Nigel Cawthorne
Page 14
His job was further hampered by the fact that Leipzig had only one waterworks. So if a water main was hit, the water system would fail citywide. Allied bombing raids also knocked out the electricity and telephone systems across the city. Grolmann’s fire crews were sent to Hamburg in July and August 1943, when the RAF began the tactic of intense area bombing, which created fire storms.
Anyone who has had a leading part to play in air defence operations, or who has been employed in any way after an air raid, will undoubtedly wish that no nation will ever again have to experience the consequences of war. After the return of my reinforcements from Hamburg in August 1943, the commander of the fire-fighting police gave me a report of his experience; I interrupted him with the exclamation: ‘For God’s sake, what kind of a war is this.’ Still under the impression of what he had gone through, he spoke with bitterness, ‘General, this is not war – this is sheer madness.’
Although Grolmann was a committed Nazi, he dated the beginning of the end to 18 October 1944, with the call-up of the Volkssturm, or national militia, which included all men between the ages of 16 and 60.
For an officer who loves his country it is a difficult decision to admit that a war so successfully begun can no longer be carried to a favourable conclusion. The call-up of the Volkssturm brought me to full awareness of this fact. What madness it was to mobilize untrained cripples, old men and callow youngsters as a last bulwark against fresh armies provided with the most modern equipment, and to entrust the command of these forces to Party agencies operating under Wehrmacht regulations.
Grolmann saw that the increasingly intense and systematic Allied air raids would inevitably weaken German resistance.
This period saw the issuance of countless new ordinances and directives by the top-level agencies, most of which were patent nonsense, since they were out of touch with reality. Contact between the government and the country and people had been lost … I remember receiving confidential instructions from Himmler in December 1944 to the effect that the units and organizations controlled by him should not become too deeply involved in matters concerning the Volkssturm because it had become an instrument of power of Bormann, that is for the top man of the Party, and the SS had no interest in it. Nevertheless, he implied that the Volkssturm would become the factor determining German victory.
In February 1945, Grolmann took charge of fire-fighting in nearby Dresden, as the merciless bombing of that city had put all municipal agencies out of action. Worse was to come.
When Russian armies reached German territory, a mass flight from east to west began for which neither urban nor rural authorities were prepared; the suffering endured by these refugees is indescribable. Party agencies in charge of caring for the population after air raids were flooded with requests for aid and bogged down completely. I assumed this task for the city of Leipzig on my own initiative and … I entrusted my fiancée, who was working with the Red Cross, with the practical execution of our plans. In unwearying day and night work she succeeded in giving thousands of miserable people a feeling of being cared for again …
However, their material conditions improved little.
US air bases moving nearer and nearer made rail and highway transportation very difficult. Food supplies from eastern areas stopped entirely and food could be obtained from other regions only in very limited quantities. Almost all males who were halfway fit even were drafted and sent to the eastern front with whatever weapons were available. The police had to release all men born after 1896 to the armed forces … The power of resistance gradually collapsed.
THE WEHRWOLF
Other Nazi fanatics could not face the inevitable and there were calls for the establishment of ‘Wehrwolf’, a guerrilla organization that would continue the struggle against the occupying forces by terrorist action.
The beginning of the final phase of the collapse started with the call for the formation of the Wehrwolf. I heard it on the radio during the Wehrmacht communiqué on Good Friday, 30 March 1945. I regarded this as wholly wrong, since it was bound to give the enemy an opportunity to employ every means he deemed fit, even against the civilian population, in an attempt to protect his own troops. In clear recognition of the consequences for a city of such illegal combat I immediately ordered the criminal police to observe whether activation of partisan units had been planned or was already underway.
As it was, the resources of the civil authorities were stretched to their limits, as Grolmann described:
Prisoners in the endangered eastern regions were moved to the west and almost always without prior notice in a state of complete exhaustion and near starvation after their stay in various prisons or concentration camps. Food was no longer sufficient, especially as the large ration depot in Gotha had been disbanded on 31 March … On the second day of the Easter celebrations, the public prosecutor of Leipzig telephoned and asked for my help, stating that between 40 and 60 persons legally sentenced to death had arrived at his office. He had orders to execute them without delay. Since he did not have the facilities for this purpose, he asked me to place an execution detail at his disposal. I refused and asked the Wehrmacht commander to back me up, which he did.
In Nazi Germany such insubordination had an inevitable consequence:
On 1 April I was suddenly relieved of my post as chief of the criminal police. It was taken over by the Gestapo, whose leader thereupon received the glorious title of ‘Commander of the Security Police’. This agency, however, did not last long. Around 10 April, the Gestapo left the city ingloriously under the cover of night, after it had shot a goodly number of the prisoners entrusted to its keeping … Chaos prevailed everywhere. In addition, there were orders from top headquarters that no city or town was to fall into enemy hands without having been defended, and that any subordinate was obliged to shoot his superior on the spot if the latter manifested a defeatist attitude in word or deed. Moreover, responsible officers were branded as cowards and their families made subject to arrest if they surrendered a town or position no matter how hopeless defence might be. Thus responsible leaders, already weighed down by other worries, became prey to feelings of mistrust and insecurity. One could not be frank with one’s own subordinates, and much less with other agencies, nor was it possible to make the preparations called for by an objective appraisal of the true situation. This was my position from 6 April on, when US troops had advanced as far as Gotha, about 150 kilometres from Leipzig.
