Grey turned finally to the specific problem of apparent German acceleration and the British response. He spoke of German capacity ("Your intention to accelerate is one thing while your power to accelerate is another"). The only way to know what was going on in another country's shipyards was for naval attaches to have free access.
On strict party lines, Balfour's censure motion was defeated, 353 to 135- Four ships were to be built; four more were authorized and waited in the wings. Churchill himself later ruefully described what had happened: "In the end a curious and characteristic solution was reached. The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight."
From the beginning of the Navy Scare, the British government attempted to learn the facts, not only from its Naval Attache in Berlin and from shadowy unofficial sources, but from the German government. In the autumn of 1908, McKenna, hearing reports of materials collected in German shipyards and of contracts awarded to shipyards before funds were voted in the Reichstag, put these matters before Captain Widemann, the German Naval Attache in London. Widemann denied everything. Indeed, he said, he was shocked that the First Lord would attribute such obviously unconstitutional behavior to State Secretary Tirpitz. McKenna, believing his own information, not Widemann, did not consult the Naval Attache again.
Grey became involved in January 1909 after reading Mc-Kenna's persuasive memorandum on German shipbuilding. Grey understood the importance of British naval supremacy; at Scarborough on November 20, 1908, he had said, "There is no half-way house in naval affairs… between complete safety and absolute ruin." But, as Foreign Secretary, he felt an additional concern: if the German government were deliberately lying to conceal an acceleration of its building program, then the whole of German policy, not just the number and delivery dates of ships under construction, was thrown into question. From the beginning of January until the publication of the British Naval Estimates on March 12, Grey struggled to extract from Paul Wolff-Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, a straightforward statement about German naval building. In dealing with Metternich, the Foreign Secretary faced two problems: first, the German Ambassador was kept in the dark by Admiral Tirpitz; second, even when Metternich was accurately informed, he was often instructed not to pass the information along to the British. The Grey-Metternich conversations, therefore, were an exercise in frustration for both men.
Grey's first meeting with Metternich took place on January 4, 1909, immediately after the Foreign Secretary had read the First Lord's memorandum. Grey referred to the rumors and reports which the British Admiralty had heard and received; Metternich said they were untrue. Grey pointed out that Britons were worried because of the large theoretical capacity Germany had for building dreadnoughts; Metternich replied that the entire German program was laid down in the Navy Laws and that any sudden shift of German shipyards to dreadnought construction was forbidden by those laws. Grey suggested that the best way of ascertaining facts was to let the naval attaches visit shipyards in both countries and see what ships had been laid down and how far along they were. Metternich said that the Kaiser would never permit this.
By the time the second conversation took place, on February 4, Metternich knew that the evidence in British hands of accumulation of advance materials in German shipyards was incontrovertible; therefore, he admitted it. The reason, he explained, was simply fore-sightedness on the part of the contractors, who were proceeding at their own risk. He insisted that no acceleration was intended and that the rate of shipbuilding was fixed by law. It was true, he conceded, that the rate of building could be accelerated, but only by a public vote in the Reichstag. Grey was in a difficult position. He respected Metternich, but he suspected that the Ambassador was withholding information. Metternich had admitted only belatedly the advance accumulation of materials; he still had not acknowledged that contracts for two of the four 1909 ships had been let in October 1908. Grey could not accuse the Ambassador of passing false information, yet he could not believe the information Metternich gave him. Once again, Grey suggested an exchange of attache visits to the shipyards. Metternich replied that the Emperor had refused absolutely. There was little more that Grey could do beyond warning that Britain would have to consider German capacity as well as the German Navy Laws in formulating its own building plans. On March 10, just before publication of the British Naval Estimates, Metternich officially informed Grey that German building would not be accelerated and that the High Seas Fleet would not possess thirteen dreadnoughts until the end of 1912. That night, Metternich warned Berlin that the British Admiralty would ask for more ships.
