by Larry Berman
The declassified records from the August 18, 1970, briefing of the president reveal that Bud focused on two significant changes of the last few years in the power equation between the United States and the Soviet Union: the rapid growth to parity of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces and the rapid development of Soviet maritime power. Drawing attention to the importance of a sea-based deterrent, Bud argued that control of the seas with conventional naval forces made it likely that our ballistic-missile-system submarines would survive a conventional naval war. The huge expense of the Polaris/Poseidon program had reduced the size of the conventional navy appreciably. The next generation of ballistic-missile submarines could not be funded by the navy’s general-purpose-forces budget because this would have disastrous effects on the ability to control the seas.80
The majority of reductions since 1968 had been in sea-control capabilities in order to save projection forces for South Vietnam. Sea control provided combined capabilities of naval air, surface, and subsurface systems to defeat the enemy at sea. Projection forces were those applied to overseas land areas—aircraft from carriers, marine forces via amphibious landings or airlifts, and the 96 percent of the logistics for all services projected via commandeered merchant marine vessels.81
In each measure, Soviet capabilities were improving relative to those of the United States. The Soviet merchant marine had already overtaken that of the United States in numbers and tonnage. The Soviets had significantly more ships ten years old or less and they were overtaking the United States in nuclear submarines.
The question of balancing sea-control forces and projection forces was central to planning for the navy. For the new CNO, the bottom line was that naval forces were already at the lowest possible level for restraining the Soviets from contesting control of the seas explicitly or through proxies. Moreover, the Soviet navy was emerging as a balanced and modern global navy, growing from its restricted operations in the form of a large submarine fleet. In honoring NATO commitments, the U.S. Navy needed to be prepared to defeat Soviet or Soviet-sponsored interference with sea lines of communication and to overcome determined resistance to projection of power ashore.82
After the briefing, Nixon called Bud aside to say that he understood that Bud was nervous, but the first goal was to nail down strategic superiority in the SALT negotiations, get out of the war in Vietnam, and then get to work on getting sufficient budget support to turn the maritime balance around. It made sense to Bud so long as strategic superiority was achieved in the negotiations.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 had been a first baby step, a contract between two sides who did not trust each other but were willing to see what might be possible. This resulted in the passage of a nuclear nonproliferation arrangement, a hotline, a ban on weapons of mass destruction in space, a limitation on the use of seabeds for strategic weapons, and further down the road, a separable first-stage disarmament proposal—later known as SALT.
Nitze was back in Washington during the SALT recess in June when he told Bud that “our government was offering too many changes in our position in too short of a time.”83 Nitze shared his grave concern about the optimism felt within the Nixon administration about prospects for the SALT negotiations. “It was his view that the only basis for optimism about concluding negotiations was under the assumption that the United States would continue to erode its positions until they became undesirable for the U.S. point of view and acceptable to the Soviets.”84
On Bud’s first day in office, he issued an administrative edict that “a competent study be undertaken on strategic arms limitations and their relation to naval forces. It is felt that inadequate analytic information and substantive analyses are available to support the current Navy rationale.”85 Bud had been prepared for the complexity of the strategic-arms issue but not for the way the arms-control bureaucracy would stampede normal staff processes. He had served a tour as the director of arms control in the office of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and, of course, there was his service during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. After coming so close to the brink, both sides wanted to reduce the chances of annihilating the world. Bud believed that the Soviets had a strategy to negotiate a test ban treaty while also initiating the largest strategic maritime construction program in history. They were trying to reduce the risks of nuclear war while working to shift the correlation of forces in a way that made it possible for Soviet foreign policy objectives to be supported by an increasing Soviet military capability relative to the West.
