Once again, however, there was felt to be a need for British expertise and capital. A start had been made on the route to Arnhem but only as a single-track line. The Dutch declared that the Arnhem line alone, even in its present state, was returning a profit of four per cent so British investors were definitely interested. Once again Locke was called in to advise in 1851. He was actually very busy at the time so he sent an assistant, MacVeagh, to Holland to assess the situation. On his return early in 1852 he and Locke discussed the whole route. An obvious recommendation was that the system should be converted to what was now accepted as the standard gauge, which made a great deal of sense as one of the original objectives had been to create a link with Germany, where tracks had already been built to the 4ft 8½in gauge. This suggestion was accepted for the route to Arnhem. Locke reported favourably on the project, which presented few technical problems, crossing the flat landscape of Holland, apart from a crossing of the River IJssel at Arnhem for which Locke and MacVeagh produced the design for the bridge.
Work began in 1852 with Brassey as contractor and Locke as consulting engineer. Although everything should have been straightforward, there were some disagreements between Brassey and the Company, which were eventually sorted out. Locke himself made just one visit to inspect the works in 1854 and the whole route was eventually opened in 1856, following the conversion of the Arnhem line to standard gauge. Although Locke’s reputation had been an essential factor in persuading investors to look at the line, he played only a minor role in its construction. He was far more actively involved in his other major European project, the Paris, Mantes and Cherbourg Railway.
Successive French rulers had considered the necessity of a naval base at Cherbourg that would help to protect the seaways between their country and the old enemy, Britain. It seemed the ideal spot from which to cover traffic moving from the English Channel out into the Atlantic and possibly attacking important ports such as La Rochelle and Bordeaux. Over the centuries, fortifications were erected, allowed to fall into ruin and rebuilt, and harbour walls were constructed. The most important works were begun under Louis XVI at the end of the eighteenth century, continued under Napoleon I and eventually completed during the reign of Napoleon III. It was then decided that the next obvious step was to connect the completed naval base and fortress to the capital by rail. It is a curious fact that the fortifications first considered as a defence against Perfidious Albion would be linked to Paris by a company with British backing. But it was still the case that the French found it necessary to look to Britain for at least part of the finance and also for engineering expertise.
This was a project that was very much led by the government, but was to be built by a private company. As the purely commercial considerations would hardly have justified the project, the government offered a guaranteed four per cent return on the capital investment. A company was formed with Count Chasseloup Laubat as President and with the board made up of half British and half French directors. There were rumblings of patriotic discontent that the work of Chief Engineer was not handed to a Frenchman, but this was a vital line of communication and the decision was taken to entrust the work to the man with the most successful record of railway construction in France, Joseph Locke. Even after his appointment, when work was under way and going well, there were still suggestions being put forward for his replacement. A decisive factor in keeping him in his post was the wholehearted support he received from Napoleon III. This is slightly ironic, as Locke was well known as an opponent of all forms of despotic monarchy.
It was decided to start by completing the line from a junction with the Paris-Rouen Railway at Mantes-la-Jolie, roughly 50km to the west of Paris, as far as Caen. The first part of the line should have been comparatively straightforward through the gently undulating farmlands of Normandy. Leaving the valley of the Seine the line reached a summit at Bréval, which was pierced by an 800-metre-long tunnel. Locke came to inspect the work at the tunnel early in 1853 with Brassey and William Locke. They all entered the tunnel with a small group of workmen holding torches and climbed up scaffolding to inspect the brickwork. The structure suddenly collapsed and all the men fell to the ground. Brassey and William landed safely, but Locke was struck on the leg by a falling beam, causing a double fracture. The engineer was rushed to Rouen and then taken on to Paris for what was thought to be the best possible medical treatment. The doctors examined the leg and declared that the only solution was an amputation. Locke was having none of that and demanded that an English doctor be brought over to examine him. While he was waiting, cold water was played on the leg to prevent infection and the patient was treated with painkillers.
Sir Joseph Olliffe arrived from the British Embassy and, in his opinion, amputation was not necessary. There is no indication of exactly what treatment Locke received, but it was mostly successful. He had a period of convalescence, where he was forced to lie in bed and occupied himself with reading novels. It would be interesting to know what his taste in fiction was, but sadly the information is not available. When he recovered he was able to return to the line in time for the grand opening, but he was left with a slight limp that stayed with him for the rest of his life.
The first part of the line offered few challenges. From Bréval there is a descent down to the valley of the Eure, which is crossed, followed by a deep cutting taking the line to Evreux. Altogether there were to be five summits between Mantes and Caen, one of which at Lamotte, west of Lisieux was cut through by a 2,500-metre-long tunnel and a steep section with a gradient of 1 in 100. At Mézidon, a branch line ran south to Le Mans, also engineered by Locke.