On March 12, the day of the publication of the British Naval Estimates and four days before they were to be presented to the House of Commons, Asquith summoned Metternich to reinforce Grey's warning. As reported to Berlin by Metternich, this is how the Prime Minister explained the British program: "According to information received by the British Admiralty, three of the four [German] dreadnoughts of the… 1909-1910 year have been under construction for several months. Not only has the material been collected, but the keel of one dreadnought of the 1909-1910 program has been laid in the Schichau yard. If preparations are made for building, and ships are actually begun some months before they are voted [by the Reichstag], it is clear that the completion of these ships can be antedated by a corresponding number of months. Mr. Asquith had no wish to complain [Metternich was paraphrasing and summarizing the Prime Minister's words] and had no justification for any complaint about this procedure. Germany alone had the right to determine the rate of her shipbuilding, and no responsible persons in England would have the right to object; but the British Government… (in estimating their own program) could not avoid taking account of the development of the German program."
The Prime Minister promised that Britain would withhold the laying down of the four contingent dreadnoughts until the pace of German construction made it imperative.
Metternich sent this report to Berlin; the answer was silence. Four days later, just two days before the opening of the naval debate in the Commons, Metternich urgently telegraphed Berlin, asking for permission to explain the German program in greater detail. Tirpitz was opposed and the Kaiser agreed with Tirpitz. "I think it would be better for Metternich to hold his tongue. He is incorrigible," William wrote in the margin of the Ambassador's telegram.
The stark nature of McKenna's Naval Estimates speech and the passion of the Commons debate forced German reactions. On March 17, the day after the debate, Metternich complained to Grey that the British government had ignored his March 10 assurance that the German naval program was not being accelerated. Grey's response was to say for the third time that the best way to clarify such misunderstandings and get accurate facts was for the naval attaches of each country to visit the other's shipyards.
The same day in Berlin, Tirpitz publicly supported the position the beleaguered Metternich had been required to take. Opening the Reichstag debate on the German Naval Estimates, the State Secretary officially declared that British fears were groundless: Germany, he announced, would possess thirteen, not seventeen, dreadnoughts in 1912. Privately, however, Tirpitz decided to admit to Metternich a fact which Metternich had not known and which, on instructions, he had been denying vigorously: that the contracts for two of the four 1909-1910 German dreadnoughts had indeed been placed with private shipyards in the autumn of 1908, six months before the Reichstag could authorize funds. Now, since the British Admiralty and government already knew, Tirpitz decided that Metternich should confirm this information in London, and explain that the contracts had been given early not to steal a march on England, but solely to get lower, competitive prices from the builders while, at the same time, preventing the yards from having to dismiss any workers.*
Humiliated by his own government, Metternich had no choice but to obey instructions. On March 18, he admitted that the contracts for two of the four ships had been placed in October 1908. His miserable situation g
ot no sympathy from Fisher, who by now believed that both Tirpitz and Metternich were dissembling. "We have got to have a margin against lying," he declared. Meeting Metternich
* An additional fact Tirpitz did not pass on either to the Kaiser or to Metternich: actual construction of one of the ships had begun on March i, 1909. When William found out five months later he was furious: "His Majesty the Kaiser sees in this a justification, though only a formal one, for the English claim that building is being accelerated," Admiral Miiller, the Kaiser's Naval Secretary, wrote to Tirpitz. "His Majesty has always emphasized that no acceleration of building has taken place." Tirpitz denied any acceleration, claiming that "start of building… is solely a private business matter for the firms. In my opinion, therefore, there was no reason to notify His Majesty. Schichau [the shipyard] began the ship in March at its own risk and with its own money to avoid dismissing workers."
by accident on March 24, he glared at the German and burst out, "How all this scare would vanish, Ambassador, if you would let our Naval Attache go and count them [the ships under construction]." "Impossible," Metternich replied. "Other governments would also want to. Besides, something would be seen which we wish to keep secret." Fisher assumed that the German ships, or the guns they carried, were even bigger than the published figures suggested.
