The process of fascistization, which took decisive steps during 1938, was a fundamental part of Franco’s determined attempt to cling onto power for life. On 9 March the Fuero del Trabajo (Labour Law) was approved, the first ‘fundamental law’ of the Franco regime and a perfect example of Italian influence (the ‘Carta del Lavoro’ of 1927). The text, which considered strike action and disruption to the ‘normality of production’ as ‘crimes against the state’ and ‘subject to appropriate sanctions’, included a resolutely quasi-fascist declaration of principles:
As a result of the renewal of the Catholic tradition of social justice and heightened human consciousness that informed our law of the empire, the state, a national instrument for the object of unity, and a Syndicalist one as it represents a totalitarian action against liberal capitalism and Marxist materialism, undertakes the task of channelling – with military, constructive and religious zeal – Spain’s pending revolution which will grant to the Spanish, once and for always, fatherland, bread and justice.79
Franco’s political orientation was not to the liking of all the groups that made up the Nationalist coalition, given their obvious rivalry with the Falange (whose leader was already Serrano Suñer, to the detriment of ‘legitimistas’ Pilar and Miguel Primo de Rivera, siblings of the ‘Absent’, and Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, his executor). Military chiefs feared their declining influence over the Caudillo and the Falangist appropriation of powers of public order and security. The Carlists resented their loss of power in the new party and their isolation in the fiefs of Navarre and the Basque provinces. The monarchists noted the declared anti-monarchism of the Falange (aware of the difficult coexistence between Mussolini and King Victor Emmanuel in Italy) and its growing influence on Franco. The Catholics were wary of what Vatican circles called the danger of the panstatism (the totalitarian character of fascism and Nazism that threatened the autonomy of the Church).
However, all of these groups saw the need to toe the line in the final stages of the military assault against an isolated, weakened and harassed Republic. As a result, there was no serious opposition to the political leeway granted to Serrano Suñer by Franco, even during the difficult month of September 1938, when the tension between Germany and the Franco-British entente over the integrity of Czechoslovakia looked to be about to lead to the outbreak of a world war. The Anglo-French retreat enshrined in the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938 avoided that contingency in exchange for the fall of the Spanish Republic and the break-up of Czechoslovakia. But, before achieving his most precious military target, Franco had to pay his own share of family blood: on 28 October a plane crash over the Mediterranean killed Ramón Franco, the black sheep of the family who had made amends for his previous failings by joining the insurrection in the first weeks as a fighter pilot.
After the internal collapse of the Republic, on 1 April 1939, Franco managed to end the Civil War with an absolute and unconditional victory. He did so through a final military communiqué which he drew up in bed, suffering from flu after not having missed a single day of the war: ‘Today, with a captive and disarmed Red Army, the Nationalist troops have gained their last military objectives. The war is over.’80 From that point, the legitimacy of the victory (the right of conquest sublimated) became the ultimate and supreme source of Franco’s undisputed authority and of his right to exercise his power for life. The triumphant end to the bloody Civil War was the foundation of his long dictatorship. The immediate legacy would also have a lasting impact: a suffering population with at least 300,000 killed in military combat, another 200,000 dead in repressive activities, around 300,000 permanent exiles, more than 270,000 political prisoners (officially counted in 1940) and a death toll from disease or starvation that would add more than 330,000 during the war and in subsequent years. In addition there was the material destruction which would lead to severe shortages of food, services and industrial goods in the coming years. According to the most reliable estimates, at the end of the war the economic indices had fallen from their 1935 levels: industrial production had dropped by 30 per cent; agricultural production by more than 20 per cent; national income by more than 25 per cent and transport was at around 22 per cent less than prewar capacity.81
In any case, the total victory of April 1939 left the way clear for the consolidation of what was already without doubt the comprehensive personal dictatorship of Franco himself. His invulnerable political position was reflected by his ceremonial entrance into Madrid, the so-called ‘Victory Parade’ on 19 May 1939. There he presided over a march-past of over 100,000 armed men and received the Gran Cruz Laureada de San Fernando, the highest military decoration of Spain, ‘in the name of the fatherland’. The next day, he went to the basilica of Santa Bárbara in Madrid to celebrate the Te Deum to give thanks to God for the victory. He delivered to the cardinal primate of the Spanish Church, Cardinal Gomá, his ‘sword of victory’ and received the following blessing as the envoy of Providence:
