by Larry Berman
King was the person Moorer had pushed on Chafee for Bud’s job as CNO. Bud’s revenge would be to move King as soon as he could, making him deputy chief of naval operations for surface warfare. Bud then moved Salzer into the Vietnam command. Bud felt that King “did a very poor job, in my judgment, primarily because he was the kind who simply never understood the Vietnamese culture. He was, by nature, a driver rather than a leader. And he turned off Admiral Chon almost completely. It was a very standoff relationship with, you know, directions being sent, and was totally counterproductive.”36 Naval historian Paul Stillwell offered a more nuanced perspective. “Vietnamization became frustrating to King because it wasn’t the same desire to victory that had existed before. He presided over the diminishment of American capability there and was not always confident of the South Vietnamese ability or willingness to take over the equipment and the roles” of the U.S. Navy operating in rivers and canals.37
The Senate confirmation hearings amounted to a stroke fest. Bud had arrived without any prepared statement, but Chairman Stennis wanted something on the record. He told Bud not to be concerned about substance but to just say something because “we want you to feel like you are a member of the family here, but we’ve got to pass on you, and make a definite recommendation, so just make such a statement as you see fit.” Speaking without notes, Bud took a few minutes to thank the committee for waiving its rules so that he could return to command. He noted that in succeeding Tom Moorer, he would now be working with a chairman of the JCS who knew more about “my” navy than he did. “I look forward to the challenge. I promise to do my best.”38
Senators Scoop Jackson and John Tower followed Bud’s brief comments with words of praise. Jackson recalled meeting Captain Zumwalt several years earlier during the complicated and sensitive Paul Nitze confirmation hearings. “I had nothing but admiration and respect for his very broad knowledge of national security matters. We are dealing with certain aspects of the situation that far transcended the narrow confines of naval responsibility. I have nothing but respect for his ability as a good generalist, to deal with the problems that he will have to face, particularly as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Senator Tower expressed special delight that a boatswain’s mate in the U.S. Naval Reserve was passing judgment on a new CNO. “I am personally delighted to see a black-shoe sailor take over as the Chief of Naval Operations. I think it is time us surface sailors have something to say about what goes on.” Tower added that he recalled “the many fine things that General Abrams had to say about Admiral Zumwalt and his work in Southeast Asia.”
Bud was asked one important question during the hearings by Senator Peter Dominick of Colorado involving the Nixon position on a “one and a half war strategy.” Bud’s reply foreshadowed his own strategic concept for a surface navy that needed to be able to defeat the Soviet navy in all oceans. “Our problem is that we can never be local in the Navy as long as we face the Soviet Union as a primary threat. . . . One of the things I want to do is to take a look at the present structure of the Navy and see whether I would recommend to Mr. Chafee and to the President any changes.”
Senator George Murphy of California next captured the sentiments of the committee: “Since I have had the privilege of serving on this committee, I know of no nomination that has been received with as much enthusiasm as yours. I think this speaks very highly.” Murphy was scheduled to be in Tulare that Saturday and promised to announce the nomination from Mineral King, a glacial valley and backpacker’s paradise whose nearby peaks are the highest points in Tulare County.
With that, the hearings concluded, taking just twenty-five minutes. Bud was on his way back to Saigon the same evening. On May 7, 1970, the full committee voted unanimously in favor of the nomination. Bud Zumwalt was confirmed by the Senate on May 15, 1970.
The change-of-command ceremony at which Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., was relieved as commander of naval forces in Vietnam by Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, Jr., occurred on May 15 aboard the USS Page County moored on the Saigon River near the Vietnamese navy headquarters in Saigon.39 Mouza, Ann, and Mouzetta flew in from the Philippines to join Elmo for the ceremony. Guest speaker General Creighton Abrams awarded Bud the Distinguished Service Medal and bestowed the Navy Unit Commendation on behalf of the secretary of the navy for “exceptionally meritorious service.” In a touching tribute to his friend, Admiral Tran Van Chon spoke about all that Bud had done for the Vietnamese navy.
