by Stalingrad- The City that Defeated the Third Reich (epub)
“What are we going to do with him? Send him to the front?”
“You can’t send his kind to the front. He’d just do the same thing there. He must be shot!”
I said: “Even so, couldn’t we still send him to the front?”
“No—he’s got to be shot.”
There was a meeting: a district committee secretary, the NKVD chief, a party organizer, and me—at that time I was also a deputy people’s commissar.
But then all the workers came out. They took everything from him. He had boots, good box calf boots. They wanted to take them, but other workers said: “Don’t bother. We don’t need anything of his. Let him die with all his stuff.”
They were put in formation, spaced three paces apart. By order of the workers, the man was shot. [ . . . ] They said: He was well provided for, a good master vulcanizer, childless, had a wife who worked in Factory no. 221. What else did he need? He couldn’t be trusted. He couldn’t be sent to the front.
[ . . . ] Some looting occurred, beginning on the second or third day of the bombing. Flour was being taken, basements were being broken into. This necessitated extraordinary measures. In some districts people were shot on sight. Several people were shot. Afterward, the problem more or less stopped, though incidents of illegal looting still cropped up. We took extreme measures and were rid of our looting problem.
Alexei Yakovlevich Zimin (Lieutenant, former worker at the Barricades factory, headquarters commandant of the 38th Motor Rifle Brigade, 64th Army): [ . . . ] The factories withstood most of the bombing. This was when two of the Barricades workshops were destroyed. None of the other workshops were hit directly, but they had windows broken and roofs torn off. The Barricades Factory Training School took a direct hit. From August 23–24, three workshops at the Tractor factory were destroyed. When that happened, everyone ran for it. The managers led the way. Workshop foremen loaded their vehicles and headed out, but then after a short break in the bombing the NKVD forces made them turn around, and the factories started up again.
Mikhail Afanasievich Odinokov (Secretary of the Voroshilov District Committee): There was a dark stain on the work of the district party organizations—certain cases in which individual factory directors and party secretaries lost their heads during the bombardment, got scared, and fled the district and the city, leaving their enterprises without leadership. By doing this they helped not the motherland but the enemy.
These directors and party secretaries were Alexei Ivanovich Brilevsky, director of the Stalingrad Cannery, party secretary Sevryugin; Moskalyov, acting director of the confectionary plant; Martynov, director of Factory no. 490; party bureau secretary Maksimov; and Mezentsev, director of Bread Factory no. 5. All of these men left without the permission of the district committee. The coward Samarin, who was in charge of district food provisioning, transformed himself into a cattle driver on the east bank of the Volga and set off for a destination unknown to the regional committee.
Claudia Stepanovna Denisova (Secretary of the Yermansky District Committee): Factories were being destroyed, people were fleeing. Some of the enterprises got some things out, but many were unable to save anything because the bombing raid had been so unexpected. The Krupskaya 8th of March Textile Factory burned down on the 23rd. It had caught fire twice. The first was put out, but the second fire destroyed the whole factory. They’d removed equipment and raw materials. There was still one workshop where they worked on transmission mechanisms. About seventy-five sewing machines were still there. Once they’d gotten out the raw materials, neither the director nor the party secretary came back. They abandoned the workshop, leaving the transmissions and machines to the Germans. This is why the factory’s director and party organization secretary were expelled from the party for desertion and cowardice.
Ivan Alexeyevich Piksin (Secretary of the Stalingrad City Committee): From August 23—at the onset of the bombardment—we began evacuating the population. It was an orderly evacuation. Mostly it was the workers’ families and the workers themselves who were leaving. We organized ferries across the Volga. [ . . . ]
The conditions for the evacuation were extremely difficult. Evacuating across the Volga was hard because the boats were being bombed. Many people died. When we sent them out on the Saratov rail line, many of the trains were bombed out. A train carrying workers from the Red October factory sustained very heavy bombing at Leninsk, and again on the way back at the Elton and Pollasovka stations. [ . . . ]
The evacuation took place under exceptionally difficult conditions, especially since the only way out was the Volga. We had to cross it. Arms and food supplies had to cross the river continuously, at the same time as the population was being evacuated. Hundreds of thousands of people had to get out, mostly women and children. Approximately 60 to 70 percent were women, children, and the elderly. And there were the wounded, who complicated the evacuation.