The Lord be always with you. Let him, the source of all right and power and under whose rule are all things, bless you and with loving Providence continue to protect you, as well as the people with whose regime you have been entrusted.82
As a result of a systematic policy of adulation and exaltation, the Caudillo’s character had become markedly colder, imperturbable, calculating and reserved, surprising even his closest friends. It had also increased his tendency to succumb to a folie de grandeur and to surround himself with sycophants at court. Even though he chose not to occupy the Palacio Real in Madrid, avoiding openly alienating his monarchist supporters, he decided to settle in the nearby palace of El Pardo with all the pomp and ceremony worthy of royalty (including the exotic Moorish Guard, a faithful reminder of his Africanist past). He also began occasionally to speak of himself in the third person and insisted that his wife be treated like a ‘lady’, accompanied by the Marcha Real (the official Spanish anthem) whenever on an official engagement, as had happened with the queens of Spain. The signs of his willingness to continue in office for life were already unambiguous, as was his determination not to proceed with the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Alfonso XIII (who died in 1941) or his son and heir, Don Juan de Borbón.
Temptation and Opportunism in World War II
Despite the profound process of fascistization that Franco’s dictatorship had undergone during the Spanish Civil War and the regime’s political and diplomatic proclivity towards the Italo-German Axis, the Caudillo was forced to stay out of the European war which began on 1 September 1939 with the German invasion of Poland. The exhaustion of men and the material destruction caused by the Civil War, along with the state’s deep economic difficulties and growing famine, left the Spanish regime at the mercy of an Anglo-French fleet which controlled Spanish maritime access to oil and food supplies vital to its postwar recovery. The situation was a strategic certainty already assumed by Franco and his civilian and military advisers during the Civil War, as made clear in this confidential report submitted to the minister of foreign affairs in May 1938:
One only need open an atlas for any doubt to disappear. In a war against Franco-British forces, one can safely say, without the slightest exaggeration, that we would be totally surrounded by enemies. From the word go we would find them on every perimeter of our territory, on all the coasts and all the borders. We could hold them back in the Pyrenees; but it seems little short of impossible to prevent an invasion at the same time along the Portuguese border […] Germany and Italy could only lend us help that was insufficient for the defence of a weak Spain, and nothing they may offer us could compensate for the risk involved in fighting by their side.83
Even though the repudiation of the democracies was combined with irredentist aspirations, both anti-British (Gibraltar in the Strait) and anti-French (Tangier in northern Morocco), on 4 September the Caudillo decreed Spain’s ‘strictest neutrality’ in the conflict. Ultimately Mussolini also opted for ‘non-belligerence’, limiting himself to lending concea
led support to his German ally while preparing Italy’s future military readiness. Indeed, as Spanish neutrality was a pure necessity and not a free choice, it was accompanied by official public identification with Germany’s cause and limited covert military and economic support to its war effort (in the form of logistic facilities for its fleet, aviation and secret service).84
In addition to the strategic and economic reasons which had forced neutrality, from the beginning of 1940 the internal political situation became less stable because of the growing dominance of the Falange at the heart of the regime and the resistance offered to this drift by other institutions and groups of the Francoist coalition. This tension within the regime resulted in different ideas of foreign policy, even if everyone understood the compelling need for neutrality under the watchful and arbitral eye of Franco. Right-wing conservatives, monarchists and Catholics (dominant in the high military command, the aristocracy, the clergy and senior civil service) were much more cautious in their pro-German attitude and favoured appeasing the Allied powers. In contrast, the Falangist sector led by Serrano Suñer (well represented amongst young military officers and new political staff recruited during the war) were fervent supporters of the Axis, willing to risk a clash with the Allies. Assuming the ambiguous neutrality of Franco as a tolerable, lesser evil, the Anglo-French Entente agreed to finance a postwar reconstruction programme and supply the country with the urgently needed wheat, fuel and industrial products. They reserved their overwhelming naval power to patrol the Spanish coasts and measure out shipments in order to prevent the re-export of goods to Germany via Italy.
