by Hugh Thomas
2. USD, 1937, vol. I, p. 369. This was no doubt a hasty aside by Eden, for the Foreign Secretary was generally sympathetic at this period to the republic. That at least is his own account, confirmed by a hostile witness like Hoare in Nine Troubled Years.
3. NIS (c), sixty-second meeting.
4. NIS (c), sixty-third meeting.
5. Cervera, p. 111.
6. GD, p. 432.
7. This visit occurred on 4 August (ibid., p. 433).
1. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1936. The Italian navy was generally strong in comparison with France, having 6 battleships to France’s 7, 29 cruisers to 16, 64 destroyers and flotilla leaders to France’s 60. (British figures for comparable craft were 15, 52 and 175, with 57 submarines, plus 5 aircraft carriers.)
2. Eden, p. 457. The British had apparently also broken the Italian naval cypher.
3. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, pp. 7–8.
1. See Alcofar Nassaes, CTV, p. 150. Italy had also sold the nationalists six old destroyers and an old cruiser, the Taranto.
2. Eden, p. 461.
3. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, p. 9. The blockade was nearly successful as it was. Whatever credence one can give to the incomplete figures reported by the German military attaché at Ankara, he clearly reflects the truth when he reports no Russian material reaching Spain at all during September by the sea route. On the other hand, substantial supplies did get through in August. See Azaña, op. cit., p. 733. Stalin had pointed out to the Spanish ambassador to Moscow, Pascua, the advantages of the domestic manufacture of armaments in order to save the ruinous costs, which, after all, could not be endless: the gold might not last.
4. Ibid., p. 11.
1. Churchill, p. 191.
2. Eden, p. 465. See minutes of this meeting in FD, vol. VI, p. 730f.
1. Baldwin used the metaphor in 1936 (Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin, London, 1969, p. 967).
2. FD, vol. VI, pp. 824–5.
3. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 805. The republicans failed, as they had wished, to get Spain reelected as a member of the League’s Council. Chile offered to arrange enough votes to ensure that, provided the asylees in the embassies were released. This idea was rejected with contempt.
4. Documents secrets du ministère des affaires étrangères d’Allemagne, 1936–43, vol. III, p. 22 (Moscow, 1946).
1. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, p. 15.
2. But Dahl returned to America in 1940.
3. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, p. 18.
1. Ibid., p. 26.
2. USD, 1937, vol. I, p. 420. Here, as so often, the best source for French policy is in these reports by the American ambassador in Paris.
3. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 823.
4. Watkins, p. 186.
5. NIS, twenty-eighth meeting; NIS (c), sixty-fourth to seventieth meetings.
6. Azcárate, p. 122.
1. Les Événements survenus en France, p. 219.
2. Azcárate, pp. 129–30.
3. Oliver Harvey, Diplomatic Diaries (London, 1970), p. 49. Cf. also B. H. Liddell Hart, Memoirs (London, 1965), vol. II, p. 136.
4. This was the celebrated ‘Hossbach Memorandum’ (Nuremberg Trials, vol. XXV, pp. 403–14). It was also the time when the Germans in Spain were becoming excited over the Spanish mining project—see p. 765. For discussion as to its validity, see A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961), p. 131, and Alan Bullock, ‘Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1967.
1. A. Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes (New York, 1953), pp. 241–2. Orlov names this soldier ‘General N’. Can one trust Orlov’s testimony? Where it coincides with, or does not contradict, other evidence, it seems acceptable. Araquistain made the same point in La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 12 July 1939: Stalin did not wish to win the war because that would have exasperated Hitler, nor to lose it because, once it was over, Hitler would have more freedom to carry on his aggression in East Europe and against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Spain for Russia was a secondary affair compared to her friendship with Britain and France, as Azaña and Pascua realized (Azaña, vol. IV, p. 734).
2. CAB, 35(37), 27 September 1937. At a subsequent meeting Chamberlain had said that it did ‘not matter to us which side won, so long as it was a Spanish and not a German or Italian victory’ (CAB, 37[37], of 13 October 1937). Louis Fischer also described how a certain Colonel Clark of the war office asked him: ‘In your opinion would it be better if Franco won quickly or if Spain remained an open wound through which the poisons of Europe could escape?’ (op. cit., p. 457).
