by Hugh Thomas
Total nationalist spending abroad, all of it on credit, must thus have been about $635 million if the figure of 7,500 million lire is considered as representing a reasonable estimate of Italian aid rather than the sum eventually paid. If 14,000 million lire were accepted, then the nationalists would be said to have received $981 million.
It is naturally tempting to place these figures beside that of republican spending of $900 million and conclude that international involvement in Spain was at least as great on the side of the government as on that of the rebels—or even greater.3 Such an account would, however, be misleading. The equation put in those simple terms does not take account of the differences between the Russian, German and Italian economies, nor the differences between the economies of the two Spains. It is not at all clear whether the Russians gave anything like value for money, and indeed the notion of value in considering Russian prices for items such as tanks and aircraft is somewhat farcical. The huge discrepancy in different estimates for what Italy made available merely points out the fact that this sort of sum will always leave room for speculation. Russian transport costs were high. Nor can the value of a gold reserve be precisely rendered in terms of ordinary money, particularly not one which was then one of the largest in the world. A more useful reckoning is that which is made possible by a rough knowledge of the numbers of different pieces of equipment, though even there a simple enumeration of numbers of aircraft does not tell anything like the whole story.
Nevertheless it is useful to know that Spain received from abroad something between $1,425 million and $1,900 million. It might also be pointed out that those who backed their side with credit—Germany and Italy—had that much more incentive to go on with their support of all kinds of order to recover payment eventually, while those who sold assistance for cash—Russia—could at least be content that they had received money for value. Some would also add that those who insisted on payment may have doubted the likely success of their side, whilst those on extended credit were confident of it.1
AID TO THE NATIONALISTS
Germany
German strength in Spain reached about 10,000 at its maximum, though 14,000 veterans attended the Condor Legion parade in Berlin in May 1939. The Germans who helped the nationalists probably exceeded 16,000, of whom many were civilians and instructors.2 About 300 Germans died in Spain. The Condor Legion numbered 5,000 men. This important, well-led, experimental tank and aircraft unit was accompanied by thirty anti-tank companies. Colonel von Thoma, who commanded the tank corps, told the Americans in 1945 that he took part in 192 tank engagements during the war.3 These Panzer Mark I tanks were not effective against the larger Russian ones in 1936 and 1937. The total number sent to Spain was probably about 200. The German shipments were delivered in about 180 separate voyages. The Germans sent about 600 aircraft to Spain including 136 Messerschmitt 109s, 125 Heinkel 51s, 93 Heinkel 111s and 63 Junkers 52s.4 Any reckoning of German help to Franco should consider also the help given in military academies, signals equipment and training made available, as well as the advice given on a hundred small but crucial matters of military organization. The 88 millimetre anti-aircraft gun was also a major contribution by Germany and probably stopped the republic making use of their aerial superiority in the spring of 1937.
Italy
Italian forces in Spain at their maximum numbered between 40,000 and 50,000 and perhaps a total of 75,000 went to Spain altogether.1 The Italians lost more than 4,000 dead in Spain,2 and perhaps a quarter of their effective military equipment there too.3 For Italy sent to Spain about 660 aircraft, of which the most important were the 350 Fiat CR.32 fighters and the 100 Savoia 79s. There were also some 70 Romeo 37s and 64 Savoia 81s.4 Perhaps 150 Italian tanks were sent to Spain, all either 3½-ton Fiat Ansaldos, armed with 7 millimetre machine guns, capable of a speed of twenty-five miles an hour, with two men on board; or heavier flame throwers, carrying 125 litres of petrol and able to throw them 60–70 yards.5 Other equipment included about 800 pieces of artillery (the excellent 65/17 millimetre 1916 model),6 which seem to have been all left in Spain. The Italian artillery was well directed by officers experienced in the First World War, headed by General Ettore Manca. The Italians probably also dispatched some 1,414 aircraft motors, 1,672 tons of bombs, 9 million rounds of ammunition, 10,000 machine-guns and automatic rifles, 240,000 rifles, seven million rounds of artillery ammunition, and 7,660 motor vehicles.7 According to estimates in the Italian press in 1939, Italian pilots flew 135,265 hours in the war, participated in 5,318 air raids, hit 224 ships, and engaged in 266 aerial combats, in which they brought down 903 aeroplanes; 5,699 officers and men and 312 civilians of the Italian air force were also allegedly engaged at different times. Ninety-one Italian warships and submarines are believed to have taken part in the civil war. The latter are said to have sunk 72,800 tons of shipping. Italian engineering, signalling and even cryptography did their bit, including schools of ‘Radio Transmission’ in Valladolid, Miranda de Ebro and Palencia.1 There were two large Italian military hospitals at Valladolid and at Saragossa, each with 1,000 beds or over, and some smaller hospitals, with three hospital trains. The general equipment and organization of the Italian units, bad in 1937, recovered in 1938 and the rations and conditions were probably superior to those of the Spaniards.2
Portugal, Ireland, France, etc.
