The table tells us there’s quite a range of possible future relations between Iran and Iraq, and of course we need to play the game to work out what is likely to happen. From Barack Obama’s vantage point, Iraq ought not to be too quick to jump into bed with Iran. He thinks a policy around 0 on the scale is just right. That is, the Obama administration wants the two countries to go their separate ways while maintaining quiet at the borders, as is their obligation under the terms of their 1975 treaty. But that is not what Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki wants. He advocates a concentrated strategic partnership (80 on the scale). Maliki’s government needs a protector; if it won’t be the United States, he would be content to obtain security guarantees from Iran. For him, forging a close association with his much larger neighbor makes a lot of sense. Left to his own devices, Maliki would choose a path that is opposite to the one President Obama wants. Of course, neither Maliki nor any future Iraqi leader will be left to his own devices. There’s plenty of pulls and tugs on all sides, so we really do need a tool, like game theory, to help us sort out what the future holds.
While President Obama urges Prime Minister Maliki not to make a deal with Iran, the expert data going into the game indicates that Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—the supreme leader with a veto over all Iranian policy—welcomes an opportunity for an even closer relationship than Maliki desires. He, too, wants a mutual defense agreement, but he also wants an almost unrestricted flow of intelligence and arms dealing between his government and Iraq’s. It appears that Khamenei would like to use Iraq as a base for gathering information about the goings-on in the Arab states next door and beyond. So there is a substantial difference between Obama’s vision for Iran and Iraq and the ambitions of the leaders of those two countries.
WHAT WILL IRAQ OFFER TO IRAN?
With this bit of background in mind, we can ask what is likely to happen under two plausible scenarios: (1) Iran and Iraq first work out their respective positions through the normal internal give-and-take of domestic politics and then, having resolved the stance they will take, negotiate against the backdrop of ongoing U.S. pressure in the form of a continuing fifty-thousand-strong American military presence in Iraq; or (2) they each settle their domestic games and then negotiate their future relations bilaterally, without outside interference and with American forces fully withdrawn.
Figure 10.6A displays the evolving positions of four key political figures in Iraq: Prime Minister Maliki; vice president and leading Sunni politician Tariq al-Hashimi; Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, who leads Iraq’s Kurdish faction; and Muqtada al-Sadr, the militant anti-American Shi’ite leader. The analysis on which the figure is based assumes that the United States will fully withdraw its troops by August 2010, an outcome favored not only by many Americans but also by many Iraqis. Figure 10.6B displays the same key Iraqi political leaders, but this time having solved the game under the assumption that the United States will maintain fifty thousand combat-ready forces in Iraq. The analyses are not precise about when Iraq’s leaders will come to a stable point of view on dealing with Iran, but they do imply that a decision will be reached not much later than August 2010—and quite possibly earlier. The issue appears to be on the back burner for now but it will surely heat up as the U.S. withdrawal date draws nearer.
The model shows that it takes six or seven bargaining rounds before Iraq’s political interests (including many more than the four leaders displayed in the figures) come to an agreement on how to deal with Iran. That is a large number of rounds before a stable outcome can emerge. So many rounds of internal discussion imply a long stretch of time between when the issue moves to the front burner and when it is settled internally. Apparently it will not be easy for the Iraqis to work out what they want their future relationship with Iran to look like.
FIG. 10.6A. The Likely Iraqi Approach to Iran If the United States Pulls Out
Figures 10.6A and 10.6B, viewed together, tell an interesting story. Despite their deep differences, Maliki, Talabani, and Hashimi slowly but surely come around to a collective agreement. They will support a relatively lukewarm relationship with Iran, a relationship not nearly as close as Maliki wants. According to the game, Iraqi diplomats will be authorized to seek an agreement with Iran that includes limited arms flow between the two countries, with no preparedness to transfer technology or share intelligence. In terms of a formal treaty relationship, what is likely to be sought is a promise from each not to use force against the other. That means, in the parlance of international affairs, that Iraq seeks a mutual nonaggression pact. The United States ultimately will support this undertaking, but only after a protracted negotiation. If U.S. troops remain in Iraq, Talabani will feel emboldened to press for an even weaker association with Iran, but he will not prevail. He will go along with Maliki’s compromise position if U.S. troops are withdrawn.
