by Larry Berman
David Halperin, who worked for both men, keeping Kissinger’s back-channel files while always remaining loyal to Bud Zumwalt, observed that “part of the reason that Kissinger and Zumwalt don’t get along is that they’re both—in some respects they’re quite alike, they’re powerful figures that cannot be had and Kissinger was in a position where he was going to have Zumwalt and you know Zumwalt is never had.”24 The animosity and distrust between the two men transcended their years in government service and defined much of Zumwalt’s post-CNO public service career. Bud thought that “Kissinger basically had a Spenglerian pessimism of a man who escaped from a fascist system, went right to the Ivy league, and didn’t understand America.”25
Bud Zumwalt, Tom Moorer, and Mel Laird fought back against the back-channel system with a “three tiered spying operation” targeted at Kissinger and aimed at ascertaining what was being withheld.26 Secretary of Defense Laird was especially taken aback upon learning that he had not even been told about the start of the first secret meeting in Paris on August 4, 1969, between Kissinger and North Vietnamese representative Xuan Thuy. The president did not want either his secretary of defense or the Joint Chiefs to know about the meeting.
Unbeknownst to Kissinger, Laird decided to make use of the top-secret National Security Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to monitor White House back-channel activity. The NSA is the Department of Defense’s communications espionage agency; the DIA is its all-source military intelligence agency. Laird told each of the military men he selected to spy on the White House that “they’d better be loyal to me.” He promised each four stars after four years and kept his promise.27 From this deal, Laird got all the information he needed about Kissinger’s contacts with foreign governments, his secure telephone conversations, and the back-channel messages on his secret conversations in Paris with Le Duc Tho and on the SALT negotiations.28 “Henry was very smart, but Mel was smarter,” observed former secretary of state George Shultz. “Mel enjoyed the bureaucratic in-fighting and was a match for Henry.”29
NSA operatives intercepted all back-channel messages, and the U.S. Signal Corps tracked White House conversations. The Special Air Missions branch of the air force controlled the planes that Kissinger used for his secret trips.30 Laird often knew Kissinger’s destination before Henry did, which is probably the reason Laird reportedly had advance knowledge of Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing. Laird never let Kissinger in on the fact that he had this information.
Another tier in the counter-Kissinger surveillance program was controlled by Bud Zumwalt through a network of loyal navy aides strategically located within Kissinger’s office. Bud took pride in creating his own intelligence network, which provided him with details on just about every activity of the Nixon and Ford administrations. This human intelligence operation provided the rawest types of data. Kissinger’s assistant Peter Rodman thought that Bud’s operation was “perhaps even more productive” than Laird’s because Bud had a private window into Kissinger’s front office in the White House.
When their relationship started, Bud persuaded Kissinger that he needed more navy personnel on the NSC, and this started a regular yearly rotation of Bud Zumwalt special assistants. Located in a cubicle between Kissinger’s office and Haig’s, these individuals “had an unequaled vantage point on everything going on—discussions of the most sensitive diplomacy, helping prepare the most secret plans, listening in on Kissinger’s telephone conversations with Nixon, Rogers, Dobrynin, and others.”31
Bud told JCS historians in 1990 that “assigning carefully chosen lieutenants to serve as Kissinger’s aides” was how he got his best information. Seymour Hersh described this as the Zumwalt Employment Service.32 The archival records document the accuracy of the information, providing the equivalent of an opponent’s game plan days before kickoff. “I had my own spies” working for Kissinger.33
Kissinger liked having navy men on the NSC because of their administrative efficiency, since the job involved scheduling, making personal arrangements, taking notes at meetings, and taking care of Kissinger’s administrative and organizational needs. Three people occupied the position—David Halperin, Coleman Hicks, and Richard Campbell. Each performed superbly in his responsibilities; each provided terrific staff work for Kissinger and personal loyalty to Zumwalt. “I want to add that David was a key member of my NSC staff during one of the most complex and difficult periods in which I held that position,” wrote Kissinger in support of Halperin’s membership application to the Council on Foreign Relations. “He was an outstanding assistant, with a keen and sensitive grasp of strategic issues and a rare ability to get things done.”34
All of the men Bud placed into Kissinger’s shop were navy, and there was very little they did not share with Bud. In return, Bud protected them and nurtured their career advancement. In a 1988 letter to Paul Nitze, David Halperin noted that “I believe you were in very large measure the man who shaped the life and career of Bud—who remains, for me, the greatest man I have ever known.”35 Coleman Hicks replaced Dave Halperin. Hicks had been a roommate of Bill Bradley at Princeton and a graduate of Yale Law School. He joined the Judge Advocate General’s Corps in the navy in 1969 as part of a four-year naval officers program. By November 1971, he was an instructor at the Naval Justice School in Newport, Rhode Island, but he left after a few weeks to become personal assistant to Kissinger, based on the recommendation of Halperin, who had consulted Zumwalt prior to making the recommendation to Henry.