3. GD, p. 550.
1. Azcárate, p. 120.
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1. Dionisio Ridruejo, Escrito en España (Buenos Aires, 1962), p. 34. This young poet and orator, briefly provincial chief of Valladolid but coming from Segovia, who denounced Franco for arresting Hedilla, became director-general of propaganda under Serrano, his mentor, in early 1938. Why was he not detained for his démarche before Franco? The answer must be that his youth, eloquence, sincerity, promise and charm ensured him the protection both of General Monasterio, head of the united militias, and of Serrano, whom he met in a tertulia of Pilar Primo de Rivera.
1. I benefited from discussion with Justino de Azcárate (Caracas, 1973).
2. Prieto, Palabras, pp. 235–6. Prieto was perhaps misinformed by ‘Luis Pagés Guix’, who put out a version of the events of Salamanca under the title of La Traición de los Franco. For commentary see Southworth, Antifalange, and De la Cierva, Historia ilustrada, vol. II, p. 293.
1. From an unpublished series of notes for a life of Prince Xavier de Bourbon-Parme in the Carlist Archives at Seville.
2. Serrano Súñer, p. 136. It is also a little doubtful whether all Englishmen liked his style of not getting to his office till eleven in the morning. That offended Sir Philip Chetwode (see below, p. 831).
3. Suances had known Franco since their childhood at El Ferrol. Both had wanted to be naval officers, but only Suances was accepted. Suances later became director of a partly British-owned company engaged in building ships for the Spanish navy. He resigned in 1934 because he was unable to bring about the nationalization of the British share. He escaped from Madrid after the start of the civil war. He was the master of Spanish governmental domination of industry till the 1960s.
1. He had held this post since April 1937. For a discussion of Beigbeder’s astute rule see Charles Halstead, ‘A somewhat Machiavellian face’, The Historian, November 1974.
2. Serrano Súñer, p. 123.
3. For two nights, Queipo had changed to 10:30 P.M. This was, he told his hearers, because a delegation of Sevillian girls had complained that his broadcasts at ten o’clock gave them only half an hour at their window with their novios. So Queipo changed his time, thereby disrupting nationalist radio programmes: for all stations were linked with Seville Radio for Queipo.
1. There is a good study of Queipo as propagandist in Dundas, Behind the Spanish Mask, p. 59f.
1. For Martínez Anido, see Cabanellas, vol. II, p. 945.
2. Most prominent bullfighters of the time (Marcial Lalanda, ‘Manolo’ Bienvida) were with the nationalists. The great Manolete was in the nationalist army on the Córdoba front, though he began to draw attention during the season of 1938. For a discussion see Rafael Abella, ‘Toros en la Guerra Civil’, Historia y vida, January 1975. Some corridas were held in the republic, mostly as benefits for hospitals or schools, despite the opposition of the anarchists.
1. Ansaldo, p. 74.
2. J. Salas, pp. 458, 459 and 462–3.
1. Catecismo patriótico español (Salamanca, no date).
2. See De la Cierva in Carr, The Republic, p. 200.
1. See Jesús Salas, p. 339.
2. The SIFNE of Bertrán y Musitú in Barcelona was merged with the SIPM in February 1938.
3. Cf. J. M. Fontana, Los Catalanes en la guerra de España (Madrid, 1951), pp. 161–2 for the spy rings of Luis Canos, José María Velat, Manol
o Bustenga and Carlos Carranceja; pp. 336–7 for the story of Clariana, the double spy, shot in Irún.
1. See Palacio Atard, La quinta columna, p. 261f.; ‘El Campesino’ alleges Rokossovsky’s role, otherwise undocumented.
2. Abella, p. 134.
3. Ibid., p. 268.
1. Pujol, Cuando Israel Manda, in ABC de Sevilla, 20 December 1936, qu. Catalunya sota el règim franquista, vol. I (Paris, 1973), p. 136; Domingo (San Sebastián), 21 March 1937.
2. The origins of the labour charter are discussed in Payne, Falange, pp. 186–7. The author was González Bueno, with help from Ridruejo and other young falangists.
1. Abella, pp. 308–9.
2. Qu. Abella, p. 325.
1. El clero vasco, vol. II, p. 293.
2. Abella, pp. 291–2.
3. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, p. 22.
4. Ibid., p. 32.
5. Ibid., p. 37.
6. GD, pp. 512–16.
7. Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, p. 144.
1. Stohrer, a professional diplomat, had been intended as ambassador in Madrid in early 1936. He had served there before, as a secretary during the First World War, busy sabotaging allied interests. He was a brilliant linguist, a tall commanding figure ‘with a remarkable knowledge of Spain’ (Hoare, p. 44).