FIG. 10. 6B. The Likely Iraqi Approach to Iran If the United States Keeps 50,000 Troops in Iraq
There is one more element in Figures 10.6A and B that is strikingly important. Muqtada al-Sadr, the militant Shia cleric, steadfastly opposes the pursuit of a watered-down, weak partnership with Iran. In the absence of a U.S. military presence, he does not budge from his initial point of view. That perspective favors almost the most extreme partnership anyone advocates. Indeed, as we will see, only some Iranian leaders—like Ahmadinejad—want as much. Sadr advocates a free flow of arms and military technology between the two countries, accompanied by a mutual defense alliance and joint intelligence operations. He will back ever so slightly away from that extreme position if the United States retains troops in Iraq, presumably out of concern for the security of his own operations.
IRAQ’S POLITICAL WINNERS AND LOSERS
Before leaving the internal decision making in Iraq for a look at the comparable domestic evaluation of choices in Iran, we would do well to inquire about who will be Iraq’s political winners and losers on this big question of partnership with Iran. Figure 10.7A displays the predicted changes in political influence for Maliki, Hashimi, Sadr, and Talabani if the United States fully withdraws. Figure 10.7B evaluates the same power question if Obama leaves fifty thousand combat troops in Iraq.
FIG. 10.7A. Changing Power in Iraq If the United States Withdraws Completely
Even a cursory glance at the projected changes in political power in Iraq suggests that Prime Minister Maliki will need a deal with Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei more urgently if the United States pulls out than if Obama proves true to his word and keeps American soldiers in Iraq. Figure 10.7A indicates that after months of rising political clout, Maliki’s influence will start to decline around late spring or early summer 2011. Meanwhile, Hashimi’s power will rise steadily. Without a substantial U.S. troop presence, the game indicates that sometime around early to mid-2012 Hashimi will be almost dead even with Maliki in clout. Conversely, if the United States retains a large contingent of combat-ready troops, while Hashimi’s growth in power is unabated, Maliki’s power does not go into decline. He remains considerably more powerful than his Sunni political rival. Since Maliki has shown himself willing to cooperate with the U.S. government and Hashimi mostly has not, a continued troop presence may be important to prevent Hashimi from becoming a bigger player than he already is. Maliki may want to reconsider the 2011 deadline for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal.
FIG. 10.7B. Changing Power in Iraq If the United States Keeps 50,000 Combat Troops There
With fifty thousand American soldiers in Iraq, Sadr’s political future looks much worse than if the United States withdraws. To be sure, the assessment derived from the game indicates that Sadr is entering a period of decline either way, but his downfall is steeper if President Obama resists the pressure to withdraw. President Talabani is also on the way down either way, but he falls faster and farther if the United States pulls out. That is a rather unfortunate combination of circumstances because Sadr is openly hostile to the United States and Talabani views the United States as an important ally.
The really big story in Iraq, however, takes us back to the changing fortunes of Hashimi and Maliki, especially if the United States pulls all of its forces out of Iraq. As I mentioned, Maliki is a reasonably reliable friend. He understands the brazen pursuit of his self-interest; he will just as quickly make a deal with Iran if the United States pulls out as he will make nice to the United States if American troops remain in place. He’s got his finger in the wind and he is working out who will do the most to be his guardian angel. The big risk in his political life is being ousted from office; the major domestic threat to his continued hold on power clearly comes from Hashimi. Hashimi wants Iraq to have nothing to do with Iran. Furthermore, he wants to reverse the government’s policy of de-Baathification; that is, he wants an end to the ongoing exclusion of former Baathists (Saddam Hussein’s party) from the government. And Hashimi staunchly opposes a federal structure for Iraq. Federalism is seen by many—most notably Vice President Joseph Biden—as the most promising means to avert civil war. Thus a political struggle along the Shia-Sunni (Maliki-Hashimi) divide is likely to cast a huge shadow over Iraq if U.S. forces are withdrawn. It is a much smaller shadow with U.S. forces on the scene.