Other foreign governmental assistance included that of Portugal whose help was, at the beginning of the war at least, incalculable, for geographical rather than military reasons. Several thousand Portuguese volunteers fought in the Foreign Legion and in some other units.3 Six hundred Irishmen fought for the nationalists under General O’Duffy. Their losses were negligible. Some right-wing Frenchmen volunteered for the requetés and the Legion—accorded the right to wear a thin tricolour ribbon across their shoulder strap, and commanded by a Colonel Courcier, of the Spahis4—as did some Latin Americans and White Russian exiles and others. The numbers could not have been more than 1,000 at most. Few Anglo-Saxons fought for Franco.5
Other help to the Nationalists
At least 75,000 or so Moroccan ‘volunteers’, Spain’s sepoys, fought for Franco and played a very prominent part in the early days.1 The nationalists also bought some fifty or so aircraft from countries other than Germany or Italy (a few Dragons and Fokkers).
AID TO THE REPUBLIC
Russia
The republic bought about 1,000 aircraft from Russia, perhaps 300 from other sources, principally France.2 Of these, almost 400 were Chato fighters, almost 300 Moscas, with perhaps 100 Katiuska bombers, 60 Rasantes and 113 Natasha bombers. From France, the principal items were the 42 Dewoitine 371s, the 40 Potez 54s and the 15 March Bloch 210s.3 Total purchases of aircraft from France must have been anywhere between 100 and 150. Other purchases included 40 Aero 101s, 10 Letovs, 14 Vultee A1s, 11 Bristol Bulldogs, 20 De Havilland Dragons, and 28 Koolhoven FK51s from Holland, and a squadron of 40 Grumman fighters from the US: with good radios, otherwise unsatisfactory for war;4 and certain aircraft engines enabling aircraft to fly at a great height. Total aircraft from countries other than Russia may have been about 320, giving a total of 1,320 aircraft in all.
It is less easy to make estimates of republican purchases of other items of equipment. According to the German military attaché’s reports from Istanbul on the basis of reports from agents in Istanbul, in some 165 shipments (71 Spanish, 39 British, 34 Russian, 17 Greek and 4 other), between September 1936 and March 1938, Russia sent by sea some 242 aircraft, 703 cannon, 27 anti-aircraft guns, 731 tanks, 1,386 lorries, 69,200 tons of war material and 29,125 tons of ammunition. In addition, 920 officers and men came that way, apparently, together with at least 28,000 tons of petrol and 32,000 of crude oil, 4,650 tons of lubricants, together with some other items, such as 450 tons of clothing, 325 of medical stores, 100 rifle machine-guns, 500 howitzers, and 187 tractors.1 Doubtless there were further shipments, though the blockade made the Mediterranean very difficult or even impossible in the next
months. As for land shipments, the nationalist headquarters made various estimates: one, of October 1938, suggested that between July 1936 and July 1938, some 200 cannon, 200 tanks, 3,247 machine-guns, 4,000 lorries, 47 artillery units, 4,565 tons of ammunition, 9,579 vehicles and 14,889 tons of fuel had come in.2 This aid was supplemented later. It came, no doubt, from the Comintern’s arms purchase agencies, the republic’s assessment commission in Paris and directly from Russia. In quantity, the republic’s foreign supplies were probably as great as those of the nationalists (in some items greater), but the quality was various. Furthermore, much was wasted or left behind on the battlefield. The variety of calibration of the rifles pinpointed the disadvantages of getting help from so many different places. The nationalist forces had a regiment of Russian tanks by the end of the war, along with a quantity of Russian machine-guns. Both sides were short of lorries; lack of transport may have been the deciding factor in the ultimate failure of the republic’s attack on the Ebro front.
