by Stalingrad- The City that Defeated the Third Reich (epub)
In his lecture Zayonchkovsky detailed the different forms of questioning. He argued that individual interrogation—one interrogator and one subject—was best, as prisoners were more likely to talk when alone than in the presence of fellow soldiers or superiors. Interrogators must not fraternize with the prisoners lest it damage the Soviet officers’ “honor and dignity.” Only in exceptional cases, such as when interrogating high-ranking officers who held vital information, was it advisable to adopt a more relaxed style over a cup of tea. To make a strong impression the interrogating officers had to show the prisoners how much they knew about them, such as by dropping information about the prisoner’s unit and the name of his divisional commander. Each question had to be carefully considered. For instance, German soldiers asked whether they belonged to the Nazi party could not be expected to answer truthfully. Instead, the question should be, “When did you join the Nazi party?”
Almost all the following interrogations took place between February 5 and 9 in the staff headquarters of the 66th Army located in Dubovka, thirty miles north of Stalingrad. The prisoners provided information about the final weeks in the Stalingrad pocket and the circumstances that led their units to surrender. They made statements about the Wehrmacht’s combat effectiveness and the strength of the Red Army. The reports contain a wealth of previously unknown information on the final days of the battle, such as the different ways Generals Strecker and Arno von Lenski3 dealt with their units as they showed signs of disintegrating. They reveal the horrendous living conditions of Russian prisoners in German captivity and the terror felt by the penned-in soldiers of the 6th Army as the artillery barrages and air attacks began.
Judging by the reports, the Germans who continued to fight in the face of hunger, exhaustion, and mass death did so out of a mixture of spite, obedience, and ideological conviction. An especially strong motivating factor was fear of capture. In this respect, the Soviet information campaign during the first weeks of the encirclement was ineffective: Wehrmacht soldiers dismissed the images of well-fed and well-clothed German soldiers in Soviet prison camps as empty propaganda. During the final weeks, the Soviets began to give German prisoners tobacco and bread and allow them to return to their units, a tactic that apparently convinced many Wehrmacht soldiers that capture was not tantamount to death.
Despite these interesting details, the interrogators were unable to arrive at a reliable picture of the German mood in the final days of the Stalingrad battle for the simple reason that the general situation and the specific interrogation protocol did not encourage reliable statements. The testimony by the German Senior Lieutenant Otto Conrady shed light on the problem. An intelligence officer in the 389th Infantry Division, Conrady noted that the Soviet prisoners he questioned in the summer and fall of 1942 stated that they fought only under threat of violence and received nothing to eat for days at a time. But his divisional commander rejected the information as nonsense: the strong resistance the 389th Infantry Division encountered in Stalingrad belied the statements of the Red Army prisoners. We can thus assume that all prisoners, Soviet and German, told their interrogating officers, at least to some extent, what they wanted to hear.
All the more disconcerting, then, are the many expressions of pro-Nazi sentiment recorded in the reports. For instance, general staff officer Herrmann Lüben believed that thanks to Nazi conditioning German soldiers would still win the war, but he worried that the “blood purity” of the German Volk had been jeopardized, and put the main share of the blame for Germany’s military failures in Stalingrad on its—non-Aryan—Italian and Romanian allies. The testimony of platoon leader Ernst Eichhorn (24th Panzer Division) leaves a particularly lasting impression. Perhaps to ingratiate himself with the Russians, Eichhorn expressed his surprise at the good treatment received by German prisoners and recounted how his men wondered why the Germans and Russians were even fighting. In the next sentence—the last of the interrogation report—Eichhorn added that for him and the other German officers it was clear who was really at fault for the war: the Jews, who had taken over everywhere save for Germany. That Lerenman, the interrogating officer, was Jewish appears to have exceeded his powers of imagination.
REPORT
on the political interrogation of POW Senior Lieutenant Max Hütler
Dubovka, February 6, 1943
Interrogated by Major Koltynin, head of 7th Section, Political Department, 66th Army, and
Quartermaster-Technician 2nd Class Gersh, interpreter, 99th Rifle Division4
Max Hütler,5 senior lieutenant, adjutant in the 544th Infantry Regiment, 389th Infantry Division. German. Age: 34. Native of Westphalia. Married. Member of the National Socialist party. Forestry researcher, instructor at the University of Göttingen. Reserve officer. Home address: Göttingen University.
The prisoner stated: “From the very beginning of the Stalingrad operation it was clear to me—and not only me but nearly all of the officers—that our high command was taking a big risk by driving in such an enormous wedge. The Russians were obviously going to try to cut through this wedge, surround our forces at its tip, and move in behind us. But we thought our commanders knew what they were doing. We thought they had enough reserves and would be able to hold our flanks. I still can’t understand why they didn’t bring more men to the flanks. We had reserves, plenty of them. The whole thing confuses me. When your army broke through our defenses at the end of November 1942, people started to panic. But we didn’t know who exactly was spreading this panic. Soldiers weren’t the only ones losing their heads. A lot of officers were too, especially the commanders of large units.