In a letter to Abe some sixty days into his job, Bud provided his former boss with an overview of his first two months as CNO: “As you know, I relieved Admiral Moorer in a ceremony at the Naval Academy on the first of July and began to face the major challenges unique to the era of the early 70s. The major problem for the Navy, of course, is that the Soviets have built a magnificent Navy along with arriving at parity in the strategic arms race while we have been engaged in Southeast Asia. As a significant measure of this change, last year their Navy had more ships in the Mediterranean than ours when only ten years ago their Mediterranean presence was negligible. At the same time, as you are well aware, the severe budget restraints have caused dramatic decreases in our Navy’s ship population. At the same time as a result of poor image of the military and an unfavorable domestic atmosphere, we are facing one of the worst personnel retention problems that the Navy has faced in the last decades.”86
Bud offered an optimistic assessment from initial briefings of the president. “The Chiefs had an opportunity to discuss briefly their views with the President in the middle of August and I was able to point out some of these problems to him. I was much impressed both by what he already knew in the strategic area and how fast he was able to take aboard the points I made.”87
Bringing Abe up-to-date on related matters, Bud explained he was “investigating means of living within budget constraints and still molding a tight efficient Naval force that can maintain a pretense of control of the seas in the face of the Soviets’ build-up; and we have kicked off many programs that we hope will eventually have an impact on the personnel retention problems.” Junior officers had already been brought in to brainstorm the retention problem. “Some of their suggestions have been unique and all of them have been mature and worthy of our addressing in some manner. Their primary concerns seem to be the standard Navy problems of family separations, a desire to be challenged with meaningful assignments, and a chance to be heard. I feel so strongly that we need to turn this downward retention problem around (our first term reenlistment on carriers is down to 3%) that I have taken steps to implement as many of their suggestions as we can within general constraints on good discipline.”
In transitioning to an all-volunteer force, it was apparent that the navy faced a particular set of problems, not only in competing with the other military services, but in maintaining public support for an adequate navy. It would be necessary to broaden the base from which people were recruited and to make the navy more of a microcosm of society at large. The navy would be linked more closely with the mores and lifestyles of the civilian population from which it was recruiting. This would be Bud Zumwalt’s next battlefield.
CHAPTER 10
ZINGERS
Your Z-grams have had an electrifying effect upon those of us lacking in excesses of gold braid and upon the men with whom we work and live so closely with. Even more than the printed Z-grams and their messages, the realization that “The Man” cares for his men.
—SAILOR P. M. MCDERMOTT1
Each of the candidates John Chafee had interviewed for the position of CNO recognized the challenges posed by the Soviet navy, but only one was able to articulate the belief that existing policies and practices in personnel administration posed an equal or even greater danger to the navy’s future. The disaffection of the nation’s youth and the loss of credibility the military had suffered as a result of the war in Vietnam required a concerted investment by those in le
adership positions. In transitioning to an all-volunteer force, it was apparent to Bud that the navy faced a particular set of retention problems, not only in competing with the other military services, but also in regard to maintaining public support for the concept of an adequately staffed navy.2
When it came to identifying inducements for making naval service more attractive and enjoyable, Bud endorsed words rarely used to describe military service; fun and zest became the watchwords for addressing regulations pertaining to personal behavior, beginning with dress and grooming but also including operational schedules, homeporting, and job rotation—all of the things that affected the long family separations that had defined “the trauma as it affected me, my wife and our children.”3 The navy had acquired some irritating and unproductive barnacles over the years that had unnecessary and unfavorable impacts on people and their families. It was those barnacles to which he took the chipping hammer.
Three weeks into his watch, a message went out to all commands that henceforth any policy or guidance emanating directly from the CNO would be identified by Zulu (military word code for the letter Z) series numbers—Z-1, Z-2, etc.4 The messages were quickly dubbed Z-grams. Bud’s decision to use Z-grams was his tactic to make himself the lightning rod for the controversy that inevitably accompanies dramatic reform. The basic purpose of Z-grams was to permit the general policies of the navy to meet the general needs of the majority of navy personnel. Family separation had long been understood as one of the main disadvantages of navy life. The program for overseas homeporting enabled the navy to meet deployment commitments without sharply increasing time away from home. The program benefited men aboard ships as well as reduced additional deployments for the rest of the navy.