Once Caen had been reached in 1855, the network of lines linking it to Paris, Rouen and Le Havre were amalgamated into the Compagnie de l’Ouest. As a result of the expansion a new station was completed in Paris, La Gare Montparnasse. The station is famous for an accident in the 1890s, when a train failed to stop and the engine crashed through the end of the building and the locomotive plunged down into the street. The next section to Cherbourg presented a far greater challenge. Much of the ground proved to be very boggy and in the worst sections there was great difficulty in constructing embankments, which tended to sink until they rested on more solid foundations. At one spot the firm ground was only found twenty-two metres below the surface. Elsewhere, cuttings had to be blasted through solid rock. Devey supplied statistics of the work required on the 131-kilometre line from Caen to Cherbourg: 20 million cubic yards of material was removed in cutting and embanking; 70 rivers and 310 roads had to be bridged. The line eventually reached Cherbourg in 1857, where it had a terminus at the arsenal.
The opening was a very grand affair, attended by leading figures from many European countries. Grandstands were erected, covered in bunting and a dais erected with a crucifix for the blessing of the project. Plants and shrubs were laid out, flags fluttered and masts were erected, hung with garlands of flowers. There were bands and parades of soldiers. The Emperor was enthroned, speeches were made – though apparently mercifully brief. Queen Victoria arrived in the harbour on the royal yacht, Victoria and Albert. Under a brilliant blue sky and a baking hot sun that left many of the spectators on the open grandstands wishing everyone would hurry up and release them from the furnace, the grand finale was enacted: the blessing of the line. The Bishop in full regalia sprinkled the two waiting locomotives with holy water, recited appropriate prayers and the line was officially declared open. The next day there was a banquet, which Locke attended and where the Emperor awarded him the cross of the Legion of Honour. Brassey reported that at the banquet he sat with the Empress who chatted amicably with him in English.
Brassey was also awarded the cross and his biographer tells an entertaining story about the contractor’s attitude to such honours. At a later date, he received the Cross of the Iron Crown from the Emperor of Austria. His agent complimented him on the honour:
Mr. Brassey remarked that, as an Englishman, he did not know what good Crosses were to him; bu
t that he could well imagine how eagerly they were sought after by the subjects of those Governments which gave away Orders in reward for civil services rendered to the State, &c. He added, that in regard to the Cross of the Iron Crown, it had been graciously offered to him by the Emperor of Austria, and there was no alternative but to accept this mark of the Sovereign’s appreciation of the part he had taken in the construction of public works, however unworthy he was of such a distinction. ‘Have I not other Crosses?’ said Mr. Brassey. ‘Yes,’ said his agent; ‘I know of two others, the Legion of Honour of France and the Chevaliership of Italy’ ‘Where are they?’ But as this question could not be answered, it was settled that two duplicate crosses should be procured at once (the originals having been mislaid) in order that Mr. Brassey might take them across to Lowndes Square the same evening. ‘Mrs. Brassey will be glad to possess all these Crosses.’
It is not recorded whether Locke was equally cavalier in losing track of his various honours nor whether Mrs Locke appreciated them. The completion of the line to Cherbourg also marked the end of Locke’s work in continental Europe.
Chapter Thirteen
THE RACE TO THE NORTH
Although in railway history, the phrase ‘Race to the North’ is usually thought of in terms of the competing east and west coast routes to Scotland vying for the fastest running times in the 1880s, the competition dates back decades before that. The start of the initial race to be first to build connections between London and Scotland has already been described, and the competition did not lessen as new lines were added. Locke had, from the first, been associated with the west coast route, but in 1844 he received an important post with the rival faction: he was appointed Chief Engineer for the Great Northern Railway.
The idea of a direct line from London to York was not new. The first proposal had been made as early as 1827 when the Rennie brothers had looked at the possibility of a line to York through Cambridge, but that had come to nothing. James Walker, who had prepared the report for the Liverpool & Manchester Railway that had recommended the use of fixed engines rather than locomotives, had surveyed one line from London through Norwich, the London & York Railway; while Joseph Gibbs had come up with a more direct route and in 1836 the proposal was formally presented to Parliament as the Great Northern Railway Bill. At this stage in railway history, bills were still fiercely contested and faced by opposition from landowners and a general feeling that there were more railways being suggested than the country would ever need: the Bill was defeated.
By the 1840s, however, the advantages of rail connections were becoming obvious, and areas without lines felt they were losing out on the economic benefits improved transport was bringing to other regions. Those landowners who had opposed Gibbs in the first place now began agitating for a line to be built. A new company was formed and walker was asked to resurvey the possible route. It was agreed that there was no case for two companies and two routes, so the rival factions were amalgamated as The Great Northern Railway, and on 17 April 1844, the following advertisement appeared in The Times:
Great Northern Railway from London to York through Hitchin, Biggleswade, St Neot’s, Huntingdon, Stamford, Grantham, Newark, Gainsboro’, and Doncaster, joining the Leeds and Selby and York and North Midland Railways near South Milford, with branch lines to Bedford and Lincoln, and a junction with the Manchester and Sheffield Railway.
This railway intersects a very wide and populous district of country which is at present beyond the reach of existing lines, and whose features are remarkably favourable for railway construction.
