By the afternoon of the 19th, the main breach was described as ‘extremely good’ and the tower breach ‘nearly beaten down’. Lord Wellington decided to assault that very day, and sitting down under cover of the advanced trenches, wrote his orders. It was twelve days now since he had invested Rodrigo. His assessment of Marmont’s eastwards movement, and his inability quickly to aid the fortress, had fully justified that decision. He had allowed himself the same twenty-four days to get the job done, as Ney had taken in 1810. Thus on the 19th he had every reason to be satisfied. That sentiment was doubtless the more satisfactory given his knowledge of ‘the other side of the hill’. Four days earlier, writing to the Earl of Liverpool, he summarised Marmont’s strength as being (apart from Thiebault at Salamanca) two divisions on the march from Toledo to Valladolid, one at Navamoral on the Tegus, forty miles west of Talavera, and one about Talavera itself. That is, all many marches distant. Marmont’s headquarters was moving from Talavera also to Valladolid and ‘I have reports that troops were to be collected at Salamanca ... (but) it is not probable that a sufficient force can be collected to oblige us to raise the siege, at least for some days.’
For Marmont knew precious little. The Governor of Salamanca, General Thiebault, had been crying wolf too often to be believed, with his reports of the construction of fascines and gabions, the movement of the British battering train, and the possible construction of a bridge over the Agueda. Thiebault’s own intelligence suffered particularly from the closing of the roads between Rodrigo and Salamanca by the guerrillas of Julian Sanchez. It was 13 January before Thiebault heard from General Barrié that the siege had begun six days previously. That very day Marmont at Valladolid (only a week’s march away) was writing to Napoleon’s chief of staff that he doubted Wellington would cross the Agueda! So when late the next day Thiebault’s undeniable news arrived, telling him that Wellington with at least five divisions had been battering Rodrigo for nearly a week, it was most unwelcome news. Marmont knew who to blame, of course:
The Emperor chose to cut down the number of his troops in Spain, and to order a grand movement which dislocated them for a time, precisely at the instant when he had increased the dispersion of the Army of Portugal, by sending a detachment of 12,000 men against Valencia. He was undoubtedly aware that the English Army was cantooned in a fairly concentrated position on the Agueda, the Coa, and the Mondego. But he had made up his mind – I cannot make out why – that the English were not in a condition to take the field: in every despatch he repeated this statement.
That Marmont shared that final sentiment is obvious, evidenced by his lack of reaction to the earlier reports from Thiebault and which he treated as ‘Wild and whirling words’. But what to do? Working on the twenty-four day precedent set by Ney, he would need to confront Wellington by the end of January, and with good numbers if the British were fielding by then six or seven divisions. Once Rodrigo fell it would be too late, for his battering train was actually within the fortress. Marmont had but four divisions only loosely concentrating towards Salamanca, with others much farther afield. And if Wellington captured Rodrigo before he could relieve the place, would the English not then make for Badajoz, and would not that leave Marmont, if closing on Rodrigo, again in the wrong place?
We are fortunate that Wellington’s detailed orders have survived, as hurriedly written that cold afternoon in the trenches before Rodrigo. Hurried because the day was wearing on, it would be dark soon after 5pm, and much of that which had to be done was best completed in daylight. The orders were in plain narrative style of who was to do what, where and when and with what, without a wasted word and not a single urgent sentiment nor supportive flattery. ‘Once more unto the breach’ was not the Peer’s style. But they do present some insight into that calm and thoughtful intellect which penned them, racing across the page as time diminished, as shot and shell moaned overhead, and his staff stood waiting, hopping in the mud from foot to foot. The orders are attached at Appendix 1.
The plan, to be appreciated best, follows a brief description of the breached sites and the French defence. It is not known in what detail these measures were anticipated by the attackers, since none of them had ever been up a breach slope before; the two attempts against the walls of Badajoz the previous year had failed in the ditch, clutching ladders that were too short. Yet outside Fort San Cristoval they had certainly met canister and grape, hand grenades and rolling shells, the defenders each with maybe six or seven loaded muskets to hand, and, had they mounted the breach, there at the top would have been the upturned carts and chevaux-de-frise of blades set in massive timbers chained to the walls.