When it was time for Hicks to move on, Bud recommended Richard Campbell, describing him as “a very outstanding young naval officer” in the same mold as Hicks and Halperin. Kissinger replied that Haig had already put Campbell on the radar screen, and “he was the number one choice.”36 In a telephone conversation the same day, Kissinger told Bud, “You have never steered me wrong.”
Richard Campbell had gone to Vietnam in 1968 “to develop strategy for the Brown Water Navy.” Afterward, he went to the Center for Naval Analyses in 1970, and in the spring of 1972, he went to work as Kissinger’s executive assistant, in which post he remained until 1974. “That has got to be the most intense period around,” said Campbell of the years in which Kissinger negotiated arms treaties with the Soviets, made overtures to China, orchestrated the end of the Vietnam War, and won the Nobel Peace Prize.37
What Kissinger did not know was that Campbell was a regular “line out” to Zumwalt on just about everything that went on inside the White House. Bud was meticulous about dictating whatever Campbell told him. These tapes were then transcribed, and they provide a hitherto unavailable view into the Nixon-Kissinger-Haig nexus. Zumwalt used “DC” to tag Campbell’s comments and debriefings, rarely referring to him by name except in one key crisis memo during the Hicks Committee hearings of November 1972. In this document, “Special Contacts,” dated November 29, 1972, and stamped Sensitive—Eyes Only, Bud mentioned “Charlie DiBona to Dick Campbell (good for feed out—no good for feed in),” meaning that Campbell’s position could not be compromised.
A sampling of DC’s input offers tantalizing views into Kissinger’s thinking, his office rivalries and personal jealousies, and the effects of Watergate. In early June 1972, DC reported that “Kissinger was distressed concerning Laird’s SALT testimony—Kissinger didn’t look at it hard enough—he was unhappy with the Laird add-ons to the budget in the name of SALT. There is a problem concerning the SALT agreement—the interpretation of it—Kissinger won’t take a firm position on anything until all the uncertainties are sorted out.”38 He reported, “Trade is the carrot that is being used—with regard to SALT Phase II the Soviets want FBS [forward-based (missile) systems close to the Soviet Union] included.” When Zumwalt asked if the PRC (People’s Republic of China) was in the SALT loop, DC replied, “Soviet matters are never discussed with the PRC.”
DC informed Bud that the president was concerned about the legislative position that Zumwalt had outlined for the Joint Chiefs of Staff because he was w
orried about the McGovern forces. “He doesn’t want to be dollar limited in Defense and wants to put more on research and development. . . . Haig sees the President a lot while Kissinger is away—during the Moscow trip, Haig was in regularly cutting Kissinger down. He made the point that more analysis of Kissinger’s position is needed. . . . It is clear that Haig is going to stay on.”