There was a meeting to discuss the defence of the city, where the representatives of the Wehrmacht present insisted that this was a purely military matter to be decided by the high command. However Nazi officials were not so sanguine.
Paul Rudin, director general of NASG, attacked the generals present in a most unbecoming manner, demanding that the city be defended to the last, in accordance with the Führer Order and that the Wehrmacht commander, who was a sick man and inexperienced in service with field units, be replaced by another officer. The commanding general refused to discuss the matter further. Soon afterwards, however, General Reinhardt and Major General Kiegesar were removed from their posts and Leipzig was assigned to a new ‘Combat Commander’, Colonel von Poncet, an officer no one knew and who was unfamiliar with the city. A few days later Director General Rudin and his wife committed suicide with Panzerfausts – the first instance of a rapidly developing suicide psychosis.
Grolmann went to visit the commander of the 14th Flak Division, the only Wehrmacht unit in the area. His appraisal was grave. Although the Russians were being held on the Elbe, large, well-equipped, motorized American units were advancing from the west. The only heavy weapons his unit had were anti-aircraft guns. Besides, he was under the command of the Luftwaffe, and could offer no assistance in the defence of Leipzig.
He did not know what action was contemplated for the defence of the city and stated that he personally regarded any military measures as madness. The new combat commander, who was not familiar with the local situation, apparently intended to fight
, but he had not a single cannon at his disposal. Hence the city and its population were seriously endangered, and for no defensible reason.
Nevertheless, the district leader of the Nazi Party – the NSDAP – in his capacity as commander of the Volkssturm, drew up a plan for the last-ditch defence of the city:
The Kreisleiter [county leader] pointed out that the enemy could only come from the west, so the city would only have to be defended to that side. He went on to explain that the Hitler Youth, under its own commanders, would defend the city from a first defensive position 3km from the city limits. Its mission was to stave off the approaching enemy with Panzerfausts. At the very edge of the city was a second defensive position. Upon the approach of the enemy they were to fight a delaying action and slowly retreat toward the main line of defence, represented by the eastern bank of the Elster River. The bridges would be destroyed; preparations to blow them up had already been completed. The police were to open fire on individual enemy targets within their own precincts.
This estimate of the situation by the Kreisleiter of the NSDAP in his capacity of local Volkssturm commander and the defence measure outlined by him were the most incredible thing I had ever heard. They could only have originated in the mind of a man who had never been a soldier himself, and thus had no concept of military responsibility, or who was ready to die … In fact, the Kreisleiter and his assistants, around ten in number, did commit suicide when US troops entered Leipzig.
In view of the general confusion and the unbelievable lack of responsibility, I felt obliged, in spite of the personal danger involved, to speak up against his appraisal of the situation and the use of tactics typical of those used by children playing cowboys and Indians. At first I protested about the commitment of untrained adolescents, calling it tantamount to the murder of children, and asked the Kreisleiter what he thought he was doing. He replied that German youth would be annihilated in its entirety anyhow, hence death under these circumstances would be the best thing. Further protest against this view was pointless, I could only call it madness. The other people present agreed with me … I explained that it did not take much military knowledge to see that a strong enemy would not come into so large a city as Leipzig from one side only. He would be much more likely to encircle the city, and then converge on it when ready. I pointed out that it was quite within the realm of possibility that any attempt to defend the city might be met by an air raid, the consequences of which were inconceivable. In any case, our own forces were much too weak for effective resistance, since they were completely without heavy arms. Therefore efforts to defend Leipzig were incapable of achieving practical end, but the city itself and hundreds of thousands of men and women would be uselessly exposed to grave danger. I also protested vigorously against the police being employed without my knowledge by any other agency.
SAVE THE BRIDGES
Despite his protests, Grolmann said preparations for the defence of the city began, with Colonel von Poncet threatening to summarily court-martial anyone who did not obey his orders.
I urgently requested Colonel von Poncet to save the bridges, otherwise the city would be divided in two and the western part could not survive since it would have no water, gas or electrical power. The combat commander promised to consider my request …
On Sunday 15 April, the encirclement of Leipzig began … In Leipzig itself everything remained quiet. The Volkssturm contented itself with establishing inadequate anti-tank obstacles at the bridges by placing trolley cars filled with stones across their exits … The government agencies ceased work and the larger shops were closed …
On 17 April the enemy converged on Leipzig and in part penetrated as far as the city limits. Sporadic shooting could be heard. It was accepted as inevitable that US troops would occupy the city the next day. No further defensive measures were taken. The city hall in the centre of town was occupied by about 500 men of the Volkssturm, headed by the Kreisleiter of the NSDAP and his staff. These men showed no evidence of enthusiasm for combat. The closer the Americans came, the more members of the Volkssturm departed by the numerous side entrances of the town hall. There were a great many Panzerfausts available, but hardly anyone had been trained in the use of this very effective weapon. Discarded, they lay about the streets and constituted a danger in themselves.