General Barrié had placed three infantry companies and a dozen gunners at the main breach, and a company of voltigeurs at the smaller. The latter was only ten paces wide at the bottom, and half that at the top, where it was all but closed by a 24-pounder cannon placed sideways across the gap in the town wall. There was space of a yard, however, between the muzzle and the wall. No retrenchments had been cut. The slope behind the breach down into the town, unlike the steep climb up to it, was quite gentle and the narrow alley beyond was blocked by only one up-turned cart. Bearing in mind the defenders had some two hours of darkness after the cannon-fire ceased, and before the assault, it was plain that no urgent effort had gone into the garrison’s last minute defensive preparations.
The main breach was a much harder proposition. It was three times wider, if less steep, powerfully defended parapets above, including enfilading cannon, and flank entrenchments the details of which were unknown; those survivors of the assault still moving forward would plunge down sixteen vertical feet of the remaining town rampart, onto what Jones describes as ‘A variety of impediments, such as iron crow’s feet, iron chevaux-de-frise, iron spikes fixed vertically, and the whole being encircled with the means of maintaining a barrier of burning combustibles’. Finally, as Napier tells us, ‘The houses behind (about twenty yards back) were all loop-holed and garnished with musketeers.’
Lord Wellington chose 7pm as assault hour partly to give the troops time to assemble their kit and move some way to their waiting areas in daylight, and latterly under cover; and partly to allow but a couple of hours of darkness for the garrison to clear rubble and effect repairs around the breaches (another lesson learned from the previous year at Badajoz).
Picton’s 3rd Division was to take the main breach, Crauford’s Light Division the lesser, with two diversionary attacks: Lieutenant Colonel O’Toole with one Portuguese battalion and Brigadier General Pack with two, to distract attention to the town walls furthest away. The two main divisional attacks were to go in after the diversions had stirred things up and, hopefully, diverted French reserves. The diversions were to kick off at 6.50pm, with O’Toole leading the 2nd Caçadores, strengthened by the Light Company 2nd/83rd, to rush across the unblocked Roman bridge to seize an outwork at the far end, beneath the Castle, and within which two guns were positioned to cover the gate to their right, where the ditch joined the main wall. Brigadier General Pack, with the 1st and 16th Line, was to attempt the outworks at the Santiago gate on the eastern walls. Both Pack and O’Toole were to take ladders in case their diversions met little opposition, and so might be developed into real escalades.
Now, there is little subtlety in taking a town: men have to climb defended breaches. In making two, and with two more threatened escalades, Wellington sought to disperse the defenders. He also sought to protect the flanks of his main attempt when it went in, by occupying the ditches on either side, by prepositioned separate parties. These were to work their way along the ditches from right and left, sweeping out any of the garrison and any obstacles they discovered, and then forming a reserve force on arrival at the breach.
Campbell’s brigade was given this task for the main breach, while Picton’s other 3rd Division brigade (MacKinnon’s) was to carry out the main assault. The 2nd/5th, under Major Ridge, was to leave the cover of the convent Santa Cruz, go east 400 paces to where the d
itch and fausse braie abuts the town wall, cut down the gate (assuming O’Toole had silenced the covering guns) mount the fausse braie, and clear it for the quarter of a mile up to the breach. The 94th was to provide two columns of five companies each, each to leave Santa Cruz, for a similar but shorter role – get into the outer ditch, but rather closer to the breach, and again clear to it. Of Campbell’s other two regiments, the 77th was to remain at the Convent as a reserve for the 5th, and the 2nd/83rd was to remain lining the second parallel, to provide fire support (and presumably to form a further reserve).
The 5th and the 94th were to leave the convent of Santa Cruz at 6.50pm, the same time as O’Toole’s battalion. Similarly, three companies of the Light Division’s 95th were to leave cover from the right side of the convent of San Francisco, get into the outer ditch half way between the two breaches, turn right and with axes clear the ditch of any obstructing palisades up to the main breach. Thus the two breaches would mutually support one another with the passage of reserves.