Stunning German victories during the spring and summer of 1940, with the defeat of France and the imminent attack on Britain, as well as the entry of Italy into the war, allowed for a remarkable change in the Spanish position. Sure enough, the strategic situation had altered radically since September 1939: the German occupation of the French Atlantic coastline and the formation of the collaborative Vichy regime under Marshal Pétain eliminated any danger to Spain from that direction; and the Italian intervention extended the war to the Mediterranean and limited the capacity of the British fleet, which could no longer use the metropolitan and North African ports belonging to France. Under these conditions, from June 1940 Franco was seriously tempted to enter the war on the side of the Axis in order to carry out the imperial dreams of his regime – the recovery of Gibraltar from British hands and the creation of a large North African empire at the expense of France (occupying Morocco, Tangier and Oran in western Algeria). However, the problem remained the same: Spain could not sustain a prolonged war effort, given its enormous economic and military weakness and the British naval control of its oil and food supplies. A report in March 1940 to the High Council of the Army submitted by General Kindelán (then captain general of the Balearic Islands) had reiterated the strict limitations imposed by military vulnerability and economic distress:
We regret to report that we are in no way prepared for such contingency [entry into the war]: the air force and navy have lost efficiency over the year since the [Civil War] victory and on land the reorganization has only just begun: our borders are still defenceless and the essential problems of fuel and explosives are yet to be resolved.85
For this reason, the cautious Caudillo tried to reconcile his expansionist goals with Spain’s plight through a last-minute military intervention on the side of the Axis, at the moment of an Italo-German victory, in order to participate as a belligerent in the subsequent division of imperial spoils. Needless to say, the overwhelming German victories and Italian intervention had reinforced public inclination and covert help for the Axis. The day that Italy entered the war, Franco wrote a revealing private letter to the Duce:
Our moral solidarity will fervently accompany you on your mission, and as for economic help you can be sure that as much as we are able (as you know our situation well) we will willingly offer it to you. You already know the reasons for our current position […] I emphasize the cordiality with which we will take advantage of any opportunity to help you with the means at our disposal.86
Franco was well aware that this hidden support would not be enough to allow him to carry out his expansionist programme. Therefore, he hoped to take part in the war on the side of the Axis powers, but only when the worst of the combat was over and the British defeat was imminent, with a view to participating in the sharing-out of colonial booty at the expense of France and Britain. In the later words of Serrano Suñer, with Franco the main architect of this diplomatic strategy, the ‘intention was to enter the war at the moment of the German victory, when the last shots were being fired’ and ‘always starting from the basis of the belief that the entry of Spain in the short, almost concluded war, would be more formal than real and would not cause us any real sacrifice’.87 In short, Franco was ready to take advantage of the certain Axis victory over the Franco-British alliance to achieve Spanish territorial aspirations at a limited cost, one which was acceptable given the conditions.
Following this tempting strategy, on 13 June 1940 Spain abandoned ‘strict neutrality’ and officially declared its ‘non-belligerence’. To the British government, just in case the situation altered, the change was justified as a precautionary measure due to the spread of hostilities to the Mediterranean. The next day, as German troops were occupying Paris, Spanish military forces ‘provisionally’ occupied the city of Tangier under the pretext of preserving order and neutrality. It constituted the first step, still a cautious and reversible one, of a more ambitious imperial programme.