When Bud’s opportunity to speak came, he looked back at the past twenty months and could see the map of Vietnam’s waterways changing from blue to green, from U.S. to Vietnamese navy, all along and throughout the rivers of the South. He noted that the South Vietnamese navy had just demonstrated its progress by joining the U.S. Navy in opening the first thirty miles of the Mekong, then without U.S. support “made a dramatic movement to Phnom Penh and then overnight to Kampong Cham with a three-inch [sic] gunship and armored boats.” This represented a tremendous feat of professionalism and navigation during which the South Vietnamese sailors removed nine thousand refugees and escorted merchant ships that had been denied passage back down to the harbor.
Turning to unfinished business, Bud reminded his relief, Admiral King, that the job was only 35 or 40 percent done. “There remain in this year 29 bases to be completed to replace U.S. Navy ships, there remains 7,500 repair technicians to be trained in these bases, there remains the job of upgrading the training of these beginners to the point where they relieve our senior petty officers and junior officers and take over their own middle management.” In closing, Bud looked to the future as CNO by sharing what he had learned from his sailors. He felt “re-qualified in youth,” meaning that from his sailors he had learned “their aspirations, the pressures under which they operate, the inducements to be discounted, the courage with which they participate nevertheless to the fullest in the support of their country—and I pledge myself to represent them in my leadership of the U.S. Navy.”40
Vietnam and Bud Zumwalt would be forever linked. As he was preparing to depart Vietnam, Bud wrote Commander Pham Manh Khue in the Second Coastal Zone, Nha Trang. “As the time draws near for me to depart Vietnam, I feel a great sense of nostalgia for . . . the pursuit of our common goal of victory in Vietnam. I assure you that my support for the Vietnamese navy will never cease.”41 As CNO Bud would do everything possible to support ACTOV and the training of the Vietnamese navy. Admiral Chon’s son, Tran Van Truc, would enter the U.S. Naval Academy as a plebe in the summer of 1970, and Bud promised to keep a special eye on Chon’s son. The Zumwalt home became Truc’s home during holidays. Bud wrote regularly to the superintendent of the academy, inquiring about Truc’s progress, and passed this information on to Chon.42 Four years later, both Bud and Chon attended Truc’s graduation from the academy.
The other link to Vietnam was through Bud’s son Elmo, scheduled to be released from the navy in early August 1970. Bud tried convincing Elmo that he should remain in the navy as a career, just as Bud’s father had convinced him to do, but Elmo had other plans. Elmo was ready to leave Vietnam. “The sense of adventure and self-testing that had first drawn me to Vietnam had long since gone. Now I just wanted to get out alive and marry Kathy.”43 Bud wrote to Dr. James Caldwell at the University of North Carolina, thanking him for all the help he had given Elmo and his family. “And who am I to stand in his way?”44 In an August 4, 1970, note to Lew Glenn, Bud reported that “Elmo returned healthy and fit from his tour in Vietnam during the latter part of June.”45 No one knew of the ticking bomb that Elmo carried inside his body.
In order to consult with his commanders in the Sixth and Seventh fleets, Bud departed Vietnam via a circuitous route. He went to Japan to meet with a senior military leader, Admiral Shigeru Itaya, who twenty-five years earlier had been a commander in the Battle of Surigao Strait when Bud was a young destroyer lieutenant. This visit was followed by meetings with Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei and a briefing from Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapor
e. From there he flew to Naples for consultations with the commander of NATO’s southern forces, Admiral Horacio Rivero, Jr. In Brussels he consulted with General Andrew Goodpaster, supreme allied commander, Europe.
Bud planned on going to Vienna to check in with his mentor Paul Nitze, who at the time was serving as the American delegate for the secretary of defense at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). Secretary Chafee nixed this idea because Admiral Moorer might once again become concerned about the Zumwalt-Nitze axis. Chafee did not want his new CNO to alienate the new chairman of the JCS. Instead, the JCS representative, Lieutenant General Roy Allison, met Bud in Brussels for a limited briefing. Bud knew that from Nitze he would have received a wider vision of the dynamics of world and superpower politics, as well as insights into relevant domestic considerations.