“By Christmas we understood the utter hopelessness of our situation. There wasn’t any help and there wasn’t going to be any. Each of us realized this, but we were afraid to admit it. We knew that we were doomed. But despite this most of us didn’t even think of surrendering. We’d been tasked with holding back as many Russian troops as possible, troops that would otherwise be sent toward the Caucasus and Rostov. That’s what we told the men. They knew what was going to happen to them, and, as you know, it was a small number of worthless men who laid down their arms and surrendered without being ordered to. The main corps of soldiers had been thoroughly instilled with a sense of duty, and they were prepared to give up their lives. Those were the men who held everything together. We weren’t bothered by the small groups. They didn’t present any danger to us.
“You say that every soldier is still a man, and as such he puts great value on his life and holds on to the idea of returning to his homeland, to his family, his wife, his children. That’s true. But still the homeland takes precedence. Each of us is able to sacrifice himself for his homeland. This has been drilled into all of our soldiers. When they were in the encirclement, all of them knew they still had to do their duty, and they did.
“During the two months that we were surrounded there wasn’t a single order related to discipline or increasing our monitoring of the regular soldiers. The only thing I know of was on January 27 or 28, 1943—I don’t remember the exact date—when General Strecker issued an order stating: (1) Immediately open fire on anyone who moves away from his unit and toward the enemy; (2) anyone who takes supplies for himself from airdrops will be tried by court-martial; (3) anyone who is insubordinate or refuses to follow orders will be tried by court-martial.
“So why did we surrender? First of all, the main force that was with Field Marshal Paulus surrendered on January 30, 1943 [sic], so continued resistance was senseless. Our group wasn’t able to draw in enough Russian forces to justify the sacrifice. We did our job for as long as we could, and if we could have held your armies back for another two or three weeks, then we wouldn’t have put down our weapons, we’d have kept fighting. Second, we had so many wounded that they impaired our ability to fight. They were packed into every other building. All of them would have been killed by artillery fire if we’d resisted any longer.
“How do I judge the current military situation in Germany?
Germany is in the middle of a very difficult crisis, but this isn’t a defeat. There’s still another 2 million or so who can be drafted. But if your offensive continues at the same pace for another two months, then our crisis might turn into defeat.”
The prisoner also said that one of the signs by which you could determine who would win was Turkey’s entry into the war. Turkey would join the side of the victors, but only when it was absolutely clear who the victors would be.6
“I was a National Socialist before the army, and now I’m a soldier. There aren’t any National Socialists in the army, just soldiers.
“I was a company commander from April to October 1942. What you’ve been saying about the brutal treatment of Russian POWs—this is the first I’ve heard of it.7 There was nothing like that in either my company or my regiment. There may be exceptional cases, but they’d have been just that: exceptions. It’s prohibited. It’s the same thing with the local populations. We have orders that make violence against the local population an arrestable offense. We’re likewise prohibited from taking valuables from civilians—or any of their things, for that matter. Sometimes we’re given permission to take foodstuffs. The packages with boots, dresses, and so on, that some of us sent back to Germany—those were things that had been found in destroyed or burned-out buildings.
“Russian soldiers are pretty good soldiers. They’re much better at defending than attacking. And here, where they defend in small groups, they do a lot better than they do as a large mass. You have good snipers.” Major Koltynin, Head of 7th Section, Political Department, 66th Army Quartermaster-Technician 2nd Class Gersh, Interpreter, 99th Rifle Division
REPORT
on the political interrogation of POW Sergeant Helmut Pist, 21st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 24st Panzer Division
Dubovka, February 9, 1943
Interrogated by Captain Zayonchkovsky, senior instructor, 7th Section, Political Department, 66th Army
Pist, Helmut. Born on January 11, 1916, in Schwarzenau (Province of Posen). Graduated from the gymnasium. Profession: agronomist. Lutheran. German. Member of the Hitler Youth. Drafted in 1937. Home address: Krefeld am Rhein, Prinz Fridrich Karl Str., 139.
When asked about the state of his unit during the final days of the encirclement, Helmut Pist stated the following:
“In early January the regiments in our division no longer existed as such. Individual groups were created that went by the names of the officers in charge. For example, a group was made up out of the 21st and 26th Regiments, and it was commanded by Colonel Brendahl. They also set up these so-called alarm groups. Those groups were different sizes. The one I was in, for example, had fifty men. We were led by Lieutenant Hermanns, and we were located in Orlovka. Morale was low. Many were criticizing the government, blaming it for giving up on us. Our food was getting worse by the day. By around January 20 we were getting fifty grams of bread per day. The air-dropped food supplies were being taken by whoever found them, despite strict orders and the threat of being shot. So there was very uneven food distribution in the units. Discipline was worsening every day, and there was more and more talk of surrender. On around January 25 Lieutenant Koars from divisional HQ told us that General von Lenski, our divisional commander, had issued an order giving freedom of action to the commanders of all units—that is, he was letting them surrender. But that order was canceled a day later.