Ezri Izrailevich Ioffe (Acting director of the Stalingrad Medical Institute): The crossing was made with small ferries and twin-engine military boats. For two or three days everything was done haphazardly, but by the 27th the crossing was organized. Everything the institute had intended to evacuate had burned on the banks of the Volga. The institute itself had burned down on August 25. Nothing was saved. Professor Kolosov carried a lone imported microscope with him to Saratov. We all set off on foot toward Cheborksar, our gathering point. Everyone met again in Saratov.
Alexei Mikhailovich Polyakov (Deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Stalingrad Regional Soviet of Workers Deputies): There were two active crossings near the statue of Kolzunov.37 Quite a large number of people crossed by the ferry near the central waterworks, which was being bombed constantly. In addition to the municipal ferries, there were two large motor boats that had been linked together—this fast, powerful vessel could cross the Volga in eight to ten minutes. They could take ten or twelve vehicles with 200–250 people in the spaces between them. A deck of planks was laid over the two joined boats. The vehicles would go on these planks.
There were some really long days, such as August 27, 28, and 30, when we transported thirty to forty thousand people within a twenty-four-hour period. About one thousand rowboats had been given to us, but they were too disorganized. They were eager to go to the east bank, but once they got there it was difficult to get them to return to the west bank. [ . . . ]
I was there day and night. [ . . . ] Having some leadership on the riverbank brought a certain amount of calm. [ . . . ] I was in command of a militia platoon, the entire force of militiamen on the river. We maintained order and assisted the people as needed. I was there until September 5. Then I was in Krasnaya Sloboda. Though I would go to the right bank several times a day—specifically, to the central command post in the park—most of my time was spent on the east bank because of the enormous crowds of evacuated people who needed to be transported farther.
Ivan Dmitrievich Burmakov (Major general, commander of the 38th [7th Guards] Motor Rifle Brigade): Our arrival at the west bank—that was an interesting moment. The masses of people there! So many kids, so many women! Men seeing off their wives and children. Piles of belongings everywhere. We were crossing at night. Everyone wanted to get across quickly, to hurry. We started to establish order. We wanted to send them as fast as possible. We’d put five women and children on a boat and send them on. Then they had to cross the islands, about a kilometer and a half. I carried two children myself. Everyone was on foot. Soldiers carried people’s belongings and children to lighten the load. You’d see a woman with a bunch of stuff and two or three kids. It’s heartbreaking to see that. Tons of people at the riverbank, tons of children. I couldn’t bear it—the next day I sent ten trucks. I gave orders for the children to be brought to the river first. With these small children running around, you think about your own children in Siberia. Over in Siberia things were all right, but the suffering in Stalingrad was terrible.
Ivan Vasilevich Vasilev (Brigade commissar, chief of the political
section of the 62nd Army): We were getting them out, across the Volga, but this evacuation, as we called it, was just as deadly. It was a dreadful sight, especially the children. They’re let out onto the sand without water or any kind of food provisions. How could a worker bring anything, what with the explosions all around, the bombs from above, and children going in the boats? You’d often come across some terrible scene on the island. If only some government representative had been present—there were plenty of vehicles coming through that could have taken them. This was well within our capabilities, but once the permission had been given—literally an hour later—they couldn’t be found, and at the same time we had to take care of the local population. [ . . . ]
As a communist, I cannot look at children with indifference. They were going around collecting scraps of bread. I telegrammed Chuyanov, telling him to send Soviet authorities to bring this matter to rest. Things couldn’t be so bad that we couldn’t feed these children. We got them fed. A private’s family—the father’s at the front, mother’s dead, leaving an infant, a four-year-old, an eight-year-old, and the sick old grandfather. How could you not help a family like that?