From Brussels Bud went to London and then for a much anticipated and needed family vacation in Bermuda. He had a month to get ready for his new position, but suddenly fate threatened to upend everything. Bud became very ill while in Bermuda, where he was enjoying a few days of well-deserved rest and fun with his family. He was so sick that he needed to be medevacked from Bermuda to Andrews Air Force Base. Waiting on the tarmac was his personal physician, Bill Narva. “You look like shit,” said Narva. “I feel like shit,” replied Bud.46
Narva saw immediately that Bud was dehydrated and in need of fluids. He personally made the decision that Bud must go directly to Bethesda Naval Hospital. In order not to raise press attention, Bud would go in Narva’s car, not by ambulance. Marine aide Mike Spiro took Ann and Mouzetta home while Mouza stayed with her husband. Tests showed that while in Vietnam he must have contracted giardia. He then had an allergic reaction to the medication, so bad that doctors thought he was having a heart attack. “I had the sinking sensation that after all these years of striving for a goal and having been appointed to the top spot now, for physical reasons I might never get there.”47 The first question Bud asked Narva was, “Will I be able to take the oath in ten days?” Narva assured Bud they would both be there.48
One of the most colorful and tradition-bathed of naval ceremonies occurs at Tecumseh Court at the Naval Academy for changes of command. At 11:00 a.m. on July 1, 1970, the ceremony at which Bud Zumwalt relieved Admiral Thomas H. Moorer as chief of naval operations began. On the way, the Zumwalt limo broke down on Route 50, three miles from Annapolis. Dressed in full regalia, Bud and Mouza hitched a ride with a young sailor, who could not believe he was escorting his new CNO to the change of command.
In the audience were Bud’s father, Mouza, and all four children, who over the years had shared the pleasures and borne the hardships and separations with patience and good humor. The day belonged to them as well. The ceremonial party—consisting of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Secretary of the Navy John Chafee, Admirals Moorer and Zumwalt, the retiring chief of chaplains, the superintendent of the Naval Academy, the judge advocate general, and the new chief of chaplains—marched onto the stage in front of Bancroft Hall. “Here in the open area with the famous statue of Tecumseh directly in front of our stage with Bancroft Hall behind us and the Naval Academy Chapel off to our far left and the beautiful Severn River on our right, it seemed truly appropriate for this important and symbolic moment to be taking place,” Bud recalled afterward.49
After the national anthem, Secretaries Chafee and Laird offered brief remarks, commenting on the superb performance given by Admiral Moorer during his tenure as CNO and expected in the higher station to which he was being called. Both secretaries welcomed Bud Zumwalt to his new command of the navy. Admiral Moorer gave his farewell speech, reading orders detaching him as chief of naval operations and ordering him to the job of chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This was followed by the traditional nineteen-gun salute, based on the superstition that gun salutes should be an odd number preceded by four ruffles and flourishes.
With the honors completed, Bud Zumwalt’s time arrived. The oath of office was administered by the navy’s judge advocate general. Placing his hand on the same Bible that Admiral Farragut used aboard his flagship, the USS Hartford, during the Civil War, Bud took his oath of office. Admiral Moorer then turned to Captain Harry Train and said, “Captain Train, break my flag.” The flag was then hauled down. Bud read his orders, turned to Captain Train, and said, “Captain Train, break my flag.” After the flag with four stars was broken at the flagpole, Bud turned to Admiral Moore, saluted him, and said, “Admiral Moorer, I relieve you.” Moorer returned the salute, saying, “Very well.”
Turning to Secretary Chafee, Bud saluted. “Sir, I report for duty as Chief of Naval Operations.” Chafee replied, “Very well.” Turning to the secretary of defense, Bud said, “Sir, I report for duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Laird replied, “Very well.” This too was followed by the nineteen-gun salute, preceded by four ruffles and flourishes.