Z-grams highlighted the interdependence of human-relations goals with the requirements for order and discipline. They were designed to correct racial and gender discrimination and to fulfill legitimate aspirations for justifiable changes. They were also intended to make clear that “I desired the kind of leaders whom men would want to follow rather than those leaders who had to drive their men. . . . Good commanders put fun and zest into the daily routine. Creative leadership can produce ways of making even the dullest routine palatable.”5
Bud’s Vietnam experience convinced him that patriotism, fighting effectiveness, and morale had little to do with the length of a sailor’s hair or allowing beer in barracks. The need to constrain a few potentially troublesome individuals would no longer be allowed to drive navy policy. Z-grams did not change the basic conditions of military service or the authority of commanding officers in the chain of command. What had changed for those in the chain of command was the need to pay greater attention to a sailor’s individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities. Therein lay the problem, since many in the chain of command were incapable of enlightened leadership.
The Z-grams came in a flurry; 69 were issued in the first six months of his term6 and 113 over the first two years, but only 8 in the next twenty-four months, when the focus was on implementation. Of all the names given to Z-grams, Bud liked Zingers best,7 which was what Lew Glenn’s crew aboard the USS Tattnall nicknamed them.8 “Each morning everyone looks forward to the good news,” wrote Glenn. Even Bud’s harshest critics were caught up in the enthusiasm of the moment, as evidenced by a note from Ray Peet, commander of the First Fleet: “Your Z-grams are having a tremendous impact out here. All the youngsters and the COs of ships are enthusiastic about them. They are serving as a catalyst for communication between seniors and juniors. The JOs are really rejuvenated.”9 After reading the Z-gram on homeporting, Mrs. Eric N. Brueland of Camarillo, California, a new navy wife, wrote, “It brought tears to my eyes for I have never seen such sincerity for others in the military expressed. . . . Just knowing that you are aware of how we wives and families fight our own little war of waiting at home is most gratifying to me.”
The most publicized and prominent Zingers were Z-57 of November 10, 1970, “Demeaning or Abrasive Regulations, Elimination of,” and Z-66, “Equal Opportunity in the Navy,” issued on December 17, 1970. Others were equally controversial, like Z-48, “Programs for People,” October 23, 1970, which created a new office in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Pers-P, the second P standing for people. Z-48 represented Bud’s attempt to institutionalize the reforms. “It is one thing to promulgate new programs, but quite another to sustain and nourish their forward progress.”10
On November 10, 1970, Bud issued Z-57, eliminating what he often referred to as Mickey Mouse or chicken regs. Indeed, Bud had intended to title the Z-gram “Mickey Mouse, Elimination of” until his vice chief, Admiral Ralph Cousins, suggested replacing it with “Demeaning and Abrasive Regulations.” The day before, two messages were sent to all officers in command alerting them of the next day’s Z-gram: “It is not in any way intended that this and other NAVOPs usurp your prerogative as an officer in command—I do not desire nor will I accept sloppiness and indifference but I believe we can maintain our high standards while allowing our people to conform to today’s styles.”11 Z-57 stated specifically, “I am not suggesting that a more lenient attitude toward irresponsible behavior be adopted.”