1. For all the above see GD, pp. 496–503 and 541–2.
2. The British mission was unpopular. ‘It was assumed’, Sir Robert Hodgson said, ‘that we were against the movement and “España, una, grande, libre”. This was proved by our obstinate denial of belligerent rights and by the continued description in the British press of the nationalists as insurgents.’ Hodgson did not have an interview with Franco till 1 February 1938 (Sir Robert Hodgson, Spain Resurgent, London, 1953, pp. 84–5).
3. CAB, 12(37). Hodgson’s mission had been suggested first in March.
4. The French government did not establish even these limited relations with nationalist Spain. All they did, as L’Action française ironically commented, was to restore the Sud Express, the main daily train from Paris to Hendaye. But Charles Maurras was received in Salamanca ‘not even as a diplomat, but as a Head of State’.
5. News Chronicle, 30 March 1938, qu. Watkins, p. 68.
1. GD, p. 522.
2. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, p. 62.
3. GD, p. 553.
4. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, pp. 64–5. By then the republicans had captured Teruel. See below, p. 771.
1. GD, p. 470.
2. Drieu la Rochelle, Gilles (Paris, 1967), p. 490.
3. Such as Captains Fitzpatrick, Nangle and Peter Kemp, whose Mine Were of Trouble (London, 1957) is an excellent picture of life in the Legion.
4. Priscilla Scott-Ellis, The Chances of Death (Norwich, 1995). A wonderful account. Another British nurse with Franco was Gabriel Herbert.
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1. Numantia, a hill fortress near Soria, resisted Rome until the end in 134–133 B.C. In fact, there was no possible escape for the defenders since Scipio Aemilianus had drawn continuous entrenchments round the town.
2. All the above conversations derive from Azaña’s diaries.
1. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 786.
2. Ibid., p. 107.
3. Ibid., p. 794.
4. Gómez Lobo to Azaña, op. cit., p. 748.
1. This sad image is Christopher Seton-Watson’s in relation to pre-fascist Italy.
2. García Oliver demanded to the state prosecutor, Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, that Fernández be released, adding, ‘we do not make requests twice’. Ortega fled the country.
3. See above, p. 287.
4. Qu. in Ossorio y Gallardo, p. 207.
1. Fifty-three compared to 98 in June 1936, with January 1936 as 100 (Bricall, p. 96).
2. Bricall, p. 70.
3. See, e.g., Azaña, op. cit., p. 760.
1. Carlos Pi y Súñer to Azaña, in Azaña, vol. IV, pp. 790–801.
2. Op. cit., p. 802; also p. 760.
3. Guy Hermet, Les Catholiques dans l’Espagne Franquiste (Paris, 1981), p. 79. The vicar-general of Barcelona forbade the opening of any church and allowed it to be known that he would refuse licences to priests who heard mass. (Evidence of Señor Irujo.)
1. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 638.
2. Convulsiones, vol. II, p. 65f.
3. See above, p. 710.
4. Prieto’s words to Azaña, op. cit., p. 638.
1. Convulsiones, vol. II, p. 34; Hernández, pp. 99–100; Castro Delgado, p. 201; El Campesino, Comunista, p. 86f.
2. George Orwell, letter to Raymond Mortimer, 9 February 1938.
3. Convulsiones, II, pp. 56–7.
4. Manuel Uribarri, El SIM de la República (Havana, 1942). Carlos de Juan, the new director-general of security, did his best to cut the size of, and remove the politics from, the police (there were 4,000 more police in the republic in mid-1937 than there were before the war in the whole Peninsula). Azaña pointed out that the ‘problem’ was common to both zones, as ‘one now refers to them’ (op. cit., p. 835).
5. The General Cause, p. 161.
1. Prieto in Yo y Moscú (Madrid, 1955), p. 156. No one ever heard what happened to El Negus, even when his policy became that of the party itself.
2. Prieto, Convulsiones, vol. II, pp. 22, 57, and Yo y Moscú, p. 189. Orlov, still head of the GPU in Spain, thought of assassinating Prieto; he was dissuaded by Hernández (see Convulsiones, vol. II, p. 117).
3. Lister, p. 125.
1. Martínez Amutio, pp. 211, 228.
2. The General Cause, p. 304. The army unit in question was the 36th Mixed Brigade, commanded by Justo López de la Fuente, who, returning to Spain in the 1960s, died in gaol because of this. There was a similar scheme in Russia during their civil war. Cf. Angelica Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin (Ann Arbour, 1964), p. 108.