Bud Zumwalt was now officially chief of naval operations. His three predecessors had been aviators; the person he was replacing, who now was his boss, had not supported the nomination.50 In his relieving remarks, the new CNO focused on looming challenges, which included a Soviet navy increasing in size, versatility, and quality and confronting the United States in areas of the oceans once considered Free World Lakes. National priorities were changing, and the navy needed to compete for personnel and resources with new and innovative programs. Meanwhile, the navy had to simultaneously continue the war in Vietnam while planning and transitioning toward the navy of the future. In closing, Bud said that the one special virtue in his selection was that only nine years earlier he had been a commander and for the past twenty months he had been closely associated with the young officers and men of the Brown Water Navy. He was in tune “with the problems, hopes and aspirations of the young at a time when inadequate personnel retention is becoming our greatest problem.” He promised to tackle and reverse these current adverse personnel trends by making the navy a place where young people wanted to be. “Let us assign my marks based on results during the next four years.”51
With that, the Navy Band played “Anchors Aweigh.”
During the transition period, Secretary Chafee had shared his thoughts on matters that would be affecting both of them.52 “The most important thing that Chafee did to reshape the Navy was, of course, to appoint Zumwalt. It had to be a revolutionary thing in his time,” recalled Stansfield Turner. “I think it was Chafee’s frustration with the personnel management procedures of the Navy and the flag detailing procedures that tempted him to take a radical step toward a Zumwalt.”53
Chafee urged Bud to think carefully about “where the Navy is going,” because “as soon as we can decide just what kind of Navy we want, then our fulfilling that requirement is made much easier.” Chafee knew this question was still unsettled. “We just haven’t made up our mind to date as to what type of a Navy we want. Is it to be a navy with a broad thin base that can be filled out in mobilization (many ships lightly manned) or is it to be fewer ships adequately manned and equipped? This isn’t an easy question but one we have got to wrestle with soon.”54
Chafee framed the next issue as one of “greater quality control on our personnel.” Considering the marines, he said, “Their philosophy that it’s a privilege to qualify for the reduced Marine Corps has much merit.” Chafee wanted to focus on “retention of just the best as we go into these big draw-downs of personnel. I think we can put greater challenge to the men to measure up to the Navy requirements rather than our sounding the alarm so much on our problems of keeping people.” The secretary raised the challenge of giving people greater responsibility. Focusing specifically on new criteria to be used when selecting captains for promotion to rear admiral, Chafee noted the navy had always selected men of character, distinguished by loyalty, physical and intellectual courage, tenacity, respect for the opinions of others, kindness to subordinates, candor in rendering opinions, and capacity to inspire and lead. “We seek in addition to the above characteristics, men of high prof
essional competence who have the ability to think logically, express themselves clearly both orally and in writing, and finally who evidence a capacity for growth in future years.”
The new navy also needed to be prepared to fight, and therefore “we need men who will be superb leaders in wartime.” Youth should not be a deterrent, and the standard should not be whether they are potential CNOs. “I would hope that you would select a few iconoclasts—original, provocative thinkers who would be unlikely CNO material but would stimulate the Navy to constantly re-examine its premises and whose selection would encourage those in the lower ranks to do likewise with the realization that they are not just tolerated but in fact welcomed. Finally, full consideration must be given for service in Vietnam. This is the crucible where men are daily being tested and those who perform well are worthy of every consideration for higher Navy responsibility.”55
Chafee had given his new CNO a broad menu. “I am really looking forward to the years ahead with you and I know we can meet the challenges that are certainly there.” On July 1, 1970, his first day on the job, Bud wrote Chafee that “in the years before us the problems in both the personnel and material areas will be great. I am sure that together we can help make the Navy ever better for the people and for our country.”56
In order to meet these challenges, Bud created a small study group to look at the present status and future possibilities of the navy. Project Sixty, named for the sixty-day deadline imposed by Bud so that he could report to Secretary Chafee, was revolutionary in every respect. Its main theme was modernization of both equipment and people. The project reflected Bud’s vision for the long-term future of the navy by rebalancing the surface, subsurface, and air components in order to counter the growing threat of the Soviet navy.57 No previous CNO had ever tried to undertake this type of reform agenda, involving strategic modernization within the context of maintaining a high-quality all-volunteer force with sufficient capability during the modernization process for the navy to continue to perform its mission.58