Z-57 liberalized regulations and practices in twelve areas: style of hair, beards, sideburns, civilian clothes, uniforms for trips between home and base and when visiting commissaries and snack bars, attire for enlisted men at officers’ clubs, salutes, motorcycles, conditions for leave, and overnight liberty. Its impact spanned the oceans. Inside the Hanoi Hilton, longtime POW James Stockdale tapped on the wall in Morse code to ask a recent arrival if there was any news from home. “Got a new CNO, named Zumwalt. No more Mickey Mouse or chickenshit.”12 Stockdale could not know that Bud was wearing a POW bracelet imprinted with Stockdale’s name. Once home, Zumwalt gave Stockdale the bracelet. “No single memento of my return or imprisonment will have as profoundness [sic] of meaning comparable to this emblem of your faith in me,” wrote Stockdale.13 On October 11, 1995, Stockdale gave Bud a copy of his book, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot. The handwritten inscription read, “For my Boss at a crucial time, Bud Zumwalt. It was he more than any other man who gave me a boost when I came out of prison, and the confidence to press ahead in the Post-Vietnam years.”14
Bud saw no evidence that listening to popular music or wearing neatly trimmed beards, mustaches, and sideburns affected sailors’ ability to operate ships and stations in a disciplined, seamanlike manner. This did not stop critics from mocking the loosening of standards and claiming that such appearances fostered permissiveness. From San Diego, a bastion of the growing anti-Zumwalt fervor, retired vice admiral Lorenzo S. Sabin, Jr., wrote Bud that a prominent La Jolla citizen was shocked “to see Navy personnel with grotesque facial hair and head hair, wearing sloppy uniforms in the streets, some with trousers tucked into clips roaring the streets on motorcycles.”15 Blanche Seaver was especially bothered when attending a change-of-command ceremony and seeing beards on half the band, making them look like “hippies from Haight-Ashbury.”16 In reply, Bud pointed out that several of the earliest CNOs would be out of compliance or nonregulation by contemporary standards.
The authorization for beer in the barracks was limited to those quarters housing officers and senior enlisted personnel, but that did not stop critics.17 Ruth Collins of Cincinnati wrote, “Concerned citizens are aroused over the possibility of increasing drunkenness in the Armed Forces. We need alert men guarding our country. We remember Pearl Harbor!”18 R. Hagmaier followed suit, “Surely you don’t think beer makes a better sailor? I remember hearing that Washington’s army was able to beat the British on a Christmas Eve because the British were ‘in their cups.’ ”19 After watching Bud’s guest appearance on The David Frost Show, Mary Carr wrote, “I must say that I think you are going for publicity and popularity and don’t seem to give a damn if you wreck the navy. Long hair, beards, beer on board ship means sloppiness, laziness, a hippie cult among the men—gradually ‘pot’ and eventually stoned and dis
credited United States navy. How could you betray your men so?”20
Retired commander Edward Loftin wrote directly to Secretary Chafee, saying he was “appalled to read the latest Z-grams permitting long hair, rock music, liquor in barracks, and several other ‘mod’ innovations by the new CNO. . . . I am not a traditionalist, but traditions have been built over a long period of time and bear examination quite well. . . . These Z-grams are getting more radical as they increase in number. I implore you to replace or subvert the new CNO before the state of discipline is reduced to shambles throughout the navy. History has proved that an undisciplined military force become a rabble which throws down its arms and flees in the face of the enemy.”21
Bud was on safe ground, because he had the support of Secretary Chafee, who shared Bud’s view on all of the changes being implemented. “One’s ability to fight isn’t affected by the length of his hair . . . actually it’s going to improve our fighting ability in that being a more attractive Navy, moving with the times, we’ll be able to keep more of our good people,” said Chafee. “Some of the greatest fighting men in the Navy had hair considerably longer than even under these regulations.”22
While some critics focused on appearances, others addressed a much more serious issue, involving erosion in the chain of command. The argument was that young enlisted men thought they could now go directly to the CNO with grievances, bypassing the petty officers. This manifested itself during the racial disturbances aboard three ships in 1972, but in some ways it was miraculous that in a navy of over six hundred ships, with all the changes going on, there were incidents on only three ships. Rear Admiral Joe Stryker, who had been in charge of Bud’s summer plebe class at Annapolis, wrote, “You will never know how much I approve what you are doing to humanize the Navy and make it fun again. . . . The only adverse remarks I have heard on your plans have been from old, fat, retired Army officers. Most retired officers tend to become Colonel Blimps as far as anything you have proposed and if you get any static from them for anything you have proposed, I would pay no attention to them. More power to you and I am sure you are on the right track.”23