Mikhail Alexander Vodolagin (Secretary of the Stalingrad Regional Committee): There were children turning up with no parents, children of all ages, from infants to teenagers. It was decided that the Komsomol would be responsible for gathering these children and transporting them to the east bank of the Volga. Comrade Bykov, secretary of the Yermansky District Komsomol, played a very active role in this work. Komsomol members began searching for unaccompanied children in courtyards, apartments, trenches, and basements. We brought these homeless children to the shelter in the basement of the City Theater. Then at three or four in the morning, or some other suitable time, we’d send them across the Volga. Supplies were being sent at the same time, so we gave them everything they needed.
Konstantin Vasilievich Zubanov (Chief engineer of the Stalingrad Power Station, StalGRES): It was only September 13 when the Germans broke through to the Volga at Kuporosnoye, definitively breaking the link between Stalingrad’s heart and brain. The artery was severed. We had a job to do: provide electricity to the southern part of the city, specifically to the industrial and residential areas in the Kirov district. [ . . . ] The Germans were entrenched in the hills of Yelshanka and Kuporosnoye38 Evidently they had heard about our work at the station, and they placed us under fierce artillery fire. After a few test shots, the Germans concentrated fire on us with exceptional force.
Refugees from Stalingrad, September 1942.
Claudia Stepanovna Denisova (Secretary of the Yermansky District Committee): On September 14 we held a meeting of the bureau of the district committee. This meeting took place in a trench. We listened to reports on barricade construction and the evacuation of minors.
We stopped the meeting because everything went quiet. Those attending were the chief of the militia, the chief of staff of the local anti–air defense, and the director of the Krasnaya Zastava factory. Someone took minutes in a notebook, everything was preserved. The chief of staff said: “I’ll go see what the trouble is.” The day before, the 13th, they enemy bombed us heavily, maniacally. [ . . . ] While he was out seeing what was going on, why there was this strange, ominous silence, some militiamen in black clothing walked by. Submachine guns, satchels, and all of them dressed the same. They walked on. We thought they were our own militiamen and said: “Didn’t we see them earlier going toward the House of Specialists?” It turned out that they were German soldiers who later took over the House of Specialists, and here we were about fifty meters away. This was around three o’clock. The chief of staff came back and said: “I suggest we leave immediately. There are German tanks on First of May Street.” The tanks were coming from a bridge in the Dzerzhinsky district, and the submachine gunners were already in the House of Specialists.
Vladimir Kharitonovich Demchenko (Major, commandant of Stalingrad): On September 14 German soldiers entered the city and occupied the NKVD building. At that time I received a message from the garrison commander saying that groups of submachine gunners were moving from the central airfield onto the southern slopes of Mamayev Kurgan. My orders were to verify this. I set out on reconnaissance with three men. I decided to stop at my HQ at the Red October factory to get a dozen or so more men, because I had heard all kinds of rumors. [ . . . ] I went along the riverbank, thinking I’d soon be getting some more men. We reached the north docks, and it turned out that the Germans were firing at the crossing. We spent two hours exchanging fire with them. I gathered my men. At the crossing there were about a hundred vehicles that couldn’t be ferried across because of all the German machine guns and submachine guns. I gathered about fifteen men at the House of Specialists. The shooting began—them firing from over there, us from over here. A junior political officer got wounded. I could tell we weren’t getting anywhere. I went back with my men to the command post on the Tsaritsa. We got as far as Kholzunov Square. There were antiaircraft guns on the square and right on the riverbank. Five enemy dive-bombers were attacking them. One gun was fifteen meters from the bank. Five planes were coming right for it. The gun started firing. We saw the bombs fall. Two of my men were lying in the water, and I jumped into a ditch. A bomb fell about ten meters away from me. I was thrown into the air, hit the ground, took quite a beating. Put me out of action for a week. I got up but fell down again. I felt like something had snapped inside me. My two comrades grabbed me and got me to our command post. The bombing started up again. A bomb struck the back wall of the building and started a fire. A high-explosive bomb. When I saw that I figured that everyone was probably dead. I got up. I could see that the building was burning.