DC also told Bud, “The President is against General Abrams because Secretary Laird is so strong for him . . . Laird was fighting for command and control changes . . . so that Kissinger could not continue his end-runs and use the JCS as he was doing.”
DC later briefed Bud on how Kissinger was trying to maneuver the Soviets and PRC to make it difficult for Hanoi not to listen in the Paris negotiation. “The President plans to carry on the signal sending for about three more months and then to really pull the plug and blast Hanoi . . . go balls out—trying to hold down civilian casualties.” DC also reported that Dave Young was working on security things for Ehrlichman. “P [president] may be ready for K [Kissinger] to leave; maybe John Connally as replacement.”
In the summer of 1972, DC reported that “Kissinger is away, first in Paris and then off to Saigon where he is focused on negotiations and getting Thieu on board with the deal. Kissinger is getting lots of pressure from the President and is fluctuating wildly—he has been very dovish lately. . . . The President is getting miffed with Kissinger—his egocentrism is getting on the President’s nerves. The President is playing it very rough.”
DC provided an example of Kissinger’s behavior. He was having breakfast with William Buckley when the president called. Kissinger told the president that he was busy and asked if it was really necessary to interrupt his breakfast. “The President was furious. . . . Kissinger lies to the President at least on minor things,” such as “Kissinger is telling the President that he has told Laird to do certain things but not necessarily telling Laird.”
In the same debrief, DC discussed the Haig-Kissinger and Zumwalt-Haig relationship. Bud viewed Haig as a man of professional competence but never really trusted him. “Both [Haig and Kissinger] were masters of deceit and disingenuousness. Each was capable of running the other down. Each has done so to me.”39 They had first met during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Haig was a lieutenant colonel working as a special assistant to Joe Califano, who was special assistant to Cyrus Vance, secretary of the army. Haig’s great knack was the ability to ingratiate himself with his superiors and to move rapidly up the ladder of assignments. He rose from the rank of colonel to four-star general during a single tour in the office of the president. This was a phenomenal rise without any command experience during senior grade.40
DC wanted Bud to know that Haig was being promoted to vice chief of staff for the army. Haig “sensed Zumwalt was opposed” and considered this “very dangerous,” but Kissinger had told him not to worry because Zumwalt “would never become Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” DC also informed Bud that “Haig’s replacement is likely to be Gen. [Brent] Scowcroft.” He then provided Kissinger’s precise schedule for the next few weeks—Camp David, Key Biscayne, the West Coast via Chicago, then after Labor Day, to Moscow for SALT II, back to D.C. on September 14, 1972, and then in October to China.
By late December 1972, DC reported that the president wanted Haig to go with Kissinger to the Paris negotiations. “The President, whose mind is being poisoned by Haig on the subject, feels that Kissinger is screwing the negotiations up—Haig told the President that Kissinger would get yo-yoed by the North Vietnamese—Haig called Kissinger to relay this as the President’s judgment—Kissinger was furious.” Kissinger was acting like a defeated man. Haig forced the B-52 issue over Kissinger’s preference for tactical air, a “less bloody image.” Haig told DC, “Henry is trying to promote me out of the White House.” In Key Biscayne, Kissinger told the president that they needed to get Haig back into the army “because nobody was watching Abrams from within the Army.” DC concluded that “Haig is playing the sinking ship routine very skillfully—he plays both sides working Henry and telephoning the President.”
DC also reported that “Kissinger discussed Zumwalt with DC—admitting that Zumwalt had a difficult problem in trying to turn the Navy’s racism around, but he isn’t sure that he can survive the Congressional concern about integration of the Navy.” When DC tried responding, Kissinger said, “You’re defending the Navy because you’re a Zumwalt man.” Kissinger tried making vicious remarks about Bud to see if he could get a rise out of DC. “Kissinger said that what really bothered him about Zumwalt was that he stood up to Kissinger all the time.”