It will form by far the shortest line from the metropolis to the north of England, Scotland, and the greater part of the manufacturing districts of Yorkshire and Lancashire …The preliminary surveys just completed prove that this railway and its branches will be easier of execution than any other great line hitherto made.
One thing the announcement made clear was that the proposed line would offer a new threat to the west coast route, with its claim to provide ‘the shortest route’ to Scotland. The new company did not get off to the best of starts. Walker was a busy man and felt unable to continue with the project now that he had completed his commitment to surveying the line. The obvious replacement would seem to have been Gibbs. Apart from his early survey work along this route, he had experience as Chief Engineer for the modest London & Croydon Railway. The directors, however, seem to have felt that his experience was not really up to the job of supervising what would be the most ambitious main line yet attempted. So they turned instead to Joseph Locke.
This was certainly a time when Locke was as busy as any engineer in Britain and it might have been thought that his first loyalty would have been to the west coast companies, but they were having problems of their own and serious disagreements about future co-operation. There was an existing route from London via Euston and the London & Birmingham Railway as far as Rugby and then continued through Derby. The Grand Junction had the idea that if there was a new more direct route to York, the L & BR route would fall out of use, which might encourage that Company to be more co-operative. They, therefore, gave their blessing to Locke who, in any case, must have been excited at the prospect of taking control over what was then the biggest railway project yet undertaken. He certainly seems to have been in a cheerful mood at this time, as he wrote to Buddicom in France on 27 July 1844, ‘nothing new here except Railways and Railway Bills’ and adding that ‘no one knows whether his own pet scheme may not have every morning as he gets up, a competing line on each side of it. Lincoln is become a most important place. A line from Wakefield to Lincoln, one from Chesterfield to Lincoln, from Nottingham to Lincoln, Cambridge through Lincoln to York, Peterborough through Lincoln.’
His first task was to confirm the best line – though it is clear from the Times announcement that the route through the fens was not a serious contender. He went over the ground and in August 1844 produced his report on ‘the proposed railway from London to York and Leeds’. He came down firmly in favour of the line through Stamford and Newark instead of the alternative through Peterborough and Lincoln. He also wrote that: ‘The terminus in London must be well placed near to King’s Cross New Road, a position not inferior, in my opinion, to any in London.’ He also indicated that in the flat land at the northern end of the route, costs could be as low as ‘ten to twelve thousand pounds a mile’, but they would be much more expensive at the southern end, particularly close to London where land prices were high. His report was immediately accepted.
Once agreement had been reached, the directors lost no time in negotiating with other companies in the north of England to make useful connections. They agreed a merger with the Manchester & Leeds Railway, and as the manager of the latter was also the chief promoter of the Wakefield, Lincoln & Boston, they included that in the deal as well. It made a great deal of sense in both economic and engineering terms, and avoided unnecessary duplication of work. Meanwhile, however, the situation was changing in the west. The Grand Junction and the London & Birmingham had settled their differences and were shortly to merge as the London & North Western Railway to continue their drive northwards into Scotland. As far as the Grand Junction was concerned, the Great Northern was no longer a stick with which to beat a rival, but a dangerous competitor – and their principal engineer was about to start working for the enemy.
There is no surviving correspondence with Locke, but on 17 September 1844 he wrote to the Great Northern, submitting his resignation. The reason he gave was that he had not been consulted about the negotiations with the Wakefield, Lincoln & Boston. It was a feeble excuse: there was no reason why the directors should have consulted him about such an arrangement, and there was certainly no rational reason to oppose an arrangement so obviously to the advantage of both parties. There is only one obvious explanation. There were to be two rival routes to the north, and he could not be the servant of two masters. He had chosen to continue where he had started, to the west.
Locke was
now able to move onward with the great project he had begun some years earlier, when he had worked on extending lines from Lancaster to Carlisle. Now he could continue over the border to Glasgow and beyond. For once, however, he would also be involved with a major engineering project only indirectly connected with railways. The construction of the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway had brought new importance and trade to Greenock and there was now an urgent need to improve the harbour facilities. Locke designed a new harbour, adjacent to the East India Harbour, the work of John Rennie and built in 1805, and sharing one pier with the latter. It was a very simple structure, a rectangular basin, enclosing 5½ acres and providing a total length of 2,350ft of quay. It had an open entrance, which allowed for 14ft depth at low tide and 24ft at high tide. The work was undertaken by the team of Brassey, Mackenzie and Stephenson at a total cost of £120,000. The excavated earth was piled up further along the river bank, but all had to be moved again when the site was needed for the Albert Dock. Eventually all the spoil was used to create the foundations for a new esplanade. The opening of the dock on 17 October 1850 was said to have been, according to a contemporary report ‘a great municipal affair’. Locke’s involvement did not extend much beyond the initial design phase: the work was straightforward and well within the capabilities of such an experienced team of contractors. The engineer was, in any case, heavily involved in a far greater Scottish scheme.
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