“Your leaflets didn’t have much success among the men before the encirclement, but then the situation changed, especially in January, when the men read them with real eagerness. We were actually looking for the leaflets you were dropping from the air, the ones with maps showing the situation on the front.
“Those last days in Stalingrad were horrible: thousands of dead bodies, and the wounded men dying in the streets because the hospitals were overcrowded, and on top of that we were taking heavy fire from your artillery and aircraft. The surrender wasn’t organized. Our bunker was fifty meters from our divisional HQ, but even though we were so close to them, we only learned about the surrender after the Russians had already showed up. We came out of our bunker and put down our weapons. War in Russia is not what it is in the west. During the French campaign in 1940, our squadron was always out in front, and only two of our guys got killed.”
Major Koltynin, Head of the 7th Section Political Department, 66th Army Captain Zayonchkovsky, Senior instructor, 7th Section Political Department, 66th Army
REPORT
on the political interrogation of the POW Ernst Eichhorn, cavalry officer in the 9th Company, 24th Panzer Regiment, 24th Panzer Division
Dubovka, February 5, 1943
Interrogated by Major Lerenman, instructor, 7th Section, Political Department, 66th Army
Ernst Eichhorn. Home address: Regensburg an der Donau, Luitpoldstrasse 11a. Field Post no. 11468.
German. In the army since 1935. Not a member of the National Socialist party. On the Russian front since June 1941. Completed cavalry school in Hanover. Born in 1902. Campaigned in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France. Not married.
One reason the surrounded German forces in Stalingrad surrendered was that the front was closing in. Maneuvering was impossible. A massive force was concentrated in this small area with no airfield. That resulted in enormous losses from artillery and airplanes. Another reason was the bad state of the food and fuel supplies. In the final days the men were getting one hundred grams of bread, a bit of horsemeat, forty grams of lard, a daily portion of broth (two liters), and four cigarettes.
They were down to a small number of artillery shells, but there was plenty of ammunition for the infantry. Tanks were turned into pillboxes. Because of that the whole regiment was operating as an infantry unit.
The officers of the 24th Panzer Division understood that the encircled units were in an extremely complicated and difficult situation, but they didn’t consider it hopeless.
The order to surrender came through divisional command. It was given verbally, and then envoys were sent out, and units from the 24th Division laid down their arms. But the order to surrender came as a surprise to everyone. Up to the very end, most of the officers were still hoping to get help from the outside. The men never questioned their orders, both during the encirclement and when they were told to surrender. That’s how the German soldier is trained: to do something only when he’s ordered to. Communication with the outside world was maintained right up until Russian units took the airfield at Pitomnik. There was no postal service after that.
The idea was widespread in the German army—among both men and officers—that being captured by the Russians meant poor treatment, torture, and death. The men and officers had all read the Russian leaflets where it said that prisoners were treated well. There were some with photographs that showed the lives of the prisoners in Russia. But no one believed it, they figured it was just propaganda. During the advance many of them had seen the bodies of men who’d been shot in the head and so on. That convinced us that the Russians were shooting prisoners.
All of the officers in the 24th Panzer Regiment think highly of the Russian artillery. They’re accurate and don’t scrimp on shells. If there hadn’t been any artillery at Stalingrad, and it was just infantry attacking the surrounded forces, then the Germans could have easily fought them off and resisted longer. The Russian infantry doesn’t deserve any specific praise. They lack the spirit for an effective offensive. The Russians were a lot better in 1942 than at the beginning of the war. But the German fighter planes are better than the Russian ones. There are a lot of young, inexperienced pilots in the Russian air force. The tanks are very effective. The T-34 is an excellent piece of machinery. Russian tanks are very well armed. And their crews are very highly trained.
The reason for the successful offensive against the surrounded German army was the simultaneity of the attacks from the north and south, and later from the west. On top of that, the Romanian units, which were positioned on the upper Don, ran away. The success of the Russian assault was also
facilitated by a certain amount of panicking in the German units. We began destroying stores of food and military equipment in the first days of the encirclement.8 That complicated the situation for the surrounded forces.
During our advance on Stalingrad there was talk among the officers that the Russians were counting on the winter, that they were going to time their own offensive for the winter. The German commanders thought the Russians were too weak and downplayed the likelihood of a Russian offensive. The German commanders thought they’d have already won by the time winter came. The officers remembered that this wasn’t the first time that their general strategic plans had been upended. It wasn’t clear then—though it’s obvious now—that the plan was unrealistic. You just can’t count on simultaneous offensives on Leningrad and Stalingrad while also planning to take the Caucasus. It’s too much. The German commanders were planning to take Stalingrad and then move down the Volga to Astrakhan. But they never took Stalingrad. To get to Astrakhan they had to try to cross the Kalmyk Steppe,9 and that entailed increasing losses for the German army.