The tanks made available by Russia to Spain probably numbered 900, the pieces of artillery 1,550, the armoured cars 300, the machine-guns 15,000, automatic rifles 30,000, mortars 15,000, rifles 500,000, lorries 8,000, along with 4 million of artillery projectiles, 1,000 million cartridges and 1,500 tons of gunpowder.3 The Russian tanks were mostly T-26s, some TB-5s, both being much heavier, better armed, faster and more formidable though less manoeuvrable than the German or Italian tanks available to the nationalists. But they benefited the republic less than they should have done.
The International Brigades
The total number of foreigners who fought for the Spanish republic was probably about 35,000, about 32,000 being in the International Brigades, which probably never exceeded 20,000 at any one time.1 There could hardly have been less than another 10,000 doctors, nurses, engineers, and others from abroad in addition. The largest national group of volunteers were the 9,000 or so French, of whom 1,000 were killed.2 Germany and Austria together contributed perhaps 3,000, of whom 2,000 died.3 The number of Poles, including Ukrainians in what after 1945 became part of Russia, may also have been about 3,000.4 Italy sent 3,350.5 The United States contributed about 2,400. Of these, about 900 were killed.6 There were about 2,000 British volunteers, of whom about 500 were killed and 1,200 wounded—a high percentage;1 about 1,000 Canadian volunteers, 1,500 Yugoslavs,2 1,000 Hungarians, 1,500 Czechs, and 1,000 Scandinavians, of whom 500 were Swedes.3 Seventy-six Swiss were killed.4 The other volunteers came from what was claimed to be fifty-three nations.5 Ninety Mexicans probably fought in Spain.6 As to Russians in Spain, the maximum at one time was 700, the total number being probably between 2,000 and 3,000.7 Perhaps 1,000 Russian pilots flew in Spain.8
One should also not ignore the 47 million roubles’ worth of ‘gifts’ from Russian workers in August 1936 and a fund reaching some $10 million from private and other organizations abroad. If one is to be pedantic, one should also remember that such services as the International Brigades and the voluntary medical missions presented no expenses to speak of in respect of foreign exchange. Over two million dollars’ worth of aid was collected by American relief bodies.
Mexico sent 20,000 rifles, 28 million cartridges and 8 batteries with some lorries and aircraft. This was not a gift, however: it was paid for even though much of this equipment was second-rate.
SUMMARY
Probable figures for foreign intervention in the civil war.
Appendix Four
Guernica
(i) Letter about Guernica from the British Consul, R. C. Stevenson, addressed to the British Ambassador, Sir Henry Chilton, at Hendaye.
British Consulate,
Bilbao,
28th April 1937.
Dear Sir Henry,
On landing at Bermeo yesterday I was told about the destruction of Guernica. I went at once to have a look at the place and to my amazement found that the township normally of some five thousand inhabitants, since the September influx of refugees about ten thousand, was almost completely destroyed. Nine houses in ten are beyond reconstruction. Many were still burning and fresh fires were breaking out here and there, the result of incendiary bombs which owing to some fault had not exploded on impact the day before and were doing so, at the time of my visit, under falling beams and masonry. The casualties cannot be ascertained and probably never will, accurately. Some estimates put the figure at one thousand, others at over three thousand. An inhabitant who went through it all, told me that at about 4 P.M. three machines appeared overhead and dropped H.E. and incendiary bombs. They disappeared and ten minutes later a fresh lot of five or six machines came and so on for several hours, until after seven. All told he estimates the number of planes at fifty. After two or three visits panic seized the population. Men, women and children poured out of Guernica and ran up the bare hillsides. There they were mercilessly machine gunned, though with little effect. They spent the night in the open gazing at their burning city. I saw many men and women erring through the streets searching in the wreckage of their houses for the bodies of their dear ones.
