/TW, ngay 8 thang 4 nam 1965: Ve viec dieu dong can bo phuc vu cho yeu cau xay dung quan doi trong tinh hinh va nhiem vu moi” [Secretariat Instruction, no. 95-CT/TW, 8 April 1965: On the Matter of Appointing Cadres to Serve the Requirement of Building the Armed Forces in the New Situation and Responsibilities], in ibid., 137–39.

  7. “Memorandum for Commissioner, Saigon, from the Permanent Representative, Hanoi,” 15 January 1965, 20-VIET N-1-4, Vol. 9001 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.

  8. Hy Van Luong, Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925–1988 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 202.

  9. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 164.

  10. Quoted in History of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1986), 195.

  11. Nguyen Thi Thap, Lich su phong trao phu nu Viet nam [History of the Vietnamese Women’s Movement] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Phu nu, 1981), 109; “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 99-CT/TW, ngay 8 thang 6 nam 1965: Ve phuong huong, nhiem vu cua cong tac van dong phu nu truoc tinh hinh moi” [Politburo Instruction, no. 99-CT/TW, 8 June 1965: On the Direction, Responsibilities, and Work to Mobilize Women in the New Era], in VKD: 1965, 198–203. Hanoi’s immediate response to the Americanization of hostilities in 1965 is discussed in greater detail in Pierre Asselin, “Hanoi and
Americanization of the War in Vietnam: New Evidence from Vietnam,” Pacific Historical Review 75, no. 3 (August 2005): 427–431.

  12. “Nghi quyet Hoi nghi trung uong lan thu 11 (dac biet), ngay 25, 26, 27 thang 3 nam 1965: Ve tinh hinh va nhiem vu cap bach truoc mat” [Resolution of the Special Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee, 25–27 March 1965: On the New Situation and Pressing Responsibilities Ahead], in VKD: 1965, 105.

  13. Ibid, 108; “De cuong bao cao tai Hoi nghi Ban chap hanh Trung uong lan thu 11 (dac biet), hop tu ngay 25 den ngay 27 thang 3 nam 1965: Kip thoi chuyen huong viec xay dung va phat trien kinh te quoc dan phuc vu dac luc nhiem vu cach mang ca nuoc trong tinh hinh moi” [Draft Report at the Special Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee, 25–27 March 1965: Promptly Adjusting the Work to Build and Develop the People’s Economy to Efficiently Serve the Revolutionary Responsibilities of the Entire Country in the New Era], in VKD: 1965, 58, 65; “Thong bao cua Ban Bi thu, so 56-TB/TW, ngay 1 thang 4 nam 1965: Nhung quy dinh cua Bo Chinh tri ve viec to chuc lanh dao cong tac tiep tuc cai tao xa hoi chu nghia doi voi cong thuong nghiep tu ban tu doanh, thu cong nghiep va thuong nghiep nho” [Secretariat Circular, no. 56-TB/TW, 1 April 1965: The Stipulations of the Politburo on the Matter of Organizing the Leadership of the Effort to Continue Building Socialism with Regard to Private Capitalist Trade, Handicraft, and Small Business], in VKD: 1965, 119–25.

  14. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 94-CT/TW, ngay 2 thang 4 nam 1965: Ve cong tac tu tuong trong tinh hinh truoc mat” [Secretariat Instruction, no. 94-CT/TW, 2 April 1965: On Ideological Work in the Situation Ahead], in ibid., 127; “Government Report Submitted by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, April 1965,” reproduced in Against U.S. Aggression: Main Documents of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 3rd Legislature—2nd Session, April 1965 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1966), 40.

 

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