The assault on the main breach by MacKinnon’s brigade was to be preceded not only by these ditch clearances, but immediately by a party of 180 unarmed sappers each carrying two hay bags to be tossed into the outer ditch at the breach, to break the ten-foot fall of the storming party. These sappers were to be immediately followed by the Forlorn Hope who, together with the main assault troops, were to have come forward into the trenches connecting the first and second parallels. The Hope was to be commanded by Lieutenant Mackie, 88th, and was limited to thirty volunteers from MacKinnon’s assaulting battalions – 1st /45th, 75th and 1st/88th. The storming party comprised 500 volunteers to be led by Major Manners, 74th. The Divisional Reserve was to be Powers’ Portuguese 9th and 21st Line, to be located in the second parallel.
The Lesser Breach on the left was again to be approached by the convent of San Francisco first by a hay sack party, from the 3rd Caçadores, then the Forlorn Hope of twenty-five volunteers from 1st/52nd under Lieutenant John Gurwood, with the main storming party of 300 volunteers led by Major George Napier, 52nd. These were all troops from Vandeleur’s Brigade (1st/52nd, 2nd/52nd, four companies 1st/95th and 3rd Caçadores). Barnard’s Brigade (1st/43rd, 1st/95th less four companies, 2nd/95th) were to be formed in reserve behind the convent.
Lord Wellington’s orders specified that once up the first or Fausse braise breached wall, Vandeleur was to detach five companies down the ditch to his right, to assist the 3rd Division; and once up the town wall, to turn right along the ramparts, again to link with the 3rd Division. A third task, once the two divisions had joined, was to open the Salamanca Gate, just 200 paces to the left of the Lesser Breach. And that was that. The orders are silent beyond the plan of attack on the walls. Nothing is said of subsequent operations within the town. We may therefore assume Wellington assumed the Garrison would yield. He had already formally summoned Governor Barrié to surrender three days earlier, on the foggy 16 January, after commencing the battering of the lesser breach; but to no avail. Poor Barrié, like all Napoleon’s garrison commanders, was barred from adopting the old custom of surrendering after a practicable breach had been established by the enemy (a sensible custom that usually excused a garrison from slaughter). The Emperor had expressly forbidden surrender before the enemy should have made his first attempt, some say three attempts.
What actually happened is best told by those who were there, like Rifleman Edward Costello, 95th, who volunteered for the storming party:
Volunteers were now required from the different regiments of our Division, and many of our men came forward with alacrity for this deadly service. With three others from my company I had, as I then considered, the good fortune to be chosen. This was a momentous occasion in the life of a soldier, and so we considered it.
At the time, we were in the trenches in front of the city, from whence came a very smart fire of shot and shell, which gave us an idea of the warm reception we might expect on our visit that night. The entire company gathered round our little party, each pressing us to have a sup from his canteen. We shook hands with friendly sincerity, and speculated on whether we would outlive the assault. If truth must be told, we also speculated on the chances of plunder in the town. I gave my father’s address to my comrade before starting, in case of accident.
In our regiment, there were four or five volunteers from each company, and we were led by Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Johnston and Kincaid. The storming division was commanded by Major George Napier of the 52nd Regiment.
Darkness closed over the city, and our imaginations became awake to the horrors of the coming scene. The stormers – in all about 120 men – were ordered to ‘fall in’ and ‘form’, and we moved to a convent occupied by the 40th, the walls of which protected us from the enemy’s shot.
The Light Divison with Lord Wellington present had moved under cover of the Convent of San Francisco and were drawn up as follows (Lieutenant Johnny Kincaid, 95th):
First, four companies of our battalion, under Colonel Cameron, to line the crest of the glacis and fire upon the ramparts. Second, some companies of Portuguese carrying bags filled with hay and straw, for throwing into the ditch to facilitate the passage of the storming party. Third, the forlorn hope, consisting of an officer (Lt Gurwood of the 52nd) and 25 volunteers. Fourth, the storming party, consisting of three officers and 100 volunteers from each regiment; the officers from ours were Captain Mitchell, Mr Johnston and myself ... Fifth, the main body of the Division under General Craufurd, with one brigade, under Major General Vandeleur, and the other under Colonel Barnard.