On the afternoon of this day the combat commander came to my office in great agitation, accompanied by a strong military escort. He had learned, he said, that the mayor, Dr Freyberg, was planning to sabotage the measures ordered by him. He asked me officially to tell him what I knew. I could only make the statement that I was not aware of any such plans. After the departure of Colonel von Poncet I immediately requested the mayor to come in. I had him escorted into my office by a security detail. After I had orientated him on what had happened I advised him to place himself under my protection; he refused, however, to do so. In unforgettable words, he described his present life to me and, in conclusion, seized the opportunity, as an old friend, to bid me farewell. After his only son had been killed in action, he said, life under the conditions to come no longer held any purpose for him. He, his wife and their 17-year-old daughter had resolved to take poison when the occupation of Leipzig began. Hence he was placing the fate of the city in my hands with the request that I exert myself to the best of my ability for the protection of the population.
To be able to effect anything at all, I had to try to find out the intentions of the combat commander. In the evening, therefore, I went to see him with a strong army escort, but could only gather that some operation or other still had to be carried out. It is grotesque to think that the two leading men of the city knew nothing of each other’s plans, and that there was such mistrust between them that they met only after taking extensive protective measures.
That evening I spent with my fiancée and the mayor and his family in the town hall. His deputy, the municipal treasurer, was also there with his wife and 17-year-old daughter. I tried to get Freyberg to reconsider his decision to commit suicide, appealing both to his conscience and his duty to stand by his country as long as it was in danger. When I was called away towards midnight, I believed that I had talked Freyberg into staying alive. A few hours later the criminal police reported to me that both the mayor and his deputy, with their families, were lying dead in their offices.
Upon my arrival at the police presidency I found about 30 US soldiers who had been brought to me as prisoners of war, the combat commander having refused to accept custody of them. I spoke to the soldiers and told them that I regarded them as free men and as my guests. I advised them to remain with me until the city was occupied, which they did.
When the Americans entered the suburbs, Grolmann contacted their commander and offered to surrender the city, though Colonel von Poncet and some 200 men continued their defence from a vault under the ‘Battle of the Nations’ monument, commemorating the end of the Napoleonic wars. Grolmann took over the administration of the city until a military government was installed. Then he became a prisoner of war in France where, in July, he heard that Leipzig was being handed to the Soviets as it fell in their zone – ‘This is the most shocking news I have ever received in my life.’
INTO BERLIN
Hans Jürgen Westphal was just four years old when he saw the Russians coming into Berlin in 1945. He had been born in the German capital on 11 May 1940 and his first memory, towards the end of 1943, was of his house being bombed.
My father’s driver and my mother picked me up and put me in this little three-wheel transporter and took me to the railway station. I remember coming out. It was a phosphor bomb, so there was water all over the place and the flames skimming across the top of the water. As we went down the street I saw the balcony coming down. The next thing I remember was my uncle’s farm in Pomerania [now largely in Poland]. I remember very, very clearly November 1944 when the Russians were approaching. I was playing outside and my grandmother came and told me that my father was coming to pick us up. You could hear
the big guns already in the distance, rumbling away. There was a level crossing and I remember German lorries coming back with wounded people and tanks going up to the front. And then my father arrived and said we had to go that night. The Russians were already near. We caught the last train. As we left a couple of shells hit the railway station. The train went off. It was the last train that ever left there. I remember being at the railway station at Frankfurt an der Oder. There were only forces there. We had to wait a couple of hours. Next to us was a train full of men in bandages.
But there was no escape from the horrors of the war as the Red Army pushed relentlessly on to Berlin.
As the Russians approached Berlin, my father – he had lost an arm during the war – his driver and my mother were going up the street in his car and my mother covered my eyes all the time. This was because there were soldiers hanging from the lampposts – deserters obviously. Everybody tried to run away. Hitler had his death squads in the streets up to the very end.
We lived near a railway station. It didn’t handle passengers so much. There was a commuter station but next to it was a station for goods. This was the place the Jews were deported from, I found out later. Beside it was a big bunker. We went to this bunker when the Russians began to shell. Before the Russians came, there was an SS unit defending the railway station. There was fierce fighting. The bunker was divided in two. They put us all together in one room. It was very tight. The next room, they put the wounded soldiers. I still have that memory of the smell of burnt flesh – a lot of them had been heavily burned. They were brought there screaming. There was only one door between which was opened and closed all the time. And then one afternoon, the SS officers ran off leaving the heavily wounded behind. They were shouting: ‘The Russians are coming! The Russians are coming!’ Then a little later Russian soldiers came, had a look around and left.