Metternich continued to try to make his government understand the British viewpoint until he left London. He wrote early in April, admirably summarizing the cause of the Navy Scare in London:
"Until November last (1908) the British Government believed that in our Naval Law it possessed a standard of reasonable accuracy with which to regulate its own annual shipbuilding requirements… Until last November it was assumed here that the execution of our program depended on the annual financial vote of the Reichstag. This security has now disappeared. The present Government has indeed our assurance that we do not wish to accelerate our 'tempo' and that we shall have no more than thirteen dreadnoughts in the year 1912. But the Government maintains that, although these may be our intentions at present, we have every right to change them at any moment we may wish to do so. The Government feels that in this important question it is groping in the dark in respect to our ship-building, and that it must not be dependent upon the good intentions of a foreign government-intentions which may change."
When Metternich's dispatch reached the Kaiser's desk, William covered it with marginalia: "Nonsense!" "This is absolutely not so!" "No!"…
After Grey's speech and the defeat of Balfour's censure motion, parliamentary debate was over, but the furor in the Cabinet and country continued. Lloyd George and Churchill persisted in trying to stave off the four contingent dreadnoughts and to ensure that, if they were to be built, they would be part of the 1910 program. (Fisher wrote chaffingly to Churchill that if Churchill would permit the four additional ships to be built, he would see that they were named "Winston, Churchill, Lloyd, and George. How they would fight!!") McKenna was "very sore with his colleagues about the way he had been treated" and reiterated his threat to resign unless the four contingent ships were ordered. Grey supported McKenna. The Conservative press hammered the government. "If the Government is not composed of stony-hearted pedants, the shipbuilding… [orders] should be given out now," declared the Daily Mail. "Eighty percent of the cost of a battleship goes in wages to the British worker." "Our Navy and our unemployed may both be starved together and soon will be if you don't turn this Government out."
Ironically, the decision to build the contingent four, when it came, was prompted not by Germany, but by Austria and Italy. In July 1909, London learned that Austria was planning to build three and possibly four dreadnoughts. The Italians reacted swiftly; although Austria and Italy were nominal allies in the Triple Alliance, each regarded the other as a potential enemy. Italy immediately announced that it would build four dreadnoughts. Therefore, looking ahead to 1912, Britain would face a minimum of thirteen German dreadnoughts in the North Sea, plus Austrian and Italian dreadnoughts in the Mediterranean. The Admiralty case became irresistible. On July 26, McKenna announced that the four contingent ships would be laid down "without prejudice" to the 1910 program. Asquith, fulfilling his promise-and also keenly aware of the results of a recent by-election in Croydon in which the Liberal candidate had been overwhelmingly defeated-backed the First Lord. Liberals grumbled that there was still no sign of German acceleration and that the Austrian and Italian dreadnoughts cancelled each other out; Conservatives cheered; the Navy Scare was over.
The resolution was painful for a Liberal government which had taken office pledging to reducing the armaments burden. For three years, the government had met this pledge. Now, within twelve months, it had ordered eight costly ships.* Indeed, it was to acquire more. Two of the dominions, New Zealand and Australia, aware of their reliance on the Royal Navy, were alarmed by McKenna's portrayal of the narrowing margin of British naval supremacy. On March 22, only six days after the First Lord's presentation of the Naval Estimates to the House of Commons, the government of New Zealand cabled an offer to pay the cost of building one dreadnought. In June, the Australian government followed with a similar proposal. Both offers were accepted and in 1910 two additional battle cruisers, New Zealand and Australia, were laid down. Directly and indirectly, the Navy Scare of 1909 resulted in a single year's harvest of ten new dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy.
In retrospect, the grounds for the scare turned out to be false.
* Six battleships, Colossus, Hercules, Orion, Conqueror, Monarch, and Thunderer, and two battle cruisers, Lion and Princess Royal.