The next Francoist move took place on 16 June 1940. It was a Spanish initiative and did not respond to any German request (let alone pressure). That day, a special envoy of the Caudillo, General Vigón, the chief of the general staff, had an interview with Hitler and his foreign minister, Ribbentrop. On behalf of Franco, from whom he brought a private letter for the Führer (dated 3 June), Vigón offered Hitler Spanish belligerency in return for certain conditions: specifically the cession to Spain, after the victory, of Gibraltar, French Morocco, Oran in Algeria and the expansion of Spanish possessions in the Sahara and Equatorial Guinea. The offer was also made conditional on the prior supply of sufficient food, fuel, arms and heavy artillery from Germany to alleviate the critical economic and military shortages in Spain. While these personal negotiations were taking place, Franco informed Rome by telegraph of the Spanish conditions of joining the Axis.88
Fortunately for Franco, although Hitler congratulated Vigón on the occupation of Tangier and expressed his desire that Gibraltar soon become part of Spain, he refused to commit himself on the other demands and claims, alleging the need to consult Italy over any modifications in the Mediterranean. In fact, the Nazi leaders looked down on the costly Spanish offer, considering it unnecessary at a time when France was falling and Britain’s defeat seemed assured. Mussolini made no effort to satisfy what he considered to be excessive demands, which moreover could give rise to a competitor in the Mediterranean and North Africa.89
The bilateral negotiations on the Spanish entry in the war continued during the summer of 1940, without any German or Italian pressure and with a repeated Spanish insistence on its conditions. This attitude of official reserve was emphasized by the reports on the Spanish situation sent by the German ambassador in Madrid and the Abwehr (German military intelligence). According to the ambassador, ‘Spain is economically unfit to carry through to the end a war lasting more than a few months’ and ‘the economic assistance requested of us could represent a great burden (especially with respect to nutrition).’ Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, accurately summarized the nature and dangers of Franco’s offer for the German general staff:
Franco’s policy from the start was not to come in until Britain was defeated, for he is afraid of her might (ports, food situation, etc.). Spain has a very bad internal situation. They are short of food and have no coal. The generals and the clergy are against Franco. His only support is Suñer, who is
more pro-Italian than pro-German […] The consequences of having this unpredictable nation as a partner cannot be calculated. We shall get an ally who will cost us dearly.90
Spain’s disappointment over the failure of its offer of belligerency was accompanied by a sudden worsening of the internal economic situation which intensified the country’s dependence on Allied supplies. The new British government headed by Winston Churchill had understood from the start of the German victories the new importance of Spain in the context of the war and had hastened to take precautionary steps with respect to any possible change in Spain’s position. To contain Franco’s temptation to join the conflict, the British authorities put into practice two complementary operations. On the one hand, foreseeing the worst, various strategic plans were drawn up for the eventuality of Spain declaring war against Great Britain or being invaded by Germany (the occupation of Ceuta, the hinterland of Gibraltar or the Canary Islands).91 The second line of action consisted of tightening the maritime blockade on the Spanish coasts and strictly rationing, with US help, the imports of food and fuel supplies to prevent the build-up of stocks in preparation for war or their re-export to Germany. Together these policies ‘proved a vital factor in convincing Spain where her interests lay’ because the evidence showed that Spain was entering ‘a period of intense internal hardship, verging on famine’.92
The deterioration of the situation in Spain from September 1940 coincided with the crucial moment of the Battle of Britain and the first German doubts as to the feasibility of the projected invasion of the British Isles. It was in this context that German strategists started to turn their attention to Gibraltar, the conquest of which could help to break British resistance and would limit the activity of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. The result of this change in strategy was the invitation by Hitler for Franco to send a representative to Germany to negotiate the conditions for the entry of Spain in the war. Franco decided to send the man whom he trusted most: Serrano Suñer. Between 16 and 27 September 1940, he had several interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop. During the conversations the disparity between the criteria of the two sides and their differing perception of the importance of Spain in the conflict and the future New Order in Europe became clear.93 Not surprisingly, the uncertainty created by the Battle of Britain, together with the relative freedom of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, had heightened Franco’s caution and his wish to take only limited risks in exchange for large compensation. In view of these differences, the discussions were suspended pending a future personal meeting between Hitler and Franco. Serrano Suñer left Berlin without having agreed any protocol for entry in the war and after attending the signing of the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan as a mere spectator.
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