In the afternoon I saw Monzón who appeared stunned by the catastrophe. He asked me what could be done for the women and children of Bilbao. I told him that evacuation on the scale suggested, he mentioned a quarter of a million, was beyond the task of man where so little comprehension was shown abroad, and where there was no organization extant for tackling and carrying out such a scheme. I told him what was felt in France over the refugee problem. I mentioned Russians, Poles, Italians, Germans and Jews all of whom had inundated France in hundreds of thousands during the past two decades. Moreover, the scheme depended on Salamanca which commanded the seas and Salamanca had not yet replied to the suggestion put to it by you that the liner Havana and the yacht Goiseko Izarra should be left unmolested on their proposed voyages between Bilbao and French ports.1 He saw the reason of it all, but nevertheless asked me if I could not think of some solution. To this I replied that I had sought one during several hours, but that I could only suggest surrender. This he said was impossible. I conjured before his eyes a picture of Bilbao destroyed in the same way with no earthly chance for more than a fraction of the population, today about half a million, escaping destruction. No, and again no. I told him I sympathized with him, that his judgment was dimmed by passion, that resistance against overwhelming odds was useless, that I would put the members of the Government, senior officials and leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party on a destroyer. But of no avail. He said surrender was impossible whatever the consequences. Today I covered the whole ground again with the President, but found there the same resistance to the idea of surrender. The President asked me whether I thought there was a possibility of the British and French Governments intervening. I said that if there were intervention I could not conceive it on any basis other than surrender. You will have read his appeal to the civilized world in the press.
I feel I have gone far enough in this regard. I can obviously not persuade them to surrender, at least not at present. I dare say, human nature being what it is, my suggestion will find an echo some time, if only then it is not too late. How in the event of an evacuation I shall proceed, I have not thought out yet. With bombers overhead, with extremist elements on the war path, with thousands of men, women and children running amok, all wanting passage, with the impossibility of keeping secret the plans for such an evacuation, I cannot see how it is to be carried out successfully …
The official denials of Salamanca respecting the bombardment of Guernica lend colour to the belief that whatever the physical courage of the rebels they will not have the moral courage to carry out their threat to raze Bilbao. Many people build fresh hopes on this slender chance. It is also argued that a Bilbao, destroyed, will bring Franco no nearer victory as he then will be without the industrial plants he so much needs …
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) R.C. STEVENSON
Select Bibliography
The following lists books, articles and other matter
referred to in the footnotes, apart from newspapers and periodicals; and also some other books consulted which are of use. The criterion for inclusion at all is often the significance of the volume or pamphlet as typical of its sort; thus the historical value of The Bishop of Chelmsford Refuted is not great; but it and other pamphlets are interesting in themselves.
ABAD DE SANTILLÁN, DIEGO, Por qué perdimos la guerra (Buenos Aires, 1940); La revolución la guerra en España (Buenos Aires, 1937).
ABELLA, RAFAEL, La España nacional (Barcelona, 1973).
ABERRIGOYEN, IÑAKI DE (IGNACIO DE AZPIAZU), Sept mois et sept jours dans l’Espagne de Franco (Paris, 1938).
ABSHAGEN, KARL, Canaris (London, 1956).
ACEDO COLUNGA, FELIPE, José Calvo Sotelo (Barcelona, 1959).
ACIER, MARCEL (ed.), From Spanish Trenches (New York, 1937).
AGUIRRE Y LECUBE, JOSÉ ANTONIO DE, De Guernica a Nueva York pasando por Berlín (Buenos Aires, 1944).
ALBA, VÍCTOR (PEDRO PAGÉS ELÍAS), Histoire des républiques espagnoles (Vincennes, 1948).
ALCALÁ GALIANO, ALVARO, The Fall of a Throne (London, 1933).
ALCÁZAR DE VELASCO, ANGEL, Serrano Súñer en la Falange (Madrid, 1940).
ALCOFAR NASSAES, JOSÉ LUIS, CTV: los legionarios italianos en la guerra civil española (Barcelona, 1972); Los asesores soviéticos en la guerra civil española (Barcelona, 1971); Las fuerzas navales en la guerra civil española (Barcelona, 1971).
ALCOLEA, RAYMOND, Le Christ chez Franco (Paris, 1938).
ALLAN, TED, The Man Who Made Franco (article) (Colliers, 1947).
ALLAN, TED (and GORDON, SYDNEY), The Scalpel, Not the Sword (London, 1954) (Life of Doctor Norman Bethune).
ALONSO, BRUNO, La flota republicana y la guerra civil de España (Mexico, 1944).