The Germans were acquiring materials and gun mountings in advance, and shipyards had begun construction early, but there was no acceleration in the delivery dates of German dreadnoughts. The four ships of the 1908 program and the four ships of the 1909 program were delivered on time and the four ships of the 1910 program were actually delayed eight months to permit a design change made necessary by the increase in gun caliber from 12-inch to 13.5-inch in six of the ten British ships.* At the end of 1912, there were-as promised by Tirpitz and Metternich-thirteen German dreadnoughts in commission. They were faced by twenty-two British dreadnoughts. Later, Churchill assessed the results and the significance of the Navy Scare:
"In the light of what actually happened, there can be no doubt whatever that, so far as facts and figures were concerned, we [Lloyd George and himself] were strictly right. The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were in no respect fulfilled in the year 1912. There were no secret German dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral Tirpitz made any untrue statement… But although the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I were right in the narrow sense, we were absolutely wrong in relation to the deep tides of destiny. The greatest credit is due to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. McKenna, for the resolute and courageous manner in which he fought his case and withstood his Party on this occasion. Little did I think, as this dispute proceeded, that when the next Cabinet crisis about the Navy arose, our roles would be reversed; and little did he think that the ships for which he contended so stoutly would eventually, when they arrived, be welcomed with open arms by me."**
The 1909 Naval Scare in Britain had other effects. There were those-Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, was one-who were convinced that the building of the four additional dreadnoughts had a favorable impact on Anglo-German relations. In Berlin-this argument went-the decline in British dreadnought building during the early Liberal years bore out German theorizing that Britons were becoming soft and effete and would-in the natural Darwinian order-soon be replaced as rulers of the world by the virile Teutons. The British government's decision to double its annual shipbuilding program, Goschen argued, replaced this growing
* The three German battleships of the class, Kaiserin, Konig Albert, and Prinzregent Luitpold, had two fewer twelve-inch guns than their predecessors. The weight saved was given to thicker armor to deal with the greater penetrating power of the heavier British shells.
**in Octobe
r 1911, McKenna and Churchill swapped jobs, with McKenna becoming Home Secretary and Churchill First Lord of the Admiralty.
contempt with respect and greater desire for friendship. A second effect was clearly apparent. The Two Power Standard, the historic guideline by which Great Britain had reckoned the sufficiency of its naval strength, was defunct. As recently as November 1908, at the outset of the Naval Scare, Asquith had restated that Britain required "a preponderance of ten percent over the combined strengths in capital ships of the next two strongest powers, whatever those powers might be." In fact, the world's third-largest navy, ranking not far behind the German Navy, belonged to the United States; no British politician or admiral envisaged war with the Americans. The 1909 Naval Scare marked the beginning of a one power standard for the British Navy; Britain was building only against Germany. Churchill, as First Lord, stated the fact officially on March 28, 1912, when he told the House of Commons that Britain's standard was one of 60 percent superiority over Germany.
There were two further effects of the 1909 Naval Scare and the decision to build eight dreadnoughts in a single year. Alarm in Parliament and hysteria in the press as to the condition of Britain's naval defenses prompted criticism of the aging First Sea Lord who directed the Admiralty and advised the government. Why, if Britain suddenly needed eight ships in a single year, had she built only two the year before? Justified or not, mounting complaints and criticism eroded Jacky Fisher's credibility. No sooner had the 1909 Naval Estimates been voted than a government inquiry began to look into these matters. The Naval Scare also deeply affected the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George. The decision to build eight dreadnoughts in a single year upset his budget calculations. To raise millions of additional pounds, the Chancellor set himself to find new sources of revenue and the taxes he proposed became even more politically controversial than the decision to build additional ships. They led, in 1910 and 1911, to a tumultuous and historic confrontation between the House of Commons and the House of Lords.
Dreadnought, Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War Page 83