With Maliki’s power slipping while Hashimi’s rises under the withdrawal scenario, there seem to be only two ways things can go—and neither is good from the U.S. perspective. Maliki can enter into a power-sharing arrangement with Hashimi. That would significantly strengthen the central government and assuage many Sunnis, two good things, but it might also open the door for the Baathists to regain control, a potentially very bad outcome indeed. After all, the projected power in the absence of the United States shows Maliki and Hashimi almost dead even and with Maliki on a downward spiral while Hashimi is ascending. Maliki, fearful of just such a takeover by Baathists, might opt for the second solution to the threat to his power. Rather than sharing leadership with Hashimi, he might call on Iran to step in and help defend his regime against a nascent Sunni-led insurgency or civil war. That, of course, would be an awful outcome for just about everyone except the Iranian leadership.
IRAN-IRAQ PARTNERSHIP
The feasibility of Iran’s army being invited in to help shore up Maliki’s regime against a Sunni threat depends, of course, on the nature of the deal the two countries will strike. The internal dynamics in Iran lead quickly—after just three rounds of domestic give-and-take—to a decision on how Khamenei should deal with Iraq in trying to forge a partnership. He will seek a full strategic partnership. Once each country has resolved its own views on partnership, it will be time for the respective negotiators to come together to discover whether they can find common ground for a deal. Figures 10.8A and B show what is likely to emerge from bilateral Iran-Iraq negotiations if the United States has pulled out militarily or keeps fifty thousand troops on the ground. The pictures tell radically different stories. Without U.S. troops present, Maliki and Khamenei quickly come to terms. If American forces are on the scene, it looks like the negotiations will be abandoned—or at least tabled—well before an agreement is reached. Indeed, the game suggests that the two governments will not have come to terms with each other even after more than two years of negotiations, if and only if Obama maintains a fifty-thousand-strong combat contingent in Iraq.
FIG. 10.8A. Iran-Iraq Negotiations After the United States Withdraws
FIG. 10.8B. Iran-Iraq Negotiations If the United States Does Not Withdraw
Figures 10.8A and B depict the policy positions of the two principal decision makers—Khamenei and Maliki—during the course of bilateral negotiations, but the figures also show the evolving policy stances of the most extreme elements with real clout in each country. Thus we see the near polar-opposite positions of Iran’s President Ahmadinejad and the Bonyads, a group of Iranian tax-exempt charities that exert massive control over much of Iran’s economy and have enormous influence over Khamenei and the ruling council of Ayatollahs. Khamenei appears comfortable with showing real flexibility to advance the prospects of striking a deal with Maliki’s government whether U.S. troops stay or go. But Mahmoud Ahmadinejad resists the partnership agreements that could be in the cards regardless of whether the United States withdraws.
According to the predictioneer’s game, Ahmadinejad starts out and ends up advocating much firmer Iranian influence over Iraq than the Iraqis can agree to, and in doing so he is likely to alienate Khamenei.3 Indeed, as we will see, Ahmadinejad doesn’t get his way and this gradually costs him political influence. Meanwhile, the Bonyads—that is, the principal moneyed interests in Iran—remain equally steadfast in their opposition to what could be a very costly Iranian partnership with Iraq. They hold out for about as weak a set of ties as the United States is willing to live with. They advocate a bit more than cordial relations between the two countries, but not much more than that. Who knows, as the Ayatollahs’ influence declines—and as we will see, it is already doing so—the Bonyads may become a vehicle through which the United States can find common ground with important stakeholders in Iran.