Alexei Semyonovich Chuyanov (First secretary of the Stalingrad Regional Committee): September 1439 [ . . . ] The city defense committee’s command post is a few meters back from the front line. Telephone and telegraphic communication with the northern and southern sections of the city has been cut off. In several places the fascists have reached the Volga, dividing the city into isolated defense sectors. It was decided that the command post should be removed to the east bank of the Volga. I. V. Sidorov, the regional committee secretary for transportation, was charged with organizing the crossing. [ . . . ] Late at night two boats came to the command post from Krasnaya Sloboda, and we started crossing. I left on the last ferry with my assistants and comrades Voronin and Zimenkov. It was relatively calm until we reached the middle of the river. We’d just gotten there when we saw flares overhead. That was when the machine-gun fire began.
We hit the deck. The engineer decided to muffle the engine, but in his haste he went too far and killed it. The current was taking us straight toward the statue of Kholzunov, where the German machine-gun fire was coming from. [ . . . ] Sidorov left the helm to go down to the engineer.
“Come on!” he said, sighing heavily. “Look what you’ve done! Do you see where we’re headed?”
“To visit the fascists!” joked Zimenkov, deadpan.
But this was no laughing matter. The boat taking fire from machine guns. There was only one way out: to swim for it. And it was just at that moment that the engine started up. Ivan Vasilievich ran back to the helm and turned the vessel sharply toward Krasnaya Sloboda.
Vladimir Kharitonovich Demchenko (Major, commandant of Stalingrad): The [Extraordinary City] Commission existed until September 14. After September 14 the Regional Committee and the Executive Committee moved to the east bank. The Commandant’s Office stayed on the west bank, but all other city and regional authorities moved to the east bank. [ . . . ] After our building on Communist Street was bombed, the Commandant’s Office worked and received people at several different locations. For a few days we were at the hospital, then we moved to October Street, then to the Tsaritsa, and from September 18 we were at General Rodimtsev’s command post. We stayed there until September 25. On September 25 we left with the 62nd Army and went to the Barricades district. From there we moved to the Red October
district under the direction of the commander of 62nd Army. We built bunkers and stayed in them all the time. [ . . . ]
I should mention that I was the only one with a map, which was on tracing cloth. Front headquarters had ordered us to show them where certain streets were, where they were located, because the city was not like other cities. We directed people. Someone would come to us at one in the morning, say, some army subunit, and they’d need help with a street or heading. Or there would be ammunition or guns that had to be picked up from the station. We’d go and show them the way. Because of all the ravines here, streets and roads aren’t that easy to find.
Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov (Lieutenant general, commander of the 62nd Army): The army’s commander and military council defended Stalingrad while based at Mamayev Kurgan. Sometimes when we were surrounded by submachine gunners we’d run down to the riverbank. There were times when we were 150 meters from the enemy’s forward positions. Were there any local party organizations there? [ . . . ] Yes, indeed! I remember comrade Chuyanov, secretary of the regional committee, who was made chairman of the defense committee, I saw him myself—Would you like to know when? It was on February 5, 1943, at the victory rally. And as for Secretary Piksin—I saw him, if I’m not mistaken, in mid- to late January 1943. Until then I had seen no one at all.
[ . . . ] Then, when things had more or less calmed down, the commandant of Stalingrad showed up on the riverbank.
“How can I help you?”
“Who are you?”
“Commandant of the city.”
“Where are you based?”
“Across the river—Leninsk, Akhtuba, Krasnaya Sloboda—everyone’s there [ . . . ].”
I think that with the right leadership, the situation here would have been different.
An army is made up of men, and the Bolshevik leadership ought to be located where the greatest danger is.
[ . . . ] The enemy had forced his way into Stalingrad. At the Tractor factory there were hundreds of tons of fuel. Transporting fuel across the Volga is not at all easy to do. It is extremely dangerous. I said: get that fuel! I met the director of the factory, who informed me that their regulations prohibited taking anything from the factory. I ordered armed soldiers to take the fuel. These men encountered armed security, who pointed machine guns at them. What was I to do? I gave up and let it go. The fuel stayed there for the enemy.