DC concluded this debrief with some Watergate intel: “David Young is in trouble with regard to Watergate phone tapping, etc. “Kissinger wants to be sure that all his papers are saved for his memoirs and has had Rodman trucking them out to the Rockefeller estate in New York, all of the most sensitive papers.” DC urged Bud to try to heal his relationship with Haig—he felt that as a result of the strong rift and jealousy between Kissinger and Haig and with the president’s hatred of Kissinger, that Haig will get even closer to the President . . . almost all contact between the White House and Laird has ceased.” DC pointed out that Kissinger’s job is on the line and if he fails to get a deal, will likely quit.
In another detailed report, DC let Zumwalt know that the president asked Kissinger for the names of “philosophers for dinner.” DC put Paul Nitze on the list but “Kissinger struck him saying President hates him.” DC also reported that Press Secretary Ron Ziegler called Kissinger to say that “two unimpeachable sources” say that Kissinger called Zumwalt “and told him the President wanted him to quit.” Ike Kidd was going to take over the Navy.
In March 1973, DC told Zumwalt about an NSC meeting that Paul Nitze attended when his name was not on the official staff participation list. This “irritated President” and “Kissinger said we’ve got to get rid of Paul Nitze.” DC said, “Kissinger is paranoid over Haig (Haig has had a secure phone installed in his office as Vice Chief of Staff for Army by special arrangement and talks to the President regularly and this drives Kissinger wild).” Moreover, “Haig sent his aide to work on DC to inform on Kissinger’s schedule” because he wanted to know whom Kissinger was seeing. “All of the staff working for Kissinger are paranoid—they debrief DC and cut him in on key items.” DC has been encouraging Kissinger to reopen dialogue with Zumwalt as a way of checking Haig’s influence, but “Kissinger doesn’t want to see too much of Zumwalt because he believes that Zumwalt won’t work in Kissinger’s best interests.”
Later in March 1973, “DC says that Kissinger feels more secure with President now that Haig has left.”41 Bud was also receiving regular updates on the Watergate investigation. A June 1973 debriefing is almost totally related to the Oval Office taping system. “Haig knew about the taps, was in bed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and was aware of the Plumber operation. Kissinger was not aware of the Plumbers taps, but did request that his own staff be tapped. The Plumbers felt that the SALT leak source was the Pentagon.” In news that must have delighted Bud, DC reported that “George Anderson’s stock is going down, he tried so hard to get Zumwalt fired that he over-exposed himself.” DC ended by informing Bud that Kissinger will be secretary of state and that the president was considering releasing a study of other presidents’ wiretapping.42 The Watergate theme continued in the July 25, 1973, debriefing—“Dean is singing” and Kissinger was “treating DC like a King, he’s so worried.” “Haig and Kissinger have formed an alliance for survival.” “The President is optimistic about Watergate—Buzhardt is afraid to tell him how bad it is.” DC told Zumwalt, “Haig is working on you again because he wants to be Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff].”
Bud believed that the system created by Nixon and Kissinger could not have produced any result other than “leaks and spying and all-around paranoia. Indeed, they had created a system in which these were everyday and essential elements.”43
The final tier in the
counter-Kissinger strategy was supplied by the liaison office between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. When Admiral Moorer replaced General Earle Wheeler as chairman, there was already in place an established liaison officer to act as a go-between for the NSC staff and the JCS chairman, to ensure that there was a flow of information pertaining to policy, as well as to the activities of both. In essence, this person was on the staff of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, responsible to Admiral Moorer, and also on the staff of the National Security Council, responsible to Kissinger.
This was a demanding job—to keep information flowing from the NSC to the JCS so that the chairman was briefed and prepared for meetings. The liaison officer was given the title assistant for national security affairs to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Daily duties entailed keeping Admiral Moorer and the Joint Chiefs advised of matters under consideration within the National Security Council system, making recommendations on staff positions and on responses relating to those queries, and providing a means for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make their military advice directly available to the National Security Council staff, as required by statute.