On the Iraqi side, Muqtada al-Sadr plays much the same part that Ahmadinejad plays in Iran. Sadr too proves all but immovable. However, even as he and Ahmadinejad try to scuttle an agreement, the game indicates that if the United States withdraws, Maliki and Khamenei will swiftly arrive at an agreement. The deal they are predicted to strike if Obama withdraws all American combat-ready troops is at 60 on the issue scale. This means the two countries will engage in a fair amount of arms transfers. They will capitalize on some coordination between their intelligence services and they probably will sign an alliance (such as a mutual entente) that assures more than nonaggression between them but that does not go so far as to provide guarantees of mutual defense. Such an arrangement probably would be sufficient for Maliki to call on Iran to defend his government against a Sunni uprising if one were to occur, thereby improving the odds of keeping Hashimi at bay.
If, however, the United States keeps fifty thousand troops in Iraq, the picture is entirely different. As can be seen in figure 10.8B, although negotiations can result in Khamenei and Maliki coming to terms, the conditions for a stable outcome are not present. That is undoubtedly because Maliki will face great political pressure at home. That pressure will oppose his signing a partnership agreement with Iran. So, facing such stiff domestic political pressure, Maliki will put any possible deal on hold. Even after simulating more than two years of negotiations, the model does not arrive at an equilibrium outcome: the game goes on. According to the game, the discussions would most probably be broken off well before the two sides could discover a deal the Iraqis could sell politically at home. That is, the American military presence is sufficient to hold Maliki’s feet to the fire, keeping him from making big concessions to Khamenei. There are ways to overcome the problems Maliki will face, but considering that there is a reasonable chance that Iraqi or Iranian diplomats might read this, I leave it to them to work out how to solve their problem. It isn’t likely that they would listen to what I have to say, but why test those waters?
Before closing this opportunity to be embarrassed, let’s take a look at the predicted evolution of political influence in Iran. This reveals some interesting insights that may make us more hopeful for the future, especially if the United States keeps forces in Iraq long enough to buy time for the predicted developments in Iran to take hold.
Figure 10.9 shows the projected changes in political power among four key Iranian interests. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the most powerful figure in Iran, is, according to projections from the predictioneer’s game, entering a long period of political decline, probably to culminate in his retirement. This signals a major change in Iranian affairs because he has a veto over virtually all policy decisions. Less well known in the west are Major General Mohammad-Ali Jafari and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. Ayatollah Jannati is chairman of the Guardian Council. An antireform cleric, he can veto candidates for parliament, and he has the authority to assess whether parliamentary decisions are consistent wit
h the constitution and with shariah (that is, Islamic) law. As such, he is nearly as powerful a figure as Ayatollah Khamenei. Major General Jafari commands the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the elite military unit whose support sustains the regime. Each of these individuals is far more powerful than Iran’s president and American nemesis, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Figure 10.9 also shows the evolving power of Iran’s Bonyads. The Bonyads were originally created during the era of the Shah and then were completely recast after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. As I have noted, they control vast sums of money, are exempt from taxes, and answer to no one except Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. They control Iran’s purse strings and, not surprisingly, have a reputation for corruption and mismanagement. But they are also political pragmatists, as we have seen, so they may be people with whom the Obama administration can find a path through to resolve many of the tensions between the United States and Iran.
FIG. 10.9. Evolving Power in Iran: Some Hope for the Future
Figure 10.9, if correct, tells a startling story of emerging change in Iran.4 Key religious leaders like Khamenei and Jannati are in political decline. Other clerics (especially the less politically involved Qum clerics, sometimes known as the Quietists) may be picking up some of the lost power, but the lion’s share of shifting political influence falls into the hands of Major General Jafari, as the principal representative of Iran’s elite military units, and the Bonyads, Iran’s money managers. Business interests are also gaining in influence. That is, a more secular and pragmatic, albeit militarized and corruption-laden regime appears to be emerging as Iran’s theocracy goes into political, if not spiritual, decline. While the theocracy is likely to hold on to the symbolic trappings of power, real control is slipping away from them and toward a more conventional strongman, moneyed dictatorship.
The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future Page 25