Lieutenant John Cooke, 43rd, also went forward into the ringside seats:
Soon after 3 o‘clock we moved toward the ground occupied by the foot guards, who were halted one and a half miles from the suburbs of Ciudad Rodrigo. These troops came forward to wish us success, and our band struck up the ‘Fall of Paris’. The 3rd Division occupied the trenches. The garrison must have observed the march of the Light Division from the ramparts. Extra troops! The governor should have pondered on it. He must have expected the assault for there were two breaches effected in the walls of this town.
At 6.30, the Light Division formed behind the convent of San Francisco, near the suburb, almost exactly opposite to the small breach and about 400 yards from it. The 3rd Division, under General Sir Thomas Picton, was formed behind the ruins of Santa Cruz, and in the trenches opposite the large breach. The two divisions were to attack without knapsacks. All was silent, except for four or five shells thrown by the enemy into our left battery, which fell not a great distance from our column. If the governor thought that the assault was preparing, he ought not to have fired at all from the ramparts, as it prevented the approach of the troops from being discovered by the ear.
At some early point Wellington was there too, according to the anonymous source quoted by Napier:
The Duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the convent of Francisco, pointed out to Colonel Colborne and to Major Napier, commanding the storming part of the light division, the spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, ‘Now do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive at the breach without noise or confusion?’ He was answered, ‘Yes, perfectly.’ Some one of the staff then said to major Napier, ‘Why don’t you load?’ He answered, ‘No, if we can’t do the business without loading we shall not do it at all.’ The duke of Wellington immediately said, ‘Leave him alone.’
And the soon-to-die commander of the Light Division also had something to say to his men:
General Craufurd led us in person. While we stood formed under the wall, he addressed us upon the nature of the duty assigned us. On this memorable occasion his voice was more than ordinarily clear and distinct: ‘Soldiers! The eyes of your country are upon you. Be steady, be cool, be firm in the assault. The town must be yours this night. Once masters of the wall, let your first duty be to clear the ramparts, and in doing this keep together.’
With hearts beat
ing, we waited watchfully for the signal, with our Division formed immediately in our rear, ready to second the effort. We were on the brink of being dashed into eternity, and among the men there was a solemnity and silence deeper than I ever witnessed before.
The convent the division had formed behind was held by the 40th. There William Lawrence, spectator-safe, commented: ‘The business those men were about to undertake was about the worst a soldier can undertake. For scarcely anything but death stares them in the face. They were silent, watching with intense anxiety for what, to many, would be the fatal signal.’
Part III – Ciudad Rodrigo The Attack 19 January 1812
Over on the right, the 5th, 77th and 94th were also on the move. An anonymous officer of the 77th wrote:
It was six o‘clock – the firing on both sides had slackened, but not ceased – their instructions had been for some time in the possession of our chiefs, who were all bustle and mystery. Soon the 5th and 77th were ordered to fall in, and we proceeded some distance to the extreme right of the ground occupied by the division, where we halted; and whilst the men hammered at their flints, and made the customary preparations for business, the order was communicated to us. (Here follows part of Wellington’s orders):
The 5th regiment will attack the entrance of the ditch at the junction of the counterscarp with the main wall of the place. Major Sturgeon will show them the point of attack. They must issue from the right of the convent of Santa Cruz. They must have twelve axes, in order to cut down the gate by which the ditch is entered at the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The 5th regiment is likewise to have twelve scaling ladders, twenty-five feet long; and immediately on entering the ditch, are to scale the Fausse Braie, in order to clear it of the enemy’s parties, on their left, towards the principal breach. It will throw over any guns it may meet with, and will proceed along the Fausse Braie to the breach in the Fausse Braie, where it will wait until Major-General McKinnon’s column has passed on the main attack, when it will follow in its rear. This regiment will make its attack at ten minutes before seven o’clock. The 77th regiment will be in reserve on the right of the convent of Santa Cruz.
Salamanca 1812- Wellington’s Year of Victories Page 4