3. For a description of these arbitrary tribunals on which the ignorant and malevolent often sat as judges, see G. Avilés, Tribunales rojos (Barcelona, 1939), passim. Hard though such books are to credit, they are impossible to reject.
1. An exception was during the collapse in Aragon in early 1938. See below, p. 779.
2. Rojo, Asi fue, p. 159.
3. R. Salas Larrazábal, vol. II, p. 1560.
1. Qu. in William Rust, Britons in Spain (London, 1939), p. 98. These instructions were not confined to the International Brigades. Pamphlets on ‘Leadership’ were also published in considerable numbers, e.g., El Mando by ‘General W.W.W.’
2. Spriano, p. 226. Other figures for 1938 from Italy were 27, 34, 47 and 35 in March and following months.
1. Gurney, p. 53. See Skoutelsky, p. 86, for a more innocent explanation.
2. The International Brigades (pamphlet, Madrid, 1953), p. 21.
3. Asensio became military attaché in the US, Martínez Cabrera military governor in Madrid.
4. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 683.
5. R. Salas Larrazábal, vol. II, p. 1583.
1. USD, 1938, vol. I, pp. 149–50. The arms profiteers at the expense of the republic came from all classes. Who in those days had not heard of Lord Hervey, who, having received payment from the republic for a cargo of ammunition, allegedly sold it again to the nationalists?
2. R. Salas Larrazábal, vol. II, p. 1619. See also Howson, especially 278ff.
3. The meeting had been convoked at the last minute, on dubious grounds (Largo Caballero, p. 236).
4. Text in Peirats, vol. II, pp. 382–93.
5. The new executive of the UGT included Ramón González Peña (president); Edmundo Domínguez (vice-president); Rodríguez Vega (secretary-general); Amaro del Rosal Díaz (assistant secretary); and Felipe Pretel (treasurer). Both Domínguez and Pretel had once been supporters of Largo, but they were now Negrinistas. Such are the consequences of power. The old Caballerista executive continued in existence, disputing the validity of the new. After some months, negotiations were begun between the two, the skilful diplomacy of the French union leader Léon Jouhaux being used to begin the conversations. Eventually a compromise was
reached, and four of the Largo Caballero wing (Zabalza, Díaz Alor, Belarmino Tomás, Hernández Zacajo) joined the executive. But they did not do so as officers, and Largo Caballero himself remained outside. See Peirats, vol. II, pp. 393–4.
1. C. Lorenzo, p. 84.
2. Ibid., p. 312; Azaña, vol. IV, p. 802f.
1. Campo Libre, 20 November 1937.
2. Ibid., 27 November 1937.
3. Ibid., 18 December 1937.
4. The total cultivable area was 60 million acres.
5. Imprecorr, 17 May 1938, p. 145. The same report says that the Institute of Agrarian Reform spent 200 million pesetas in credit and aid to peasants between July 1936 and 31 December 1937.
1. Pike, p. 129. The last was an unsuitable contact: Troncoso, an important link in nationalist intelligence, was arrested in Bayonne for organizing a group, including an Italian fascist, the Marquis di Maraviglio (editor of the Rome paper La Tribuna), whose aim was to capture the republican submarine C-2 when it docked in Brest.
2. A. Toynbee, Survey, 1937, p. 391.
1. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 848.
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1. So De la Cierva says (Historia ilustrada, vol. II, p. 328), though he says the spy was Cipriano Mera—a story of which the latter does not speak in his own book.
2. Azaña, vol. IV, p. 812.
1. Aznar, p. 549. The command was as follows: 22nd Army Corps (Ibarrola)—11th Division (Lister) and 25th Division (Vivancos); 20th Army Corps (Menéndez)—68th Division (Trigueros) and 40th (Nieto); 18th Army Corps (Heredia)—34th Division (Etelvino Vega) and 64th (Martínez Cartón). Tanks (both T-26s and BT-5s), artillery and sapper units were attached to each Army Corps.
2. The best journalistic accounts of this battle from the republican side were by Henry Buckley and by Herbert Matthews in Two Wars and More to Come (New York, 1938). See also Lister, p. 171f.; R. Salas, vol. II, p. 1637f. Lojendio, Azñar, and Villegas are sources for the nationalist counter-offensive.
1. See Kindelán’s report on the republican air force, 8 February 1938, qu. R. Salas, vol. II, p. 1624.
2. Ciano, Diaries 1937–8, p. 46.
3. Galland, p. 32.
1. Prieto, Palabras al viento, p. 220. Both were later shot. See below, p. 858.